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FOREWORD
The Hungarian Labour Market Yearbook series was launched fifteen years ago 
by the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences with sup-
port from the National Employment Foundation. The yearbook presents the 
main characteristics of the Hungarian labour market and of the Hungarian 
employment policy, and features an in-depth analysis of a topical issue each 
year. From the outset, the editorial board has striven to bring relevant and us-
able information on trends in the Hungarian labour market, the legislative and 
institutional background of employment policy, and up-to-date findings from 
Hungarian and international research studies to policy makers, civil servants, 
municipalities, NGOs, higher education and research institutions, the press 
and electronic media.
The research published in the yearbook series should provide a good source 
of knowledge for higher education on the topics of labour economics and hu-
man resources management. The yearbook presents the main characteristics 
and trends of the Hungarian labour market in an international comparison us-
ing available statistical information, conceptual research and empirical analysis 
in a clearly structured and easily accessible format. Continuing our previous 
editorial practice, we selected an area that we considered especially important 
from the perspective of understanding Hungarian labour market trends and 
the effectiveness of evidence-based policies. Thus, this year the focus is on pub-
lic works in Hungary.
The yearbook has four main parts.
1. The Hungarian labour market in 2014
Economic trends were more favourable in 2014 than in previous years, the Hun-
garian gross domestic product increasing by 3.6 per cent in comparison to the 
preceding year. Household incomes rose leading to an increase in consumption, 
and consequently therefore, to the creation of new jobs. The labour market sur-
vey in 2014 found that, in comparison to the previous year, the employment 
rate increased by 208 thousand persons, which occasioned the total number of 
people in employment to rise above 4.1 million. The employment rate of the 
15–64 age group improved by 3.7 percentage points, from 58.1 per cent to 61.8 
per cent this being the best result in the past quarter-century. Some 0.6 percent-
age points of the improvement are explained by a demographic factor, namely, a 
decrease in the number of the observed age group. Factors in the internal regu-
latory environment that had a significant impact on the labour market include 
the increase of the minimum wage, the increase of public works expenditure, 
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the extension of the family tax credit, and the lifting of the employment ban 
on recipients of the insured maternity leave [gyed extra].
The rise in employment took place in a context of expanding labour supply. 
Due to the increased retirement age, the number of people on the labour mar-
ket also increased year on year, although this effect was partly offset by the op-
portunity for women to retire after 40 years of employment. The labour sup-
ply of younger people was increased by the fact that the school leaving age was 
reduced to 16 years, and that fewer students decided to continue their studies 
in higher education in 2013 and 2014 than before. The introduction of ‘gyed 
extra’ typically motivated an earlier return to the labour market for those who 
were better educated and lived in settlements better equipped with day-care 
facilities for children. Finally, the labour supply was further increased by the 
extension of public works, which offered employment opportunities to some 
people who had previously been permanently excluded from the labour market.
First among the factors influencing the demand side is the extension of pub-
lic works. In 2014, there were 182.4 thousand public workers as an annual av-
erage, but since public works typically do not last for 12 months, the number 
of people involved in this employment form was at least one and a half times 
more. The main employer of public works participants is still the public sector: 
159.5 thousand people were employed here, however the number of people work-
ing in the private sector (typically at majority-state-owned enterprises) and at 
non-profit organisations increased at an above-average pace in 2014. All major 
data sources noted the improvement in the labour absorptive capacity of the 
private sector. Institutional labour statistics registered a 50 thousand increase 
in the number of enterprises with more than five employees, and data from the 
National Tax and Customs Administration show that 80 thousand more peo-
ple were employed in enterprises than in the previous year (in addition to a 10 
thousand increase in the number of private entrepreneurs and partnerships, and 
a 20 thousand increase in the number of public sector employees). The survey 
developed for the forecast of labour demand – pursuant to an EC regulation 
on job vacancy statistics – also registered a positive shift in 2014. There were 
23 thousand job vacancies at the observed organisations in the private sphere, 
which is less by only 2.7 thousand than in 2007, the last year before the crisis, 
and almost twice as many as at the time of the deepest economic crisis in 2009.
The number of unemployed also significantly decreased in 2014. According 
to the ILO definition, it dropped from 441 thousand to 343.3 thousand, while 
the number of registered job seekers fell from 527.6 thousand to 422.4 thou-
sand. The number of respondents identifying themselves as unemployed in a la-
bour survey also dropped from 666.5 thousand to 538.8 in one year. Regarding 
educational attainments, the number of people with higher education was 35.4 
thousand persons – representing the smallest group in 2014 – and fell short by 
6.7 thousand than that of the previous year. The biggest winners of the improv-
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ing unemployment situation were those with (lower and upper) secondary vo-
cational education, the majority of whom had presumably found employment 
in the private sphere. The increase in the number of public works participants 
in 2014 could mostly mitigate unskilled unemployment.
After the crisis, the gross earnings within observed organisations in the pri-
vate sphere increased significantly in nominal terms, although at a fluctuating 
pace: in 2012 they exceeded the level of the previous year by 7.3 per cent, in 
2013 by 3.6 per cent, and in 2014 by 4.3 per cent. A significant contributing 
factor to the growth rate in 2014 was a greater than 10 per cent increase in ir-
regular earnings (premiums, bonuses), which represented about 8 per cent of 
total earnings. The gross average wage in the public sector is 17 percent below 
wages in the private sector, but the gap reduces to 5 percent if public works par-
ticipants are excluded from the comparison. Since there was no change in the 
rate of income tax or social security contributions in 2014, the growth rate of 
gross and net earnings had increased, and due to a 0.2 per cent fall in consum-
er prices, the growth rate of real earnings had exceeded that of nominal wages.
2. In Focus
This year, In Focus addresses the issue of public works. The scale of Hungarian 
public works is unique in Europe both in terms of the number of participants 
and expenditure. By 2015, the government has envisaged the employment of 
some 200 thousand participants from a 270 billion forints budgetary support. 
The public works programme has been the most important employment policy 
of the period since 2010 and therefore analysing its short- and long-term effects 
is an important task. This part consists of two chapters: the first summarises 
international experiences, the second presents the facts and available research 
findings pertaining to the Hungarian public works. In Chapter 1 Judit Kálmán 
gives an overview concerning the international experiences of public works. She 
presents the motives, goals and theoretical background of public works, and re-
views the design and results of evaluations of some concrete public works pro-
grammes in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness.
The chapter is supplemented by three boxes which present in detail the pro-
grammes of countries or group of countries that run notable public works pro-
grammes. These texts summarise the results of evaluations of these programmes 
as well.
In box K.1.1 Ágota Scharle presents the most important characteristics of Slo-
vak public works programmes, in box K.1.2 Judit Kálmán does the same for 
the Argentinian ones, and in box K.1.3 Tamás Bakó for the Scandinavian ones. 
The authors also summarise the most important evaluation results of respective 
programmes provided they are available.
Chapter 2 of Közelkép deals with the Hungarian public works programme. In 
section 2.1 Katalin Bördős sums up the regulations and amendments of certain 
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forms of public works that have been in place during different periods since the 
regime change. The section deals separately with the system before 2011, and 
the one after 2011 that has involved uniform public works. It covers the regula-
tions and institutional changes of certain forms of public works as well as their 
respective implementations.
In section 2.2 Irén Busch and Katalin Bördős take account of the most impor-
tant data sources on public works with regard to participation and cost figures. 
The section provides an overview of the types of territorial (national, local) or 
individual level data available in each period, evaluates each data source in terms 
of their reliability, and briefly addresses the possibilities of data analysis. In sec-
tion 2.3 Zsombor Cseres-Gergely and György Molnár review the basic facts with 
regard to public employment. The authors assess public works participation as 
an episode of the customer journey in public employment services leading, pos-
sibly, to employment on the open job market. They analyse participation rates 
in the public employment service for each programme, including public works, 
and track the typical journey of the unemployed belonging to different groups 
and having different observable characteristics.
In section 2.4 Luca Koltai analyses the values of public works employers. It gives 
an account of the staff of organisations operating public works programmes by 
rendering their opinions, expectations, identified goals and perceived effects of 
the public works programmes. In section 2.5, based on a particularly large na-
tional administration panel data base, János Köllő provides an analysis on the 
rate of public workers at the end of 2011, and assesses to what extent these in-
dividuals worked before 2011 in “real”, that is, non-public works related posi-
tions. The section examines the extent to which real and public works contributed 
to the employment of public workers, then analyses the frequency and length of 
real employment relationships.
In section 2.6 the study of Zsombor Cseres-Gergely describes the nature of 
the participants in public works programmes, and analyses the extent these 
programmes are implemented in line with their declared aims, whether they 
really reach out to the long-term unemployed and improve the employability 
of participants by temporary work opportunities.
In section 2.7 Márton Czirfusz addresses the territorial inequalities of public 
works, and seeks to answer the question of whether the transformed and ex-
tended system of public works after 2008 has reproduced spatial inequalities.
In section 2.8 Irén Busch reviews the most important data of winter pub-
lic works that is aimed at decreasing the seasonality of public works. In sec-
tion 2.9 Zsombor Cseres-Gergely and György Molnár examine the individu-
al and environmental factors related to exit from public works. The authors 
take into account which factors are related to exit to the open, non-public 
works-related job market, and which are the ones impeding that. Further-
more, they also analyse the factors that lead to returning to public works, 
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registered or unregistered unemployment, in contrast to employment in the 
open labour market.
Finally, the paper by János Köllő in section 2.10 examines the potential reinte-
gration of public workers from the perspective of their fellow workers: whether 
in genuine work organisations, with peers employed in the primary labour mar-
ket, or in separate public works units. While the former may facilitate a situation 
whereby job seekers and employers find each other, separation does not provide 
an opportunity for employers to form an opinion regarding the skills and pro-
ductivity of public workers in a genuine work environment and this can hinder 
the reintegration of public workers, and their transition from welfare to work.
The compiled analyses of In Focus examine public works from various angles. 
More detailed and evidence-based analyses are currently not available concern-
ing public works in Hungary. The international overview enables us to assess 
the Hungarian programme also in the light of international experiences. We 
hope that this collection of studies will support a more evidence-based decision 
making in public policy and enable professionals in the field to use the research 
findings presented. Likewise, we hope that the non-professional audience in-
terested in the topic may also acquaint themselves with the nature, results and 
problems of public works.
3. Instruments of labour market policy (February 2014 – April 2015)
The most important changes affected the institutional system of employment 
policy. On 1st of January 2015, the National Employment Office was dissolved 
without a successor entity, and its tasks and competences were distributed among 
other public agencies. Employment policy has since been managed by the min-
ister responsible for employment policy, while vocational and adult training 
were entrusted to the National Institute of Vocational and Adult Education, 
which is a newly established agency by the Ministry of Economy. As of 1st of 
April 2015, the independent agencies have been converted – in the framework 
of reforming government agencies – to ministerial departments, where tasks 
and competencies are assumed by regional government agencies and their ap-
pointed government commissioners.
Co-financed by the European Union, new and comprehensive programmes 
for the 2014–2020 development phase have been launched. Projects on em-
ployment policy were primarily realised in the framework of the Economic 
Development and Innovation Operation Programme, and also according to 
two priorities (Improving the competitiveness of enterprises and encouraging 
employment, and Encouraging employment and developing corporate adapt-
ability.) Furthermore, the Territorial and Settlement Development, Human 
Resources Development and Competitive Central Hungary Operational Pro-
grammes also had activities that aimed at increasing employment and the la-
bour market integration of job seekers and the disabled.
The hungarian labour markeT
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The regulation of the development tax benefit intended to encourage em-
ployment was changed from July 2014, primarily in accordance with a devel-
opment map defined by the European Commission for the 2012–2020 period, 
and the equality of opportunity dimensions thereof. Changes in the intensity 
of supports mainly favour small and middle enterprises. In the framework of 
employment protection, action plan recipients of the insured and flat rate pa-
rental benefits were affected by a positive change. In the regulation of the main 
job creating programme, which was public works, only minor changes were 
made during this period.
From 1st of January 2015, the pension system was amended in a way that abol-
ished the possibility of early retirement in certain occupations. From 1st of March 
2015, municipalities have increased autonomy in designing means-tested social 
benefits, except for the means-tested unemployment assistance, which will be 
administered by government agencies at the micro-region level. The regular so-
cial benefit was renamed as disability and childcare allowance and long-term 
unemployed persons aged over 50 are no longer eligible for this, but instead can 
apply for the means-tested unemployment assistance. Other allowances (e.g. 
for housing or medicine) were merged and renamed as local assistance and mu-
nicipalities have considerable freedom in setting the conditions of entitlement.
4. Statistical data
This section gives detailed information on the main economic trends, popula-
tion, labour market participation, employment, unemployment, inactivity, wag-
es, education, labour demand, regional disparities, migration, labour relations, 
and social welfare assistance as well as an international comparison of selected 
labour market indicators. The data presented here have two main sources: on 
the one hand, the regular institutional and population surveys of the Central 
Statistical Office – Labour Force Survey, institutional-based labour statistics, 
labour force accounting census: on the other hand, the register of the National 
Labour Office and its data collections – the unemployment register database, 
short-term labour market forecast, wage tariff surveys, and the NLO’s Labour 
Relations Information System. More information is provided on these at the 
end of the statistical section. In addition to the two main data providers, the 
Central Administration of National Pension Insurance has provided the data 
on old age and disability pensions and assistance. Finally, some tables and fig-
ures are based on information from the online databases of the CSOs, the Na-
tional Tax and Customs Administration and the Eurostat.
All tables and figures can be downloaded in Excel format following the links 
provided. All tables with labour market data published in the Hungarian La-
bour Market Yearbook since 2000 are available to download from the follow-
ing website: http://adatbank.krtk.mta.hu/tukor.
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ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Changes in the external economic environment had complex impacts on the 
Hungarian economy in 2014. The performance of the main economic part-
ner countries moderately increased in previous years (the European Union’s 
performance was 1.4 percent while that of Russia 0.6 percent higher than in 
2013). As a result of the long lasting fall in raw material prices, in particu-
lar of oil, and of low demand, inflation was universally moderate. The major 
central banks of the world pursued a lax monetary policy which created a fa-
vourable interests and liquidity environment throughout the year worldwide 
(MNB, 2015). However, at the same time, the escalating conflict between 
Russia and the Ukraine and the ensuing embargo had a negative effect on the 
Hungarian economy. Nevertheless, Hungary’s gross domestic product grew 
by 3.6 percent in 2014 (HCSO, 2015a) since the previous year, which places 
Hungary among the top countries of the EU member states. This growth is 
predominantly due to the greater output in agriculture and industry – the 
latter driven by the growth in vehicle production and related supply chains 
(HCSO, 2015b). Furthermore, the economy grew as a result of a 14 percent 
increase in investments relative to the previous year, basically made possible 
by favourable interest rates as well as the Hungarian National Bank’s lending 
program for growth and the accelerated transfer of EU funds. In terms of do-
mestic regulatory efforts, raising the minimum wage, increased funding for 
public works programmes, raising the family tax allowance and introducing 
the supplementary child care benefit have had the greatest impact on the la-
bour market. The purpose of the new child care benefit introduced as of 1st 
January 2014 is to encourage families to raise children and help mothers to 
return to the labour market.
LABOUR FORCE DEMAND AND SUPPLY
After a slow increase in employment between 2003 and 2007, a period of stag-
nation took place, followed by the number of employed dropping to the level 
of a decade earlier after the autumn of 2008, when the economic crisis hit 
the Hungarian labour market. While the loss of around 150 thousand jobs 
was incomparable to the labour market shock of the 1990s, and the impact 
of the crisis on the labour market in Hungary proved to be smaller than in 
the rest of the EU countries, it had implications other than just the drop in 
numbers. Most jobs ceased to exist in the industrial sphere, and the middle 
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aged with a secondary education were hit the hardest, i.e. those who earlier 
had taken their employment for granted. The two main ways of coping with 
the employment situation were going to work abroad and the inactive element 
returning to the labour market.
The main earner’s losing his/her job or merely increasing bank debts forced 
many inactive household members to go back to the labour market to try and 
find a job. Using the EU–SILC database, this so called added worker effect 
was found in 28 European countries (see Bredtmann at al., 2014): women 
with an unemployed husband are more likely to enter the labour market and 
find a full time job than those with an employed husband. As a result of in-
creased activity, up until 2014 the increase in employment did not involve a 
similar drop in the rate of unemployment.
The employment level was the lowest in 2009 and 2010, which was followed 
by a short stagnation period. A favourable change started as late as in 2012. 
According to the findings of the Labour Force Survey, in 2013 the annual 
average employment was 3 million 892 thousand persons, basically the same 
number as in the years directly before the crises and nearly 160 thousand more 
than at the lowest level in 2009 and 2010. This increase had three sources:
•	The number of persons commuting to work abroad grew by about 50 thou-
sand, triggered by the crisis and made possible by Austria’s and Germany’s 
– the two main target countries – opening up of their markets to the Hun-
garian labour force in May 2011.
•	 From 2012, public works programmes grew significantly: the annual av-
erage shows that around 60 thousand more worked in these programmes 
in 2013 than in 2010. This is partly due the special winter public works 
programmes introduced in 2013 which helped keep the number of public 
works employees at the summer peak level over the latter months of the year. 
(Owing to the same programmes, the number of public works employees 
was equally high in the first quarter of 2014.)
New jobs were created in the private sector (for instance in vehicle man-
ufacturing), and investments grew a little, bringing the loss of jobs in con-
struction to an end.
The Labour Force Survey of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office found 
a significant, 208 thousand growth in the number of employees in 2014 rela-
tive to a year earlier, of whom
•	 45 to 50 thousand, about one quarter of the total increase, were employees 
in the expanded public works programmes;
•	 similarly, about 50 thousand more worked in enterprises employing 5 or 
more in the private sector;
•	 partly due to taking over some of the welfare responsibilities and partly to 
establishing new agencies, 20 to 25 thousand employees were added to the 
labour force of budgetary institutions;
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•	 the numbers working abroad seemed to change only minimally, with daily 
about two thousand more persons reporting work outside Hungary, yet the 
unrecorded labour market migration probably grew at an even higher level.
In 2014 the number of employees was higher than 4.1 million, while the 
employment rate of those aged 15 to 64 grew by 3.7 percentage points in 
one year, from 58.1 percent to 61.8 percent, the latter being the highest of 
the past almost 25 years (Figure 1). Regarding this index, Hungary jumped 
to the 19th and 20th place in the European Union at the end of 2014, com-
ing before Ireland, Poland and Slovakia. However, 0.6 percentage points of 
the increase is due to a demographic factor, notably the shrinking of this age 
group population.
Figure 1: The number of employees and the employment rate, 2008–2014*
* Inflated and weighted data based on the 2011 census.
Source: HCSO Labour Force Survey.
With the improving employment situation the labour force supply grew, too. 
With the gradual raising of the retirement age, the number of those in the la-
bour market grows every year, which, however, is partially counterbalanced 
by the option for women to retire after 40 years of employment. At the same 
time, the labour force supply in young generations grew because of the lower-
ing of compulsory education to 16 years and because of fewer students decid-
ing both in 2013 and 2014 to go on to higher education after having earned 
a secondary school certificate. The introduction of the supplementary child 
care benefit appears to encourage typically those mothers to return to the 
labour market who have a higher education and live in communities with a 
relatively large number of day care institutions for children. The supply also 
increased with the expansion of the public works programmes which offer 
employment to the long term absentees from the labour market.
The most important factor influencing the demand side is the expansion of 
the public works programme, not only because they increase the number of 
employed but also because they offer work to people who otherwise have no 
050,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
20142013201220112010
Public sector, employees
Full time
Part time
Monthly
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
 Non-profit organizations 
 Enterprises 
Pe
op
le
People
Tamás bakó & JudiT lakaTos
22
chance whatsoever in the open labour market (for instance persons living in 
depressed regions or having low education levels). Consequently public works 
programmes thus have implications for a wide range of employment indices. 
By 2014, the change of paradigm in addressing unemployment – ensuring 
public works employment instead of unemployment provisions – created a 
huge segregated labour market. In 2014 the annual average showed that 182.4 
thousand worked in public works programmes; however, as such jobs typically 
do not last 12 months, at least one and a half times as many worked in pub-
lic works programmes for some time.1 Only 13.1 percent of persons having 
worked in public works programmes could later find a job in the open labour 
market, the rest live on social aid and wait for the next public works vacan-
cies (see Cseres-Gergely Zsombor in Section 2.9 in In Focus). Public works 
employees are not paid based on performance, but earn the public work wage 
which is three quarters of the minimum wage.
In 2014 the number of public works employees ceased to heavily fluctuate 
within the year, with a sharp drop only in May as the winter season was over 
and new jobs were not yet launched. A further change is that public works 
jobs became almost exclusively full time (which, however, is hardly a solution 
for carers of elderly persons or of young children in the household). The main 
area of public works programmes remains the public sector with 159.5 thou-
sand employees while in the organizations of the private sector (typically in 
enterprises with a majority state ownership) and in non-profit organizations 
(performing public duties) the number of public works employees grew more 
than the average rate in 2014 (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Monthly changes in the number of public works employees, 2010–2014*
* Until 2012 information is only available on the public sector. Right axis: 
enterprises and non-profit organizations, left axis: public sector.
Source: Monthly Labour Reports.
1 Public works programmes 
starting between January 1, 2011 
and December 31, 2012.
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After dynamic growth between 2011 and 2013, there was no change in the 
number of persons working abroad in 2014 – at least of those covered by the 
Hungarian Labour Force Survey (Lakatos, 2015). The overwhelming major-
ity of the nearly 100 thousand persons having reported working abroad on a 
daily basis commuted between their families in Hungary and the workplace 
abroad (Figure 3). That probably large numbers commute is corroborated by 
the fact that about half of the 43 thousand persons having reported to work in 
Austria in 2014 lived in neighbouring counties Győr-Moson-Sopron and Vas.
Figure 3: Number of employees reporting to be working in Austria and Germany, 
1999–2013
Resource: HCSO Labour Force Survey.
It is difficult to estimate the actual number of persons currently working 
abroad, and the classical definition of migration is not really useful either 
in the environment of free movement of labour. In terms of workers in a for-
eign country, Hungarian surveys provide more or less reliable data only on 
those who are earners in Hungarian households, which however, appear to 
exclude young people supporting only themselves, even if their permanent 
address is still their parents’ homes. Furthermore, there is no information 
available about people moving abroad with their families, even if only for 
a short period.
The aggregation of labour force surveys of EU member countries in 2013 
found about 200 thousand Hungarian employees in EU countries, while a 
Hungarian project (SEEMIG) estimated the number of Hungarians living 
abroad at 350 thousand (HCSO, 2014). As the inflation of Labour Force Sur-
vey data is based on a population that excludes this kind of migration, those 
who work abroad but are not included in the Labour Force Survey count as 
employed due to the inflation. Furthermore, the above average employment 
rate of the so called labour market migrants can be a distorting factor. The fur-
ther increase of the number of Hungarians working abroad in 2014 makes it 
highly probable that Hungary is one of the very few EU member states where 
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the migration rate in the working population had consistently been low and 
has only started to dynamically grow in recent years.
Even with the lack of accurate data it is certain that the increasing labour 
market migration of recent years improved the labour market prospects of 
those staying in Hungary; it is however a cause for worry that in a few occu-
pations in high demand migration is threatening the proper functioning of 
services in Hungary. While currently this is only true for health care, several 
other services or occupations even in industry are likely to face labour force 
shortages in the future.
Economic trends were more favourable in 2014 than in earlier years. 
Household incomes grew, resulting in increased consumption and hence 
new jobs. The amelioration of the labour intake capacity of the private sec-
tor is confirmed by every important data source: the Institutional Labour 
Statistics found a nearly 50 thousand work force increase in enterprises 
employing 5 or more, while according to the data of the National Tax and 
Customs Administration 80 thousand more were employed in some form 
by enterprises than in the previous year, in addition to 10 thousand more 
employees in self-employment and in partnerships, and 20 thousand more 
in public institutions.
According to the labour statistics, the number of jobs grew by 20 thousand 
in the industrial sector, the greatest increase happening in energetics divisions 
and vehicle manufacturing. The Labour Force Survey, covering the entire em-
ployed population including employees of small enterprises, self-employed and 
partnerships as well as persons performing income earning activities in the 
reference week on an ad hoc basis, found a much greater, nearly 70 thousand 
increase in this section of the national economy. Similarly, both data sources 
indicate a growth in employment in construction, with the Labour Force Sur-
vey showing a more dynamic change, while both sources show little change 
in trade. In the area of non-financial services, institutional statistics clearly 
show a growth while according to the Labour Force Survey the increase did 
not take place in all service sections universally.
The survey designed to forecast labour market trends in compliance with 
the EC decree to record unfilled vacancies found a significant increase in 2014 
too. In the private sector there were 23 thousand unfilled vacancies, only 2.7 
thousand fewer than in 2007, the last year before the crisis and almost twice 
as many as in 2009 – the year showing the lowest level.
The overall increase of the employment rate involves a set of differences, 
depending on the variable. The various indices are heavily influenced by the 
substantial role of public works employment in the labour market. Thus, the 
differences in the employment rate by educational attainment diminished, 
though still being great, as in the majority of public works jobs lower educa-
tional attainment tends not to be a problem (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: The breakdown of the employment rate by educational attainment,  
2006–2014*
* Due to the specific age group, students currently in secondary education are includ-
ed in the population with only primary education.
Source: HCSO Labour Force Survey.
In 2013, again owing to public works programmes, regional differences in the 
employment rate diminished (Figure 5), while in 2014 a growth in demand 
for non-subsidised jobs increased the difference in favour of the developed 
and industrialized regions of the country. Labour migration within the coun-
try remains low, migration or commuting motivated by better employment 
chances is typically transborder.
Figure 5: Employment rate in the various regions of Hungary,  
in the age group 15 to 64, 2006–2014
Source: HCSO Labour Force Survey.
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UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL 
LABOUR FORCE
While the number of employed steadily grew from 2010, and essentially 
reached the pre-crisis level in 2013, unemployment numbers did not change 
until as late as 2012 and the drop in 2013 was far smaller than expected giv-
en the growth in employment. The reason for this is that large numbers of 
inactive persons became unemployed (and employed), which is partly con-
nected to the expanded public works programmes ensuring work for people 
who, knowing the constraints of the local labour market, had given up active 
seeking (and did not qualify as unemployed according to the ILO definition 
based on three criteria). In addition, escaping the inactive status was motivat-
ed by the increased importance of the multi-earner household model in the 
crisis. In 2014, however, the number of unemployed, as defined by ILO, also 
dropped significantly, from 441 thousand to 343.3 thousand, that of regis-
tered job seekers from 527.6 thousand to 422.4 thousand, and that of those 
reporting themselves unemployed in the Labour Force Survey from 666.5 
thousand to 538.8 thousand in one year (Figure 6).
Figure 6: The number of registered job seekers, unemployed by the ILO definition 
and self-reported unemployed, 2006–2014
Source: National Employment Service/Ministry for National Economy/
HCSO Labour Force Survey.
The number of ILO unemployed in the Labour Force Survey database de-
creased according to all main variables. In 2014 57.5 thousand fewer men 
and 40.2 thousand fewer women were unemployed by annual average than 
a year earlier. One of the consequences of the crisis was that the unemploy-
ment rate in men was higher than in women, but from 2013 it switched 
back to a higher female unemployment rate. In 2014 the difference be-
tween the two rates was 0.3 percentage points as opposed to 0.1 percent-
age points in 2013.
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While the youth unemployment rate dropped from 23.5 percent to 20.1 
percent, the 67.6 thousand unemployed aged 15 to 24 still make up nearly 
one fifth of all unemployed.
The number of unemployed with only primary education fell by 22.8 thou-
sand, the number of persons with a secondary level final exam certificate 
– counting as unskilled in the labour market – by 7 thousand, that of persons 
having vocational education or apprentice training by 41.2 thousand and that 
of people with special vocational education by 20.2 thousand. There were 6.7 
thousand fewer unemployed with higher education than a year earlier, who in 
2014 made up the smallest, 35.4 thousand strong, group of unemployed. The 
improving employment situation benefitted those with vocational secondary 
education (both special and regular) the most, the majority of whom seem to 
have found a job in the private sector.
The expansion of the public works programme in 2014 primarily mitigat-
ed unemployment in the unskilled. While the unemployment rate in county 
Győr-Moson-Sopron was down at, and in county Vas near, 3 percent, which 
counts as full employment, in counties Hajdú-Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg it was 13 percent or a little higher. Regional differences in the unem-
ployment rate somewhat grew once again in 2014 because public works pro-
grammes played a smaller role in removing differences, and the larger part of 
the growth in employment took place in the private sector and was concentrat-
ed in the more developed industrial regions of the country. The relatively good 
indices of the Western border area and hence of the West-Transdanubia region 
are heavily connected to commuter job opportunities in Austria (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Regional unemployment rates in Hungary, 2006–2014
Source: HCSO Labour Force Survey.
The average unemployment time spell grew by 0.7 month, from 17.9 months 
to 18.6 months in one year (Figure 8), with the Central Hungary region hav-
ing the longest period and the biggest increase. Due to their nature, public 
works programmes eliminated some of the long term unemployment by re-
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ducing temporarily the average time requirement to find a job. However, this 
effect ceased to work in 2014 as participants in public work programmes were 
more or less the same persons. People spending a relatively short period as 
unemployed appear to be more eligible for the new jobs available in the pri-
vate sector created recently in the growing economy because they still have 
their full employability potential. At the same time, however, persons who 
live in regions with scarce public works programme jobs (e.g. central region) 
and who have low education and obsolete or non-existing work experience 
making them largely unemployable in the private sector tend to get stuck in 
unemployment.
Figure 8: The average unemployment spell (left axis) and the rate of long term (over 
one year) unemployed in all unemployed (right axis), 2006–2014
Source: HCSO Labour Force Survey.
Public works programmes have a stronger and more direct impact on the num-
ber of registered job seekers than on the number of ILO unemployed. In May 
2014, when there were 100 thousand fewer public works employees than in 
the previous month, the number of registered unemployed grew by about the 
same number. By July the number of public works employees was a steady 160 
to 200 thousand while that of registered job seekers at around 400 thousand.
The share of first job seekers was 13 percent in 2014, which is higher, even if 
not substantially, than in the previous year despite the fact that a significant 
part of active tools designed to help the young to find work (for instance, the 
First Job Guarantee program, the state’s taking over taxes and public dues 
in the framework of the job protection action plan, subsidising workplace 
scholarships from the central budget, a variety of start-up programs) were in 
place. One explanation is that 20 thousand of the first job seekers had only 
primary education (some even dropped out of primary school), with hardly 
any chance of finding a job in the open labour market. To avoid long term 
unemployment, they would need to be involved in personally-tailored train-
0100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
Job seekers not 
receiving any support
Social care recipients
Recipients of job seeking 
benefit, social provisions
Registered jobseekers
20142013201220112010
Quarterly
Pe
op
le
The hungarian labour markeT...
29
ing programmes, however the current labour market policy seems to concen-
trate on public works programmes rather than training.
The impact of the reform of the system of unemployment provisions (cut-
ting back the job seeking benefit period to three months, limiting eligibility 
for job seeking aid to persons having not more than five years to work before 
retirement, linking income-tested benefits to participation in public works 
programmes and in other active programs) peaked in 2014. On average, 59 
thousand persons per month were given job seeking provisions, of which near-
ly one third received the special pre-retirement allowance. As the job seek-
ing benefit period was typically already three months in 2013 because ear-
lier types of benefits were expiring, the number of recipients was essentially 
stable. In 2014 nearly 30 percent fewer registered job seekers received regu-
lar social assistance than a year earlier in line with the government’s plans to 
replace the small amount of aid with better paid public works jobs. On an 
annual average 231 thousand of the registered job seekers were not given any 
pecuniary provision and another 132 thousand received HUF 22,800 as an 
employment substitution subsidy (Figure 9). (Recipients of this subsidy were 
typically involved in public works programmes and hence earned higher in-
comes in a part of the year.)
Figure 9: The number of recipients of job seeking benefit, social provisions  
and of job seekers not receiving any support, 2010–2014
Source: National Employment Service/Ministry for National Economy.
In addition to the unemployed meeting formal criteria (such as ILO unem-
ployed or registered job seeker), a considerable number are on the labour mar-
ket who could (would) become employed if certain conditions were in place. 
The Eurostat definition of potential additional labour force is the ILO un-
employment definition supplemented by three further categories: underem-
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ployed, i.e. persons wishing to go over from part time jobs to full time employ-
ment, job seekers not immediately available for work and persons available 
for work but not seeking it. In 2014 623.4 thousand persons met the defini-
tion of potential additional labour force, of which 96 thousand were under-
employed. The 539 thousand persons reporting themselves unemployed is 
about the same magnitude as the number of unemployed within the poten-
tial additional labour force.
In addition to the 4 million 70 thousand employed and 3427 thousand un-
employed in the age group 15 to 64 regarded as active age, there are 2 million 
175 thousand who are inactive for various reasons, 7.5 percent less than a year 
earlier. In each inactive category a decreasing trend was recorded, however to 
a different extent. In the retired, which is the largest group, this was caused 
by the incremental increase of the retirement age while in pupils, in addition 
to demographic changes, by the lowering of compulsory education as well as 
by fewer of them going on to higher education than in earlier years; as for the 
recipients of child care support, measures to encourage the return to the la-
bour market (child care benefit supplement) played a crucial role. Due to cut 
backs on pecuniary unemployment support, the number of inactive on such 
payments decreased dramatically, while the expansion of the public works 
programmes and the recovery of the economy made it possible for a larger 
number of so called other inactives to enter the labour market than before.
EARNINGS
Gross earnings in the private sector (and partly in the non-profit sector) are 
shaped by the wage policies and business profits of economic organizations, 
the only single central intervention being the setting of the minimum wage. 
As for employees of budget institutions, however, labour policy makers have 
a wider range of tools, which is reflected in the increase of earnings in these 
two major areas (public and private sectors) over the past few years.
While in the 2000s gross earnings in the private sector grew basically at 
an even pace, with some setbacks in the crisis years from 2008 to 2010, the 
raising of the mandatory minimum wage in 2012 well exceeding the wage 
growth in the private sector failed to exercise any major impact on the sector 
overall. At the same time, gross earnings in the public sector decreased be-
tween 2008 and 2010 (basically as a consequence of cancelling 13th month 
salaries and later the earning supplement too, originally designed to replace 
13th month salaries); in the last four years, however, wage adjustments for 
various groups of employees produced some increase in earnings yet nominal 
gross earnings in 2014 were still lower than in 2008. Temporal comparison, 
however, is distorted by the ever growing number of public works employees 
in the public sector.
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Figure 10: Gross earnings and the minimum wage, 2006 = 100 percent
Source: HCSO Institutional Labour Statistics.
While raising the minimum wage from HUF 78 thousand to HUF 93 thou-
sand in 2012 had hardly any effect on the rate of growth of earnings, two 
consequences need be mentioned. The more important one is the “whitening” 
of wages in areas of the economy where employers tended to report only the 
minimum wage and paid employees the rest of their earnings in cash. This 
was found by Reizer (2011) also in his analysis of the “twofold minimum wage 
rule” introduced in 2006. Such divisions typically are retail trade, food ser-
vice activities, some of the business services and construction where raising 
the minimum wage had a significant impact on the level of gross earnings 
and hence on the rate of earnings increase. Earnings statistics in the private 
sector cover only enterprises employing five or more, information on small-
er organizations are accidental. However, data suggest that earnings in the 
latter are around the current minimum wage, i.e. the rate of growth of earn-
ings follows the changes in the minimum wage. (Nevertheless, the increase 
in earnings shown in the statistics does not necessarily mean that employees 
actually receive higher salaries; their payment can even decrease if earlier the 
employer and the employee had split between themselves the amount they 
had not paid in taxes and contributions for the unreported part of the wage.)
The other consequence of the relatively high minimum wage relative to av-
erage earnings is that it worsens the chances of unqualified labour to find a 
job as their labour is too expensive for the value they produce (Kertesi–Köllő, 
2004). Consequently, in some respects, it was rightful and reasonable to set 
the threshold for public works wages some 25 percent lower than the normal 
minimum wage at the same time as the minimum wage was raised by nearly 
20 percent in 2012.
The annual 3 to 5 percent of minimum wage increase over the last three 
years was more or less in harmony with the rate of increase of gross earnings 
in the private sector. The average gross earnings of minimum wage earners 
(excluding employees in jobs requiring vocational qualifications whose so 
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called guaranteed minimum wage threshold was HUF 118 thousand in 2014, 
about 16 percent higher than the normal minimum wage) was 40 percent of 
the average gross earnings in the private sector, and 58 percent of the average 
earnings in manual jobs in 2014.
In the observed organizations of the private sector, the nominal value of 
gross earnings grew considerably, though in a somewhat fluctuating fashion, 
after the crisis: by 7.3 percent in 2012, 3.6 percent in 2013 and 4.3 percent 
in 2014 compared to the previous year. The over 10 percent growth of the 
non-regular part of earnings (bonuses, premia), making up about 8 percent 
of earnings, made a large contribution to the increase of earnings in 2014. 
On the whole, the larger part of non-regular earnings accrued to non-manu-
al employees; in terms of the individual amounts, differences in non-regular 
earnings by national economy sections and divisions are several times as big 
as in regular earnings (Figure 11). The average gross earnings of non-manual 
employees in the private sector is currently 2.2 times as high as in manual 
jobs, with the earning gap having somewhat narrowed over recent years. The 
relative distribution of earnings by sections of the national economy is 0.2 in 
non-manual jobs, which is smaller than the 0.3 percent in manual jobs which 
means that non-manual earnings are more homogenous than manual earn-
ings – at least in the private sector.
Figure 11: Gross earnings in the major sections in the private sector, 2014
A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing, C: Manufacturing, D: Electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply, E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and reme-
diation activities, F: Construction, G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles, H: Transportation and storage, I: Accommodation and 
food service activities, J: Information and communication, K: Financial and insur-
ance activities, L: Real estate activities, M: Professional, scientific and technical 
activities, N: Administrative and support service activities.
Source: HCSO Institutional Labour Statistics.
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In 2014 gross average earnings in the public sector were 17 percent lower than 
in the private sector (earnings in the private sector were 5 percent if the basis 
of comparison is average earnings excluding public works employees). While 
the latter difference does not seem too high it is to be noted that the share of 
non-manual employees in the public sector is much higher than in the private 
sector. The difference between average earnings in manual and non-manual 
jobs was 3 and over 30 percent, respectively, in 2014.
While no overall wage reform took place in the public sector after 2008, 
corrections were introduced in the various occupational groups and classes 
of the national economy. The most important measures were introduced in 
2013, which had an impact on the earnings index through the basis in 2014 
too. In 2013 wages were raised for those health care workers who were left out 
of the previous round (involving about 90 thousand employees); more impor-
tant, however, was the wage adjustment in public education with salaries be-
ing raised in a differentiated way in September 2013 in conjunction with the 
introduction of the teachers’ career model. In 2014 wages of employees in wel-
fare services were raised, and a minor raise was introduced in the armed forces.
Figure 12: Gross earnings in the public sector, 2010–2014
Source: HCSO Institutional Labour Statistics.
While it is not part of gross earnings (they count as welfare costs), those em-
ployees in public institutions whose income would have decreased because 
of the tax reform in 2011 are paid a so called ‘compensation’. The share of 
recipients of compensation in the sector excluding public works employees 
dropped from two thirds to under one third (around 210 thousand persons) 
in 2014 as the increase in earnings counterbalanced (or surpassed for the 
lucky ones) the negative impacts of the tax reform hitting low earning em-
ployees. The average amount of the compensation was HUF 9700 per month, 
which, if counted as income, would have resulted in an approximate HUF 
4000 higher average gross monthly income in the public sector excluding 
public works employees.
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Income from work outside the regular wages (i.e. remuneration in direct 
income or saving on expenditures, such as cafeteria) was an average HUF 14 
thousand per month in the private sector and HUF 12 thousand per month 
in the public sector. In the latter, excluding public works employees, who do 
not get this type of remuneration, the monthly remuneration was on average 
a little over HUF 15 thousand, or HUF 180 thousand a year, which is slightly 
higher than that in the private sector.
In addition to the rate of increase of gross earnings, net earnings are shaped 
by the current regulations of taxation and contribution payments, which have 
greatly changed over the last three years. Contributions payable by the em-
ployer were raised by 0.5 percent in 2011 and by another 1 percent in 2012 
to a total of 18.5 percent (of which 1.5 percent is solidarity contribution, 10 
percent is pension contribution and 7 percent is health insurance fee). In 
2013 rates of contributions did not change and the upper threshold of pen-
sion contribution was removed, which however, only applied to the highest 
earners and only to an extent which was set off by new personal tax rules fa-
vouring them. With the phasing out of the super gross income, the person-
al income tax became a truly flat rate tax, increasing net earnings for those 
making over HUF 200 thousand per month and proportionately with the 
gross income. As in 2014, quite uniquely, neither the tax rate nor the rate of 
contributions changed, gross and net incomes grew in the same way and, ow-
ing to the 0.2 percent decrease in consumer prices, real earnings grew more 
than nominal wages.
While raising the rates of contributions has the same effect on net earnings 
for all employees, making the personal income tax a flat rate in 2011 (although 
the super gross earning still worked as a kind of second bracket at that time) 
and phasing out the tax relief increased the net income only in the case of 
gross incomes higher than an annual HUF 3 million. For lower earning em-
ployees raising children “the loss” was set off by the introduction of the tax 
relief for dependents (Table 1). From 2011, HUF 62,500/months/beneficiary 
for one and two dependents and HUF 206,250/months/beneficiary for three 
or more dependents can be deducted from the tax base. Couples could share 
the benefit but not all families with many children could write off the full 
amount from their tax base. For them 2014 brought a positive turn with the 
write-off being made deductible from wage contributions. The micro simu-
lation model used by HCSO suggests that the benefit introduced in 2014 re-
sulted in an 11 percentage points higher net earnings increase for employees 
with three or more children, making up 6 percent of all employees, than for 
employees not entitled to the dependency benefit.
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Table 1: Net and real earnings calculated with the family tax relief  
introduced in 2014
Number of dependent children
Net earning*  
(HUF/person/
month)
Net earning Real earning** Share of employees 
by number of  
children (percent)
change compared to 2013  
Q1 to Q4 (percent)
0 child 152,538 3.3 3.5 48.6
1 child 159,445 2.7 2.9 25.5
2 children 178,694 2.7 2.9 20.0
3 or more children 202,006 14.9 15.1 6.0
National economy total 162,485 3.8 4.0 100.0
* Net earning calculated including the family tax relief.
** Real earning calculated at the 99.8% consumer price index in 2014.
Source: Labour Market Trends, 2014 Q4, HCSO, March 2015.
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INTRODUCTION
Júlia Varga
This year, In Focus addresses the issue of public works. The scale of Hungarian 
public works is unique in Europe both in terms of the number of participants 
and expenditure. By 2015, the government has envisaged the employment of 
some 200 thousands participants from a 270 billion forints budgetary sup-
port. The public works programme has been the most important employment 
policy of the period since 2010, and therefore analysing its short- and long-
term effects is an important task. This part consists of two chapters: the first 
summarises international experiences, the second presents the facts and avail-
able research findings pertaining to the Hungarian public works. In Chap-
ter 1 Judit Kálmán gives an overview about the international experiences of 
public works. She presents the motives, goals and theoretical background of 
public works, and reviews the design and results of evaluations of some con-
crete public works programmes in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness.
The chapter is supplemented by three Boxes which present in detail the pro-
grammes of countries or group of countries that run notable public works 
programmes. These texts also summarise the results of evaluations of these 
programmes.
In Box K.1.1 Ágota Scharle presents the most important characteristics of 
Slovak public works programmes, in Box K.1.2 Judit Kálmán does the same 
for the Argentinian ones, and in Box K.1.3 Tamás Bakó for the Scandinavian 
ones. The authors also summarise the most important evaluation results of 
respective programmes provided they are available.
Chapter 2 of In Focus deals with the Hungarian public works programme. 
In Section 2.1. Katalin Bördős sums up the regulations and amendments of 
certain forms of public works that have been in place in different periods since 
the regime change. The section deals separately with the system before 2011, 
and the one after 2011 that has involved uniform public works. It covers the 
regulations and institutional changes of certain forms of public works as well 
as their respective implementations.
In Section 2.2 Irén Busch and Katalin Bördős takes account of the most 
important data sources on public works with regard to participation and 
cost figures. The section provides an overview of the types of territorial (na-
tional, local) or individual level data available in each period, evaluates each 
data source in terms of their reliability, and briefly addresses the possibilities 
of data analysis. In Section 2.3 Zsombor Cseres-Gergely and György Molnár 
review the basic facts with regards to public employment. The authors assess 
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public works participation as an episode of the customer journey in public 
employment services leading, possibly, to employment on the open job mar-
ket. They analyse participation rates in the public employment service for 
each programme, including public works, and track the typical journey of 
the unemployed belonging to different groups and having different observ-
able characteristics.
In Section 2.4 Luca Koltai analyses the values of public works employers. It 
gives an account of the staff of organisations operating public works pro-
grammes by rendering their opinions, expectations, identified goals and per-
ceived effects of the public works programmes. In Section 2.5, based on a par-
ticularly large national administration panel data base, János Köllő provides 
an analysis on the rate of public workers in the end of 2011, and assesses to 
what extent these individuals worked prior to 2011 in “real”, that is, non-
public works related positions. The Section examines the extent real and pub-
lic works contributed to the employment of public workers, then analyses the 
frequency and length of real employment relationships.
In Section 2.6 the study of Zsombor Cseres-Gergely describes who partici-
pates in public works programmes, and analyses the extent these programmes 
are implemented in line with their declared aims, whether they really reach 
out to the long-term unemployed and improve the employability of partici-
pants by temporary work opportunities.
In Section 2.7 Márton Czirfusz addresses the territorial inequalities of public 
works, and seeks to answer the question of whether the transformed and ex-
tended system of public works after 2008 has reproduced spatial inequalities.
In Section 2.8 Irén Busch reviews the most important data of winter public 
works that is aimed at decreasing the seasonality of public works. In Section 
2.9 Zsombor Cseres-Gergely and György Molnár examine the individual and 
environmental factors related to exit from public works. The authors take 
into account which factors are related to exit to the open, non-public works-
related job market, and which are the ones impeding that process. Further-
more, they also analyse the factors that lead to returning to public works, 
registered or unregistered unemployment, in contrast to employment in the 
open labour market.
Finally, the paper by János Köllő in Section 2.10 examines the potential re-
integration of public workers from the perspective of who they work together 
with: whether in genuine work organisations, with peers employed in the pri-
mary labour market, or in separate public works units. While the former may 
facilitate the opportunities for job seekers and employers to find each other, 
separation does not give an opportunity for employers to form an opinion 
regarding the skills and productivity of public workers in a genuine work en-
vironment, which can hinder the reintegration of public workers, and their 
transition from welfare to work.
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The compiled analyses in In Focus examine public works from various an-
gles. More detailed and evidence-based analyses are currently not available 
about public works in Hungary. The international overview enables us to as-
sess the Hungarian programme also in the light of international experiences. 
We hope that this collection of studies will support a more evidence-based 
platform for decision making in public policy and enable professionals in the 
field to use the research findings presented. Likewise, we hope that the non-
professional audience interested in the topic may also acquaint themselves 
with the nature, results and problems of public works.
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1. THE BACKGROUND AND INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES OF PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES
Judit Kálmán
In this chapter we provide an overview of international experiences of public 
works. We present the motivation, goals and theoretical background of public 
works as a public policy intervention, the various designs of concrete public 
works programmes, and the main results of evaluations aimed at measuring 
the efficiency and effectiveness of these programmes. The chapter is supple-
mented with boxes which summarise the experiences of a few concrete cases 
in various countries (see Boxes K1.1, K1.2 and K1.3).
Public works programmes were introduced in developed and less developed 
countries with a variety of motivations and goals. These included counter-cy-
clical measures or social policy, infrastructural development and disaster man-
agement aims. The programmes operated in various forms and with various 
target groups and programme structures. The experiences concerning their 
implementation and levels of success are also different.
The labour market background of public works – the problem  
of the long-term unemployed and their activation
The linkage of welfare provisions to public works (workfare) can only be under-
stood in the context of activation interventions directed at the unemployed and 
the fight against poverty. Activation measures try to facilitate the return to the 
labour market of the long-term unemployed and other disadvantaged groups.
Earlier what was meant by activation – strictly speaking – was the size of expenditure for 
active measures, and in this respect, there were significant cross-country differences in 
public policy practices. The crisis has renewed attention to the importance of activation, 
as well as to the fact that different elements of the unemployment and social benefit sys-
tems were interrelated. Thus, the efficiency of active labour market measures depends on 
the generosity of insurance based and social benefits, eligibility conditions and the moni-
toring and enforcement of these conditions, as well as on the sanctions applied in the case 
of non-compliance (see more on this, for example, Martin, 2014, Immervoll–Scarpetta, 
2012, and the OECD series: Grubb–Tergeist, 2006, Duell–Grubb–Singh, 2009, Grubb–
Singh–Tergeist, 2009).
Since the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis, long-term unem-
ployment has further increased (Figure 1.1) in most countries, including Hun-
gary. This causes significant social tensions and puts a serious burden on the 
social and employment system, thus the activation of the unemployed involves 
significant challenges.
Following the rise in unemployment which accompanied the crisis, social 
spending has also risen in almost all countries. It is striking though that in 
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Hungary and Greece, both heavily affected by the crisis, social spending de-
creased, while in Spain and Ireland, which were also inflicted with high rates 
of long-term unemployment, this spending significantly increased (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.1: The rate of long-term unemployed among the unemployed  
in OECD countries before and after the crisis, 2007, 2013 (percentage)
Abbreviations: AT: Austria; AU: Australia; BE: Belgium; CA: Canada; CL: Chile; 
CZ: Czech Republic; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES: Spain; FI: Fin-
land; FR: France; GR: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IR: Israel; IS: Iceland; 
IT: Italy; JP: Japan; KR: Korea; LU: Luxembourg; MX: Mexico; NL: The Nether-
lands; NO: Norway; NZ: New-Zealand; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; SI: 
Slovenia; SK: Slovak Republic; TR: Turkey; UK: The United Kingdom; US: The 
United States.
Source: OECD (2014a).
Figure 1.2: Changes in social spending and real GDP between 2007/2008  
and 2012/2013 in OECD countries (percentage)
For country abbreviations, please see the list of Figure 1.1.
Source: OECD (2014b).
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There are significant differences across countries in terms of their GDP-ratio 
expenditure allocated to active labour market measures, which are influenced 
by different public policy traditions, labour markets and macro-economic 
situations (Figure 1.3).1
Figure 1.3: Expenditures for active labour market interventions in GDP-ratio  
before and after the crisis in EU member states, 2006, 2012
Abbreviations: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BG: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: Czech Re-
public; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; EL: Greece; ES: Spain; FI: Fin-
land; FR: France; HR: Croatia; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LT: Lithuania; 
LU: Luxemburg; LV: Latvia; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: 
Portugal; RO: Romania; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; UK: The United 
Kingdom
Source: Own calculations based on the Eurostat Labour Market Policy (LMP) data-
base.
Increasing the rate of active labour market measures is unambiguously recom-
mended by the OECD and the EU, since recent evidence supports the per-
ception that these are much more efficient from a labour market perspective 
than passive measures. In this respect, Hungary is in the mid-range: it spends 
less as a share of GDP on active measures than the Scandinavian countries, 
but more than other East-Central European and especially, Mediterranean 
countries. One of the main reasons for the significant increase of these in 
Hungary after the crisis is attributable to the costs of its increasingly expand-
ing public works programme.
Linking welfare benefits to work
The reform of the classical – primarily benefit based – welfare system, the 
practice of tying the provision of benefits to useful work for the public, and 
enforcement via financial sanctions, that is the development of the workfare 
(work and welfare) system, originates from the United States. The expression 
has been known since the 1970s but the use of these programmes has only 
spread in the developed and developing world since the 1990s.
1 Hudomiet–Kézdi (2011) and 
Galasi–Nagy (2012) write more 
extensively on the international 
experiences of public works.
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In the United States, the Act that enabled member states to launch pro-
grammes linking benefits to work was introduced in 1981. After five years, 
these programmes were already in place in 29 states and, following the wel-
fare reforms of the Clinton era [Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Act (PRWORA), 1996], their number increased sharply. At the same 
time, active labour market measures are used in the United States only to a 
very limited degree and the social welfare system is not as developed either 
as in European countries.
In the United Kingdom, it was also in the 1990s that connecting work 
with the welfare system became one of the main goals of the reforms (wel-
fare to work). The New Deal programmes (New Deal for Young People, New 
Deal 25+, New Deal for Lone Parents, New Deal for the Disabled, New Deal 
50+ targeted those aged 50+ etc.) and a tax reduction to support employment 
(Working Families Tax Credit) were introduced at this time. Several local wel-
fare to work programmes were launched.
The introduction of welfare programmes linked to work and the emphasis 
on work elements also have traditions in the Scandinavian countries, although 
not necessarily in the form of extensive public works programmes (see Box 
K1.2). Welfare programmes linked to work are also prevalent in Australia 
(mutual obligation), Canada (Canada Works and other local programmes) 
and the Netherlands (Work first).
It is typical of workfare systems that beneficiaries have to comply with var-
ious conditions in order to be able to receive benefits. These conditions are 
such that an element of them is aimed at the improvement of the employa-
bility of the beneficiaries (training, rehabilitation, gaining work experience) 
and another element prescribes publicly useful activities (free or very low paid 
public works). The introduction of this system spurred heated social debates, 
as did the phenomenon of welfare dependency, which is often mentioned to 
justify the system.
There are two types of workfare programmes. While the first one is aimed 
at reducing benefit dependency and assisting a return to the primary labour 
market, the second one intends to improve skills and promote employment 
(training, qualifications) for recipients of social services and benefits, or among 
societal groups whose members have less opportunities to become employed 
in the primary labour market. In practice, the individual programmes usu-
ally incorporate both approaches: beyond changing income transfers they 
also seek to create incentives for employment (wages instead of withdrawn 
or reduced benefits).
Public works programmes in developed and developing countries
Specific public works programmes are known not only under the name of 
workfare, but as temporary community projects or work-intensive projects 
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– reflecting the idea that they are not only about infrastructure construction 
and maintenance projects organised by the government, but also about vari-
ous useful activities beneficial to the public. These programmes are used in 
countries having different levels of development. In several less developed 
countries, they are virtually the only labour market interventions applied. 
In developed countries, however, their use is being retracted – due to the im-
pact of negative evidence in analyses and evaluations –, for they are costly and 
other labour market interventions have proved to be more efficient, primarily 
due to substitution – and crowding-out effects.
The main macro-economic goals of public works programmes usually in-
clude: reduction of seasonal and/or cyclical unemployment, direct job crea-
tion, tackling regional and structural labour market problems, helping certain 
workforce-groups in disadvantaged situations, combating poverty, providing 
income transfers for the poor and a certain stimulus to the economy. The lat-
ter can be realised not only through rising consumption, but public works 
programmes can also encourage the creation of new jobs over the long term. 
Used as countercyclical measures during economic crises, jobs created by pub-
lic works generate income and thus can increase aggregate demand.2
In developing countries the above goals are complemented or substituted 
by disaster management, reduction of seasonal unemployment and income 
losses following poor harvest years or slowdown in infrastructure construc-
tion etc. Most of these programmes tend to offer short-term (typically 3–12 
months) employment for low wages typically in the construction, farming 
and regional development sectors as well as community (education, health, 
social) services (Betcherman et al, 2004). The organisers of public works can 
be municipalities, civil organisations or even private firms.
In countries with high and middle incomes – where there are no budget 
or administrative constraints to implement a rapid response programme – 
public works are primarily used for macro-economic reasons, most often as 
short-term shock therapies, or as temporary measures against high unemploy-
ment (the upper part of Table 1.1). The first and most well-known such public 
works programme implemented with a crisis-management purpose was the 
New Deal in the United States during the 1929–1933 crisis, but more cur-
rent examples include the Argentinian, French, Chinese, South-Korean or 
even the Latvian, Slovenian, Portuguese programmes.
The targeted participants are usually special – less employable and/or long-
term unemployed – social groups, and therefore, these programmes often in-
volve re-employability (combined with training elements), or in some cases, 
welfare functions as well. Such an example is the reform of the Argentinian 
Jefes programme which transformed from a short-term intervention to a large-
scale social safety net reaching the bottom 20 per cent of households (see Box 
K1.2 on the Argentinian experiences). The South-African and Latvian public 
2 Among the EU countries, Lat-
via, Hungary, Slovenia, Portugal 
and the Czech Republic have 
restarted large-scale public 
works programmes in reaction 
to the crisis.
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works programmes were also similar, dedicated to reducing long-term pov-
erty. Latvia, hit hard by the global financial crisis, introduced its programme 
as a reaction. Between 2008 and 2010, the county’s GDP fell by 21 per cent, 
while from 2008 to 2009 the poverty rate increased from 10.1 per cent to 
18.1 per cent, and the employment rate decreased by 11.2 per cent. In reac-
tion to these problems Latvia spent an amount equivalent to 22 billion forints 
(or about 73 million EUR) for its public works program between 2009 and 
2011, which comprised 0.25 per cent of the Latvian GDP and was 2.5 times 
the social and anti-poverty expenditure (Azam et al, 2013).
Table 1.1: Some examples of public works programmes in middle  
and low income countries
Country, programme Start date Main objective/root cause
Middle income countries
Argentina (Trabajar) 1996 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Argentina (Jefes de Hogar) 2002 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Botswana 1978 Seasonal employment
Chile 1993 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
South-Africa 2004 Poverty reduction
Salvador (Programa de Antecion Temporal al. Ingreso) 2009 Poverty reduction
Latvia 2009 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Poland 1992 Active labour market intervention
Mexico (Programa Empleo Temporal) 1995 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Sri Lanka (Emergency Northern Recovery Project) 2009 Poverty reduction
Uruguay (Programa de Actividades Comunitarias) 2003 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Low income countries
Afghanistan 2002 Poverty reduction
Bangladesh (Rural Maintenance Program) 1983 Transition to re-employment
Ethiopia 2005 Poverty reduction
India (MGNREGS) 2006 Guaranteed employment
Yemen 1996 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Kenya 2009 Poverty reduction
Madagascar (HIMO) 2000 Seasonal employment
Malawi (Central region, infrastructure programme) 1999 Transition to self-employment
Malawi (Social Action Fund) 2009 Seasonal employment
Ruanda (Vision 2020) 2008 Poverty reduction
Tanzania (Social Action Fund) 2000 Seasonal employment
Zambia 2002 Poverty reduction
Source: Subbarao et al (2013) Table 3.3 and 3.4.
In developing countries public works programmes can serve various short and 
long-term objectives (the bottom part of Table 1.1), however, these countries 
also face serious implementation challenges in a number of areas including 
administrative capacities, lack of information and budget sources. Due to 
such obstacles, the targeting of programmes is often combined: on the one 
hand, they are concentrated at the most disadvantaged settlements, which 
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is already some sort of selection, and, on the other hand, the public works 
wages are offered below the market wage (or if it exists, the minimum wage) 
usually accessed by the poor –, which has a self-selection effect, i.e. only those 
persons apply to the programmes who do not have other income opportu-
nities (self-targeting). In these countries public works programmes serve the 
purposes of poverty reduction, guaranteed employment, perhaps transition 
to employment, in contrast to developed or middle income countries, where 
one-off tackling of macroeconomic shocks and active labour market charac-
ter are more determinate.
Theoretical background – arguments for and against  
public works programmes
Linking welfare services to public works is based on the theoretical premise 
that the unemployment benefit, – allowances and other passive provisions 
decrease the willingness to work, which can be counter-balanced by the eli-
gibility conditions and attached sanctions of active programmes – such as 
public works. So this is not about the eligibility criteria that determine ben-
efit entitlement (such as that the claimant’s income is below a certain level 
for means-tested benefits), but about further payment conditioned on behav-
ioural requirements and the sanctioning of non-compliance (OECD, 2007, 
Besley–Coate, 1992, Basu, 2013).
Since access to information is asymmetric, this system helps the service to 
reach the target group. There is a screening effect that can operate through 
conditions which attract only those who are the most in need and keep the 
better-off away from the programme, which in turn, reduces the administra-
tive costs for the government. The operation of this effect is confirmed by 
the study of Dutta et al (2012) who grouped the participants of the Indian 
workfare programme into income groups and demonstrated that the partici-
pation rate was virtually zero among the rich, but 35 per cent among those in 
the lowest income percentile.
Indirectly, a deterrent effect operates. The conditions cause such a degree 
of inconvenience (frequent visits to the public employment agency, com-
pulsory public works, perhaps training, etc) which compels the leaving of 
the unemployment status as soon as possible, or the outright avoiding of 
benefits and the taking of individual steps against poverty. Nonetheless, 
Besley–Coate (1992) draws attention to the fact that the deterrence effect 
of public works can only function if the amount of work to be performed 
is much higher than the claimants usually work without the intervention. 
This, however, is very difficult to measure in countries with extensive grey 
and black economies.3
The following arguments are usually made for workfare type public works 
programmes:
3 Surveys (Molnár et al, 2014 , 
Koltai, 2013c) in Hungary also 
confirm that those in the periph-
ery of the labour market work a 
lot both in registered and unreg-
istered employment, and public 
works is not a deterrent, but is 
perceived in some regions, quite 
contrarily, as an opportunity.
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•	 Political popularity – programmes are visible and can be well communicat-
ed, the tax payers may feel that the beneficiaries provide something to the 
public in exchange for the benefits (value for money).
•	 Provision of fresh work experience to the participants. The lack of work ex-
perience is often one of the major obstacles of employment for the long-
term unemployed.
•	 Well designed public works programmes can indeed create useful infra-
structure, which can promote growth and reduce territorial inequalities, 
etc. (OECD, 2007, Martin, 2000).
•	 Wide-scale public works programmes can have a wage-increasing impact 
in the private sector. Berg et al (2012), for example, have shown that since 
most of the poor of India usually live and work in rural areas, one way 
in which the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MGNREGS) programme, involving some 54 million households, 
contributed to the reduction of poverty was an indirect effect, whereby mar-
ket wages in the agricultural sector had increased in territories where many 
were involved in the programme. Imbert–Papp (2015) also found similar 
results in relation to this Indian programme.
•	 Strengthening social cohesion, pro-poor growth, reducing exclusion, com-
bating unregistered employment (OECD, 2009, Martin 2014).
Against workfare type programmes the following arguments can be made:
•	 Programmes can stigmatise participants.
•	The job opportunities offered in public works are usually simple tasks not 
requiring any qualifications, which do not help in gaining real work expe-
rience that is valued by employers and would increase subsequent chances 
of employment. In fact, by constraining the available time on job search, 
public works make employment chances even worse (Kluve, 2006).
•	The substitution effect of these programmes, that is, if employees are laid off 
and then the given tasks are carried out by public workers, one cannot talk 
about real job creation.
•	 Too intensive use of the programmes can crowd out private employment, 
which can even contribute to the widening of the poverty gap and social 
inequalities, which may generate further public expense.
•	There can be a budget substitution effect if public works programmes that 
are too long and involve expensive maintenance costs, draw away resources 
from more efficient public policy programmes; this effect has been shown 
by several evaluation studies in the United States with regards to directed 
job creation programmes. (Roy–Wong, 2000).
•	 A so-called locking-in effect takes place in public works when the engagement 
of participants in job search is limited or non-existent, whereby participa-
tion in public works makes people eligible again for unemployment benefits, 
which lead to a kind of public works-benefit spiral (on this see, for example, 
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Brown–Koettl, 2012, on the Hungarian situation Csoba, 2010, Csoba–Nagy, 
2012, Köllő, 2009, Köllő–Scharle, 2011, Molnár et al, 2014). This effect can 
be increased or its development can be facilitated by the method of pro-
gramme design: defining the number of working hours and other criteria.
•	 Deadweight loss can appear (as with all government interventions), that 
is, whether the given job would have also been created without the public 
works support.
•	 Job replacement effect can take place on the part of the individual, which 
means that there are even some employed in public works programmes who 
could otherwise find a job in the primary labour market.
Different forms of public works
As has been shown, public works are complex governmental interventions 
usually affecting multiple, even conflicting problem groups, which in turn 
can decrease their efficiency. The form of implementation and the structure 
of the programme depend on the declared objectives, size, characteristics and 
needs of beneficiary social groups. If these factors are not treated with due 
care, then the poverty reduction effect of public works deteriorates (OECD, 
2009). The forms of public works programmes can be the following.
1) Fixed-term annual employment guarantee programmes, for example, provid-
ing guaranteed employment for a specific duration outside the harvest season. (An 
example of this are the Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, 
later named the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, and the Employment Guarantee Scheme operating in Maharashtra state.)
2) Governmental employment programmes, which mostly offer large-scale, 
long-term and continuous employment during economic, political or labour 
market tensions (the most well-known example is the New Deal programme im-
plemented in the United States in the 1930s, or the Jefes de Hogar programme 
in Argentina, introduced in 2002). Typically, these larger-scale programmes 
are suspended or reformed following a change in the economic situation. These 
programmes in the United States have achieved some serious and long-lasting 
results in infrastructure development. Public works can mean not only the cre-
ation or maintenance of physical assets or infrastructure. Some experimental 
programmes employ public workers in social or health services – for instance, 
since 2010 in the United States public workers have been employed in home 
care for the elderly and people living with AIDS, or in day care for children, etc.
3) Short-term employment programmes following natural disasters or during 
temporary labour market tensions. This is the most typical form, for exam-
ple, in Africa and South-Asia. These programmes have a dual aim: to elimi-
nate damage and to provide temporary, one-off income transfers to the poor.
4) Explicitly labour intensive employment programmes: the aim of these, 
on the one hand, is to increase aggregated employment, and on the other, to 
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create valuable infrastructure. This form is often used by international do-
nor organisations as well, in order to make sure that their organisational ex-
penses also benefit the poor. An example of this could be the AGETIP pro-
gramme in Senegal, the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programming 
(EIIP) programme of the ILO, and a number of programmes financed by 
the World Bank.
The method of programme financing also varies. In Europe, the USA, Can-
ada and South-Asia, these programmes are typically financed from national 
(and regional, local) government sources, while in Africa by multilateral or-
ganisations and donors. The latter usually provide only temporary employ-
ment and do not guarantee return to the primary labour market. The cost of 
programmes are influenced by capital intensity (especially, materials and as-
sets in respect of high value infrastructure), but administrative, organisational 
and management costs are not negligible either. In public works that create 
physical infrastructure, the cost of the work force is usually around 30–60 
per cent of total costs, while in programmes organised to provide services they 
can reach up to 80–90 per cent (del Ninno et al, 2009).
The selection of participants into public works programmes can occur by 
self-selection, by programmes focusing on disadvantaged local communities, 
by assessing the financial situation of applicants (means testing), or any com-
bination of these. Since most of the time, the programmes provide temporary 
employment, participants are mostly registered as programme beneficiaries 
and not as public employees, hence, the employment regulations and respec-
tive wage levels do not apply for them either. In most of the public works pro-
grammes, payments are not accounted as wages but as compensations, which 
thus can be even lower than the official minimum wage, in fact, social security 
and health contributions are usually not deducted either. Some programmes 
however, – such as the Argentinian Tarabajar or the South-African public 
works programme – provide health and occupational accident-insurance to 
their participants, sick leave and maternity leave for those working more than 
four days per week, and so forth.
The regulation, organisation, practical implementation, administration and 
management of programmes are a complex task. Nevertheless, in the literature 
it is generally accepted that the success and effectiveness of these programmes 
depend exactly on factors such as the timing, adequately determined wage lev-
els – motivation of participants –, and the quality of performed work and/or 
completed infrastructure (Subbarao et al, 2013, Ravallion et al, 2013).
Since public works programmes are often decentralised, the responsibility 
of the local municipalities must be stressed in the selection of projects and 
participants. In the literature a separate concept (program leakage) refers to 
public works-related fraud and corruption phenomena, which are unfortu-
nately frequent, as opportunities arise at several points – but to date few aca-
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demic studies have examined these aspects in detail. Fraud and corruption can 
occur at the point of selection of participants/beneficiaries. Potential partici-
pants may provide false data regarding their household and personal incomes 
in order to get into the programmes. Selection might occur not only follow-
ing predetermined eligibility criteria but also through acquaintances, bribed 
officials, on political grounds, etc and, therefore, the programme is less able 
to meet its original objectives in supporting the poorest. Furthermore, cor-
ruption cases can happen during the implementation phase as well: there are 
more public workers registered than actually employed, the performed job 
is over/under-estimated, or the actual payments differ from wages reported 
and reimbursed in the programme (Subbarao et al, 2013).
Expenditures and number of participants in European  
public works programmes
As we have seen in Figure 1.3, expenditures as a GDP percentage on active 
labour market interventions are very different in European countries. The 
Scandinavian countries are the forerunners, the Mediterranean ones are the 
laggards, and Hungary is situated somewhere in the middle. Within active 
labour market measures, it is direct job creation spending that indicates the 
resources allocated for public works programmes. The GDP ratio of these fig-
ures varies greatly in different countries as well (Figure 1.4). In 2014, Hungary 
(0.47 percentage points of GDP), Ireland (0.28 percentage points of GDP), 
Bulgaria (0.15 percentage points of GDP) and France (0.14 percentage points 
of GDP) spent the most on direct job creating public works programmes. 
Within the expenditure of active labour market measures the spending of 
Slovenia, Ireland, Lithuania and Latvia are relatively high (around 20–30 
per cent, which translates to 0.07–0.14 percentage points of GDP). Togeth-
er with Greece, these are the countries that operate more significant public 
works programmes.4
4 Koltai (2013c) offers more in-
sight into the details, require-
ments and results of European 
publ ic works programmes, 
which include several lessons 
for the Hungarian programme 
as well.
Figure 1.4: Expenditure on direct job creation in GDP percentage, 2006 and 2012
For country abbreviations, please see the list below Figure 1.3.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat Labour Market (LMP) database.
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Figure 1.5 shows the rate of expenditure on direct job creation within active 
measures before and after the crisis. Strikingly, the expenditure was increased 
in only three countries in reaction to the crisis: in Bulgaria, Latvia and Hun-
gary. Bulgaria and Latvia however belong to the group of countries that spend 
relatively little proportion of their GDPs on active measures (see Figure 1.3) 
but within active measures, Bulgaria devoted 75 per cent of its spending to 
public works in 2012.5 The Hungarian public works programme achieved 
roughly a similar ratio within active measures by 2012.
Figure 1.5: Expenditure on direct job creation within active labour market measures (percentage)
For country abbreviations, please see the list below Figure 1.3.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat Labour Market (LMP) database.
Looking at the ratio of expenditure on public works and direct job creation 
within total (active and passive) labour market expenditures (Figure 1.6), one 
can notice that even in Bulgaria – just as in any other countries – the rate of 
expenditure on public works programmes has fallen back to 20–21 per cent 
since the crisis.
Figure 1.6: Expenditure on direct job creation within total labour market expenditure (percentage)
For country abbreviations, please see the list below Figure 1.3.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat Labour Market (LMP) database.
Thus, while the majority of European countries have reacted to the crisis with 
other types of labour market interventions, the increase of public works was 
striking in Latvia and especially Hungary (from 14 per cent in 2006 up to 
5 Countries spending the most 
on ALMP measures in terms 
of their GDP ratios: Denmark, 
Sweden and the Netherlands 
do not even feature in Figure 
1.3, which just shows how un-
typical it is for them to tackle 
unemployment by public works.
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40 per cent). The scale of the Hungarian public works programme shows that 
the degree of its application to manage the crisis and long-term unemploy-
ment are unrivalled in the whole of Europe.
Figure 1.7 provides a comparison on the number of participants in public 
works programmes before and after the crisis. These programmes were quite 
significant in Bulgaria, France, Luxemburg, Ireland and Slovakia, with 7–20 
per cent of those seeking employment being public workers in 2006.
In most countries, however, the number of those involved in public works 
decreased during the crisis, even in the case of French, Luxembourgish and 
Irish programmes, which previously were characterised by high participa-
tion rates. In Slovakia the decrease was drastic, but even in Bulgaria, where 
the rate temporarily increased to 15 per cent between 2006 and 2008, yet by 
2012, the proportion of public workers had fallen considerably, implying that 
after the crisis most of the unemployed were treated with other active and 
passive measures in that country too.6 In 2012, the Hungarian public works 
programmes was the most extensive in respect of the rate of job seekers in-
volved in public works, only the Irish and French public works programmes 
approximate this participation rate.
6 In this database there are no 
data with regards to Hungary 
in 2006. The Hungarian data 
on public works is presented in 
detail in Section 2.3.
Figure 1.7: The rate of participants involved in direct job creation  
(public workers/100 job seekers) 2006, 2009, 2012
For country abbreviations, please see the list below Figure 1.3.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat Labour Market (LMP) database.
Evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness  
of public works programmes
According to international evidence on active labour market measures the 
more a programme is tailor-made and targeted the better chances it has to 
achieve real results. Impact assessments and analyses of some programmes 
relying on micro-econometric tools found different impacts, and often not 
significant or negative effects for various labour market interventions (for de-
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tails on this and the applied methodology see, for example, Kézdi, 2011, Hu-
domiet–Kézdi, 2011, Galasi–Nagy, 2012, Card et al, 2010).
Evaluations addressing the efficiency of public works programmes have 
shown negative results on long term labour market effects (Betcherman et al, 
2004, Martin–Grubb, 2001, Card et al, 2010, Kluve, 2010, Rodriguez-Pla-
nas–Jacob, 2010, Hohmeyer–Wolff, 2010, Brown–Koettle, 2012).
Analysing the active measures of the Swedish labour market reforms realised 
in the 1990s, Calmfors et al (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of a number of 
evaluations and found that the more job creations programmes imitated the 
situation of real employment, the more effective they were. Otherwise, the 
study depicts a rather negative picture in respect of all active employment 
policy measures. According to the authors, the scope and number of active 
measures that Sweden used in the 1990s was by no means efficient. Although 
these programmes have contributed to the reduction of Swedish unemploy-
ment they did not increase the employment rate. In their opinion, smaller 
but more concentrated programmes can be more efficient especially if they 
pertain to the long-term unemployed and less to the young. According to the 
Swedish experience, it is not a good idea to link active measures to regaining 
eligibility for unemployment benefits.
Card et al (2010) have carried out a meta-analysis on 97 evaluations involv-
ing 199 programmes (among them East-European and developing country 
ones) and concluded that it was not the size and time of introduction of active 
labour market programmes, nor the macro-economic situation that mattered, 
but efficiency depended primarily on the type of programmes. While individu-
al counselling, job search assistance and job placements and wage subsidies 
(roughly in this order) could be efficient, public works programmes were un-
successful with respect to subsequent employment and earnings. The success rate 
of training is mixed, small-scale, well targeted training may work well if the 
general growth prospects of the economy are also good. However, training 
in general is usually quite expensive and especially the programmes targeted 
at the young have a minimal positive effect both on subsequent employment 
and earnings. These findings are also supported by Carling–Richardson (2004) 
and Sianesi (2008), who have concluded that the closer public works are to the 
conditions of normal employment, the better their effect is on participants.
Another evaluation from the East-Central European region is the study of 
Rodriguez-Planas–Benus (2010) that examined the Romanian programmes 
running between 1999 and 2002 by the method of paired comparisons and 
using employment history variables. The results of individual program-types 
varied from each other, programmes assisting job search and small enterprises 
had a positive effect on the future employment chances of participants, while 
public works programmes were significantly ineffective. The Slovak public 
works programmes were analysed by Ours (2000) who, in contrast to other 
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evaluations, found the Slovak public works programmes to be effective – they 
significantly decreased the time participants spent on job search and increased 
the length of subsequent employment episodes. The high number of private 
entrepreneurs participating in the Slovak public works could have contrib-
uted to this extraordinary result (Hudomiet–Kézdi, 2011). At the same time, 
Ours’ study found that the Slovak wage subsidy programmes and most of the 
training elements ineffective. Regarding the Latvian programme, Azam et al 
(2013) concluded that the targeting of the programmes was good. In a pro-
pensity score model the programme appeared successful in the short-term, the 
income of participants exceeded the income of non-participating households 
by 37 per cent, and forgone income due to participation in the programme 
was also quite low in comparison with other countries.7 At the same time, the 
Latvian public works programme was very small compared to the weight of 
problems caused by the crisis (Latvia spent 0.25–0.5 per cent of its GDP on 
this in 2010–2011) which have limited the effect of the programme.
Public works programmes are popular in developing countries and have be-
come standard measures to address poverty often used by governments and 
the World Bank8 (see Table 1.1). Despite the extensive use, however, there 
have not been too many analyses prepared, and even the results of those are 
not positive. The targeting of programmes is in general good, the low income 
programmes reach the poor,9 but often people with better incomes also enter 
the programmes. Devereux–Solomon (2006), and McCord–Slater (2009), eval-
uating public works in developing countries, concluded that in comparison 
with other development policy interventions, the results were quite meagre 
both in terms of reducing poverty as well as stimulating growth.
Analysing the world’s biggest volunteer public works programme, the In-
dian NREGS programmes by counterfactual, regression discontinuity de-
sign, Zimmermann (2012) has shown that the programme mattered more in 
terms of combatting poverty, but it had no effects on the Indian rural labour 
market. Concerning NREGS, Azam (2012) has found that the programme 
had significant effects on the activation and wages of females, but the study 
could not demonstrate similarly significant results for males. Examining the 
same programmes, Dutta et al (2012) have also shown that there was a higher 
need for the programme in the poorer parts of India, but actual participation 
rates did not reflect this need. Thus, the NREGS did not guarantee employ-
ment to all the poor: on the one hand, it generated queues and rationing, on 
the other hand, there were territorial inequalities in its targeting and many 
families above the threshold could get access.
There are few empirical studies on the operation of local labour markets, 
and thus, it is not known to what extent public works programmes crowd 
out employment in the private sector. The general view of evaluators is that 
as long as public works programmes are well targeted, they can be effective 
7 On one hand, because Latvia 
in this period was characterised 
by a very high level of unem-
ployment, which is to say, that 
it was very difficult to find other, 
even temporary work too. On 
the other hand, the number of 
benefit recipients and the cover-
age of assistance was rather low, 
and hence, participants in pub-
lic works did not forego serious 
alternative sources of income.
8 Since 2008, the World Bank 
has supported the financing of 
24 public works programmes 
in several developing countries.
9 It is important for targeting to 
adequately define the wages in 
the programme. Zimmermann 
(2012) notes that while wages in 
the public works programmes 
of Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Chilli, Senegal and Sri 
Lanka remained under market 
wage level, in the programmes of 
Botswana, India, Kenya, Tanza-
nia and Philippines, it occurred 
that higher wages were provided 
resulting in a crowding out ef-
fect on employment in the pri-
vate sector.
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measures of poverty reduction and social safety net provision by offering tem-
porary employment (Subbarao et al, 2013, Betcherman et al, 2004, Ravallion 
et al, 2013, del Ninno et al, 2009, Spevacek, 2009, Martin, 2000, 2014, Dar–
Tzannatos, 1999, Brown–Koettle, 2012, Zimmermann 2014). But, according 
to evaluation results, even this effect is valid only in the short-term, in par-
ticular, when public works wages remain below the minimum wage applying 
to the unskilled workforce (Ravallion, 1999, del Ninno et al, 2009, Ravallion 
et al, 2013). However, as active labour market measures promoting re-integra-
tion and opportunities in the labour market, public works programmes do not 
function well, moreover they are quite costly.
Evaluation evidence shows that it is more in the case of special situations 
when public works programmes can be justified and successful. On the one 
hand, during crises even in middle income countries there might be a need for 
income transfers providing appropriate stimuli for the poor (Brown–Koettl, 
2012). On the other hand, the programmes can be successful if they are aimed 
at regions or workforce groups in very disadvantaged situations, or if they 
also serve other goals besides increasing employment. Such temporary posi-
tive effect was shown, for example, by Vodopivec (1998) with regards to the 
Slovene programme, and the above statement is also valid for the Macedo-
nian and Slovak programmes as well (see Box K1.1). The analyses however 
also highlight the fact that public work programmes only help the situation 
of participants temporarily, and do not contribute to long-term employment 
opportunities. The evaluations produced on more developed and transition 
countries have rather revealed an overall negative effect on the employment 
chances and future earnings of participants (Card et al, 2010, Brown–Koettle. 
2012, Betchermann et al, 2004, Kluve et al, 1999, Heckman et al, 1999, Walsh 
et al, 2001, Rodriguez-Planas–Jacob, 2010, O’Leary, 1998).
Conclusions
Public works programmes are contested because they are highly expensive, 
and their benefits and success is uncertain, especially in the long run. Their 
use is often justified by economic and financial crises, when unemployment 
rises temporarily and aggregated demand decreases. It is for the mitigation 
of these causes that public works are introduced, but then they usually sup-
port re-employability and provide welfare functions, strengthening the so-
cial safety net. The latter objective is typical in developing countries, where 
– largely due to international donor organisations – the use of public works 
is increasingly prevalent.
Behind public works programmes, there is the workfare concept, accord-
ing to which the provision of benefits and income transfers should be linked 
to publically beneficial work. These programmes have spread in developed 
countries especially since the economic and financial crises.
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There are a number of arguments for and against public works programmes 
in the literature. Decisive elements in implementation and success are the 
following: good targeting (to what extent the programme reaches the poor), 
setting wage levels for adequate incentives, a clear and transparent regula-
tion and institutional environment that help counter fraud and corruption 
opportunities.
Nevertheless, evaluation results are rather unfavourable. Public works pro-
grammes seem to be fairly unsuccessful in terms of subsequent employment 
and earnings, yet – if they are well targeted – they can fulfil the role of social 
safety net. It is worth noting that while the programme evaluations produced 
with micro-econometric methods provide very important information about 
the efficiency of these programmes, they usually examine output results (sub-
sequent employment, wages) only. They do not include interactions among 
various labour market-oriented public policies (training, benefits, sanctions, 
other active measures, etc) important for activation. Very few evaluations have 
been done, for instance, on the effect of these programmes on inequalities 
or on the trade-off between efficiency and equity, which can be particularly 
interesting when stricter benefit sanctions increase employment and poverty 
at the same time.
Furthermore, it is important to point out that evaluations usually reveal only 
the short-term effects of the programmes, partly for lack of data, and partly 
for empirical estimation strategy reasons. In other words, the real, long-term 
(several years) impacts of public works programmes on poverty and unem-
ployment are unknown. For the chronically poor, temporary employment is 
not a real and long-term solution and if their continuous employment is not 
possible then public works are not a feasible measure to manage the problem. 
If poverty is extremely widespread in a country, then large-scale public works 
programmes can offer some sort of a temporary social protection, but at the 
same time, they can also crowd out other, alternative and more cost-efficient 
social policy measures.
A brief analysis of the European data reveals that the scale and magnitude of 
the Hungarian public works programme, by allocating all available resources 
for labour market measures only to this type of intervention, is a public policy 
response to the problems of the crisis and long-term unemployment unrivalled 
in Europe. This is one of the reasons why the analysis of the programme’s ef-
ficiency as well as its short and long-term impacts is a very important task.
Ágota Scharle: public workS programmeS...
59
K1.1. Public works programmes in Slovakia
Ágota Scharle
In Slovakia, long-term unemployment is at a simi-
lar level as in Hungary: in 2012, it amounted to 
about 20 per cent of the working age population. 
Long-term joblessness is especially high among the 
uneducated: in Slovakia 61, while in Hungary 49 
per cent of these were permanently unemployed.1
In the past twenty years, the Visegrad countries 
have used quite similar policies to tackle long-term 
unemployment, but centrally organised, state sup-
ported public works programmes have only reached 
a significant size in Hungary and Slovakia. Table 
K1.1 summarises the magnitude of public works 
programmes, while their institutional character-
istics are summarised in Table K1.2.
Table K1.1: Participants and spending on Public Works Programmes and PES staff in 2012
Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary
Average number of public workers (head) 24,702 6,669 54,968 92,412
% of the registered unemployed 1.1 1.3 13.2 14.2
Government expenditure (million euro) 40.4 27.4 51.1 245.0–455.3*
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.22–0.47
Government expenditure on public  
employment agencies** (% of GDP) 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.12
* The higher value is the official one, the lower value 
was adjusted to be comparable with the Slovak fig-
ure: the latter excludes taxes and social security con-
tributions paid on public works wages and exclude 
the potential cost of benefits as well, assuming that 
public workers would all be eligible for benefits.
** Job search assistance and administration pertaining 
to benefits and services.
Note: The data from Poland include public works and 
“socially useful work” (odbywający prace społecznie 
użyteczne) programmes. The data from Slovakia are 
from December 2012.
Source: Eurostat online, Mýtna Kureková et al. (2013) 
p. 27. MPIPS (2012), Scharle (2014a).
Governments have used large-scale public works 
programmes in Hungary and Slovakia since the 
mid-2000s, partly for the retention of work capac-
ities and stimulation of active job search, partly for 
the mitigation of poverty. In both countries, there 
may have also been latent political aims beside the 
officially declared ones, such as the appeasement 
of the working poor and of the middle class recep-
tive to prejudice towards benefit recipients (among 
them Roma), as well as the mitigation of social ten-
sions in disadvantaged villages (Guy–Gabal, 2012, 
Scharle et al, 2011).
By 2012, the number of public works partici-
pants have reached an unprecedented size (13–14 
per cent of the long-term unemployed). However, 
due to some differences in the regulations, the Slo-
vak programme costs significantly less: the gov-
ernment allocates 0.07 per cent of the GDP from 
the central budget as opposed to 0.22 per cent in 
Hungary (Table K1.1). In the case of Slovakia, this 
is roughly equivalent to the amount the govern-
ment spends on public employment services, while 
in Hungary, it is almost twice as much. The signifi-
cant difference in the costs is largely attributable 
to the fact that the public workers in the Slovak 
system are not paid wages, but only a supplement 
(which is lower than the difference between the 
public worker wage and benefit in the case of Hun-
1 Calculations for the 15–59 age group by Anna 
Orosz and Flóra Samu, based on European Labour 
Force Survey (EU LFS) data for 2012. The unedu-
cated were defined as having completed maximum 
lower-secondary education, the long-term unem-
ployed were defined as non-employed (either unem-
ployed or inactive) at the time of the interview and 
one year earlier.
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gary) to their benefits and organisational costs are 
usually financed by the local municipalities.
In both countries, impact assessments conduct-
ed up to now have found that these large-scale 
public works programmes are not able to decrease 
long-term unemployment, but provide temporary 
relief to jobless households and may also help re-
duce social tensions at the local level (see the main 
text of this chapter, Harvan, 2011, Duell–Mýtna 
Kureková, 2013). Moreover, since the budget allo-
cated for employment programmes is sparse, there 
are fewer resources for potentially more effective 
programmes, such as training.
According to international evidence, public 
works programmes can also decrease participants’ 
chances of re-employment (see the main text of this 
chapter). This may arise, for instance, from the so-
called lock-in effects. These may occur when job-
seekers can expect to be recalled on public works, 
as some may tend to take less effort to look for a 
job in the open labour market. The intensity of 
job search can also be decreased by the fact that 
in public works participants have less time to look 
for permanent and regular work, or they cannot at-
tend a job interview.2 In the Slovak case, the latter 
effect is slightly smaller, since public workers can 
work a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 20 hours 
a week. As of January 2014, this has been slightly 
modified to 64–80 hours per month (which is ap-
proximately 15–19 hours per week).
The opportunity for corruption is lower in the 
Slovak system. Since public workers receive a ben-
efit (not a wage), this is paid directly to them by the 
2 Obviously, this effect is only significant in those 
regions where there are plenty of available jobs.
Table K1.2: Design of public works programmes in 2013
Programme Hungary Slovakia
Explicit aims Activate the unemployed, prevent losing contact with the labour market, prevent loss of work 
habits, provide temporary relief to alleviate poverty
Latent aims Appease population that social assistance recipients, many of whom are Roma, have to work 
in order to receive support. Discourage black work
Who can participate? All registered unemployed, also rehabilita-
tion allowance recipients
Only minimum income benefit recipients
Do participants stay on the unemploy-
ment register?
No Yes
Working time per week 20-40 hours 10-20 hours
Maximum duration (month) 11 18, renewal after 6 months (for municipal 
contracts)
Compensation of public workers Wage Higher benefit (activation allowance)
Is it insured?* Fully (P, H, A, U) Partly (H)*
Who pays the compensation of workers? Central government reimburses employer via 
PES (up to 100% of wage costs)
Central government pays the higher benefit 
via PES
Who pays the other costs (organisation, 
materials, etc)
Employer but managers can be public work-
ers, subsidies are available for other costs
Organiser**
Supervision of use of government subsidy Very weak Weak
* Participants are covered by pension (P), health (H), 
accidents (A) and unemployment (U) as well. Un-
employment insurance would imply that they can 
earn eligibility for insured unemployment benefit 
after a certain period of public works. In the Slovak 
case the entitlement for health insurance is based on 
registered unemployed status not on participation in 
public works. LTU = long-term unemployed, PW = 
public works, SUW = socially useful work.
** In most cases this is the local government, but can 
also be the PES, in which case other costs are cov-
ered by the central budget.
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public employment agencies, without the involve-
ment of municipalities. Thus there is no such in-
centive that, for example, the municipality might 
make the participants sign for more work days than 
they have actually worked and keep (or share with 
participants) the reimbursement received from the 
central budget. However, in both countries there 
exists an unlawful practice whereby municipalities 
increase their access to resources by replacing their 
employees in unskilled occupations (for instance, 
cleaners or kitchen assistants) by public workers 
(Brutovská, 2006, Farkas et al, 2014).
The incentives leading to the continuous enlarge-
ment of public works programmes are smaller in 
the Slovak case. This is because public workers are 
not removed from the unemployment register, but 
continue to receive a social benefit, which is not 
paid by the municipality, but the local public em-
ployment service. By contrast, in the Hungarian 
system, it is the municipalities which pay the wag-
es of the public workers, and authorities check the 
use of sources only sporadically. As a result, local 
municipalities have a strong interest in organising 
public works and expanding the available budget. 
Moreover, in contrast to the Slovak system, public 
workers improve statistics in two ways: they de-
crease the number of the registered unemployed, 
and increase that of the employed. This means 
that any attempt by the central government to cut 
spending on public works programmes is likely to 
be met by a strong opposition from mayors, and 
will additionally attract bad publicity, since a mass 
layoff of public workers will immediately increase 
registered unemployment.
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Argentina underwent a very serious economic 
crisis in the 1990s. In 1996 the Argentinian gov-
ernment launched short-term public employment 
programmes (Trabajar) that provided temporary 
income transfers mostly to the poor, who did not 
receive other social assistance. By 2002, the deep-
ening of the financial crisis further exacerbated un-
employment, increased poverty and generated so-
cial tensions. Thus a newer, larger-scale programme 
(Jefes de Hogar) was initiated.
Trabajar programme, 1996–2001
The Trabajar programme was born as part of a se-
ries of labour market reforms planned for the long-
er-term, but mainly as a reaction to the problem of 
rising poverty related to the increase in unemploy-
ment caused by the effects of the 1995–1996 reces-
sion. The unemployment rate was 17 per cent on 
average but 40 per cent among the poorest in the 
lowest income-decile. The Trabajar programme 
replaced an earlier programme, called PIT, which 
had been proclaimed unsuccessful. Trabajar pro-
vided six hours per day public works temporary 
employment to the members of poorer households 
not receiving unemployment benefit, training or 
other assistance, primarily in small-scale local de-
velopment projects, which were also to the benefit 
of the poor.
Since the primary goal was poverty reduction, 
the main filter mechanism was low wage level. Evi-
dence has shown that the choice of an appropriate 
wage level is a critical element of the design and tar-
geting of public works programmes so that they ac-
tually reach the poorest. The wages in the Trabajar 
programme were later decreased, roughly to two 
thirds of the average wage earned by the poorest 10 
per cent in the country, so that the programme was 
attractive to only those with low income per capita 
and not very good employment prospectives. Be-
sides this self-selection mechanism, the programme 
applied regional development perspectives as well: 
only municipalities of the poorest settlements and 
districts could apply to the project in order to en-
sure that the poor in these localities were provided 
with work opportunities.
Financed by the Argentinian government and 
supported later by the World Bank (financing 
approximately 15 per cent of the costs), the pro-
gramme was implemented by the local and regional 
offices of the Employment and Social Affairs Min-
istry. The ministry compiled a “menu” from eligible 
projects, and provided a number of conditions, cri-
teria and other instructions to the design, evalua-
tion, selection and monitoring of projects. Eligible 
applicants were municipalities (66 per cent of to-
tal projects were run by them), civil organisations 
(15 per cent) and central agencies as well as private 
firms. The most important selection criterion was 
the disadvantaged situation of the region, but oth-
er factors, such as cost-effectiveness, social criteria 
as well as the administrative capacity of the imple-
menter were also taken into account.
In the framework of the Trabajar programme 
typically smaller-scale (below 100 thousand dol-
lars) construction and renovation projects were 
accomplished: renovation of smaller roads, bridg-
es, dams, schools, health institutions, community 
centres and construction of social housing. These 
lasted 4–6 months on average and employed 20 to 
a maximum of 100 persons. There was great empha-
sis put on the involvement of implementers in de-
cisions concerning the program, usage of well-de-
fined selection criteria and continuously performed 
detailed monitoring. Part of the non-wage relat-
ed project costs were financed by the participating 
municipalities themselves – but municipalities in 
disadvantaged regions received higher grants. In-
dividual participants in Trabajar received health 
insurance and coverage for accidents while being 
in the programme.
The selection mechanism worked well, according 
to many international studies and credible impact 
K1.2 Temporary public works programmes in Argentina: Lessons learned
Judit Kálmán
Judit Kálmán: temporary public worKs...
63
evaluations (Jalan–Ravallion, 1999, Ravallion et al, 
2001, Ronconi et al, 2006) Trabajar has been one of 
the best targeted programmes1 leading to consider-
able net income transfers: on average by 26 per cent, 
but in the case of the poor, it increased net income 
by 75 per cent. Due to the construction-type work 
far more males (cc. 80 per cent) than females worked 
in the programme, which created approximately 700 
thousand jobs in 85 per cent of the country’s settle-
ments. Another frequently mentioned positive fea-
ture of Trabajar was its harmonisation with oth-
er programmes and systematic monitoring. At the 
same time, it must be noted that Trabajar offered 
only temporary employment that could mitigate but 
not solve the problem of rising unemployment. Later 
on, participating municipalities ran out of resources 
devoted to the measures, and especially after 1999, 
when the crisis intensified again, the program began 
shrinking for budgetary reasons and subsequently 
reached fewer participants.
Jefes de Hogar programme, 2002–2009
This programme was initiated as a quick response 
to evolving social problems in the name of “in-
clusive society”. It focused on unemployed heads 
of poor households by providing them with be-
low minimum wage cash benefits for usually 4–6 
months. One condition of entry was that partic-
ipants enrol their children in schools and take 
them for certain medical checks. In addition, par-
ticipants had to perform community work and/or 
participate in training for 4–6 hours per day. The 
main goal of this programme was not infrastruc-
tural development but the provision of community 
services (community kitchen, handicrafts and oth-
er activities). Thus, the participation rate of women 
was above 70 per cent – much higher than in the 
Trabajar programme, and the local municipalities 
also assumed more important roles. In a short pe-
riod of time, Jefes became a much larger programme 
than Trabajar. 15 per cent of the active labour force, 
i.e. two million people participated in it, which rep-
resented serious challenges in terms of expenditure, 
administration, fraud prevention and so on.
The Jefes programme was less progressive than 
Trabajar, yet it covered a large element of those in 
need and distributed the supports effectively. This 
although, is difficult to evaluate, since beside the 
50 per cent unregistered employment, the govern-
ment did not possess accurate income statistics of 
the poor (Ronconi et al, 2006). Extended with new 
elements, the programme provided useful commu-
nity services and social infrastructure. Participants 
were categorised based on their chances of re-em-
ployment and long term needs for social support. 
Different programme modules (training, comple-
tion of education, local job placement, public works 
positions in services) were combined for these dif-
ferent groups. In each case, the programme pre-
scribed that participants’ children should also be 
beneficiaries of health and education services.
One of the main flaws of the programme was that 
it tried to find solutions for two problems – poverty 
and unemployment – at the same time. Further-
more, the very diverse local capacities also imped-
ed programme implementation (inaccurate regis-
ters, ill-coordinated work conditions, difficulties of 
personal counselling, etc.). There are several meth-
odologically adequate evaluations concerning the 
programme. According to the analysis of Galasso–
Ravallion (2004), many people entered the pro-
gramme who did not fulfil eligibility conditions, 
while some of the really poor were excluded. Never-
theless, the programme decreased aggregate unem-
ployment, and in its first years, the existence of the 
programme saved about 10 per cent of the partici-
pants from sliding into extreme poverty. Ronconi 
et al (2006) followed participants of the Jefes pro-
1 Among others, Ravaillon et al (2001) analysed the 
impact of Trabajar in a way that compared the 
subsequent income of those who exited the pro-
gramme (involuntarily) with those who stayed in, 
as well as with a control group of non-participants. 
According to the study, those who exited suf-
fered from high initial income loss in comparison 
to those who stayed in, as well as in comparison 
to the control group. The study though does not 
address the subsequent employment episodes of 
those who exited.
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gramme for two years in a rolling panel evaluation. 
Relying on the difference in difference method, the 
authors found short-term positive effects on the rise 
of income and therefore, on the decrease of poverty, 
but in the long-term they also observed some nega-
tive effects. Most of the participants were identified 
with very low productivity rates, and the selection 
mechanism was inefficient (many non-eligible in-
dividuals became beneficiaries, and many could 
stay in repeatedly for long periods), which raised 
issues about undue political influence. The evalu-
ation also questioned the programme’s effects on 
growth, as household consumption did not increase 
in the long-term. Moreover, a certain programme 
dependency had also developed. In relation to this, 
the authors raise some political economy consider-
ations, according to which the votes of the 2 mil-
lion participants dependent to such an extent on 
the programme naturally mattered for those poli-
ticians running it.
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K1.3 Scandinavian public works programmes
Tamás Bakó
Until the end of the 1980s, the Scandinavian wel-
fare states were characterised by a low unemploy-
ment rate and hence an easy to finance, generous, 
mainly passive unemployment service. As a result 
of a recession in the early 1990s, unemployment 
increased significantly (in Sweden, the unemploy-
ment rate was consistently below 2 per cent at the 
end of the 1980s, but increased to 8.2 per cent by 
1993), and therefore, earlier generous transfers 
could no longer be afforded. In response to the sit-
uation, the Scandinavian states extended active la-
bour market measures.
In the following we provide a brief overview of 
the Scandinavian active labour market measures, 
with particular emphasis on public works, a con-
cept which we are going to use in a broader sense 
than we are used to in standard Hungarian prac-
tice, as we include all forms of subsidised employ-
ment that aim to support permanent re-employ-
ment in the primary job market.
First, Sweden introduced social employment. In 
this programme employers received support for a 
maximum of six months after providing tempo-
rary (usually six months) employment to the un-
employed. The employees performed mainly social 
work for a wage corresponding to collective agree-
ments in the public sector. Subsidised employment 
was abolished in this form in 1998.
Subsequent measures essentially promoted work 
experience. An important feature of these measures 
was that they were usually directed at performing 
such activities that otherwise would not have been 
undertaken. Participating unemployed persons re-
ceived unemployment benefits, and work was organ-
ised by non-profit organisations, mainly local munic-
ipalities, ensuring that they did not crowd out any 
of the work force from the primary labour market.
Employee leasing was introduced in 1997 in the 
course of which employers received subsidies if they 
employed unemployed persons for six months (this 
could be extended by another three months). Dur-
ing this time the unemployed person had to work 
part time, but also participate in training and in-
volve themselves in job search. The wage received 
for work was limited to 90 per cent of the unem-
ployed person’s previous wage.
The above mentioned measures were partially 
replaced by the activity guarantee programme in-
troduced in 2000, whose main element was that 
eligibility for unemployment benefits was not pro-
longed following participation in active labour 
market programmes. This programme did not 
provide a single measure, but a framework system 
within which the unemployed could participate in 
various programmes. The target group of the pro-
gramme was the long-term unemployed, and those 
unemployed who in all probability would become 
long-term unemployed. Participants were either 
looking for jobs or participating in special labour 
market programmes.
In Finland, the unemployed person, in cooper-
ation with the public employment service, is re-
quired to prepare an employment plan that de-
scribes the active labour market measures that 
will be used by the job-seeker. A status report re-
lated to the employment plan must be sent each 
month to the Finnish social security office which 
then transfers the unemployment benefits based 
on this report.
The so called work trial is another noteworthy 
active labour market measure in Finland. The pub-
lic employment service offers temporary placement 
in different positions (PES) in which the jobseeker 
can demonstrate their skills and motivation to po-
tential employers. After the unemployed have tried 
their hands in the various tasks required in the de-
sired position, they discuss together with the PES 
and the employer, what other help they need to be 
able to do the particular job. During a work trial, 
the unemployed receive unemployment benefit and 
also a reimbursement of the travel and accommo-
dation costs that arise from employment.
In response to the crisis, further innovative la-
bour market measures were introduced in Finland. 
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One of these was the work exchange programme, 
in which older employees with a long employment 
record are replaced by an unemployed person, on 
the basis of an agreement with the employer, for 
a maximum of one year. For this period, the older 
employees receive compensation – unemployment 
benefits corresponding to 70 per cent of their wage 
–, and they are basically on paid annual leave, not 
being obliged to search for a job. This measure 
has explicitly been used to tackle cyclical unem-
ployment.
Another new programme is social enterprises that 
employ persons with multiple disadvantages or dis-
abilities. The social enterprises are market-based 
(profit-oriented activity must make up at least 50 
per cent of their revenue), but the wages of their 
employees are subsidised if they are members of 
one of the target groups mentioned above.
The youth guarantee programme provides intern-
ship and apprenticeship programmes in various job 
positions for the unemployed under 25 years of age 
and new graduates between 25 and 29 years of age, 
besides the previously mentioned work trial pro-
gramme.
In Denmark, a cornerstone of labour market 
policy is that it compels all unemployed persons 
to participate in some sort of activity. The starting 
date of compulsory participation depends on the 
age of the unemployed, and upon their request it 
can also commence earlier. Declining cooperation 
or participation results in the withdrawal of unem-
ployment benefits. The unemployed, in coopera-
tion with the staff of the PES, choose a programme 
that they deem the most beneficial to themselves, 
thus, this can be a voluntary programme as well.
In the case of Norway, since unemployment is 
relatively low, active labour market measures have 
been focused on the hard-to-place unemployed. In 
theory, all basic active labour market measures are 
available to the unemployed in Norway, but a few 
special programmes are only available to the un-
educated, immigrants and people living with dis-
abilities.
The most important active labour market meas-
ure, besides training, is wage subsidies that are 
provided to employers who employ disadvantaged 
people. The programme aims to provide an oppor-
tunity to gain work experience and acquire basic 
skills for unemployed school leavers and immi-
grants at private and public enterprises. An action 
plan is drawn up for each participant, which has to 
be accepted by the representative of the employer. 
The employer has to declare that the intern will be 
regarded as a potential employee: the aim of these 
rules is to reduce the crowding-out effect. The em-
ployer receives an operational grant after each ap-
proved internship contract.
*
In spite of the apparent differences, these Scan-
dinavian countries use subsidised work as an ac-
tive labour market measure, according to the same 
principles. The measures that require job-seekers to 
work while on benefit are intended for well-defined 
target groups. A very important common principle 
is that work is an opportunity rather than an ob-
ligation, and the employment of the unemployed 
person cannot lead to losses of existing jobs. Al-
though in the Scandinavian countries there is no 
similar programme to the Hungarian public works, 
it must be noted that in these countries the number 
of public employers is much higher than the OECD 
average. While in Hungary, public employers (e.g. 
forestry, water supply, public railway) employ pub-
lic workers – now increasingly full time – for pub-
lic sector wages lower than the minimum wage, in 
the Scandinavian countries analysed workers are 
hired for these positions as normal employees in 
the public sphere.
The following sources were consulted to prepare 
this paper:
Denmark: www.ma-kasse.dk;
Finland: www.te-services.fi and www.suomi.fi;
Norway: Duell–Singh–Tergeist (2009);
Sweden: Calmfors–Forslund–Hemström (2004).
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2 PUBLIC WORK PROGRAMMES IN HUNGARY
2.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT OF 
PUBLIC WORKS SCHEMES: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Katalin Bördős
This subchapter describes the regulation details regarding the various types 
of public works programmes in Hungary, discussing the system before 2011 
(in which basically three types of public works programmes existed) and the 
one after 2011 (the ‘unified’ system) separately. The subchapter also discusses 
institutional and legislation changes (including those concerning the funding 
mechanisms of public works programmes) as well as implementation issues.1
Types of public works programmes before 2011
Before 2011, public works programmes could take three distinct forms in 
Hungary (namely, organised by the ���, national authority, or by munici�
palities). These three types did not differ substantially in terms of content or 
types of activities they covered, but they did vary by the funding mechanisms 
and by who the responsible body was.
Although schemes under the name of ‘közhasznú munka’ (hereafter referred 
to as ‘����managed public works’) had been launched since as early as 1987 
(Csoba, 2010), it was only first regulated by Act IV of 1991 Regarding this 
type, any decision about subsidising participation was made by the public em�
ployment services (���): local offices were responsible for the placement of 
registered jobseekers who carried out public tasks (usually belonging to the re�
sponsibilities of municipalities) for a maximum of one year. A jobseeker could 
only be re�employed as a public worker within a two year period if they were 
not eligible for social insurance�based benefits, although this could be easily 
manipulated by employing someone on consecutive short periods with inter�
ruptions, enabling local ��� offices to employ them for more than one year 
(Szabó, 2013). A maximum of 70 per cent2 (after 1992, 90 per cent in the case 
of Roma participants or workers no younger than 45) of total wage costs and 
some direct costs (for example, transportation costs or protective equipment) 
could be financed by the decentralised part of the �mployment Fund allo�
cated by counties (Firle–Szabó, 2008, Frey, 2008). Funds for ����managed 
programmes dramatically decreased after 2009; with the global economic 
crisis deepening, its role was taken over by municipal public works schemes.
The second type of public works programmes, those operated by national 
authorities [közmunkaprogramok] was first launched in 1996: these schemes 
were usually organised for seasonal jobs requiring heavy manual labour, such 
1 I would like to thank Márton 
Kulinyi, Ágota Scharle and Irén 
Busch for the clarification on 
some details and their useful 
comments.
2 The level of intensity varied 
by county.
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as flood control, maintenance works in transport infrastructure and public 
buildings, or environmental tasks (Firle–Szabó, 2008). One of the most sig�
nificant of the national public works programmes was delivered under the 
framework of the ‘100 steps’ government programme from November 2005 
to the end of June 2006, involving 1024 (about every third) settlements na�
tionwide and providing work for a total of 24,550 participants (Audit Re�
port, ÁSZ, 2007).
Funding of national programmes was provided via tenders: before 2003, the 
responsible ministry, and from 2003 on, the �ublic Works Committee called 
for applications annually. The range of possible applicants covered local gov�
ernments and other public bodies, such as public utilities, forest management 
plans, or national parks. Applicants who proposed employing disadvantaged 
groups or who operated in disadvantaged regions received preferential treat�
ment during the tenders. Up to 60 per cent of all costs were covered by the 
central budget, a further 7–10 per cent had to be contributed by the appli�
cant, and the rest was financed from other sources, most often by �uropean 
Union funds (Firle–Szabó, 2008). The funding mechanism was regulated 
by the 49/1999 (III. 26.) government decree, which was modified several 
times over the years. These modifications included, for example, broaden�
ing the range of possible applicants; loosening the requirement of employing 
a minimum of 100 workers; providing more possibilities for training under 
the frameworks of the programme; and enabling a somewhat more flexible 
accounting for costs (Audit Report, ÁSZ, 2007). From August 2008 on, the 
applicants were required to ensure that at least 40 per cent of workers were 
persons eligible for regular social assistance (Frey, 2008).
The third type of public works programme, the municipal public works 
scheme [közcélú foglalkoztatás], was introduced from May 2000 by the 
modification of the �ocial Code in 1999. The main goal of the introduc�
tion was to provide temporary work opportunities for regular social assis�
tance [rendszeres szociális segély] claimants: participation in municipal 
public works for at least 30 days was prescribed as an eligibility condition 
for social assistance. Beneficiaries were only exempt from this condition in 
the event that neither the municipality nor the local ��� office could offer 
any public works. The requirement regarding the 30�day participation has 
remained in force during the whole period and was not affected by con�
secutive changes in the minimum income scheme, such as tightening the 
behavioural requirements in 2005, changing the formula for the amount 
in 2006, and introducing the unemployment assistance in 2009 (first un�
der the name of ‘rendelkezésre állási támogatás’ [RÁT], later renamed as 
‘bérp�tl� juttatás’ [B�J], and later as ‘foglalkoztatást helyettes�t� támoga�
tás’ [FHT]). Municipal�type programmes were organised and operated by 
local governments or their partnerships.
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Among the three types of public works programmes, the municipal one had 
the most generous subsidies for the municipalities from the central budget. 
Before 2009 (pre�‘Road to Work’�period), the annual �ublic Budget Act de�
termined an ear�marked budget for municipal public works. Th e central sub�
sidy could be spent on the wage costs of the participants, material expenses or 
administration costs. The amount of the subsidy the municipality received 
depended on the number of participants and the number of days they were 
employed (for example in 2008, it was set as 3,900 HUF per participant per 
day). The annual overall amount by settlement was constituted by a fixed 
amount (in 2008, it was 50,000 HUF) and an additional amount that de�
pended on the number of regular social assistance recipients and municipal 
public works participants in the previous year. This allocation mechanism 
proved to be inefficient and inflexible in the period between 2000 and 2002, 
as it did not allow for redeployment of resources between settlements: while 
in some cases settlements did not absorb all available funds, in other cases 
some settlements had a deficit (Audit Report, ÁSZ, 2007). From 2003 on, 
redeployment among settlements was enabled: settlements which absorbed 
more central funds during the first half of the year were allocated more re�
sources for the second half of the year, whereas available funds for settlements 
which relied less on public works were cut. It was the Hungarian �tate Treas�
ury which was responsible for administering and paying the subsidies.
Road to Work programme, 2009–2010
The main objective of the Road to Work programme (which was announced 
in 2008 and launched in 2009) was to provide additional funding resources 
for local governments, enabling them to provide work opportunities in mu�
nicipal�type programmes to a substantially higher number of welfare recipi�
ents. Besides increasing the budget for local governments, some other changes 
regarding public works were introduced. First, those who were no older than 
35 and had not finished elementary school were obliged to take part in formal 
education instead of participating in public works. �econd, each municipality 
had to work out a so�called ‘public works plan’ which included calculations 
for the number and distribution of prospective public works participants, 
along with details on the nature of planned tasks, timing, and funding needs 
(Scharle et al, 2011). These annual plans had to be developed in cooperation 
with the local ��� office in charge, and had to be finished prior to the 31st 
of January in each year.
At the same time the programme was launched, the social welfare system 
underwent a substantial change. The group of regular social assistance claim�
ants were divided into two groups: those who were assessed as able to work 
and those who were not. The formal group of claimants became eligible for 
a new benefit, the unemployment assistance [rendelkezésre állási támogatás], 
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and became the main target group of public works schemes. The latter group 
(those who were assessed as incapable for work, due to ailing health status or 
other reasons) continued to receive social assistance. While unemployment as�
sistance claimants had to register as jobseekers and were obliged to cooperate 
with the staff of the local ��� office, social assistance claimants were subject 
to behavioural requirements set by the body appointed by the municipality, 
which was usually the family assistance centre.
The Road to Work programme provided a budget for municipal public 
works that was considerably larger than ever before. Furthermore, the govern�
ment also tried to incentivise municipalities to expand public works through 
a change in the funding mechanism: in the case of municipal public works, 
the intensity of central funding increased to 95–100 per cent from the pre�
vious level of 90 per cent, whereas in the case of unemployment assistance, 
central funding was only 80 per cent (Scharle et al, 2011). Act CLXIX of 
2007 (which set the public budget for the year 2008) defined a budget for 
municipal�type public works which was much larger than in the previous 
years. From this budget, the Treasury automatically reimbursed 95 per cent 
of wage costs for every public worker the settlements requested funding for 
in every month. �ubsidies were also available for the rest of the wage costs 
(5 per cent): the annual public budget acts defined a formula for a grant that 
was differentiated by the social characteristics of the settlements, and the to�
tal amount of subsidies paid to municipalities depended on the total popula�
tion of the settlement (in 2010, for example, it was 4,100–20,300 HUF per 
person). The formula for the unit cost depended on the number of regular 
social assistance claimants and on the number of public works participants 
in the previous year, among other factors.
The ‘unified system’ after 2011
Main changes
From �eptember 2011 onwards, the three types of public works programmes 
described above were abolished and replaced by the ‘unified system for public 
works schemes’. The new system is regulated by Act CVI of 2011, while the 
funding mechanism is described by the 375/2010 (XII. 31) government de�
cree. Legal oversight was taken over from the Ministry for National �conomy 
by the Ministry of the Interior from 1 July 2011.3
The new act has established a previously non�existent form of legal relationship, 
the so�called public works engagement, which has replaced the former legal re�
lationship (employment) of public workers. This meant that since 1 �eptember 
2011, public workers can be hired at a wage lower than the statutory minimum 
wage set for those in a legal relationship of employment. The minimum wage 
set for public workers is declared via government decrees, and amounts to about 
3 During the preceding gov-
ernment’s rule between 2006 
and 2010, the responsible gov-
ernmental department was the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour (SZMM).
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76–88 per cent of the net minimum wage (depending on the year); for public 
workers employed in higher skilled jobs (requiring a certificate), it is about 84–
86 per cent of the net minimum wage4 (Busch–Cseres-Gergely, 2011, Molnár 
et al, 2014). In addition, public workers are now entitled to fewer days off (20 
days per calendar year, irrespective of age) compared with those employed on 
the open labour market. Concerning other rights and responsibilities of public 
workers, the Labour Code (Act I of 2012) has remained in force.
In the new system, behavioural conditions applied to public workers also 
became stricter: unemployment assistance claimants are now obliged to accept 
any jobs offered, irrespective of their education level; before 2011, they were 
allowed to reject jobs for which they were overeducated (by more than one 
level) without any sanctions. Furthermore, finishing elementary school is no 
longer compulsory for uneducated jobseekers under 35 (a rule which was in�
troduced at the launch of the Road to Work programme) (Molnár et al, 2014).
Behavioural conditions were tightened once again from January 2013: those 
who decline to participate in the public works programme that was offered 
not only face a reduction in benefit level but can also be erased from the un�
employment register and excluded from all future public works opportunities. 
From �eptember onwards, jobseekers who do not comply with local decrees 
that prescribe keeping their garden and surroundings clean, or whose child 
under the compulsory school�leaving age is frequently absent from school 
without a justified reason, can also be disqualified from participation (Cseres-
Gergely–Varadovics, 2013).
Subtypes of public works schemes in the new system
�ince 2011, potential subtypes of public works schemes are the following 
(based on Molnár, et al, 2014, Kulinyi, 2014, and Tajti, 2011):
– �hort�term public works: these programmes last for 1–4 months and in�
volve part�time work for a maximum of 4 hours per day. �articipation is possible 
only for unemployment assistance recipients. This type of programme became 
extremely rare in 2012 and had become non�existent by 2013 (Mód, 2013).
– Long�term public works programmes: these programmes originally lasted 
for 2–11 months; from 2015 onwards, the maximum duration is 12 months. 
They involve full�time work for 6–8 hours per day. �ince the beginning of 2015, 
rehabilitation benefit claimants (those with health impairments but assessed 
as able to work) have the opportunity to work for only 4 hours per day. The 
main target group of these programmes is the group of unemployment assis�
tance claimants, although any jobseekers can participate.
– New national public works programmes: these programmes are organ�
ised by state�owned corporations (such as public utilities or forest manage�
ment plans), for tasks including flood control or maintenance works in pub�
lic transport infrastructure. The maximum duration is 12 months, and work 
4 Since 1 January 2015, the full-
time wage for public workers 
in unskilled occupations (that 
require no certificate) is HUF 
79,155 per month, and HUF 
101,480 per month for public 
workers in occupations requir-
ing a certificate, as defined by 
the 376/2014 (XII. 31.) govern-
ment decree. Since 2013, a public 
worker hired as the head of a 
working group is entitled to a 
somewhat higher wage: as of 
2015, it is HUF 87,090 in un-
skilled occupations and HUF 
111,660 in occupations requiring 
a certificate. Similarly to wages 
in the open labour market, wag-
es of public workers are subject 
to personal income tax (16 per 
cent), social security contribu-
tions paid for pension (10 per 
cent), health insurance (7 per 
cent) and unemployment insur-
ance (1.5 per cent); employer-
side contributions are the social 
contribution (13.5 per cent) and 
the contribution for vocational 
education (1.5 per cent).
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can be done for 6–8 hours per day (for rehabilitation benefit claimants, 4–8 
hours per day).
– ‘Value�generating public works’ programmes: the objective of these pro�
grammes was to ‘support activities that enable local governments to save costs 
or to accumulate revenues’ (Molnár et al, 2014). They operated until 2012.
– Model programmes ‘�tart’: these programmes operated under the long�
term public works category until 2013, when they became a distinct subtype 
(Mód, 2013). Managers of these programmes receive additional professional 
assistance and consulting during the planning and implementation phases. 
�ub�categories include the ‘micro�regional model programmes’ (that are imple�
mented in disadvantaged regions; Kulinyi, 2014) and the ‘agricultural model 
programmes’. The long�term objective of agricultural model programmes is 
to encourage and establish self�sufficient economies by supporting social co�
operatives and subsistence farming. From November 2013 on, the condition 
for receiving subsidies from the central budget is that revenues from these pro�
grammes must be spent on wage costs of public workers or on the management 
of the social cooperatives (Cseres-Gergely–Varadovics, 2013). The programmes 
are usually complemented by training for the participants: this training can 
only be offered by the state�owned Türr István Training and Research Insti�
tute, a background institution of The Ministry of Human Capacities (Mód, 
2013). Besides the micro�regional and the agricultural model programmes, 
other subtypes of the �tart programmes exist that can cover a wide range of 
activities: for example, ‘special �tart model programmes’ can subsidise jobs 
for homeless jobseekers, or can finance cultural community development etc.
– Transitory programmes during winter: due to the strong seasonality of 
employment, these programmes try to counterbalance the usually lower em�
ployment rate during winter time. The first programme was launched in No�
vember 2013, and covered activities such as processing horticultural prod�
ucts, indoor maintenance works, or working in public administration, social 
services or public education institutions (Kulinyi, 2014). These programmes 
were most often linked with training for the participants.
– Mobility support for public workers: job exchange. �articipation is pos�
sible exclusively for unemployment assistance recipients.
– �ubsidies for small� and middle�sized enterprises to hire unemployment as�
sistance or rehabilitation benefit claimants: these programmes are very similar 
to wage subsidy measures that subsidise hiring workers who increase the total 
workforce at the firm. The subsidy covers 70 per cent of wage costs and can be 
given for a maximum of 8 months. After the subsidy is used up, the employer 
receiving the subsidy is obliged to extend the contract of the subsidised work�
er for an unsubsidised period that is at least half as long as the subsidy lasted.
Figure 2.1.1 presents the distribution of programme types (implemented in 
2014) by the amount of final costs and the number of participants.
National 
model programmes
Other model 
programmes
Long-term 
programmes
National 
programmes
Micro-regional 
model programmes
Spending
(billion HUF)
Participation
(persons)
78.0
34.8
42.8
1.5
120,000
81,000
180,000
2.4 1,367
4,947
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Figure 2.1.1: Spending and participation in public works programmes by type, 2014
Source: Belügyminisztérium.
Funding
Managers of public works programmes can apply for funding from the cen�
tral budget at the regional ��� agency in charge. The source of funding is 
the �mployment Insurance Fund (later renamed as the National �mploy�
ment Foundation); complementary training is financed by ��F grants, such as 
�RO� 1.1.2/1.1.4 (Busch, Cseres-Gergely and Neumann 2012) or �RO� 2.1.6 
(Mód, 2013). The intensity of central funding depends on the subtype of the 
programme: it can be up to 100 per cent of total wage costs (including social 
security contributions) in the case of long�term public works programmes. In 
certain cases, central funding can also be spent on direct costs other than wage 
costs or on administration costs: the level of intensity varies between 5–20 per 
cent of the total subsidy on wage costs (depending on subtype; see Table 2.1.1).
Table 2.1.1: Intensity of central funding since 2011 (per cent)
Short-term Long-term National
Model programmes ‘Start’ 
(except for the  
‘special’ variation)
‘Special’ model 
programmes 
‘Start’
Gross wage costs 95 70–100* 100 100 100
Direct costs 5 20 20 Depends on the no. of partici-pants, piecewise linear***
A maximum of 
30
Administration costs 1,5** 3
* Depending on disadvantaged/non-disadvantaged status of the settlement.
** Since 2015 and only for municipalities with no independent town hall.
*** Programmes with 1–15 participants: up to 100 per cent; programmes with 16–45 
participants: 100 per cent for the first 15 participants, 90 per cent for the rest 
(above 16); programmes with 46–135 participants: 100 per cent for the first 15 par-
ticipants, 90 per cent for the second 15 participants (16–45), 80 per cent for the rest 
(above 45); programmes with more than 135 participants: 100 per cent for the first 
15 participants, 90 per cent for the second 15 participants (16–45), 80 per cent for 
the third 15 participants (46–135), 70 per cent for the rest (above 135).
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Summary: main changes in the institutional and legislative 
context concerning public works in the past 20 years
�ince the transition in 1989/1990, the institutional and legal context of public 
works schemes in Hungary has undergone several transformations. Arguably, 
the Road to Work programme (launched in 2009) and the ‘unification’ of 
the system (introduced in 2011) brought about the most substantial changes. 
For an overview on the different types of programmes during the period of 
1991–2015, see Table 2.1.2.
Table 2.1.2: Overview of public works types
PES-type  
public works
National-type  
public works
Municipal-type  
public works ‘Unified’ system
Period 1991–2010 1996–2010 2000–2010 2011–
Type of activities all kinds of municipal 
tasks
municipal communal, envi-
ronmental tasks, or other 
public functions
all kinds of municipal 
tasks
all kinds of municipal tasks 
and tasks defined in Act CVI 
of 2011
Target group any registered job-
seeker
mainly long-term unem-
ployed
2000–2009: RSA-
claimants; 2009–2010: 
UA-claimants
registered jobseekers (UA-
claimants), rehabilitation 
benefit-claimants
Potential employers municipality, munici-
pal company, public 
body, NGO
municipality, public author-
ity, public company
municipality, municipal 
company, public body, 
NGO
municipality, public body, 
church, NGO, municipal or 
public company, etc.
Funding agency PES (from the Unem-
ployment Insurance 
Fund)
Public Works Committee 
(from the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund)
Hungarian State 
Treasury (from the 
Unemployment Insur-
ance Fund & national 
budget)
PES (merged into the general 
government offices in 2015)
Way of application for 
central funding
reimbursement 
through the PES
through tenders by normative funding reimbursement through the 
PES / general government 
office
Intensity of central 
funding
up to 70 per cent 60 per cent 90–95 per cent 70–100 per cent
(Subsidised) wage paid 
for participants
statutory minimum 
wage
statutory minimum wage statutory minimum 
wage
wage for those engaged in 
public works (set by gov. 
decree)
Duration of programme max. 12 months depends on programme 
(about 3–12 months)
min. 30 days – max. 12 
months (in each year)
max 12 months, in 2014: 
max. 11 months (can be 
extended); since 1 January 
2015: max. 12 months + can 
be extended by 6 months
Related legislation Act IV of 1991 (Fltv.)  6/1996 (VII. 6.) MüM min-
istry decree; 49/1999 (III. 
26.) gov. decree; Funding: 
49/1999 (III. 26.) gov. de-
cree; 199/2008 (VIII. 4.) 
gov. decree
Act III of 1993 (‘Social 
Code’); Funding set in 
the annual public 
budget acts
Act CVI of 2011 (Kftv.); Fund-
ing: 375/2010 (XII. 31.) gov. 
decree; Wages declared by: 
170/2011 (VIII. 24.) gov. 
decree
Notes: RSA – regular social assistance (‘RSZS’), UA – unemployment assistance 
(‘RÁT’, ‘BPJ’ or ‘FHT’). MüM – Ministry for Employment Policy.
Source: Kulinyi (2014), author.
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Activities covered by the three types of programmes before 2011 did not dif�
fer significantly, although national�type programmes had a higher propensity 
to involve tasks that required heavy manual labour, whereas municipal�type 
and ����type programmes covered all kinds of activities that usually belong 
to municipal responsibilities, including administration tasks. Concerning the 
characteristics of the target group, all three schemes targeted those not em�
ployed on the open labour market, specifically the long�term non�employed. 
The main objectives of all three types, as communicated by the governments 
(work test, providing income support for long�term unemployed and welfare 
recipients, supporting the least developed regions) were also similar. Howev�
er, the intensity of funding from the central budget, as well as the reimburse�
ment mechanisms differed among the three types. As municipal�type pro�
grammes provided the most generous incentives for local municipalities, after 
the introduction of this programme type in 2000, it became more and more 
prevalent, and total costs spent on this type gradually increased during the 
period (although total expenditures on national�type programmes exceeded 
the amount spent on municipal�type programmes in 2006, most likely due 
to the ‘100 steps’ government programme in that year) (see Figure 2.1.2). The 
introduction of the Road to Work programme in 2009 brought about a dras�
tic expansion of municipal�type programmes: the intensity of subsidies from 
the central budget as well as the allocation mechanism of subsidies became 
even more favourable for the municipalities, and the total budget appropri�
ated for public works was also enlarged.
Figure 2.1.2: Cost of public works programmes by type (billion HUF at 2000 prices)
Note: No data are available on National-type public works for the years 2000, 
2001 and 2003.
Sources: 2000–2003: Scharle et al (2011), 2004–2010: Frey (2010), 2011–2012: 
Employment and Public Works Database [Foglalkoztatási és Közfoglalkozta-
tási Adatbázis], 2013: Law on the state budget of Hungary.
By launching the Road to Work programme, the government intended to fur�
ther strengthen the principle of ‘work instead of benefits’, a principle which 
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had become more and more dominant in governmental communication since 
the year 2000. This doctrine prevailed and also became more emphasised af�
ter 2011: besides the expansions of public works in volume and costs, the ob�
ligations of the long�term unemployed concerning job search behaviour and 
cooperation with the ��� have become stricter. Former programme types 
(the municipal�, the national� and the ����type schemes) were abolished and 
replaced by a ‘unified’ scheme; this reform aimed at reducing the fragmen�
tation of the institutional system and the different funding mechanisms by 
programme type (however, the intensity of central government funding still 
differs by programme subtype). In the new system, the ��� rather than the 
municipality alone allocates participants to programmes, somewhat reduc�
ing corruption risks. One of the most significant changes from 2011 was the 
introduction of a new legal relationship, applied to those engaged in public 
works: this provided legal bases for hiring public workers at a wage lower 
than the statutory minimum wage. Despite the name ‘unified public works 
schemes’, various subtypes exist that differ by length and other characteris�
tics; the prevalence of these subtypes has varied over the last four years, with 
some of them fading into non�existence. To summarise, the budget appro�
priated for public works programmes has been expanding over the years, and 
this increase is likely to continue in the future, due to the fact that Hungarian 
employment policy is becoming more and more dependent on public works 
programmes as the main instrument among active labour market measures.
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2.2 SURVEY-BASED AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA  
ON PUBLIC WORKS
Irén Busch & Katalin Bördős
This subchapter summarises and evaluates the most important available data 
sources on the size and costs of public works programmes in Hungary. Since 
the various types of programmes were organised and funded by different 
agents, available datasets might also differ by source, coverage and method-
ology of data collection. We provide here a short overview on the availabil-
ity of data covering the different time periods by unit of observations (aggre-
gate-, regional- or individual-level data) and assess the reliability of datasets 
and their potential for research purposes.
Official aggregate data on the number of participants
On the total number of public works participants, two official time-series data-
sets were available for public usage (Cseres-Gergely–Molnár, 2014a, Molnár et 
al, 2014) before 2015. The first one was included in an annual report published 
by the National Labour Office [Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal; the office was 
dissolved on 31 December 2014] on the number of participants in active la-
bour market measures (Mód, 2013). The relevant statistics are the total num-
ber of participants involved, which is the total number of people who were 
engaged in public works programmes for at least once (at least for one day) 
during the relevant period, thus it does not provide information on the num-
ber of days employed or intensity of work (part-time, full-time). Distributions 
by type of programme (municipal-, national or PES-type), county, gender and 
age group are available. The second relevant data source is a monthly report 
published by the Central Statistical Office of Hungary [Központi Statisztikai 
Hivatal] under the name ‘Wages’, which includes a table on its last page on 
the average number of participants (headcount) in public works programmes. 
This shows the daily number of participants averaged over the month (KSH, 
2014). Data are published by month and by number of working hours.
A third official publication on total headcount exists since 2015, however 
it only includes data from the year 2013: these are published on the official 
website for public works programmes, launched in 2015 by the Ministry of 
the Interior. Available statistics cover both the total number of participants 
involved in a given month and the average number, and also the number of 
participants entering and exiting programmes per month. The source of data 
is the Integrated Information System maintained by the National Employ-
ment Service, and not the reports of the local jobcentres (as was the case in 
the annual reports of the Labour Office).
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Settlement-level data
Treasury data on the number of participants in municipal public works 
programmes (unpublished)
The Hungarian State Treasury [Magyar Államkincstár] used to maintain two 
datasets on the number of participants and expenditures of municipal-type 
public works programmes, which existed until 2011. The source of the first 
database was the municipalities’ (settlements) reports on local government 
spending and revenues. The information source consists of about 50 separate 
forms: it is not cleaned or assembled into a standardised and user-friendly 
dataset. In theory, data covers the total number of public works participants 
in every Hungarian settlement; however, item nonresponse is common, which 
limits the opportunities for analysis (see the methodological appendix of 
Scharle et al, 2011 for details).
The other dataset of the Treasury contains data on the amount of munici-
pal-type public works subsidies paid from the central budget to the munici-
palities. This encompasses data on the amount requested by the municipali-
ties, the amount transferred, the number of subsidised workers (by number 
of working hours), and days spent in programmes in every month. This data 
source seems to be the most reliable information on the headcount and to-
tal costs, as aggregating the settlement-level data on the national level is the 
best approximation of the published official aggregate statistics. Data are only 
available until 2010, as from 2011 on it is the local PES offices instead of the 
Treasury who administer the costs of the programmes. A disadvantage is that 
it only provides information on municipal-type programmes (during this pe-
riod, a total of three types of programmes ran in parallel, one of which was 
the municipal-type), and it only contains information on subsidies spent on 
wages, thus no information is available on material or administration and 
management costs.
T-STAR
The Regional Statistics Database System (T-STAR) is a settlement-level col-
lection of data covering various topics, maintained by the Central Statistical 
Office and published annually. The two relevant variables, ‘total number of 
participants in municipal-type public works’ and ‘total spending on munic-
ipal-type public works’ belong to the topic ‘Municipal welfare system’. Data 
that belong to this topic are based on the No. 1206 form of the National Data 
Collection Programme (OSAP), which is a questionnaire filled in by local 
governments and sent to the KSH. Between 2003 and 2010, the first vari-
able contained the number of unemployment assistance claimants who par-
ticipated in municipal-type programmes, weighting part-time and full-time 
workers equally (that is, headcount was not full-time equivalent). The second 
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variable was total spending on municipal-type programmes in the given year, 
accounted by the municipality (including both wage costs and material and 
administration costs). From 2011 on, the variable on the headcount repre-
sents the number of unemployment assistance claimants who participated 
in any public works programmes, while the information on total spending 
is no longer available.
In the case of Budapest, both variables are constituted as the sum of the 
district municipalities’ relevant variables, meaning that data on Budapest do 
not include spending and headcount in programmes organised by the mu-
nicipality of the capital (which covers all districts but has an independent 
separate budget), resulting in an underestimation of the actual spending and 
headcount in the case of Budapest.
Although expenditure data of the Treasury and those in the T-STAR do not 
cover exactly the same elements (for example, the T-STAR includes all costs 
accounted for programmes, whereas the Treasury only has data on subsidies 
for wage costs), not unexpectedly, there is a strong correlation between the 
two series. However, there are some controversies as well: there are some set-
tlements where T-STAR data is missing or zero, while according to the Treas-
ury data, a positive amount was transferred as a subsidy (about 1–5 per cent 
of all settlements, depending on year), suggesting item nonresponse from the 
municipalities’ part during the KSH’s data collection for the T-STAR. There 
are also some settlements where the difference between the two series is sub-
stantial: the value of either variable is greater or smaller by 30 per cent than 
the other variable’s value (about 13–18 per cent of settlements). Assuming 
that the Treasury’s data is more reliable (since it is not based on self-reporting 
of the municipalities and is linked with actual cash transfer), one must treat 
T-STAR data concerning these settlements with caution.
Individual-level data
The Hungarian Labour Force Survey (Central Statistical Office)
The questionnaire for the Hungarian version of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
contains more than one question on public works participation. Before 2014, 
there were two questions that touched upon engagement in public works. 
Those who claimed that they were employed with a temporary contract (as 
opposed to an open-ended one) are asked about the reason for that, and one 
of the options is ‘Because I am employed in a public works programme’ (em-
ployment in public works schemes always come with a temporary contract). 
The other relevant question was about whether the respondent received any 
benefits for active-age persons: one of the options until 2013 was ‘I do not re-
ceive any benefits at the moment but participate in a public works programme’. 
Based on these two questions, two distinct estimates could be made on the 
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number of participants for the years before 2014, but neither could distin-
guish the participants of the three types of public works programmes (that 
existed until 2010). Besides that, some inconsistencies arise when comparing 
the two estimates (see the methodological appendix of Scharle et al, 2011 on 
the details of this comparison and calculations). The yearly estimates based on 
the question about benefit receipt are more in line with trends based on other 
data sources, hence this variable seems to be more reliable for estimating the 
total number of public works participants, compared with the responses to 
the question about the reason of the temporary contract (Scharle et al, 2011).
Since 2014, a direct question about participation in public works has been 
added to the questionnaire, while the relevant option of the question about 
benefit receipt was dropped. Another question has been added, which is about 
whether the respondent participates in training related to a public works pro-
gramme.
The main advantage of the H-LFS is that it contains a rich set of variables 
on the labour market characteristics of the respondents, enabling researchers 
to analyse participants by several aspects. Another strength is the rotational 
panel design and the fact that all individuals in the household are observed. 
On the other hand, since it is a survey based on the self-reporting of the re-
spondents (or one of their family members), responses to the relevant ques-
tions are prone to measurement error: for example, some participants might 
not be aware of the exact nature of their legal status and might misreport it 
as regular employment; some others might feel stigmatised by their partici-
pation and thus may not admit it to the interviewer.
Unemployment register data by the National Employment Service
The datasets of the unemployment register – administered by the National 
Employment Service – include basic information (e.g. residence, date of birth, 
sex, education level etc.) on all registered jobseekers as well as benefit receipt 
and participation in active labour market programmes. Data on public works 
participation come from two sources. First, engagement can be registered as a 
reason for temporary suspension of registered unemployment status or unem-
ployment benefit receipt. Second, it can also be coded among the active labour 
market programmes. Data for the years before 2011, however, is of question-
able quality: national-type and municipal-type public works programmes were 
not always registered by the local PES offices, as these were not organised by 
the PES (as opposed to PES-type programmes). With the reform of the pub-
lic works institutional system in 2011, a new information system called Em-
ployment and Public Works Database (FOKA) was introduced in September 
2011 that replaced the previous system called Employment and Social Sys-
tem (EADAT). In the new system, claims for benefits for active-age persons 
(namely, the unemployment assistance and the regular social assistance) are 
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registered by the municipality (by the notary’s office)1, while participation in 
ALMPs (including public works) is administered by the PES via their own in-
tegrated system. In the previous system, if an assistance-type benefit claimant 
entered a public works programme, it was the notary’s office’s responsibility 
to register this action. However, since there are no sanctions defined in the 
relevant legislation against failing to register this information, municipalities 
do not have incentives to enter all data they are theoretically required to do 
(Audit Report, ÁSZ, 2013). Hence, data on participation in municipal-type 
public works for the years before 2011, as well as data on assistance-type ben-
efit claims for the whole period is not necessarily reliable.
Another drawback is that the location (the settlement) of the programme 
in which the worker participated cannot be observed: the dataset only has 
information on the permanent address of the jobseeker (which is not neces-
sarily the same as the location where they live or work) and on the location 
of the local PES office.
On the other hand, register data have the advantage of containing rather de-
tailed information on all jobseekers registered, which offers a good opportuni-
ty for research. For example, Molnár et al (2014) analyse employment chances 
on the open labour market for those exiting public works programmes, using 
unemployment register data after the introduction of the new FOKA system.
Database on employment spells – data by the National Tax  
and Customs Administration
This database was created in May 2004, and originally only contained data on 
employment spells that were covered by the Labour Code. To assemble the 
dataset, initial data was provided by the National Health Insurance Fund of 
Hungary (OEP). On 1 January 2007, the Standardised Hungarian Employ-
ment Database (‘EMMA’), managed by the PES, was terminated, and since 
then, employers are required to report all changes concerning employment 
spells to the tax administration agency. Since 1 September 2011, this report-
ing obligation also applies to the legal relationships of engagement in public 
works. Besides the start and end dates of the employment spell, the number 
of working hours as well as the code for the occupation [based on the Hun-
garian Standard Classification of Occupations (FEOR)] are registered.
The tax administration agency shares the contents of the dataset with the 
Central Office for Administrative and Electronic Public Services (KEKKH), 
which is a data managing authority that belongs under the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Interior; it is also the legal successor of the National Labour 
Office in managing the dataset. Based on this dataset, exits from public works 
programmes can be monitored: the Ministry of Interior calculates the ex-par-
ticipants’ rate of employment on the open labour market within the first 30 
and on the 180th day after the end of the programme. The anonymised ver-
1 �� �� 1 ����� ��1�� �� �� ��� ���
n��a� ��v��nm�n� �ffic� a� ��� 
m�c��������n ��v��.
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sion of the dataset is also frequently used by researchers, as it can be linked 
with other administrative datasets through a special hash code generated for 
individuals based on their social security number. Although data is not al-
ways precisely reported by employers (missing data is not uncommon), the 
dataset is still rather well-suited for analysis purposes: it provides an oppor-
tunity for examining the history as well as the exit rates of participants of 
public works programmes.
Aggregate data based on this dataset is not published by the tax adminis-
tration agency.
Further data sources on the characteristics of public works participants
There are some other data sources that focus explicitly on the characteristics or 
living conditions of public works participants; these are usually small-sample 
survey or interview data that are not necessarily representative of the whole 
population of public workers. For example, Koltai (2013a) examines the labour 
market attachment of a total of 283 participants in five micro-regions through 
a survey designed directly for this purpose. Another example is a report made 
by the Hungarian Anti-Poverty Network (Farkas et al, 2014), which is based 
on another survey on a total of 533 public workers (and in-depth interviews 
with 42 additional workers): it contains questions on the history, income sta-
tus and employment prospects of the respondents. A third survey conducted 
by Bass (2010) is, contrary to the previous two surveys, a representative one, 
although it only covers the 33 least developed micro-regions of Hungary. The 
survey was conducted during June and July 2009, which is shortly after the 
Road to Work programmes were launched: the sample covers a total of 1,718 
households (with 7,844 individuals) in 52 settlements.
On the deviations among statistics based on different data sources
As discussed in the beginning section of this subchapter, aggregate headcount 
statistics are published both by the Central Statistical Office and by the Min-
istry of the Interior. In addition, in the case of the Central Statistical Office 
[KSH], two different data sources provide a basis for the aggregate statistics: 
the Hungarian Labour Force Survey and the data collection through the 
institutional system. Due to methodological reasons and the peculiarity of 
each data collection process, aggregate statistics on the headcount might dif-
fer. These peculiarities are the following:
1) The KSH’s data collection through the institutional system: data pro-
viders are all firms that employ at least 50 workers, a representative sample of 
firms with employees numbering between 5–49 and of non-profit organisa-
tions, and all public institutions financed by taxes or social security contri-
butions. Deviations from other statistics might arise from the fact that not 
all employers are covered by this data collection, even though the number of 
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public workers hired by firms with less than 5 employees or by non-profit or-
ganisations is not significant (however, non-profit organisations show a slowly 
increasing trend in hiring public workers, especially since 2015).
Official statistics on the average stock headcount concerning those engaged 
in public works are published once a month. It is important to note that the 
headcount is not in full-time equivalent: all participants are considered with 
a weight of one who, at the time of the data collection, have a contract con-
cerning engagement in public works for at least 60 working hours per month 
(even if the contract is terminated before the end of the month). Corrections 
by KSH on previously published statistics are frequent.
2) The Hungarian Labour Force Survey, conducted by the KSH. As previ-
ously described, the LFS is a regular household survey with questions on the 
economic activity of persons between the ages of 15 and 74. The objective of 
the survey is to monitor employment and unemployment trends using sta-
tistics that are comparable among countries and are not affected by changes 
in the Hungarian regulation and methodology. Statistics are therefor based 
on the standard definition of the International Labour Organisation (ILO): 
an employed person is defined as someone who, during the week before the 
questionnaire is conducted (reference period), performed some work for at 
least one hour and received compensation (wage or salary) for it, or who had 
a formal attachment to their job but were temporarily not at work (e.g., due 
to illness or vacation) during the reference period. In the case of public work-
ers, those who participated in training related to a public works programme 
are also considered as public workers, regardless of whether they actually per-
formed work or not during the reference period.
Data collected from the questionnaires are weighted using sampling weights 
and aggregated to the level of the population. Monthly statistics are not pub-
lished, instead, the KSH calculates three-month averages. Since they are esti-
mated on a sample, the headcount statistics are subject to sampling error on 
the one hand, and measurement error on the other. The smaller the sample is, 
the larger the sampling error is; measurement error can result from the fact 
that household members can respond to the questionnaire on behalf of their 
family members, and might not know the exact nature of the legal relation-
ship the other is engaged in.
3) Statistics based on administrative data and published by the Ministry of 
Interior. The source of the data is the information system used by the PES2 
to keep track of clients (registered jobseekers); the database is managed by 
the Central Office for Administrative and Electronic Public Services. The 
relevant statistics concerning the number of public works participants is the 
monthly average stock headcount, which is the daily number of participants 
averaged over the month. During the calculations on the total headcount 
– contrary to the KSH’s statistics based on its institutional data collection – 
� B����� ����� ��1�� ��� ��ca� 
PES ����c��; ���m ����� ��1� 
�n� ��� m�c��������na� ��n��a� 
��v��nm�n� �ffic��.
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participants who exit from public works programme during the month are 
weighted by a number less than one. Since it is based on administrative data 
instead of a sample, the total population of participants can be observed. It 
is important to note that – consistently with the methodology used for other 
labour statistics – monthly headcounts are calculated by taking into account 
participants between the 20th day of the relevant month and the 20th day of 
the consecutive month. This can make a substantial difference, especially in 
months when a large-scale programme starts or ends. In statistical reports, 
new clients or events are feature in the period when they were recorded in 
the register. As of January 2015, data for a given month are recorded on the 
20th day of the following month.
Summary
There are several data sources that can be used for the estimation of the num-
ber of participants or total costs of public works programmes in Hungary. 
However, they differ by exact content, methodology, the period for which 
they are available, and level of reliability. For the period before 2011, some 
of these datasets (for example the T-STAR or the expenditure data of the 
Treasury) solely relate to municipal-type programmes that existed until 2011, 
whereas other databases (such as the unemployment register data) have more 
reliable data on PES-type public works programmes. We summarise the most 
important data sources that are available on the settlement or at individual 
level in Table 2.2.1.
Comparing the data sources above, we can conclude that it is basically im-
possible to assemble a dataset that covers all types of public works programmes 
and calculates headcounts or costs based on a consistent methodology over a 
longer period. As pointed out by the State Audit Office of Hungary (Audit 
Report, ÁSZ, 2013), even headcount calculations that are supposed to refer 
to the same period and to the same programmes (but are based on different 
data sources) are not always consistent with each other. Since the changes of 
the institutional system and reduction of the fragmentation of the funding 
mechanism in September 2011, the reliability of the database managed by the 
labour institutions has improved. Official aggregate statistics on total head-
count are published by both the Central Statistical Office and the Ministry 
of Interior; these statistics might differ due to the methodological details of 
the data collection process and ways of calculation.
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Table 2.2.1: Overview of the most important data sources on public works programmes
Database Source of data Content Unit of observation Advantages Disadvantages
Treasury data on 
municipal public 
works programmes
municipalities’ re-
quests for funding 
[62/2006 (III. 27.) 
gov. decree, appen-
dix No. 6]
amount of subsidies 
requested and trans-
ferred to settlement, 
monthly headcounts
municipality (month) supposedly reliable 
data on expenditure
only cover municipal-
type programmes, 
only for the years 
before 2011
KSH T-STAR OSAP form no. 1206 
(obligatory reports 
from the municipali-
ties’ part)
number of partici-
pants & total ex-
penditure on munici-
pal-type public works
municipality (year) consistent (harmo-
nised) time series, 
available for a longer 
period
in some cases, less 
reliable data; only 
cover municipal-type 
programmes
KSH H-LFS household survey participation in 
public works at the 
time of response
individual (quarter) rich data on indi-
vidual characteristics
potential misreport-
ing
PES register (Eadat, 
Foka)
unemployment regis-
ter
reason for suspen-
sion of benefit or 
jobseeker status, 
participation in 
ALMPs
individual (spell) rich data on indi-
vidual characteris-
tics; covers all regis-
tered jobseekers
not necessarily reli-
able data on public 
works for the years 
before 2011
NAV data Form No. 15T1041 
on employed persons 
covered by social 
security insurance
engagement in pub-
lic works, FEOR-code, 
number of working 
hours
individual (spell) rich data on indi-
vidual characteris-
tics; covers all public 
workers
occasionally missing 
data
N����: KSH = C�n��a� S�a�����ca� Offic�� OS�P = Na���na� S�a�����ca� Da�a C����c�
���n P����amm�� N�V = Na���na� Tax and Cu���m� �dm�n����a���n� PES = �ub��c 
�m���ym�n� ���v�c�� FEOR = Hun�a��an S�anda�d C�a���fica���n �� Occu�a���n�.
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2.3. PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES IN THE PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM, 2011–2013 – BASIC FACTS
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely & György Molnár
Public works has been the most significant employment policy programme 
since 2010 both in terms of spending and the number of participants. For 
2015 the Government has envisaged the participation of 200 thousand per-
sons in public works and allocated 270 billion HUF from the national budget.
The public works portal of the Government1 was launched on 25 March 
2015, which provides, among others, basic statistical data from the beginning 
of 2013. However, it does not sufficiently describe the important features of 
the programme because of the period covered and the definitions applied. 
The situation is further aggravated by separation of the management of, and 
government data on, public works and related training as well as other labour 
market programmes.
There are two regularly published sources available on the preceding pe-
riod (see also Sub-chapter 2.2.). One of these is the publication of the Na-
tional Labour Office (NLO), closed on 31 December 2014, on the number 
of participants involved in active labour market policies (Tajti, 2012, Mód, 
2013) and the other is the table included on the last pages of the report “Sal-
aries” (entitled “Headcounts and Salaries” previously) of the Central Statis-
tical Office (CSO).2 The publication of the NLO is quite detailed but only 
uses the special term “headcount of participants involved” (or more specifi-
cally: net headcount of participants involved). The CSO publication uses 
the term “average monthly headcount”, but the groups included change an-
nually even after 2011, which strongly limits comparability. The CSO data, 
going back to 2013, have recently been re-published in a modified structure 
in the Stadat database.
Vertically consistent data on the average headcounts of Hungarian public 
works programmes between 2011–2013 were first published in the studies 
Molnár et al (2014) and Cseres-Gergely–Molnár (2014). In the present study 
public works programmes are examined from a broader aspect, as part of the 
client path, ideally approaching work on the open labour market, undertaken 
by the unemployed in the public employment system,3 defined as the services, 
supports and programmes of the Public Employment Service and other gov-
ernmental authorities. We made our calculations using the primary data set 
provided for us by the National Labour Office (NLO), stored in the Data-
bank of the MTA KRTK.
First this data set is presented below as well as the relevant details of data 
processing. Then the share of beneficiaries of the public employment system 
1 http://kozfoglalkoztatas.kor�
many.hu 
2 http://www.ksh.hu/earnings
3 Note that this concept does 
not exist in the literature, but 
is our definition. Its similarity 
to the known concept “Public 
Employment Service” (PES) is 
partly a play on words, partly a 
deliberate choice: it is an exten�
sion of the PES by other related 
institutions.
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in the individual programmes is examined. In this respect several statuses 
in the social welfare and public employment system are identified (only reg-
istered, participating in a programme or currently outside the system). The 
specific succession of these statuses is called “sequence”. The final part of the 
Chapter provides an overview of the most frequent sequences and their main 
characteristics.
The labour micro-database of MTA KRTK and the process  
of data cleaning
The main characteristics of the micro-database
The research relied on the individual data of the Employment and Public 
Works Database (EPWD) of the (now closed down) National Labour Of-
fice.4 The part of the database provided at our disposal contains the primary 
database of registered job seekers, participants of public works and other 
labour market programmes as well as beneficiaries of job seekers’ allowance 
[álláskeresési járadék] and employment substitute allowance [foglalkozta-
tást helyettesítő támogatás] between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013.
The data sets are based on episodes. Episodes are events in an individual’s 
life with duration of potentially more than one day. Episodes are defined by 
four pieces of information: the individual concerned (personal data), the start-
ing and closing date of the episode as well as its nature (registration, public 
works, training and other programmes and type of support). Episodes with 
differing characteristics are considered individual episodes even if they are 
related in time. Episodes may overlap only if they are registration and pro-
gramme episodes.
In accordance with data protection rules, individuals are indexed by an 
artificial identifier; the following personal data are available: sex, age group, 
educational attainment, and place of residence (municipality). The starting 
date of the ongoing episodes of individuals already included in one of the 
registries on 1 January 2011 is also known. Since the system of public works 
was transformed completely on 1 January 2011, there was no episode of this 
kind that had commenced prior.
Since data from the registry of employees held at the tax authority (previ-
ously called Unified Hungarian EPWD, see Section 2.2) was not available to 
us, it is not known whether individuals leaving the public employment sys-
tem take up employment or not – except for a monitoring undertaken 180 
days after the end date of public works (discussed in Sub-chapter 2.6 in de-
tail). Because of regulations on benefits it is likely that the majority of par-
ticipants leaving and re-entering the system take up work in between but it is 
not certain. In case of those leaving the system and not re-entering it during 
the period concerned, not even this may be assumed.
4 We wish express our thanks to 
the officials at the National La�
bour Office, especially to József 
Tajti Head of Department as 
well as Attila Kicsi, Péter Mód, 
Miklós Németh and János Papp 
for their valuable help.
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Improving the consistency of the data set
Public works participants are in principle removed from the unemployment 
registry and are re-entered upon finishing their participation in public works. 
However, the registry was not in accordance with this procedure and includ-
ed public works participants in most cases. This duplication was corrected.
The case was similar for several other active labour market programmes. As 
for active labour market programmes, participants of training programmes5 
and public benefit works programmes were included in the registry, while 
the participants of the following programmes were not: wage (cost) support, 
support for becoming an entrepreneur, support for internship of young pro-
fessionals, housing allowance, supporting the employment of individuals en-
titled to availability allowance6 [rendelkezésre állási támogatásra jogosultak 
foglalkoztatásának támogatása] and local transport allowance. (A summary 
table of the headcounts of these programmes in 2011 and 2012 is published 
– Molnár et al, 2014, p. 72.) Discrepancies were also corrected in these cases.
Occasionally, (public works or other) programmes or episodes overlapped 
in time. This was probably due to failing to close down the earlier programme 
in the registry. We merged overlapping or directly contiguous registration epi-
sodes. In case of programmes overlapping in time, we closed the earlier one 
on the starting date of the subsequent one. These changes only concerned less 
then 1 per cent of the episodes.
It was an important issue to decide what to do with programmes follow-
ing one another in a very short time (often a few days). They accounted for a 
few per cent of the episodes. It was considered that they be merged. However, 
thorough analysis showed that they are not due to registration mistakes but 
individual programmes with different characteristics. It may have also hap-
pened that the break between the two programmes was actually longer than 
shown but the earlier programme was not closed on time – but it was not pos-
sible to correct it. The seemingly technical decision may have an impact on 
the proportions of participants entering the open labour market from public 
works (or other programmes).
For example, one day after the closure of a public works episode a new one 
is started, which lasts for more than six months, following which the partici-
pant concerned takes up employment on the open labour market. At the time 
of monitoring, in 180 days after the end of the first episode, the participant 
is not working on the open labour market, while in 180 days after the sec-
ond he is, which gives a 50% rate of finding employment. If the two episodes 
are merged, monitoring only takes place after the second episode and this re-
sults in a success rate of 100%. Since the real issue is whether someone enters 
another public works programme after the first episode, we decided not to 
merge episodes following one another in a short time period.
5 Except for the training provid�
ed for public works participants 
and training support provided 
through employers.
6 The strangely named avail-
ability allowance is paid to the 
long�term unemployed whose 
health would enable them to 
participate in public works but 
they do not receive an offer at 
the moment. The name implies 
that they are available to public 
works. Later it was renamed as 
wage�substitute allowance �b�r�
pótló juttatás] and then as em�
ployment substitute allowance 
�foglalkoztatást helyettesítő tá�
mogatás]. The monthly amount 
of 22,800 HUF (about 75 EUR) 
has been unchanged for years.
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Public works in the public employment system
From 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013 nearly 1.8 million persons were 
involved in the public employment system for some length of time (Table 
2.3.1.). A little more than a million of these (59%) entered the public employ-
ment system during the three years, while the others had already been within 
the system on 1 January 2011. If someone left the public employment system 
and re-entered it (maybe several times) during the period of the research, they 
were taken into account as one person. The relationship with the public em-
ployment system is a broader concept than being registered as unemployed; 
it supposes the fulfilment of at least one of the following three requirements 
(overlaps are possible):
1. registered unemployed,
2. participant of a public works programme,
3. participant of another active labour market programme.
Table 2.3.1: The number of those involved in the public employment system between 
2011 and 2013 and their share in the various programmes
Headcount  
(thousand persons)
Share  
(percentage)
Number of those involved in the public employment system 1774 100.0
Only registered 1180 66.5
In public works (total) 449 25.3
 – without training 331 18.7
 – with training 118 6.7
Other programmes 202 11.4
Totala 1831 103.2
a The number exceeds the number of participants of the public employment system 
and 100 per cent, because 57 thousand persons (equalling 3.2 percentage point) 
participated in both public works and other programmes.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EPWD.
In the following, the succession of various employment statuses of the partici-
pants of the public employment system (taking into consideration the above 
limitations) will be discussed. Since the main objective is to analyse public 
works, the other active labour market programmes are presented together. 
There are five different statuses:
1. registered unemployed, not participating in any of the programmes (here-
inafter only registered),
2. public works participant, not receiving training,
3. public works participant receiving training,
4. participant of another active labour market programme,
5. is outside the public employment system but was involved in the system 
sometime during the three-year period of the research and re-entered it.
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Occasionally, status 2 and 3 are merged.
Precisely two-thirds of the 1.77 million persons involved in the social wel-
fare and public employment system did not participate in any programmes, 
one quarter of them participated in public works sometime during the three 
years and somewhat more than one-tenth participated in another programme 
(Table 2.3.1.).
More than one quarter of the 450 thousand persons participating in pub-
lic works during the three years took part in two different years and slightly 
less than one quarter of them were “regulars” and participated in it in each 
of the three years (Table 2.3.2.). In case of the other programmes, the share 
of participants taking part in the programme in two different years is basi-
cally the same but the share of participants taking part in a labour market 
programme in three years is insignificant.
Table 2.3.2: Accumulation of participation in programmes in various years,  
2011–2013 (percentage)
One Two Three
Total
years’ participation
Public works 48.6 28.1 23.3 100.0
Other programmes 69.0 29.4 1.6 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EPWD.
Taking a look at the individual years separately reveals that the number of 
those involved in the public employment system did not change – it was only 
in 2012 that figures were five per cent higher than in the other two years (Ta-
ble 2.3.3.).
Table 2.3.3: The number of participants in the public employment system  
and the annual percentages of participants in the various programmes, 2011–2013
2011 2012 2013
Number of participants in the 
public employment system 
(thousand persons)
1174 1226 1164
Number and share of partici-
pants of programmes
Thousand 
persons %
Thousand 
persons %
Thousand 
persons %
Public works (total) 236 20.1 234 19.1 315 27.0
 – without training 234 19.9 222 18.1 201 17.2
 – with training 2 0.2 13 1.0 114 9.8
Other programmes 81 6.9 85 7.0 101 8.7
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EPWD.
The number of participants in public works did not change between 2011 and 
2012 but then significantly increased in 2013 due to public works including 
training. Their share within the participants of the public employment sys-
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tem grew from slightly below 20% to more than 25%. Public works includ-
ing a training element had scarcely existed previously. In 2013 the number 
and share of participants of other programmes also increased but part of this 
increase may have been virtual: while in 2011 and 2012 the proportion of 
participants (of public works and other programmes) taking part in the pro-
grammes repeatedly within a year was below one percentage point, this fig-
ure doubled in 2013 (this is not presented in a separate table). The thorough 
analysis of microdata showed that for some participants of public works in-
cluding training, periods of various lengths were registered as labour market 
training. In fact, these were most likely to be elements of the same programme.
The total of days spent in the public employment system did not change dur-
ing the three years examined (Table 2.3.4.). Participants took part in any of the 
programmes on slightly less than one-fifth of their days spent in the public em-
ployment system. The proportion of days spent in programmes increased from 
14 to 23 per cent mainly due to public works. The proportion of days spent in 
public works including a training element increased less than the proportion 
of days spent in the public employment system. The number and proportion 
of days spent in other (not public works) programmes increased slightly.
Table 2.3.4: The number and share of days spent in the public employment system, 
2011–2013
2011 2012 2013 Total
Number of days in the public employment 
system (million) 263 266 266 795
Share (percentage)
Only registered 85.7 80.2 77.0 80.9
Public works (total) 10.5 15.5 18.3 14.8
 – without training 10.4 15.3 15.6 13.8
 – with training 0.0 0.3 2.7 1.0
Other programmes 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Share of days spent out of / in the public 
employment system (percentage) 16.5 24.6 13.1 18.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EPWD.
The share of days spent outside the public employment system is a distorted in-
dicator, since it necessarily has lower values in the first and last year than in the 
middle year. In 2011 it does not contain those who were within the system in 
2010 and also re-entered later but were outside the system at the beginning of 
2011. The case symmetrically applies to 2014. There are two reasons the propor-
tion of the days spent outside the public employment system was nevertheless 
included in Figure 2.3.4. Figures for 2012 indicate that the persons involved 
in the public employment system spend – compared to the time within the 
system – 25 per cent of the time outside the system. Since there are some who 
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are in the public employment system throughout the whole year, the propor-
tion of the time spent outside the system in the case of those repeatedly leav-
ing and re-entering is significantly higher. This will be discussed in detail later.
It is worth noting that in 2013 relatively fewer days were spent outside the 
public employment system than in 2011, although the distortion described 
above should be symmetrical. Thus the volume in this case is not interesting 
but the difference between the two proportions is. This difference is highly 
likely to be due to the increase in the time spent in public works.
The average length of participating in public works grew from less than 
four months in 2011 to nearly six months in 2012 (Table 2.3.5.). Since the 
number of participants did not increase during this two year period (Table 
2.3.3.), the increase in the number of days spent in public works was the re-
sult of the increase in the average length of participating in public works. The 
length slightly decreased in 2013 but remained above five months. On aver-
age, public works participants took part in public works for slightly less than 
nine months in the three years examined.
Table 2.3.5: The average length of participation, 2011–2013 (number of days)
2011 2012 2013 2011–2013
Public works (total) 117 177 155 262
 – with training 35 53 62 66
Other programmes 126 133 123 168
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EPWD.
The average length of participation in other labour market programmes was 
about four months in each of the three years. Because of multiple participa-
tion, the average length throughout the three years was 5.6 months.
The length of training organised in public works was two months on aver-
age in 2013. This requires two remarks as explanation. Considering that this 
programme was launched as part of the public works programme that start-
ed in December 2013 (see Sub-chapter 2.8), the length of the programmes is 
longer but data are not available from 2014. On the other hand, there is only 
one month of public works with a training element in 2013 (see Table 2.3.2.). 
The average of 66 days results from the fact that some persons participate in 
six-month or even one-year-long public works programmes including training.
Average headcounts
The number of those involved in the public employment system did not change 
between 2011 and 2012 and basically the number of participants of other (not 
public works) programmes stagnated too. Redistribution of proportions was 
caused by public works, since the increase in public works participants was ac-
companied by a decrease (of the same extent) in the number of persons only 
registered but not taking part in any programmes (Table 2.3.6.). While in 2011 
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the number of public works participants was 2.7 times higher than the partici-
pants of other labour market programmes, by 2013 this figure increased to 3.9.
In 2011 more than half of the total headcount was employed four hours 
daily. This type of public works was discontinued in 2012 and only six- and 
eight-hour employment remained, with a strong predominance of the latter. 
Thus the full-time equivalent headcount for the three years increased even 
more between 2011 and 2012 (the final line of Table 2.3.6.).
Table 2.3.6: Average annual headcounts in the public employment system,  
2011–2013 (thousand persons)
2011 2012 2013
Only registered 618 584 562
Public works (total) 75 113 133
 – without training 75 111 114
 – with training 0 2 19
Other programmes 28 31 34
Total 721 728 729
Full-time equivalent in public works 54 108 128
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EPWD.
Monthly figures are similar to annual ones (Table 2.3.1.). Apart from seasonal 
fluctuation, the number of those involved in the public employment system 
is more or less stagnating, while the number of participants in programmes 
slightly increases without any fluctuation. Consequently, the headcounts of 
public works participants and those only registered mirror each other pre-
cisely. There is a strong seasonal decrease in the number of public works par-
ticipants at the end of 2011 and 2012, which is offset by winter public works 
organised at the end of 2013.
Figure 2.3.1: Average monthly headcounts in the public employment system 
(thousand persons)
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The proportion of public works including a training element or organised as 
training per se started to grow at the end of 2012 and then there was a sudden 
surge in November 2013. Although this increase was slightly at the expense of 
public works without training, it mainly entailed a net increase (Figure 2.3.2.).
Figure 2.3.2: Public works with and without training, monthly figures  
(thousand persons)
Characteristic individual paths in the public employment system
The definition of a sequence
When entering the public employment system, the majority of participants 
initially only become registered unemployed. After a while they either leave 
the system or receive some kind of “treatment”: they participate in public 
works or other active labour market programmes. Upon completing the pro-
gramme, they either leave the system or become registered unemployed again. 
Those leaving the system also sometimes re-enter.
This section examines the typical paths taken by participants in the public 
employment system between 2011 and 2013. Merging the two types of pub-
lic works programmes, we continue to differentiate between four statuses in-
dicated by the following letters:
R = registered unemployed,
W = public works participant,
P = participates in another programme,
O = currently outside the public employment system but was involved pre-
viously and re-enters later.
The path of a person entering the public employment system is defined by 
the series of the daily statuses. A full sequence is the series of 1096 letters cor-
responding to the 1096 days between 2011 and 2013. This would be unman-
ageably long; therefore the days spent in the same status are merged. The se-
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ries created in this way, containing information from the various episodes is 
called a sequence. The path of an individual registering initially as unemployed, 
then leaving the system after receiving labour market training (because of e.g. 
finding employment) but re-entering and registering as unemployed again 
before participating in public works is described by the following sequence: 
R–P–O–R–W. Sequences end if an individual leaves the system for good or 
the final date of the data set available is reached. This representation only 
takes into account the succession of episodes but not their length; however, 
in some cases their length will also be discussed.
A sequence may be further simplified by examining only the episodes of a 
path but excluding their succession. The above sequence then contains the 
following episodes: WOPR. In this case the elements follow one another al-
phabetically and in order to differentiate it from a sequence, no hyphens sep-
arate the letters.
The most frequent sequences
The individual paths of the 1.8 million persons in the public employment sys-
tem during the period examined is described by 4000 different sequences, the 
20 most frequent of which are presented in Table 2.3.7.7 These cover nearly 
89 per cent of the people involved.
More than half of the participants entered into the register, did not participate 
in any programmes, left and did not re-enter. Figure 2.3.3. shows the length of 
the episode of those who entered and left the system during the period exam-
ined. The majority (53 per cent) leaves the system within 120 days. It is worth 
noting that the peak is on days 92–94, i.e. the days after the end of the disburse-
ment of the job seekers’ allowance. About one-third is still within the system 
after 180 days, without participating in any programmes – and after one year 
the number of participants with this status is still more than 40,000 persons.
Returning to the issue of sequences, the next large group includes the par-
ticipants who left the public employment system and then re-entered but did 
not participate in public works or any other programmes. This may happen 
once or several times (see items 2, 4 and 15 in Table 2.3.7.). The variations of 
staying in the registry and out of the system once or several times account for 
less than 16 per cent of the sequences, as seen in line 2 of Table 2.3.8. (Please 
note that Table 2.3.8. – as opposed to Table 2.3.7. – lists episodes within the 
various combinations not in the order of their occurrence but alphabetically.)
70 thousand of the 450 thousand public works participants participated in 
public works once and then became registered unemployed again (R–W–R). 
42 thousand of them participated in public works after registration and then 
either left the public employment system or were still in public works at the 
end of 2013 (R–W: see line 6 of Table 2.3.7.). Less than 7 per cent left the sys-
tem as public works participants, while the others are still within the system.
7 Calculations related to se�
quences were made using the fea�
tures of the Stata sq programme 
package. Authors: Ulrich Kohler, 
Magdalena Luniak and Chris-
tian Brzinsky-Fay.
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Table 2.3.7: The most frequent sequences describing paths  
in the public employment system
Number Type of sequence
Headcount (thousand persons) Proportion (percentage)
total not right-censoreda total not right-censored*
1. R 899,560 688,849 50.72 65.06
2. R–O–R 212,808 144,599 12.00 13.66
3. R–W–R 69,554 35,801 3.92 3.38
4. R–O–R–O–R 52,271 31,824 2.95 3.01
5. R–P 46,200 29,616 2.60 2.80
6. R–W 41,747 2,806 2.35 0.27
7. R–W–R–W–R–W 34,600 321 1.95 0.03
8. R–W–R–W–R 33,576 11,539 1.89 1.09
9. R–W–R–W 29,841 855 1.68 0.08
10. R–W–R–W–R–W–R–W 24,256 107 1.37 0.01
11. R–P–R 22,385 13,895 1.26 1.31
12. R–W–R–W–R–W–R 21,007 4,160 1.18 0.39
13. R–O–R–W 14,770 581 0.83 0.05
14. R–W–R–O–R 14,439 7,141 0.81 0.67
15. R–O–R–O–R–O–R 12,794 5,703 0.72 0.54
16. R–O–R–W–R 12,224 6,133 0.69 0.58
17. R–P–O–R 10,608 6,146 0.60 0.58
18. R–O–R–P 9,123 3,945 0.51 0.37
19. R–W–R–W–R–W–R–W–R–W 7,989 26 0.45 0.00
20. R–W–R–W–R–W–R–W–R 6,293 1,227 0.35 0.12
1–20. total 1,576,045 995,274 88.85 94.00
Total of sequences observed 1,773,743 1,058,773 100.00 100.00
a Not right�censored data means the participant left the public employment system 
before 31 December 2013.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 2.3.3: The length of staying in the public employment system  
of participants only registered who entered after 1 January 2011  
and left before 2013 (N = 485,794)
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Table 2.3.8: The combination of episodes in the various sequences and their share 
(N = 1,173,743 persons)
Number Type of sequence combination Proportion (percentage)
1. R 50.72
2. OR 15.83
3. WR 15.59
4. WOR 6.48
5. PR 4.62
6. OPR 3.47
7. WPR 1.83
8. WOPR 1.39
9. P 0.04
10. W 0.02
11. WP 0.00
12. WOP 0.00
13. WO 0.00
14. OP 0.00
Total 100.00
Note: The episodes follow one another alphabetically in the combinations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The situation is different for the sequence R–P. A relatively high number of 
participants, nearly 30 thousand, were registered as unemployed first and then 
left the system after one programme participation.
Sequences containing public works
Table 2.3.9. presents the combination of episodes of Table 2.3.8. as well as 
their share. There is practically no sequence containing public works exclu-
sively or public works and another programme; the majority of participants 
enter public works after at least a short registered unemployment. There are 
four main types:
1. the most frequent one is alternating registered unemployment and pub-
lic works participation;
2. in about one quarter of the cases the above combination is interrupted 
by one or more periods spent outside the public employment system;
3. in 7 per cent of the cases participants also take part in other programmes 
in addition to public works;
4. in addition to the above (type 3), there is also time spent outside the pub-
lic employment system.
In view of quitting public works permanently, the case of those not within 
the public employment system on the last day of the period examined is es-
pecially important. There are only 100 thousand persons like this out of the 
450 thousand involved in the public employment system during the three 
years (Table 2.3.9.). The others (WOR, WOP and WOPR types) also left the 
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system after a public works episode but they were within the system again 
on 31 December 2013.
Table 2.3.9: Share of combination of episodes containing public works
Number Type of episodes
Share (percentage)
total  
(N = 449,203)
Not right-censored 
(N = 99,139)
1. WR 61.55 58.59
2. WOR 25.60 29.41
3. WPR 7.24 6.58
4. WOPR 5.51 5.22
5. W 0.08 0.15
6. WP 0.01 0.01
7. WOP 0.01 0.02
8. WO 0.01 0.02
Total 100.00 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Only 7 per cent of the 58 thousand persons belonging to type WR and leav-
ing the system in the three-year period finished their path via public works; 
the others left the system from registered unemployed status. This may have 
a technical reason, which will be discussed later. The most frequent sequence 
(62 per cent) participants of this type went through is R–W–R, followed by 
R–W–R–W–R (20 per cent) and R–W–R–W–R–W–R (7 per cent). It is only 
5 per cent that exit after a sequence of R–W. There are individuals alternating 
between the two statuses ten times.
The proportion of WOR types, i.e. those who were also outside the system 
in addition to being registered and participating in public works, is some-
what higher among the permanent leavers than in the whole sample. It seems 
that individuals who already have been outside the system are more likely to 
leave it again. This type is very varied: it includes more than 500 sequences. 
It has two relatively frequent forms (among the not right-censored cases): 
R–W–R–O–R at 24 per cent and R–O–R–W–R at 21 per cent. Less than 5 
per cent of them leave the system after a public works episode.
The less significant WPR type also includes more than 400 different se-
quences. Leaving the public employment system is the most common in the 
case of the R–W–R–P sequence; more than 20 per cent of the WPR catego-
ry belongs here. Among the leavers the share of the sequences R–P–R–W–R 
and R–W–R–P–R is more than 20 per cent. As opposed to public works, the 
share of those exiting from a programme not from registered unemployment 
is relatively high.
And finally, the last of the more significant groups includes those who went 
through all of the four types of episodes. Logically, there are more combina-
tions than in the case of the previous types: it contains more than 1000 dif-
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ferent sequences, none of which is outstandingly frequent. The most typical 
are sequences containing six or seven episodes (including time spent outside 
the system), the average length being 7.6 sequences. Similarly to the previous 
type, four times as many participants leave the public employment system 
from another programme as from public works.
Analysis of all the sequences containing public works and ending before 
the last day of 2013 reveals that in 95 per cent of them the final episode is reg-
istered unemployment, in more them 4 per cent it is programmes other than 
public works and in only slightly more than 0.5 per cent it is public works. As 
mentioned before, this may have a technical reason: after a completed pub-
lic works episode, participants enter registered unemployment automatical-
ly, which may last for a few days even if finding employment. And in fact, in 
the case of 20 per cent of sequences ending in W–R the length of the final R 
episode is a maximum of three days. However, on average, the length of this 
final R episode is extremely high – 170 days – indicating that public works 
does not lead to exiting the system in the majority of cases.
Table 2.3.10. indicates the share of sequences containing a varying number 
of public works episodes among all the sequences containing at least one pub-
lic works episode. The figures show that the overwhelming majority of those 
who left the public employment system during the three years examined only 
had one or two public works episodes.
Table 2.3.10: The distribution of sequences according to the number  
of public works episodes
The number of public works  
episodes
Share (percentage)
Total sequences  
(N = 449,203)
Not right-censored  
(N = 449,139)
1 44.1 68.2
2 23.7 21.5
3 18.0 7.4
4 9.8 2.2
5 3.2 0.6
6 0.9 0.1
7 0.3 0.0
8 0.1 0.0
9 0.0 0.0
10 0.0 0.0
11 0.0 0.0
12 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Conclusions
Between 2011 and 2012 a total of 1.77 million persons were involved in the 
public employment system, including 1.37 million who spent more than 120 
days in it. A surprisingly high number stay in the system for a considerably 
long time without participating in public works or other active labour market 
programmes. A total of 450 thousand participated in public works, including 
100 thousand who exited the public employment system permanently during 
the three years. The others were within the system continuously or re-entered 
it after some time spent outside it.
The analysis of the path undertaken in the public employment system as 
well as the order and length of episodes shows that it is less likely to exit the 
system from public works than from other programmes, and the more someone 
participates in public works, the less likely he/she is to leave the system. Individu-
als who already spent time outside the system and then re-entered it are also 
more probable to leave it again. Please note that it is a concurrence of phe-
nomena and not a cause and effect relationship: it does not ensue from the 
above that public works reduces the likelihood of leaving the system; it may 
as well hold true that individuals with no chance of exiting tend to become 
public works participants. Referenced earlier research, numerous micro level 
analyses and the findings of fieldwork indicate that it is not justified to think 
that long-term public works participants are not capable of doing productive 
work if they have the opportunity.
Sub-chapters 2.5. and 2.6. will address the issue of who tends to become 
a public works participant and Sub-chapters 2.9. and 2.10. will explore the 
factors related to entering the open labour market. As shown above, the time 
spent in the public employment system has a prominent role to play in this.
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2.4 THE VALUES OF PUBLIC WORK ORGANISERS  
AND PUBLIC WORKERS*
Luca Koltai
In this section, we rely on the results of a questionnaire to examine what are 
the values which appear in public works. Our intention is to give an overview 
of what the staff of organisations operating public works thinks about public 
works, what they expect, and what their opinions are concerning the impact 
of public works. After data collection, we examined1 the opinions regarding 
the content, measurability and sustainability of “value-generating work” in 
in-depth interviews.
In the case of public works, even defining the aims is not an easy task. This 
is because public works can be used for (income-generating) poverty reduc-
tion, work test, activation, or additionally labour market reintegration aims 
(see Chapter 1 on this). The national systems of public works have never iden-
tified with any of these aims, but rather have combined them (with various 
weights). Thus, we also used a broader approach to interpret the observed re-
sults and effects.
The aims of public works
The forms of public works are rather versatile. According to international 
experience, there are very different modelling approaches involved in terms 
of titles, aims and regulations: for example those prioritising social bonding 
or work, while other forms condition provisions on public works (workfare) 
(see Chapter 1, or Betcherman et al, 2004). The aims of public works can be 
categorised according to the following functions.
Poverty mitigation: The primary aim is, on the one hand, to temporarily 
mitigate income poverty by securing income generating activities for people 
living in profound poverty, and, on the other hand, to keep the permanently 
unemployed above the poverty threshold. The programmes aimed at these 
goals typically offer incomes that are widely accessible to the poorest for whom 
employment in the open labour market cannot be expected.
Development of workability, work test: these involve workability retention/
development for those being most remote from the labour market. Creating 
or retaining propitious conditions for work can also be the aim of these public 
works programmes. These programmes are regulated and participants often have 
an obligation to cooperate in some form with the labour market institutions. 
Public works as a work test provide an opportunity for potential employers to 
select employees with adequate job skills and to employ them without risks.
Labour market integration: promoting labour market integration is the goal 
of many public works programmes. These programmes usually comprise per-
* ������ �� ����� ���� �� ���
p��ss ��� g�a������ �� �h� f���
����ng �n��v���a�s �h� hav� 
c�n�������� �� �h�s ��s�a�ch: 
Judit Ádler, Gusztáv Aladi , 
Gabriella Borsós, Judit Csoba, 
Márton Kulinyi, Éva Kuti, Zsu-
zsa Laczkó, Ildikó Lakatos, Péter 
Mód, Judit Nagy, Ilona Nagyné 
Varga, Éva Orsós, Ágota Scharle, 
Mária Szeder-Kummer, Zsolt 
Szulimán, Ildikó Tamási.
1 F�� �h� ��sc��p���n �f �h� 
m��h�����g� �s�� �n �h� ���
s�a�ch s�� Ann�� 2.4.
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sonal development as well as training elements, and provide diverse work op-
portunities (Koltai, 2013a).
Most of the public works programmes do not neatly follow solely just one or 
the other aim, but some combination thereof. The national experience is also 
similar, over the past 20 years the aims of the public works programme varied, 
sometimes one, at other times another function would become paramount.
The aims of public works according to the examined organisations operat-
ing public works
One of the most important questions of our research was how public works 
participants evaluate the aims and results of the programme. To what ex-
tent do organisers help develop and revitalise the employment skills of public 
works participants and might facilitate their employment? In the study we 
approached 870 organisations operating public works (in 2012) which were 
primarily public, municipally owned entities. Participants of the survey were 
asked to provide their answers on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 meant “strongly 
disagree” and 5 meant “strongly agree.” The aggregate results are presented 
in Figure 2.4.1.
Figure 2.4.1: Perceptions of the aim of public works
“The public works in this settlement organised by your organisation can...”
The highest agreement emerged in the case of the organisers’ contribution to 
the aims of solving direct economic problems. This was followed by aims of a 
social nature, in which the most widely shared aim was that concerning the 
work test function of public works.2
The work test function of public works is supported by more than two thirds 
of the respondents (68 per cent). Only 3 per cent of the respondents did not 
2 Th� c�a�m “P����c ����s 
��gan�s�� �� ���� ��gan�sa�
���n p��v���s a c�s���ff�c��v� 
����f��c� f�� �h� p��v�s��n �f 
m�n�c�pa� �as�s” ��c��v�� 4.2 
p��n�s �n av��ag�. Th� c�a�m 
“P����c ����s f����� ��� f��m 
am�ng �h�s� �n ��n�fi�s �h� 
�an� �� ����” ��c��v�� 4 p��n�s 
�n av��ag�.
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believe that the public works organised “filters out among those on benefits 
the ones who do not want to work”.
According to organisers, the aim of public works is primarily to provide a 
cheap labour force for municipalities as well as to filter and activate beneficiaries. 
56 per cent of the respondents largely agree with the statement that “public 
works decrease the number of the unemployed and beneficiaries” (3.7 point 
average). Although organisers do not expect to tackle long-term unemploy-
ment, it is clear to them that while someone is in public works, the benefits 
payable to them can be saved. Certainly, this explains why the largest part (62 
per cent) of respondents agreed with the evaluation according to which public 
works “decrease the number of beneficiaries” (3.8 point average).
To the question of whether public workers experience participation in public 
works as an opportunity or an obligation, the answers were strongly divided: 
36 per cent said that it was an opportunity, 37 per cent said that it was an ob-
ligation. The negative replies however strongly differed: according to 12 per 
cent of the respondents one cannot talk about obligation at all, while only 
5.7 per cent rejected the claim that participants experienced public works as 
an opportunity. A study published in 2010 which examined participants in 
public works found that it was less than half of participants who had volun-
tarily entered public works (Csoba et al, 2010).
There is no strong agreement regarding the poverty mitigating effect of 
public works, despite the fact that public works provide a higher income 
than the benefit. Only 28 per cent of the respondents agreed with the 
statement that “public works provide an opportunity for locals to gain an 
adequate income”.
The answers given to the open questions of interviews and questionnaires 
yield us a more subjective picture. According to some respondents, income from 
public works “is more than the benefit,” but elsewhere: “to carry out physical 
work all day long for a couple of thousand forints and travel back and forth, 
it’s no wonder there is no work discipline”. According to another respondent: 
“This little money is not what matters to them. Firewood, mushrooms, the 
products of community gardens, that is what matters.” Elsewhere we heard 
the following: “It is a pity that only one person in a family can participate in 
public works and only for a couple of months”.
62 per cent of the respondents did not agree with the statement that public 
works are “adequate to tackle long-term unemployment” (35 per cent did not 
agree at all, only 15 per cent found it an adequate measure, and the average 
point was 2.3). This was the most rejected aim. In a survey prepared during an 
earlier programme called ‘Road to work’ (in Hungarian: “Út a munkához”) 6 
per cent of the respondents found public works an adequate measure to tackle 
long-term unemployment, but some 67 per cent thought it could provide a 
temporary solution (Petz, 2011).
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According to the respondents, 90 percent of the public workers in 2012 
obtained entitlement for social benefits again, and 80 per cent of the pro-
gramme participants became public workers again. The very high (80–100 
per cent) and seasonally-dependent probability of return clearly shows the 
circular character of public works (benefits-public works-benefits). This phe-
nomenon has already been observed over a 15 year period (Csoba et al, 2010). 
People who have participated in public works are in a particularly difficult 
situation. After the third event a so-called locking-in effect develops in the 
course of which the public worker’s chances of employment are lower than 
they were before the person entered into public works (Csoba et al, 2010, 
Hudomiet–Kézdi, 2012). �e should not forget that it is oft en in the inter-
est of the organisers of public works to retain the good workers, to call them 
again and again, and that organisers might be reluctant to replace a work-
force that proved successful. Thus, both the public workers and the organ-
iser get used to the circular character of public works, in fact, they strive to 
stay in/retain that.
An important aim of public works can be the maintenance and development 
of participants’ employment skills so they can start with better chances in the 
real job market. Thus, it can be considered as a result if the public works con-
tribute to “employment skills” or “the acquisition of work experience”. On 
average, the 870 respondents gave medium scores to this question, only about 
a quarter of them agreed with the aims/effects that are related to the develop-
ment of the personal and employment skills of public workers.
According to 43 per cent of the respondents, public works have a positive 
effect on the participants’ human relationships, only 19 per cent rejected 
this claim. Another survey, conducted in 2010 that asked the same question, 
found a much higher, 74 per cent consensus in this regard (Petz, 2011). The 
interviewees also emphasised this aspect: communities have evolved (in one 
settlement there was even a “public works holiday” held), “they came and went 
together”, and “paid better attention to each other”.
According to 33 per cent of the respondents, public works “contributes to 
the revitalisation and development of employment skills of participants”, but 
the rate of respondents who disagreed with this statement was also the same 
(34 per cent). The accumulation of work experience is evaluated positively by 
more respondents: according to 39 per cent, public works contribute to the 
participants’ acquisition of work experience.
This picture is further qualified by information from the interviews. Ac-
cording to many, there is an element in society for whom it is beneficial for 
them just to frequent a place, or a community daily. For many of them it is the 
first time that they have involved themselves in an employment relationship 
that “provides work norms and experiences in which there are some expectations.” 
There are some who have a profession in which it is possible to organise work 
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for them, but unfortunately this tends to apply to skilled workers only. For 
women and those with a weak physique there is little adequate work. There 
were only sporadic opportunities for education which were limited to train-
ing programmes for specific occupations, and the short programme phases 
did not allow enough room for that. One of the mayors said the following 
concerning this: “There is little sensible work, the quasi jobs and work expe-
rience gained here does not mean anything in the primary labour market”, 
“this builds team-spirit only.”
It is very often expected that public works should provide a way into the la-
bour market, that is, they should contribute to the subsequent employment 
of the public worker. The aforementioned study from 2010, which questioned 
the organisers, has established that according to 2.7 per cent of the respond-
ents, public works helped employment in many cases, while according to 37 
per cent they had no bearing on employment (Petz, 2011). A 2010 study re-
lying on control groups found that on average 4.6 per cent of public works 
participants became employed and the chances of re-employment increased 
depending on the degree of distance of the public works organisation from 
the municipality (Csoba et al, 2010).
In our research half of the respondents disagreed more with the statement 
that public works contribute to subsequent employment (50.9 per cent), while 
only every fifth respondent found this aim valid, and thus it received the sec-
ond worst (altogether only 2.7) score.
In this area, personal interviews provide particularly interesting informa-
tion. These also confirm the phenomenon already mentioned that employers 
are interested in keeping people with adequate skills at work, and to ‘cream 
off’ the target group. Many of the organisers, admittedly dissuade good work-
forces, craftsmen etc. from exiting to the primary labour market. “I told him 
that it was true, you get less here, but you don’t have to travel; you’re already 
at home at three pm…” Others have only said that they would do nothing to 
prevent a competent public worker leaving. A director of a public employment 
agency complained that “if they need to upload a 200 persons programme in 
three days, they call in all able-bodied persons” irrespective of whether they 
could perhaps be recommended for a job in the open labour market.
�e also asked the organisers of public works regarding the proportion of 
participants who could in their view find employment in the primary labour 
market thanks to having participated in the programme. �e did not differ-
entiate between registered and unregistered jobs or between permanent or 
temporary jobs. Due to a very high standard deviation, we interpreted the 
results by calculating with the modus of data which was at a 10 per cent value. 
It must be noted that there was no difference between those who reported as 
measuring the indicators themselves, and those who did not do so but only 
hazarded a guess in their responses.
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Value-creation
During the reform of public works, the government identified value-added 
work as the most important objective and highlighted agricultural production 
and the provision of utility services (sanitation, environmental management).
In terms of value-creation we found three areas of public works. The highest 
publicity was received by those value-added Start-model programmes which 
are aimed at animal husbandry, plant production and the creation of various 
products. Another area where public workers carry out some sort of public ser-
vices typically include the maintenance of public and farming roads, weeding, 
eradication of ragweed and the maintenance of public spaces as well as pub-
lic and private forests. The third area is the integrated organisation of public 
works. In this case, public workers only “help out” in providing public duties 
at some workplaces. Such are for instance delivery, portering, health, educa-
tional tasks at the municipality, maintenance, cleaning, kitchen, etc. duties at 
cultural institutions, and staff assistance functions at civil or church organi-
sations. These three different areas provide divergent working conditions. In 
the first two, public workers can participate in separated groups, brigades in 
public works. Their number is often independent from the number of persons 
that would economically be optimal to carry out the given task.
Both in the case of production and public service in groups the results are 
the produced economic value. The effect of employment from the perspec-
tive of labour market reintegration is, however, highly questionable. The most 
important reasons for this were articulated by the president of the National 
Association of Local Municipalities (in Hungarian: Települési Önkormány-
zatok Országos Szövetsége) in the following way:
“The Start work programme, however, significantly differs from other public works pro-
grammes, since the basis of agricultural programmes are appropriate professional knowl-
edge. These programmes do not bring results if the management of planning, cultivation 
and livestock production are done by a staff without appropriate professional knowledge” 
(Zongor, 2013).
For public works integrated into existing organisations there is an operat-
ing organisation that ensures the work process. There is much more attention 
given to the integration of workers and the public works are also more valuable 
from a labour market perspective. According to one of the survey respondents:
“Among public and municipal functions there are certain unserved or poorly served areas 
(cultural, social sphere, etc.) which represent a real market need and money needs to be 
allocated to them. Their utility and efficiency is clear, although cannot be measured in 
monetary-terms.”
The report on case AJB-3025/2012 published by the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights also underpinned the finding of our research that the 
organisers of public works (typically municipalities) dispensed neither intel-
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lectual (expertise and qualification) nor productive infrastructure. The or-
ganisers unequivocally complained about the unpredictability of timescales 
and the arbitrariness of the budget. The establishment of the necessary pro-
ducer infrastructure and the development of needed market embeddedness 
can only be efficient as part of a more long-term, planned and consistent local 
(or even regional development) process. In many cases neither the procure-
ment processes are organised nor the producer relationship clarified between 
the organisers of public works and the local market. Also, several questions 
arise when the product is for “internal use” (for example in public catering); 
it is unclear at what – cost or market – price this should be accounted. An-
other question concerns what the impact of public works is on local producer 
markets, for it is from there where the solvent demand will be missing. The 
most difficult question to answer though is how such a “production” could 
become sustainable.
For decades, the activation of those permanently distanced from the pri-
mary labour market and the achievement that at least some percentage can 
stand on their own feet have been one of the biggest challenges in Hungary. A 
multitude of countries have experimented with many-many models. Relying 
on these experiences the expert committee of the European Union regularly 
develops and publishes professional and methodological recommendations. 
The organisations of the social-economy (in other words social enterprises) that 
create new jobs or fulfil transit functions can operate in various legal forms.3 
Micro, small enterprises and non-profit limited companies are typical, but 
they can be civil organisations or even cooperatives. The selection of the op-
timal legal form suitable for the given enterprise and the local context are 
important for the establishment as well as the sustainability of the organisa-
tions’ development capacity. Related to public works, there are also more and 
more such governmental initiatives that are aimed at involving public work-
ers into social cooperatives. In this regard, the legal regulation pertaining to 
cooperatives has also been amended.
The aims of public works for the individual
In our panel research on public workers, conducted between 2012 and 2013, 
we examined what the aims of public works could be for individual partici-
pants. �e tried to present how public workers experienced this form, and 
how we disregard the general aims and effects of the system.
Public works embodies for the participants various functions. �e analyse 
these by relying on the theoretical work of Marie Jahoda ( Jahoda, 1982).
For public workers, the most important functions were status-related: this 
type of work provided a sense of usefulness, and prominently, it provided a 
household income. Livelihood and extra income were highlighted as the big-
gest advantages of public works by participants. According to 61 per cent it 
3 Acc����ng �� �h� ��fin����n 
�f �h� N�np��f�� En���p��s� 
an� S��f�S�s�a�na������ T�am 
(NESsT) �� �s s�ch a p��p�s�f���� 
p�ann�� �n���p��n��� ac��v��� 
�ha� �s c��a��� ���h �h� a�m �� 
�ff�� �nn�va��v� s������ns �� s��
c�a� p�����ms. S�c�a� �n���p��s�s 
can �� n�n�p��fi� ��gan�za���ns 
�h�ch app�� ��s�n�ss m����s �� 
f��fi�� �h��� �as�c m�ss��n, an� 
can �� ��s�n�ss �n���p��s�s 
�h�ch s���v�, �n a������n �� �h��� 
��s�n�ss ��j�c��v�s, �� ach��v� 
s�gn�fican� s�c�a� �ff�c�s. Th��� 
�as�c p��nc�p�� �s a ��a� �p���
ma��sa���n �ha� �s ��p��s�n��� �� 
���p�ng �n �a�anc� an� ha�m�n� 
���h �c�n�m�c an� s�c�a� g�a�s.
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is important that with this income they have contributed to the household 
income. Nearly 50 per cent provides a livelihood with this income to their 
family, so in their case, public works strengthened their breadwinner status as 
well. Many of the respondents highlighted that public works qualify as pen-
sionable time; hence, they can get closer to a retirement that offers security.
So the poverty mitigating function of public works was deemed the most 
important by respondents. It was also mentioned that 30 days employment 
was needed to qualify for entitlement to social assistance and this could be 
fulfilled by participating in public works.
“Public works are good because my income is more than 22,500 forints and I accumulate 
pensionable years, and anyway, I don’t have another job.” “For me it’s good like this because 
I don’t have to live on benefits. The kids can be provided for. I can also pay the utilities.”
Many (40 per cent) also agreed that they performed useful tasks as public 
workers. Additionally, it was an important aspect that these public works 
were close by and there was no need to commute.
The strengthening of a social network was perceived by approximately 20 per 
cent of the respondents, who noted that since participating in public works 
they had gained more acquaintances/friends.
The rate (18 per cent) of those to whom activity was important was roughly 
the same: they highlighted the fact that they had experienced more regular-
ity in their days than they used to have before. These factors of public works 
(activation function, usefulness of tasks, and increase of social network or 
regular timetable) contribute mostly to the development or nourishment of 
employment skills.
Public workers saw only few long-term opportunities in these employment 
forms. Only 14 per cent expected the development of skills necessary for em-
ployment, and likewise very few (16 per cent) were those, according to whom 
public works contributed to subsequent employment; which is to say that the 
reintegration function of public works is perceived at a very low level. Moreo-
ver, some believed public works had an outright destructive effect.
Concerning the shortcomings of public works, most respondents (29 per 
cent) highlighted low wages, which needs to be interpreted carefully. For 
wages are indeed below the minimum wage, but without public works, for 
most respondents, there would only be social income available, compared to 
which the public works wage is still slightly higher. Compared to the falling 
amounts of benefits (and constrained access conditions) over recent years, 
public works can even represent a desired income. Therefore, many have high-
lighted that in this way they can earn more than by being on benefit. The fall 
of wages were mostly criticised by those who had had a longer public works 
history and they compared current incomes to earlier ones.
Regarding the questions on public works’ reintegration role to the labour 
market, there were more negative than positive answers. 20 per cent of re-
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spondents saw some sort of negativity in public works in this respect (less 
time for job search, it does not help in finding employment as one is excluded 
from temporary jobs, or is not hired because of one’s public works past). The 
need for permanency appeared very strongly though: many noted that they 
could accept public works as a permanent job (in fact, there were some who 
would even wish that).
A large part of public workers perceive their future as rather hopeless, they 
do not think they will be able to find employment. Often they do not have 
long-term plans or ideas at all.
“�e won’t be able to find employment anywhere. Neither part-time nor full-
time. For me there’s only public work as an opportunity. Because I am Roma.”
Summary
All prior forms of public works have received and still receive various criticisms. 
Sometimes it is the capacity of public works to lead back to the labour mar-
ket, at other times it is organisation, participants’ weak work performances, 
or wages below the minimum wage that are criticised. Others attack public 
works because of its high public costs, the degree of their own contribution, or 
the constantly changing administration. In the past 20 years, national public 
works programmes with various names and frameworks have tried to achieve 
various declared and undeclared aims, while there have been a number of aims 
and expectations which public works could obviously not live up to. Therefore, 
it is natural that, regarding public works, constant – and always justifiable – 
dissatisfaction and perceived indispensability are articulated simultaneously.
At the moment, the government wishes to push the primary aim of pub-
lic works in a social direction (HVG, 2015), that is, the explicit aim of pub-
lic works is that it should replace benefits. In other words, it is explicitly the 
poverty mitigating function that is placed at the forefront. This approach 
removes public works from the circle of labour market measures and places 
public works among social provisions, and does this in such a way that inten-
sified obligation and local dependency criteria make people living in poverty 
more and more vulnerable. Parallel to this, the production goals of Start work 
programmes are still present.
“In the case of participants in the micro-regional agricultural projects of the Start model 
programme, exit to the open labour market is an achievable aim after providing an op-
portunity for self-sufficiency, and then employment in a protected environment (social 
cooperative) with professional help” – the ministry informed Népszabadság (NOL, 2012).
Integration in the open market is increasingly sidelined, or even disappears 
as an aim among the organisers of public works and public workers. Due to the 
pressure of an increasing number of participants, the organisers try to involve 
as many locals as possible, and thus mitigate poverty and secure an inexpensive 
workforce for the provision of their public services. The labour market func-
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tions of public works are not relevant and realistic to them. According to the 
organisers these types of public works do not develop such skills and compe-
tencies that might open the door to jobs in the open labour market. There are 
no resources available for labour market skills development either. The interest 
of the organisers of public works is basically the retention of well performing 
public workers, especially those in value-generating, productive public works.
The picture held by public workers is similar. Their future perspectives are 
in many cases bleak and few of them see a liberating opportunity in public 
works. They do however perceive public works as an easily accessible income 
that is higher than benefits. The highest demand is for permanence, which 
is to say that for most people, public works provide an acceptable income (as 
long as they are available) and they are still more predictable than, for exam-
ple, grey employment in the primary labour market.
The tendencies presented in this study also underpin the change of function 
in public works. The actors do not perceive this measure anymore as that of 
employment policy, neither is the demand of employment in the open labour 
market brought to mind, rather poverty mitigation and activity in exchange 
for benefit become primary. This process decreases the demand of all actors 
to take active steps toward employment. This is also demonstrated by our re-
search findings which revealed that the job search activity of public worker 
respondents drastically decreased during 2013–2014.
During the last wave of the survey (February–March 2014) only 15 per cent searched for 
jobs (as opposed to 42 per cent in the previous year), 13 per cent checked job advertisements 
(earlier this rate was 42 per cent), just 8 per cent applied for some sort of a job (in contrast 
to the previous 33 per cent), and practically no one went to job interviews, although pre-
viously every fifth (19 per cent) respondent noted that they did so in the hope of a job in 
the labour market (Koltai, 2014).
2.4 Appendices
Research methodology
During the research on the organisers of public works, we based our work on 
qualitative as well as quantitative work.4 Public workers had an option to fill 
out and return the organisational questionnaires via an online platform, email, 
or in a printed format. The population was composed of a database provided 
by the National Employment Service (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Foglalkozta-
tási Szolgálat) containing data on 8,537 organisations that received public 
works support in 2011–2012. The organisations of the population were typi-
cally contacted via email. Since our results would have been distorted by the 
low internet usage of employers in small and in the most disadvantaged set-
tlements, we randomly selected 200 organisations among them to which we 
also sent the questionnaires in a hard copy. In this way we could ensure that 
26 per cent of the respondents were operating in this quarter.
4 Th� f��� ��p���s a�� acc�ss���� 
a�: h��p://�s����a���.h�, Koltai–
Kulinyi (2013), Koltai (2013a), 
(2014).
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During the research, we could process a total of 870 questionnaires that pre-
dominantly arrived to us online. The responding organisations employed 52 
thousand persons in 2011 and 40 thousand persons in 2012. This was nearly 
20 per cent of the number of public workers nationwide in 2011 [256,607 
persons (Tajti, 2012)]. Furthermore, in selected locations and organisations 
(national organisations, settlements of various sizes, the most disadvantaged 
micro-regions, etc) we conducted twenty in-depth interviews with the rep-
resentatives of organisations affected in some way by public works, the direc-
tors of the public employment service, and experts. In the research, there were 
three focus-group discussions which were carried out with the involvement of 
affected organisations in public works of the relevant settlement and region.
The regional distribution of organisations responding shows a varying pic-
ture. Responses have been received from the whole country with the highest 
response rate of 11 per cent arriving both from Bács-Kiskun and Borsod-
Abaúj-Zemplén county. In 2012, 20 per cent of public workers worked in 
these two counties. In the other counties we observed a response rate simi-
lar to the distribution of public workers. There was a somewhat higher will-
ingness to respond in Veszprém and Győr-Moson-Sopron counties and a 
lower one in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county. �ith 67.5 per cent, local mu-
nicipalities are in an overwhelming majority among respondents (just as in 
the population of organisers of public works). The remaining 13 per cent 
are municipal organisations and 4 per cent are municipal associations. Thus, 
84 per cent of respondents organises public works as a public institution. In 
2012, 75 per cent of public workers worked in these institutions (Employ-
ment and Public �orks Database) – no wonder that their rate is so high 
among respondents as well.
In March–April 2013 during the research pertaining to public works par-
ticipants our experts conducted structured interviews with 283 persons em-
ployed in public works in five selected micro-regions. The micro-regions were 
selected in a way that ensured we received the highest variability in their char-
acteristics. Having said that we have to note that the mode of sampling in 
the research is not representative. Instead, are aim was to arrive at a picture 
regarding the situation and life of public workers. During the panel research 
we asked the involved participants four times: the first two times when pub-
lic works were started, then when public works ended and participants exited, 
and the fourth time three months following the end date.
Our sample is representative in terms of gender distribution and, with a dif-
ference of 3–5 per cent, in terms of education as well. The sample was weight-
ed by age, as the older age groups were slightly over-represented in the sample. 
Furthermore, we also organised focus groups and interviews where we invited 
participants affected by public works (experts, local employers, organisers of 
public works, municipality, etc).
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2.5. PUBLIC WORKERS IN THE LEGAL LABOUR MARKET
János Köllő
Information on the employment of public workers in market jobs had been 
missing until recently and has remained scarce. It is only the follow-up sur-
veys of the National Labour Office (abbreviated in Hungarian as NMH) 
performed since 2011 that provide some information on their labour market 
status six months following the termination of their status as a public worker. 
The lessons learnt from these surveys (Molnár et al, 2014, Cseres-Gergely–Mol-
nár, 2014) are summed up in chapters 2.3. and 2.6. of ‘In Focus’.
However, the follow-up surveys tell only part of the story for two resons. 
First, the surveys are based on administrative data while the majority of the 
jobs taken by public workers before and after their public works spells are 
unregistered. (Farkas et al, 2014). Second, the entry of public workers into 
market jobs should not be viewed as arrival in a safe haven: in most cases it 
only means an episode in a hectic labour market career. This chapter seeks to 
draw attention to the latter problem using data on 25 thousand public wor-
kers observed on a monthly basis over an eight year wide time window. Lack 
of observations on off-book employment remains a problem that awaits fu-
ture research.
Data
Our sample is drawn from a large longitudinal data set covering 50 percent 
of Hungary’s population aged 5–74 in 2003. The data collects information 
from registers of the Pension Directorate, the Tax Office, the Health Insur-
ance Fund, the Office of Education, and the Public Employment Service. Each 
person in the sample is followed from January 2003 until December 2011 or 
exit from the registers for reasons of death or permanent out-migration. We 
have information on whether the person observed was in employment in a 
given month, for how many days, in what jobs and contractual arrangements, 
with what employers and for what compensation.
Public workers can be distinguished in the database since the third quarter 
of 2011, though their numbers reached the level known from other sources 
of data only in the last quarter of the year. In October-December 2011, 97 
thousand persons are indentified as an entrant to a public works program-
me at least once; on average, these persons worked three months as a pub-
lic worker, performing a total of 195 thousand man months, which leads 
us to estimate the average stock at 65 thousand.1 This figure is bigger than 
the 54 thousand published in the institutional labour market statistics of 
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, but smaller than the calculations 
made by Cseres-Gergely–Molnár (2014) on the basis of the NMH register 
1 The 195 thousand man months 
would have been accomplished 
by 65 thousand people, if they 
were at work for the entire pe-
riod of the three months.
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(77.6 thousand). Due to lack of further data no explanations can be made as 
to the reasons for these differences, however, it can be stated that our data-
base covers the majority of persons involved in public works programmes in 
the period observed.
In the present study we will observe the labour market career between Ja-
nuary 2003 and December 2010 of persons involved in public works prog-
rammes in the fourth quarter of 2011. The calculations presented are made 
on the basis of a 50% sample (that is a 25% sample of the whole population) 
drawn from the public administrative panel database. The sample is made up 
of 24,195 persons and as many as 2.323 million monthly observations. The 
constriction of the sample was necessitated by the limited computing capa-
cities at the author’s disposal.
The key question of the analysis is to what extent the persons involved in 
public works programmes at the end of 2011 formerly had market jobs. This 
cannot be observed directly, since public works – as mentioned before – was 
not listed among the available labour arrangements in the period between 
2003 and 2010. Alternatively, we will rely on the fact that before 2011 the vast 
majority of public workers were public employees earning the minimum wage. 
Market jobs are defined as (i) employment in incorporated and unincorpora-
ted companies, business partnerships and self-employment including assisting 
family members (ii) employment in a public institution at a wage exceeding 
110% or 150% of the daily minimum wage. The two cut-off points result in 
upper and lower estimates of market employment, respectively.
Of course, this approach of estimation is not free of mistakes because: i) 
public workers receiving a significant supplement from the local government 
above their standard compensation appear to have a market job; ii) persons 
in standard public sector jobs, who earn less than 110% or 150% of the daily 
minimum wage appear as public workers.
Since the bias from the second source is obviously larger, our calculations 
underestimate the share of market jobs.
In the rest of the chapter we first look at the roles that market jobs and public 
works participation played in the labor market careers of the 24,195 persons 
under examination. Second, we analyze the incidence and duration of market 
jobs. Finally, we are taking a look at how the number of market jobs held by 
members of the sample affected their average employment rate in 2003–2010.
Public works participation and market jobs – estimations
As shown in Table 2.5.1 the employment rate of those involved in public 
works programmes at the end of 2011 was rather low in 2003–2010, 25% on 
average, well below the national average of those with a primary education 
attainment.2 We estimate that 14–16% came from market jobs and 9–11% 
from public works participation. As expected, employment in market jobs 
2 The rate of employment of the 
population aged 15–59, not in 
education, having finished 0–8 
classes in primary education 
was 45.6 per cent in the spring 
of 2005. (The Author’s calcula-
tion based on the April–June 
2005 wave of the Labour Force 
Survey.)
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declined in the period of the crisis, and public works employment made up 
for it only by 2009. In the year when the Orbán-government took office the 
rate of public works participation decreased for a while, recessing the employ-
ment rate of the population observed here below 20%.
Table 2.5.1: The rate of employment in 2003–2010 of those involved  
in public works programmes at the end of 2011  
(estimates, yearly average of monthly observations, per cent)
Year
Employed  
in public works
Employed  
in a market job
Not employed  
in a legal job Total  
of observations
estimation fact
Upper estimates
2003 7.0 17.0 76.0 100.0
2004 6.9 17.1 76.0 100.0
2005 8.2 16.1 75.7 100.0
2006 8.7 16.7 74.6 100.0
2007 8.4 16.3 75.3 100.0
2008 9.5 16.2 74.3 100.0
2009 17.4 13.1 69.5 100.0
2010 4.1 14.7 81.2 100.0
On average between 
2003–2010 8.8 15.9 75.3 100.0
Lower estimates
2003 8.6 15.4 76.0 100.0
2004 8.3 15.5 76.0 100.0
2005 9.8 14.5 75.7 100.0
2006 10.8 14.8 74.6 100.0
2007 10.4 14.3 75.3 100.0
2008 11.8 13.9 74.3 100.0
2009 20.4 10.3 69.5 100.0
2010 8.5 10.3 81.2 100.0
On average between 
2003–2010 11.1 13.6 75.3 100.0
The number of observations: 2,322,720 man months, 24,195 persons. See 
the text for the definitions of market employment. Source: administrative 
panel data of persons involved in public works programmes in the fourth 
quarter of 2011.
Table 2.5.2 presents a range of indicators related to the persons observed. 
As shown, a majority of these people had a real, legal job at least once in the 
period between 2003 and 2010. Those entering a job at least once worked 
there for 17–20 months on average out of the 96 months observed and ear-
ned an income equal to 50–51% of the national daily average, as opposed to 
the income earned in a public works programme, which equals 37–41% of 
the national daily average.
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Table 2.5.2: Selected indicators of persons involved in public works programmes  
in the fourth quarter of 2011, 2003–2010
Lower estimation Upper estimation
Employed in a market job at least once (percentage) 70.9 75.3
Months worked by those working in a market job  
at least once (average) 17.2 19.6
Average daily income in a market joba (percentage) 49.8 50.5
Average daily income in public works (percentage) 37.3 41.0
The number of observations: 24,195 persons.
a As a percentage of the daily amount of the national minimum wage.
Source: Administrative panel data of persons involved in public works programmes 
in the fourth quarter of 2011
The data presented contradict general public opinion that public workers “are 
unemployable” and “have no idea what a real job is”: three quarters of them 
have already been in a real, legal job. Their labour market employment in the 
long run is still very low, which leads us on to the questions of the incidence 
and duration of market jobs.
The incidence and duration of market jobs3
As shown in Table 2.5.3 persons entering the labour market at least once in 
2003–2010 took up three market jobs on average over a period of eight years: 
a little less than one third of them are one-time entrants, a quarter of them 
are two-time entrants, another quarter are three- or four-time entrants, and 
one fifth of them entered even more times (18 times for the record-holder).
The average duration of market jobs amounted to 5.6 months. This is a dow-
nward biased estimate since it includes employment spells on-going as of 1 
January 2003 and/or continuing beyond 31 December 2010. The completed 
duration of these left and right censored spells may be longer or in some cas-
es considerably longer than their observed duration. Among the uncensored 
episodes that started and terminated within the eight years observed, short-
term labour arrangements are, of course, over-represented: their average comp-
leted duration was 4.1 months.
We take a closer look at these labour arrangements in Figure 2.5.1, which 
shows the distribution of market work episodes by completed duration. The 
points of the curve show what percentage of these labour arrangements had 
a duration shorter than 1, 2, ..., 96 months. As we can see, 60% had a durati-
on shorter than three months, almost 80% had a duration shorter than half 
a year, and 90% were shorter than one year.4 Th e overall labour market em-
ployment of public workers is thus made up of many short episodes, and the 
duration of their market jobs is not longer than their public works episodes: 
according to Cseres-Gergely–Molnár (2014) the average completed duration 
of public works episodes was 3.4 months in 2011, 5.1 in 2012 and 5.9 in 2013.
3 From this point onwards a 
wage limit of 110% will be ap-
plied to differentiate between 
market jobs and public works.
4 Note that in these calculations 
we make no difference between 
individual employers. It is pos-
sible that during a continuous 
employment spell the person 
observed had several employers. 
In the database the employment 
spells can be broken down by 
employers, a task left for future 
research.
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Table 2.5.3: Employment episodes in market jobs of persons involved  
in public works programmes in the fourth quarter of 2011, 2003–2010
Average/Percentage
Average number of employment spells 3.0
The distribution of workers by the number of employment spells  
in market jobs (percent)
1 30.3
2 23.0
3 16.1
4 10.8
5 7.1
6 4.7
7 or more 8.0
The average duration of episodes (month) 5.6
The average duration of uncensored episodes (month) 4.1
The number of observations: 54,833 employment spells, which belong to 18,228 per-
sons. The number of completed spells is 41,516, which belong to 14,599 persons.
Source: administrative panel data of persons involved in public works programmes 
in the fourth quarter of 2011.
Figure 2.5.1: The cumulated distribution of the duration  
of finished employment episodes, market jobs, 2003–2010
The figure refers to episodes which started beyond 1 January 2003 and terminated 
before 1 January 2011. The number of observations: 41,516 episodes, which belong 
to 14,599 persons.
Source: Administrative panel data of persons involved in public works programmes 
in the fourth quarter of 2011
Finally, we present a “box-and-whiskers” chart to illustrate how much the 
number of employment spells contributed to the total rate of employment 
in the entire period, and thus to the total income generated. On the hori-
zontal axis of Figure 2.5.2 we can see the number of market jobs, while on 
the vertical axis we have the total amount of time worked in market jobs in 
020
40
60
80
100
Tim
e 
sp
en
t i
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t (
20
03
−2
01
0,
 m
on
th
s)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Number of employment spells
János Köllő: Public worKers...
117
2003–2010. The lower and upper edges of the boxes show the 25th percentiles, 
respectively. The line in the middle of the boxes is the median. The bottom 
and top “whiskers” show the lowest and the highest connected values, while 
the circles denote the heavy outliers.
Figure 2.5.2: The correlation between the number of employment episodes  
and the total amount of time worked, market jobs, 2003–2010
Source: Administrative panel data of persons involved in public works programmes 
in the fourth quarter of 2011
Persons working 30–40 months are those having more than eight employ-
ment spells in a period of eight years. The total amount of time worked in 
one single job is very low, even if there is a tiny minority of outliers who spent 
80–90 months in one permanent job. In this respect, there is a striking con-
trast between the average Hungarian employee and the average public worker. 
According to the Labor Force Survey (wave 2005 Q2), the uncompleted du-
ration of employment in respondents’ current jobs amounted to 106 months 
on average, with a duration of 100 months for those who completed prima-
ry school and 63 months for those who completed less than that. Since the 
episodes observed at a given point in time are most likely to approach their 
half-time, average completed duration is about twice as long as the observed 
uncompleted duration. This compares to only four month’s completed dura-
tion in the population examined in this chapter.
Conclusions
Persons pondering over the issues of public works, including the author of the 
present text, are most probably mistaken when they contrast public works to 
stable market employment as a desired alternative and consider the perma-
nent labour market inclusion of public workers as a policy goal. Data shows 
that this is more of a dream, than a real objective.
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A policy based on the actual characteristics of the labour market of public 
workers would do better to promote more frequent entry into market jobs. 
On the one hand such an approach demands far more patience: a clear un-
derstanding that public works used as a tool of discipline – except for labour 
markets in a very good condition – is dysfunctional. The unexpectedly deli-
vered “notices” that call for public works of an incalculable duration hampers 
both informal work that is necessary for daily breadwinning and job seeking. 
On the other hand, the more people who have more frequently the oppor-
tunity to be employed in a real work organization, the greater is the chance 
that a number of them are selected for permanent employment. As shown in 
Chapter 2.10, the current practice of public works offers limited help as to 
the transition to real jobs. Until this situation remains unchanged, it would 
be advisable to terminate all elements of regulation that impede entry into 
market jobs – unstable, short-term and temporary as they typically are.
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2.6 THE COMPOSITION OF ENTRANTS TO PUBLIC WORKS, 
2011–2012*
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely
Since the most important stated aims of public works are to reach its target 
group and improve its employability by temporary work opportunities, a 
critical yardstick of its effectiveness is the fulfilment of these objectives. This 
subchapter examines the participants of public works and to what extent the 
first aim is fulfilled. The database of the Public Works portal [Közfoglalkoz-
tatási Portál] provides information for 2013–2014 and Mód (2013) provides 
information for 2012 and 2013. A similar topic is studied by Koltai (2013) too 
but with a different methodology due to the small amount of data collected 
and the high number of criteria considered. The present subchapter uses the 
data and the concepts introduced in Subchapter 2.3.
The analytical framework considers the public employment system and its 
clients. The subchapter classifies the episodes of the public employment system 
into two categories: non public works (e.g. registration before a possible par-
ticipation in public works, or participation in other programmes) and public 
works episodes. Relevant data are presented in Subchapter 2.3: the individual 
data of the National Labour Office were used to compile an episode-based 
micro-database. It contains a total of 2,278,036 non public works episodes 
in the years 2011–2012 and a further 833,769 episodes in 2013, compared to 
685,935 and 245,882 public works episodes in the respective years.
As described in Subchapter 2.1, the Government introduced a unified sys-
tem of public works at the beginning of 2011. We have seen 265,813 entrants 
in 2011, 263,931 in 2012 and 402,073 in 2013. There is a change in the an-
nual distribution of entrants between 2011 and 2012: while the distribution 
of entries over the first year was relatively even, with a peak around April, in 
the following years most entries took place in February-March (see Figure 
2.6.1) with a new peak at the end of 2013 due to training courses organised 
in winter public works (see Subchapter 2.8). Another striking change is that 
the length of time spent in public works significantly increased between 2011 
and 2012. While the first year saw a majority of 2–4-month episodes, in epi-
sodes in all lengths emerged in similar proportions. It is worth noting that 
the length of episodes depends on their starting date: those starting at the 
beginning of a year are the longest (about 220-days long on average) and their 
length decreases towards the end of the year.
* I would like to express my 
thanks to Borbála Lente for her 
research assistance with data 
preparation.
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Figure 2.6.1: The number of entrants to public works in respective months
Source: Author’s calculations based on the complete Employment and Public Works 
Database (EPWD).
Both the length of episodes and the composition of the participants changed 
in the first two years of the operation of the new system. The eight panels 
of Figure 2.6.2 show the change in key indicators of composition over time.
Panels a) and b) indicate that the number of participants spending a short 
time in the public employment system before entering public works substan-
tially increases over time, while the number of participants spending a long 
time there decreases. This implies that a large proportion of participants enter 
public works quite soon after entering the public employment.
Panel c) shows that the average cumulated time spent in public works also 
increases until 2013 but then decreases in 2013. It is only possible if the pro-
gramme involved a considerable number of new participants who previously 
had not participated in public works.
According to panel d) the total time spent in the public employment system 
shows a similar pattern to what is seen in the case of public works in panel c) 
but it increases to a larger extent. It seems that public works does not shorten 
time spent in the public employment system but may even, on the whole, increase 
it. The slight decrease in 2013 shows that the new entrants had not previously 
participated in either public works or the public employment system. Mean-
while, the share of those receiving employment substitute allowance [foglal-
koztatást helyettesítő támogatás] prior to participating in public works (see 
e) decreased significantly and this, similarly to panel b), indicates a decline in 
the share of the long-term unemployed. This tendency is underpinned by the 
increase in the share of clients aged under 25, as seen in panel f).
It is remarkable that the composition of the clients in terms of educational 
attainment was quite stable. The share of unqualified participants somewhat 
changed when seasonal work was available (panel g); however, it increased 
considerably in the winter of 2013–2014, probably because of an increase in 
headcounts related to public works with training.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
201320122011
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
201320122011
a) The proportion of cases preceded by a 0–3-month
 long non-public-works episode
b) The proportion of cases preceded by a more than
 one year long non-public-works episode
0
100
200
300
201320122011
600
800
1000
1200
201320122011
c) The total amount of time spent in public works
 since 1 January 2011
d) The total amount of time spent in the public
 employment system
0.6
0.8
1.0
201320122011
0.15
0.20
0.25
201320122011
e) The proportion ofo cases where participants received an
 employment substitute allowance prior to entering public works
f) The proportion of participants aged below 25
0.4
0.5
0.6
201320122011
0.25
0.30
0.35
201320122011
g) The proportion of participants with maximum lower 
secondary schooling (8 years of schooling)
h) The share of participants with a vocational qualification
Zsombor Cseres-GerGely: The ComposiTion of enTranTs...
121
Figure 2.6.2: Time series characteristic of the composition of public works 
participants in respective months
Source: Author’s calculations based on the complete EPWD.
As mentioned before, public works aims at getting the long-term unemployed 
onto the open labour market sooner or later. Long-term unemployment can-
not be measured properly by using the administrative data of the National 
Labour Office alone (since registration itself is already an approximation, and 
after leaving and re-entering the system a new registration commences). There-
fore long-term unemployment herein is measured by the total time spent in 
the public employment system prior to participating in public works (i.e. “ex-
perience in the public employment system”).
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The time spent in the public employment system is connected to the non public works episode 
concerned. It is calculated by increasing the value related to the previous similar episode by 
the subsequent public works episode (if any) and by the non public works episode concerned. 
Consequently, this value is ex post in terms of the non public works episode and ex ante in 
terms of the potential subsequent public works episode. It is important to stress that infor-
mation on the experience in the public employment system is only available if the participant 
was still within the system on 31 December 2010. In these cases the length of this episode 
is also included. If a participant exited the system on 30 December 2010 from a registration 
period and then re-entered on 2 January, his/her period of experience starts from scratch.
Achieving the first aim is shown in Figure 2.6.3 as the relation between the 
share of entrants to public works and experience in the public employment 
system. The figure shows that the share of entrants increases evenly in each 
of the three years, suggesting that the targeting of public works is effective. 
However; contradicting the assumption of effective targeting, a significant 
share (5–20 per cent) of participants with an experience of less then one year 
in the public employment system enter public works. It is odd that there is 
entry to public works after a registration period of about 10 days in each of 
the three years, after which 17, 33 and 34 per cent of participants enter pub-
lic works in the respective years. Nevertheless, targeting is less than perfect 
in the case of participants with a long track record in the public employment 
system too and it is also deteriorating. The peak of the graph characterising 
the relationship in 2011, around 500 days, later flattens out, indicating that 
fewer of such participants are involved. At the same time, the proportion of 
participants with the longest experience increases.
Figure 2.6.3: Proportion of entrants to public works from non public works episodes 
as a function of cumulated experience in the public employment system
Source: Author’s calculations based on the complete EPWD.
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By definition, experience in the public employment system also cumulates 
during public works episodes, thus it is generally true that public works par-
ticipants later have a bigger chance of participating in it again. However, it is 
more than that, as seen in Table 2.6.1. The rows of the table contain the serial 
number of public works episodes of the same client (cumulated for all years), 
and the columns contain the year the episode is commenced. The individual 
cells indicate how frequent an episode of a certain serial number was. In 2011, 
although slightly more than one-tenth of participants took part in the pro-
gramme twice (and a few of them even more times), the majority participated 
only once. In the following year, more than half of the clients participate in 
the programme for the second time and nearly one-fifth of them participate 
for at least the third time. They had either taken part also in the previous year 
or had participated several times in the year concerned. The trend continues 
in 2013; in that year only less than one-third of the entrants had not partici-
pated in public works earlier.
As a result of cumulating experience, the connection shown in Figure 2.6.3 
and repeated entries to the public employment system, an extremely large 
number of participants re-enter public works several times. This results in 
an increase in experience in public works and in the public employment sys-
tem, as seen in Figure 2.6.1.
Table 2.6.1: Distribution of the serial number of public works episodes  
in the respective year of commencement
No. 2011 2012 2013 Total
1 87.6 37.0 28.4 47.7
2 11.3 44.6 25.0 26.6
3 1.0 14.0 25.9 15.4
4 0.1 3.5 13.7 6.9
5 0.0 0.9 7.0 3.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on the complete EPWD.
In addition to experience, other factors also have an impact on the likeli-
hood of someone entering public works. The details are shown in Table 2.6.2, 
which indicates that men, older participants, the unqualified and partici-
pants who are not fresh graduates are more likely to enter public works. The 
proportion of entrants increases between 2011 and 2012 in the case of each 
group and then drops below the 2011 value in each group. The registered 
population is fairly stable in terms of gender and school attainment; how-
ever the increase in the share of older participants, young participants and 
fresh graduates is remarkable and exceeds the increase in the likelihood of 
entry to public works.
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Table 2.6.2: Share of entrants to public works in the year of entry,  
broken down according to their characteristics and the distribution  
of the registered unemployed in the year of entry to public works
2011 2012 2013 Average
Share of entry according to characteristics  
of entrants
Total population 31.9 33.1 27.4 30.1
Demographic characteristics
Female 31.4 29.1 25.6 28.0
Male 32.3 36.2 29.0 31.8
Age
Below 25 26.9 27.1 25.0 26.0
Aged 25–44 32.1 31.6 26.7 29.5
Over 44 34.8 40.5 30.3 34.0
Educational attainment
Max. eight years of schooling (lower-secondary level) 48.4 50.1 39.8 44.7
Vocational school 27.9 31.2 25.4 27.6
Min. secondary school leaving examination (Matura) 15.5 16.0 13.9 14.9
Fresh graduate 24.6 24.9 23.7 24.2
The history of participants in the preceding non 
public works episode
Max. 3 months 17.0 37.3 36.9 32.8
4–9 months 17.2 29.9 23.8 24.0
10–12 months 19.6 35.1 27.4 27.9
More than 12 months 52.8 30.9 19.6 34.0
Did not receive unemployment benefits 39.2 42.8 31.6 36.3
Received unemployment benefits 21.9 19.4 19.9 20.4
Did not receive employment substitute allowance 6.5 15.1 15.5 12.9
Received employment substitute allowance 67.6 61.7 44.4 55.1
Did not participate in training 31.6 33.2 27.0 29.9
Participated in training 20.4 26.5 33.6 30.8
Did not participate in other programmes 32.1 34.5 28.3 30.9
Participated in other programmes 10.8 4.9 4.2 5.9
Proportions within the registered population
Demographic characteristics (distribution)
Female 44.4 43.1 46.0 44.8
Male 55.7 56.9 54.0 55.2
Age
Below 25 18.8 20.5 21.2 20.4
Aged 25–44 54.3 52.3 49.0 51.3
Over 44 26.9 27.3 29.8 28.4
Educational attainment
Max. eight years of schooling (lower-secondary level) 40.6 39.1 42.3 41.0
Vocational school 34.8 34.9 33.0 34.0
Min. secondary school leaving examination (Matura) 24.6 26.0 24.7 25.0
Fresh graduate 10.5 12.9 15.3 13.4
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2011 2012 2013 Average
The history of participants in the preceding non 
public works episode
Max. 3 months 24.3 33.0 33.9 31.0
4–9 months 28.9 37.5 31.1 32.2
10–12 months 7.2 9.4 7.3 7.8
More than 12 months 39.6 20.1 27.7 29.0
Did not receive unemployment benefits 55.1 58.3 63.5 60.0
Received unemployment benefits 44.9 41.7 36.5 40.0
Did not receive employment substitute allowance 59.2 61.6 58.9 60.0
Received employment substitute allowance 40.8 38.5 41.1 40.0
Did not participate in training 98.5 98.1 95.1 97.0
Participated in training 1.6 1.9 4.9 3.0
Did not participate in other programmes 96.8 95.0 96.1 96.0
Participated in other programmes 3.2 5.0 3.9 4.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on the complete EPWD.
As for the length of the non public works episode preceding public works, the 
composition of entrants changes considerably over time. While in 2011 more 
than half of the entrants had spent in excess of 12 months in a non public 
works episode, in 2013 only 20 per cent of them had done so. In parallel, the 
share of entrants from all shorter categories increased, especially of entrants 
with a length of less than three months. At the same time (probably partly 
due to the restart of the registration period following a public works episode) 
the proportion of participants registered for a long time decreases, while the 
proportion of those registered for a shorter time increases.
The proportion of entry among participants who had not received unem-
ployment benefits dropped more sharply than the proportion of those who 
had. During the three years the earlier small share of those who had not re-
ceived employment substitute allowance increased three-fold, and the share 
of those who had received decreased. This is not in line with the changes in 
the related population, since the proportion of those who did not receive un-
employment benefits increased in this period, and the proportion of those re-
ceiving and not receiving employment substitute allowance was nearly stable. 
A very small proportion of the registered unemployed participated in training 
or other active labour market programmes. While public works participation 
of the former increased one and a half times, public works participation of 
the latter decreased by half.
The independent effects of individual characteristics are not always compli-
ant with what is seen in Table 2.6.2 because of the correlation between them. 
In order to exclude these effects, a simple logit model was used for estimating 
the likelihood of entry to public works for each of the three years, at the end 
of a non public works episode: this is the time when entry to public works is 
realistic. The average marginal effects of the individual variables are shown 
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in Table 2.6.3, which is comparable to the differences between likelihoods 
in categories of a given variable indicated by Table 2.6.2. The findings are in 
line with earlier findings and mainly differ in their absolute value.
Table 2.6.3: Average marginal effects after logit estimation.  
Outcome variable: entry to public works from a non public works episode
2011 2012 2013
Demographic characteristics
Male 0.00484*** 0.0347*** –0.000722
Aged 25–44 0.0165*** 0.0166*** 0.0138***
Over 44 0.0459*** 0.0768*** 0.0452***
Schooling: vocational school –0.0552*** –0.0648*** –0.0500***
Schooling: min. secondary school leav-
ing exam (Matura) –0.0786
*** –0.108*** –0.0878***
Fresh graduate 0.0223*** 0.0457*** 0.0516***
History of participant in registration
Number of days spent in the public 
employment system 0.000125
*** 0.000151*** 0.000108***
Number of unsuccessful placements –0.0724*** –0.0414*** –0.0392***
Received unemployment benefits 0.0231*** –0.0603*** –0.0426***
Received employment substitute allow-
ance 0.484
*** 0.245*** 0.118***
Participated in training –0.0377*** –0.0378*** 0.0713***
Participated in another active labour 
market programme –0.106
*** –0.270*** –0.218***
Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors.
Reference categories: female, aged below 25, with educational attainment of a maxi-
mum of eight years of schooling (lower secondary), not a fresh graduate, did not 
spend time in the public employment system, had no unsuccessful job placement, 
did not receive unemployment benefits or employment substitute and did not par-
ticipate in any other active labour market programmes.
Logit coefficients were calculated using the total sample, while the average effects 
were calculated using a 5-per-cent sample due to being highly resource-intensive.
Significant at a level of ***1 per cent, **5 per cent, *10 per cent.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the complete EPWD.
It appears that the composition of public works participants changed as a result of 
a shift in the programme structure of the public employment system. At first, 
predominantly clients with a long period of registration entered public works, 
which changed over time. This has happened partly because of the restart of 
the registration period, which in the case of repeated participation, decreases 
the time of the preceding registration but does not decrease the average time 
spent in the public employment system. The majority of participants continue 
to be unqualified and older. It is important to note, however, that among new 
entrants it is young people and fresh graduates who have an increasing share.
Thus there are significant changes behind the relative stability of headcounts, 
presented in Subchapter 2.3, which are partly beneficial, partly adverse.
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It is beneficial that public works apparently reaches a number of clients reg-
istered for a long time but not yet previously involved in other programmes. 
This may provide more financial security than the small amount of employ-
ment substitute allowance or social benefit or in many cases the local labour 
market that is accessible without support and mobility. It is less favourable that 
over time the targeting of the programme deteriorates. As seen in Subchap-
ter 2.5, a significant part of public works participants have considerable work 
experience, therefore the expedience of the programme in general should 
be examined. It is especially a serious cause for concern that the likelihood 
of young participants, usually with a short time spent in the public employ-
ment system, entering public works increases. The labour market prospects 
of young people may be improved by other support instead of public works 
(as indicated in the Youth Guarantee plan of the Government) (Ministry for 
National Economy, 2013). Still, their share within public works participants is 
growing. Since participants obviously become increasingly attached to public 
works in the public employment system, it is of special importance that the 
targeting of the programme be as effective as possible.
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2.7 SPATIAL INEQUALITIES OF PUBLIC WORKS 
EMPLOYMENT
Márton Czirfusz
This chapter deals with the spatial inequalities of the public works scheme. 
The main question to be answered concerns which types of unevenness are 
present at the sub-national scale if we look at access to the programme and 
the distribution practices of quotas and funding.
Local or regional inequalities of the labour market and effects of labour 
policies have been covered in some of the former yearbooks of The Hungarian 
labour market and also the In focus sections of those (see for example Kabai–
Németh, 2012, Kertesi–Kézdi, 2010, Lőcsei, 2011). These studies have made 
clear that spatiality is a crucial aspect if analysing the realm of labour. How-
ever, spatiality as such is not only a dimension of labour (or in the case of this 
yearbook, of the public works scheme) to be taken into account. Space (i.e. 
the fact that social relations are distributed over space) is constitutive of the 
public work scheme: the public works scheme is distributed geographically 
unevenly, and thereby public works as a social relation reproduces geographi-
cally uneven development. Spatial patterns to be discussed in this chapter are 
not a result of purely spatial causes; spatial forms have to be understood as 
a result of social relations occurring over space, as a result of the geographi-
cally uneven historical development of capitalism (see for example Massey, 
1995). From this perspective, local variations of the public works scheme are 
not only ‘local specificities’ in-line with or diverging from processes at the 
national scale; the national level picture shown in other chapters of In focus 
are constituted exactly of these local processes.
This chapter is structured as follows. The first part is a literature review on 
how the public works scheme, and workfare in general reproduces socio-spa-
tial inequalities. Secondly, data used for describing the spatial inequalities 
of the Hungarian public works scheme is discussed. The third part covers a 
description of spatial inequalities of the public works scheme, the main ar-
gument being that the programme funds are distributed unevenly not only 
socially, but also spatially.
Public works as spatial policy
At times of economic crises society reacts to the growing unemployment and 
the worsening of life conditions in different ways. On the one hand social 
movements (such as trade unions or other representations of class interests) 
call for direct job-creation by the (national) state. On the other hand, the 
state itself (mediating between economic processes and prevailing ideologies 
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of the political elites) also considers direct job-creation as an effective means 
of tackling the devastating effects of economic crises (cf. Arrighi, 1990, Silver, 
2003). In other words, following Polanyi’s (2001) idea of the ‘double move-
ment’, in times when the self-regulating market fails (such as recently, during 
and after the 2008 crisis), social dislocations ‘naturally’ lead to social protec-
tionism and different forms of political intervention.
In Hungary, these historical processes unfolded in a very similar way as in 
core countries of the world-system, following the waves of global capitalist de-
velopment. During the downturn of the 1870s some suggested that the state 
should play a more active role in job-creation, but this idea was easily fobbed 
off in the heyday of economic liberalism (cf. Rézler, 2001). During the 1929–
33 Great Depression, the government (both at the national, as well as on the 
municipal level) attempted to create jobs in public works programmes (Baksay, 
1987), the 1930s also featured government policies offering social assistance 
only for those taking part in public works. Following the crisis of the 1970s 
the government put forward a rapid restructuring of the manufacturing in-
dustry and a raising of the standard of living, but controversial labour policies 
at national and at firm-level were also introduced (cf. Fazekas–Köllő, 1985). 
The public works programme widened after the 2008 crisis is, thus, not a sig-
nificantly new phenomenon, and its explanation cannot be limited to shifts of 
ideologies or economic policy ideas of current governments or political elites.
The current public works programme as a public policy goes hand in hand 
with workfare policies of West European and North American core countries, 
introduced in the past decades. How these policies reproduce socio-spatial 
inequalities has been at the forefront of critical labour and political-econo-
my studies since the 1990s. The following paragraphs summarise how and 
why workfare policies reproduce socio-spatial inequalities, as it is an inherent 
characteristic of them, and how the inequalities might be conceived as a re-
sult of inter-related economic processes at different geographical scales, from 
the local to the global (cf. Peck, 2002).
The transition from welfare to workfare is often described in an over-sim-
plified way as a neo-liberal economic shift towards the hollowing-out of the 
state. This term means that both the national and the local state (in Hun-
gary the more than 3200 municipalities) are losing power and their role in 
governing labour market processes. It might be self-evident from this per-
spective that social inequalities rise because of market processes – resulting 
in opportunities depending very much on where one lives. Employment op-
portunities differ, both as a consequence of variegated individual strategies 
in securing livelihoods, and the development trajectories of the local govern-
ment. This latter means, for example, that some municipalities are better off 
in attracting firms and capital for job creation, and thus from the rising local 
taxes more money might be re-distributed as social benefits. In spite of these 
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processes, local governments are taking different positions in the competi-
tion for national or supra-national financial transfers, such as development 
funds (see, inter alia, Kálmán, 2012). Following that, one cannot simply say 
that the state is losing power under the political-economic formation of ne-
oliberal capitalism, rather, the state both rolls out from, and rolls back into, 
certain realms of production of goods and services and social reproduction 
(Peck–Tickell, 2002).
From the 1970s on (following the economic downturn) ‘First World’ coun-
tries observed a triple transformation of the state, public works programmes 
being an integral part. Firstly, the Fordist mode of production declined, tra-
ditional wage relations having been substituted by deregulated, flexible forms 
of employment. (Flexibilisation is also typical for Hungarian – and more 
generally, for Eastern European countries’ – labour policies since the 1990s, 
irrespective of which parties were in power.) Secondly, parallel to the change 
in the mode of production, workfare states replaced former welfare states; 
dismantling the collective rights of social assistance, and introducing the 
obligation to work (for a current overview of the Hungarian case, see Cseres-
Gergely–Molnár, 2014). Thirdly, the penal apparatus of the state is widening, 
in a sphere where it is still possible (Wacquant, 2008). In Hungary, the pu-
nitive state and the public works programme is closely intertwined ideologi-
cally: for most of the public works programme the Ministry of the Interior 
is responsible (and not the Ministry for National Economy which oversees 
labour market policies in general).
The shift from the welfare state to the workfare state does not only transform 
the national scale. Overall, it might be conceived as a shift from a Keynes-
ian welfare national state to a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime 
(Drahokoupil, 2007, MacLeavy, 2010). In Hungary, the upsurge in public 
works employment is a complex structural change in public administration, 
affecting different scales of governance. For instance, the supra-national EU 
scale (from which financial transfers arrive in ‘less-developed’ countries and 
regions – cf. Lendvai, 2008) played an indispensable role in financing the 
public works programme shortly after the outbreak of the 2008 economic 
crisis (Elek–Scharle, 2011). The scale of the national and the local state will 
be analysed in detail in the following parts of this chapter.
Economic crises have always been played out unevenly geographically (cf. 
Fazekas, 1996, Lőcsei, 2011, Boros–Pál, 2011), and thus employment policies 
tackling crises have also led to spatially uneven outcomes: their direct effect is 
smaller in areas where the primary labour market and traditional wage labour 
play a larger role (Czirfusz, 2014). Declining manufacturing regions are typi-
cally locations in which the national state launches national programmes in 
order to attract investments which also boost employment (for a comparable 
Czech example see Drahokoupil, 2007). In other cases the state becomes the 
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direct employer, such as in the Hungarian public works scheme. In addition, 
inequality might also be analysed within localities: in larger settlements un-
employment is concentrated in specific neighbourhoods (such as in quarters 
dominated by the working class or lower social classes in general). The local 
state reacts to spatial unevenness through the use of different local policies: for 
instance, Budapest’s 23 autonomous district municipalities introduced highly 
different social policies in spring 2015. A further aspect to be considered in 
this differentiation is the combination of the public works programme with 
punitive policies (Wacquant, 2008). Seemingly this move decreases social in-
equalities, but in reality these policies reproduce intra-urban tensions. The pub-
lic works programme fossilizes masses of people as the working poor – a pri-
marily urban problematic situation throughout Eastern Europe (Smith, 2008).
In some countries, spatial unevenness of employment has led to overtly spa-
tially focused policies. This has been the case in the United States in which 
welfare assistance was decentralised to the 50 states by the Clinton admin-
istration, or in the policies of the Labour governments in the United King-
dom after 1997 (Peck–Theodore, 2000). The aim of these policies is that they 
decentralise decision-making and financial resources (for example access to 
some funds are only available in designated ‘backward’ areas), and local needs 
are taken into account with spatially variegated development policies. Also 
important from a historical point of view, is that in the era of the neoliberal 
mode of regulation (since the 1970s in the Western world) local governments 
are able to show an increase of competencies, and are able to re-legitimise their 
jurisdiction by governing the realm of employment and unemployment locally 
(MacLeavy, 2008). This is a somewhat unique turn as the general public and 
the political discourse is about the growing constraints of local policy-making.
Despite these advantages, the disadvantages of the decentralisation of labour 
market policies are also visible. Rescaling responsibilities from the national 
level to the sub-national means growing competition for financial resources 
among regional and local governments. Rescaling is not a structural answer 
for the uneven development and is not an alternative to neoliberal economic 
policies (Crisp, 2012). In line with this argument, Peck and Theodore (2000), 
as well as Artner (2015) point out that workfare policies and welfare reforms 
are both part of the economic policies aiming to increase competitiveness 
– i.e. flexible, deregulated labour markets and public works programmes are 
two sides of the same coin, functionally complementing each other. What 
follows from this statement is – as shown in the following parts of the chap-
ter – that a public works programme is inherently unable to decrease spatial 
inequalities – as it does not deal with structural causes of unevenness, i.e. 
capitalist development. What is more, in local labour markets where the pri-
marily labour market is weak the public works scheme does not offer a solu-
tion for different groups of unemployed people according to educational at-
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tainment or other social dimensions. Public works programme participants 
are expelled from the primary labour market and forced into low-wage and 
low-skilled workplaces (in the Hungarian case, public works employees get 
less than the minimum wage).
In the Hungarian version of the public works scheme the roles and respon-
sibilities of the different scales brought about new hierarchies within public 
administration. The main regulatory changes have been discussed in Chap-
ter 2.1 of this book. Without repetition this chapter discusses how roles and 
power relations have been established between different spatial scales.
The public works scheme in Hungary is a national programme, directed by 
the minister responsible for public works,1 who decides upon the allocation of 
the appropriation secured by the yearly state budgets. The planning is carried 
out jointly with the sub-national level institutions: the 20 government offices 
of 19 counties and the capital city of Budapest (Figure 2.7.1), as well as the 
government offices in 174 districts.2 Spending the allocated funds is decided 
by the same government offices,3 according to municipal and other employers’ 
requests examined by the minister or the government office itself. Organis-
ing and the implementation of the public works at the local level are in the 
hands of the almost 3,200 municipalities.4 Co-ordinating the public works 
scheme, its communication and compiling the requests for funding is dealt 
with by the district’s government offices, as well as directly by the ministry.5
1 In some cases jointly with the 
minister responsible for employ-
ment policy – Act IV of 1991
2 Government decree 320 
of 2014, § 8. In Hungary, the 
counties (NUTS 3 level – see 
Figure 2.7.1) have limited power, 
but possess an elected county 
council. They also seat govern-
ment offices which are bodies 
of the executive authority at 
the sub-national level. The 174 
districts (NUTS 4 level) serve 
mostly administrative purposes.
3 Government decree 320 of 
2014, § 8. and government de-
cree 375 of 2010, § 7.
4 Act CLXXXIX of 2011, § 13 
and 15.
5 Government decree 320 of 
2014, § 11; Government decree 
66 of 2015, § 15.
Figure 2.7.1: Counties of Hungary
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Spatial allocation of the budget available for the public works scheme might 
be based on two principles. The first one is the equal access to enter the pro-
gramme which means that every unemployed person has equal rights and 
an equal chance to get a job under the scheme. This principle is important 
for the individual citizens, as availability of some of the social benefits is 
currently dependent on the fact of whether the person in need has taken 
part in the public works programme (this illustrates quite well that a work-
fare state is in formation in contemporary Hungary). The other principle 
which might be considered by policy-makers is prioritizing ‘ backward’ re-
gions with more available funding. In the yearly allocation of financial re-
sources characteristics of the regional and the local labour market have to 
be taken into account, and municipalities and areas might be designated 
as prioritized ones ‘in order to tackle social tensions and to offer a broad 
spectrum of public works’.6 However, how concretely this consideration is 
actually taking place is not detailed in the legislative documents. As a re-
sult, funding of the programme is assumed to be distributed unevenly be-
cause of two factors: Firstly, municipalities’ requests for public works quotas 
do not correlate with the number of unemployed people or with the social 
needs existing (some local municipalities do not organise public works at 
all). Secondly, the consideration as such at the regional or ministry level 
(vis-à-vis a normative allocation of funding) also opens up the possibility 
of bargaining and lobbying. The spatially uneven distribution of the budget 
and quotas of employment in the public works scheme is the topic of the 
following parts of this chapter.
Data
This chapter builds on official registry-based data on public works programme 
participants between 2011 and 2013. The data harmonised by the Databank 
of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences was complemented by other municipal-level (in Budapest: district-
level) datasets of the Regional Development and Spatial Planning Informa-
tion System (Országos Területfejlesztési és Területrendezési Információs 
Rendszer, TeIR) concerning the population number and the number of un-
employed.
Methodologically the main challenge in analysing the spatiality of pub-
lic works is to locate the public works programme episodes geographically. 
Participants of the programme are registered according to their permanent 
place of residence (coded by the postcode).7 The place of residence does not 
necessarily coincide with the actual place of work or the headquarters of the 
employer (this latter is the case for example at such employers as national 
forestry companies, national park or water management directorates cover-
ing larger areas).
6 Government decree 375 of 
2010, § 7/A. See also the govern-
ment resolution 1,044 of 2013.
7 The database contains 117.6 
million rows which describe 
one day of a public works par-
ticipant. Among those episodes 
the postcodes of permanent ad-
dresses were missing in 3,800 
cases which were not included 
in this study. The verification 
of the database (sorting out 
mistypings, etc.) was not pos-
sible. All in all these constraints 
are not considered as significant, 
and do not modify the main ten-
dencies to be described.
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The database registers postcodes of employed persons and this is used for 
aggregating data to the scale of municipalities. If several postcodes are used 
in one municipality, data was aggregated to the municipal level.8 As in some 
cases the same postcode is used in separate municipalities, several (adminis-
tratively independent) municipalities were pulled together in order to ensure 
compatibility with other databases containing the number of inhabitants and 
unemployed.9 In the case of Budapest, if possible, the district10 was used as an 
analytical unit. In the end, the database consisted of 2,613 aggregated units. 
In the following parts of the chapter, these will be referred to as municipali-
ties. The number of participants in the public works scheme was calculated 
by using the full-time-equivalent, in order to sort out the statistical effect of 
part-time work (cf. Cseres-Gergely–Molnár 2014).
Spatial inequalities of the public works scheme
Following the literature review of the preceding parts, it might be assumed 
that the spatial allocation of the public works in Hungary is highly uneven. 
In order to verify this assumption, the spatial distribution of the public works 
employment and unemployment was compared (Figure 2.7.2).
The two maps show 2013 municipal level data, the size of the circles is pro-
portional to the number of public works employment and that of the unem-
ployed persons, respectively. As other chapters in this book have demonstrated, 
after the reorganization of the public works scheme in 2011, 2013 featured a 
mostly solidified structure in terms of programme instruments and legislative 
background. Still, it is clearly visible from the comparison of the two maps 
that public works are not evenly distributed. More financial resources have 
been allocated to the Eastern parts of Hungary, but disproportionally more 
if the unemployment figures are taken into account. (It is clear that the pub-
lic works scheme contributed to the fact that the number of unemployed in 
these Eastern counties of Hungary11 is not as high compared to the Western 
parts of the country as it would be without the programme.) The fact that 
the distribution is highly uneven might be justified with county-level aggre-
gated data. 17.4% of full-time-equivalent public works employment is con-
centrated in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county (compared to an 11.7% share of 
the unemployed persons), a further 14.7% was allocated to Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg county (with 11% of the unemployed), followed by Hajdú-Bihar county 
(8.6%), Békés (7.3%), Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok (7.2%) and Baranya (7%). In Bu-
8 For example, four-digit post-
codes 2241 and 2242 both refer 
to the municipality of Sülysáp, 
data of the two postcodes was 
combined.
9 For example, postcode 7400 is 
used in the county seat Kapos-
vár, as well as two neighbouring 
municipalities. Postcodes 7451 
and 7461 denote two (formerly 
independent) neighbourhoods 
of Kaposvár. The three post-
codes were combined, as well 
as other statistical data of Ka-
posvár and the two other mu-
nicipalities. As a result, the least 
common multiple of different 
databases was secured.
10 Budapest has a two-tier ad-
ministrative system, responsi-
bilities are shared between the 
Budapest municipal govern-
ment and the governments of 
the 23 independent districts. 
As most of the social policies 
are delegated to the district 
governments in the city, and 
these social policies are highly 
different district-by-district, it 
is more meaningful to analyse 
those than the aggregated data 
of Budapest. (Budapest dis tricts 
are not to be confused with 
Hungary’s 174 sub-national 
districts – the administrative 
units referred to earlier.)
11 The most visible (and the most cited) differences within the 
county in terms of economic development is the East–West slope, 
apart from the Budapest–countryside divide. Western counties 
are often depicted as developed ones whose ‘winner’ economies 
are deeply integrated into global production networks (mostly in 
the manufacturing sector). The Northeast is characterised by an 
industrial decline starting during the 1970s global economic crisis 
and by a collapsing industry following the end of state socialism 
in 1989. Remaining parts of the East show a higher percentage 
of agricultural production, although most of the municipalities 
with several tens of thousands of inhabitants also have some 
companies in the manufacturing sector being in superior posi-
tions in global commodity chains. In the public discourse, social 
problems and tensions are often conceived as prevailing mostly 
in the easternmost counties, such as Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg.
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dapest 8.8% of the unemployment is concentrated, but the capital city only 
received 1.9% of the public works employment. The differences between the 
counties increased slightly between 2011 and 2013, primarily because of the 
growing share of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén.12
Figure 2.7.2: Full-time-equivalent person-days of public works employment (above) 
and the number of unemployed persons (below) at the municipal level (2013)
Data source: Databank of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences; Regional Development and Spatial Planning Information 
System.
The map also reveals that county-level data obliterates considerable intra-county 
differences. It is striking that the allocation of funding within the counties of-
ten coincides with the assumed labour market position of the areas in the pub-
12 For the geographical location 
of counties referred to in this 
chapter, see Figure 2.7.1.
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lic discourse and in the national media. The Southern part of Baranya county 
at the Croatian border is a disadvantaged area with complex social problems 
emerging in the past 25 years of capitalism, and it also received significantly 
higher public works employment quotas than other parts also affected by un-
employment. Several stigmatized regions in the national public discourse which 
are often depicted as areas in which people are not working, lazy, or even wel-
fare scroungers – such as the former industrial centre of Ózd and its vicinity 
(Northwestern part of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county), or the middle part of 
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county – received higher proportions of public works 
employment, seemingly with the intention to discipline those regions.
It is also obvious from the comparison of the two maps that on the map 
below, larger cities with higher numbers of unemployment do not stand out 
from the upper map showing public works employment. Larger municipali-
ties with larger (absolute) unemployment receive relatively smaller quotas of 
public works employment, or to put it differently, people living in larger set-
tlements have a significantly lower chance of entering into the programme 
once they become unemployed. This tendency is also shown on Figure 2.7.3 
which compares the distribution of public works employment, unemployment 
and population according to settlement size categories.
Figure 2.7.3: Distribution of public works employment (full-time-equivalent person-
days), unemployment and population according to settlement size categories 
(2013)
* Population: 1.7 million.
Data source: Databank of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences; Regional Development and Spatial Planning Information 
System.
The public works employment scheme is primarily a programme running in 
smaller municipalities. The divide lies at settlements around 10 thousand 
inhabitants – in smaller municipalities than that unemployment is higher 
than in larger municipalities and this is not compensated for by a larger par-
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ticipation in the public works scheme. The situation in cities above 50 thou-
sand inhabitants is most striking: unemployment is present, but public work 
employment opportunities are scarce. Further qualitative studies are needed 
to find out whether the legislative environment (the responsibilities of the 
different scales of public administration) or the local government’s manage-
ment capacities limit the available public works in this category. For example, 
it might be assumed that large municipalities have neither personal resourc-
es, nor infrastructure, nor organisational knowledge of how to offer public 
works for several hundreds or thousands of unemployed people – the result 
being that these settlements do not apply for large quotas. The case of Bu-
dapest is unique in the sense that firstly, both the 23 districts and the city of 
Budapest offer public works employment, and secondly, the unemployment 
rate is rather low as there are more opportunities of waged labour on the pri-
mary labour market. It is also clear that in Budapest individual portfolios of 
securing livelihoods might be more diverse than in smaller settlements (cf. 
Smith–Stenning–Rochovská–Świątek, 2008). Despite these circumstances 
it is obvious that the public works scheme does not offer a viable policy solu-
tion for offering a large number of jobs for unemployed people in Budapest.
A larger scale public works programme has been organised and executed 
by the local governments since 2001. Unevenness of this public policy meas-
ure is not a new phenomenon emerging after the 2011 relaunch, but it is 
certainly true that broadening the programme in 2009 resulted in growing 
inequalities among municipalities (Keller–Bódis, 2012). These inequalities 
might be analysed in a breakdown according to different instruments of the 
programme. Full-time-equivalent person-days combined in public works em-
ployment were 19.7 million in 2011, 39.4 million in 2012 and rose to 46.8 
million in 2013. The shares of different instruments have constantly changed 
during the three years: the short-term public works, the so-called value-pro-
ducing public works and the wage subsidies offered to companies employing 
public workers were all ended in 2011. So-called Start model programmes 
were launched in 2013 (Table 2.7.1).
Different instruments of the programme contribute differently to change 
employment locally. In the following we analyse whether the person-days 
of public works employment correspond to the principle that counties and 
municipalities with higher unemployment should receive more funding and 
more public works quotas. To measure this question the distributions of pub-
lic works employment and unemployment between municipalities were com-
pared using the widely used inequality measure, the Hoover index.13 If the 
distribution of public works employees and that of unemployed persons is 
similar (i.e. the Hoover index is small and decreasing) then the programme 
reduces spatial inequalities of unemployment.14 Calculations were made both 
for the whole country (to measure the inequalities within the country), as 
13 Hoover index (H) measures 
the deviations of two distribu-
tions (xi, f i): 
             
The range of the index is be-
tween 0 and 100%; the higher 
the index value, the higher is the 
difference of the two distribu-
tions. The measure also shows 
what percentage of one distri-
bution has to be re-distributed 
throughout municipalities in 
order to achieve the same distri-
bution as that of the other one.
14 There is a methodological 
problem, of course, inasmuch 
as public works employment and 
unemployment are in a complex 
causal relation. Growing public 
works employment decreases 
unemployment. If the distri-
bution principles of quotas are 
followed, this decrease in unem-
ployment also leads to decreas-
ing public works employment.
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well as for the counties. This latter might refer to the role of government of-
fices at the county level in distributing public works employment within the 
counties. Results are shown in Table 2.7.2.
Table 2.7.1: Distribution of full-time-equivalent person-days among  
public works employment instruments (%)
Instrument 2011 2012 2013
Short-term public works 37.47 0.10 0.00
Long-term public works 26.46 64.97 28.42
Wage subsidies for companies 3.05 0.00 0.00
National programme 28.48 35.03 21.04
Value-producing public works 4.55 0.00 0.00
Start model programmes 0.00 0.00 50.64
Altogether 100.00 100.00 100.00
Data source: Databank of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences.
Table 2.7.2: County level inequalities of public works employment  
and unemployment, according to the instruments (Hoover indices, %, 2011–2013)
County
2011
Public 
works 
employ-
ment total
Short-term 
public 
works
Long-term 
public 
works
Wage subsi-
dies for 
companies
National 
programme
Value-
producing 
public 
works
Budapest 16.3 18.5 19.6 31.3 43.7 73.9
Baranya 28.4 18.6 30.5 47.7 57.5 72.0
Bács-Kiskun 16.3 14.7 20.3 60.3 35.1 94.2
Békés 16.6 13.4 16.0 52.2 34.9 68.0
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 20.8 16.6 19.8 34.9 52.5 73.2
Csongrád 25.1 18.7 21.1 57.1 35.2 79.0
Fejér 20.3 19.8 18.3 44.2 49.2 88.9
Győr-Moson-Sopron 25.8 21.5 23.7 55.4 50.6 60.3
Hajdú-Bihar 19.2 16.9 21.5 29.5 37.6 64.8
Heves 22.9 20.7 25.8 48.5 46.0 91.4
Komárom-Esztergom 17.7 18.0 18.8 45.6 31.3 75.9
Nógrád 11.5 12.2 19.9 38.9 37.3 79.2
Pest 28.9 25.1 26.1 59.2 47.2 81.5
Somogy 21.5 16.5 18.2 62.6 50.0 68.0
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 22.2 17.3 21.6 37.6 39.7 73.9
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 18.8 17.8 18.5 38.7 37.3 91.7
Tolna 24.8 17.9 20.2 55.9 45.1 60.0
Vas 25.4 19.2 20.0 48.2 48.7 77.5
Veszprém 20.7 22.1 20.7 41.3 47.1 87.0
Zala 25.2 20.0 16.0 47.9 54.5 93.9
Total Hungary 25.8 22.9 27.0 48.7 47.1 77.7
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County
2012 2013
Public 
works 
employ-
ment total
Long-term 
public 
works
National 
pro-
gramme
Public 
works 
employ-
ment total
Long-term 
public 
works
National 
pro-
gramme
Start 
model 
pro-
grammes
Budapest 12.6 12.4 17.5 11.1 10.4 22.3 22.9
Baranya 39.2 40.2 50.6 32.3 25.9 44.9 37.4
Bács-Kiskun 26.3 30.1 32.7 27.9 17.8 34.1 54.8
Békés 24.7 27.5 30.9 23.5 15.0 30.2 30.9
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 27.6 29.4 38.4 33.1 23.3 41.5 40.4
Csongrád 27.5 33.5 27.0 23.6 17.2 24.4 42.7
Fejér 27.8 34.3 32.1 26.3 12.0 27.9 72.4
Győr-Moson-Sopron 29.3 34.6 35.3 29.4 25.4 35.3 88.8
Hajdú-Bihar 32.4 35.7 31.8 34.1 21.9 29.9 46.7
Heves 33.3 41.7 35.6 28.9 16.2 31.2 63.8
Komárom-Esztergom 18.8 17.6 24.4 22.4 13.3 25.3 84.3
Nógrád 26.0 33.1 39.0 29.9 25.1 36.1 50.0
Pest 32.7 27.0 43.0 26.7 20.9 40.9 80.4
Somogy 29.2 33.5 39.0 25.4 22.1 34.5 39.5
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 27.4 28.8 35.0 26.3 19.7 31.2 35.6
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 26.6 32.1 30.1 31.4 22.6 29.7 45.5
Tolna 31.3 38.2 33.1 37.3 22.6 33.5 66.3
Vas 30.2 37.7 34.3 30.5 27.4 32.2 85.2
Veszprém 28.4 34.8 33.2 31.0 25.7 34.9 83.4
Zala 35.5 39.8 41.9 35.1 17.7 38.0 73.6
Total Hungary 32.9 37.6 38.2 34.7 22.4 37.5 53.8
Note: Grey background of cells indicates instruments with higher inequalities than 
the total public works of the respective year. Public works employment was meas-
ured by full-time-equivalent person-days.
Data source: Databank of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences; Regional Development and Spatial Planning Information 
System.
Let us commence the analysis of the table with the yearly totals. It has al-
ready been shown that the distribution of the financial resources was highly 
uneven between municipalities in 2013. As the value of the Hoover index 
rose constantly between 2011 and 2013 (from 25.8 to 34.7 per cent), the pro-
gramme was less and less successful in channelling public money to munici-
palities with higher unemployment – despite the successive reforms of the in-
struments and the changing legislation regarding the implementation of the 
programme. The Hoover index of 34.7 per cent means that out of 10 person-
days in the country 3.5 were to be located elsewhere in order to concentrate 
resources into municipalities with higher unemployment. There have been 
large differences between specific instruments of the programme regarding 
the unevenness of their spatial distribution. The national programme (cover-
ing one-fifth to one-third of the person-days) was expected to fulfil the prem-
ise of even distribution (as it is co-ordinated at the national level, knowing 
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the socio-spatial trends of the whole country), but in fact, it has been more 
unevenly distributed than the total number of the public works employment 
(the Hoover index of the instrument exceeds that of the total).
Some of the instruments cancelled at the end of 2011 – such as the short-
term programme – were allocated broadly evenly, in concordance with the 
spatial distribution of unemployment. Despite the even allocation, the in-
strument itself was not able to help those people in need in securing liveli-
hoods, as it only offered employment for a very short period of time (Cseres-
Gergely–Molnár, 2014).
Wage subsidies paid for companies employing public workers, and the so-
called value-producing public works (the latter including municipal pro-
grammes) mobilised a small number of people (Table 2.7.1). Their spatial in-
equalities were high – in the case of the latter out of 10 person-days 8 were not 
in municipalities facing higher unemployment (Table 2.7.2). From this perspec-
tive, ceasing these instruments at the end of 2011 was a meaningful decision.
Long-term public works employment quotas differed significantly from year-
to-year. For 2013, however (perhaps because of a more thoughtful planning 
of the instrument) a spatial distribution was found which resembled spatial 
patterns of unemployment. Further qualitative research is needed for figur-
ing out whether the county and district government offices have played a role 
in this quite successful allocation of the financial resources.
Start model programmes were launched in designated ‘backward’ areas of 
the country in 2013. Although according to its name it is a model programme, 
its share became rather large in 2013, representing half of the total public 
works programme. The allocation of the financial resources is highly uneven 
(see the high Hoover index value). The cause of this unevenness might be that 
municipalities suffering from the most complex social problems have neither 
the organisational capacity, nor a viable agenda on how to tackle (mostly 
long-term) unemployment in their jurisdiction, thereby they were not apply-
ing for these financial resources. What follows then is that this instrument 
is biased towards municipalities which are more entrepreneurial (cf. Harvey, 
1989) than others; not eliminating the uneven geographical development of 
capitalism, but actually reproducing it.
Looking at county-level data it becomes obvious that even within counties 
public works employment is not concentrated to municipalities in which un-
employment is higher. In 2013 out of 10 person-days 2–4 (Komárom-Esz-
tergom 2.24, Tolna 3.73) go to settlements non justifiably if we make a com-
parison with the actual unemployment numbers. There are only a few cases 
in which the distribution of the financial resources have become (slightly) 
better – such as in Csongrád county. The same is true for Budapest and the 
surrounding Pest county, in which low and decreasing public works employ-
ment have become more even (but the total number of public works partici-
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pants is minimal compared to the number of unemployed). In some counties 
the spatial unevenness of the allocation has drastically increased, such as in 
Nógrád (11.5% to 29.9% between 2011 and 2013) – 3 out of 10 person-days 
were to be allocated elsewhere if a distribution fitting to the unemployment 
were to be considered. Among ‘winner’ counties of the programme (those 
with relatively high resources) it is only Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg in which the 
unevenness of the person-days did not increase – contrary to the situation in 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén or Hajdú-Bihar.
Speaking of the specific instruments, the value-producing scheme and com-
panies’ wage subsidies were allocated by considerations of low efficiency. The 
short-term public works instrument was directed to settlements more in need 
in 2011 in a majority of counties, the long-term employment programme dis-
tribution, however, was rather uneven. In 2012 two instruments compensated 
for each other, except for four counties and Budapest. In 2013, Start model 
programmes were introduced. However, there was not a single county in Hun-
gary in which funding was primarily allocated to settlements with higher un-
employment. Apart from Budapest, 3–9 out of 10 person-days were utilised 
in municipalities in which it was not duly justified by unemployment figures. 
Long-term public works instrument runs smoothly, and unevenness has sig-
nificantly decreased in the counties (inequalities are the highest in Vas county 
with a Hoover index value of 27.4%). The co-ordination of the national pro-
gramme has led to a rather uneven spatial allocation – both among counties 
and within counties.
In sum, public works employment is unevenly distributed among counties, 
districts and settlements. One might conclude that this policy measure is un-
able to decrease unemployment differences within Hungary. The legislative-
organisational environment involves sub-national level of governance in the 
implementation of the programme. It is clear, however, that these units of 
public administration have not been able to concentrate public works em-
ployment into settlements with the highest unemployment – thereby pub-
lic money is used for maintaining uneven geographical development in the 
country. More detailed analysis would be needed to discover whether this 
inequality is a consequence of deficiencies in the hierarchical, power-laden 
allocation mechanisms or ‘simply’ a management problem. The first expla-
nation might cover controversial causal relations: decentralisation might be 
the cause of uneven allocation of funding, but it might also represent a tool 
which would help in allocating the resources more evenly. The second expla-
nation might result from the fact that all counties and districts are fighting 
for more public works employment, thus interests at different scales of the 
public works governance leads to spatial inequalities.
One cannot fail to consider the scale of the individual either. Local social 
hierarchies are reproduced through the public works programme; the em-
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ployability criterion is decisive in establishing new tensions – in-line with 
current social policies making a distinction between deserving and undeserv-
ing poor. If unemployment exceeds the number of public works employment 
quotas (which is the case in most of the municipalities), it is the ‘employable’ 
people who get the jobs. Thereby, individual skills become more important 
in public policies than structural problems of the economy (cf. Peck–Theodore, 
2000), reproducing neoliberal capitalism on the individual, the local and the 
national scale. Entrance and exit chances in relation to the programme are 
highly differentiated (Cseres-Gergely–Molnár, 2014) and social inequalities 
are reproduced. These trends are covered in other chapters of In focus in detail.
Conclusion
Public works employment broadened at the culmination of the 2008 crisis, 
and re-shaped in 2011, reproducing socio-spatial inequalities of labour. Public 
works employment is, however, not a single public policy intervention which 
might be analysed independently from other labour market policies (such 
as flexibilisation of the labour force) or social policies (shift from welfare to 
workfare). The public works programme is an important element in (and a 
symptom of) not only reproducing social inequalities, but also marginalis-
ing spaces and places. In spite of the legislation that resources should be con-
centrated on areas with more severe unemployment, data from 2011–2013 
shows that this goal was not achieved – in fact, the allocation of the financial 
resources has become spatially more uneven. One critical reason for this un-
evenness is the nature of the legislation which does not provide a clear struc-
ture concerning how to deconcentrate funding and employment numbers to 
counties and municipalities. How allocation proceeds directly at certain spa-
tial scales of public administration was not analysed in this paper; the main 
goal was to describe unevenness at different geographical scales. What fol-
lows from the analysis of the data is that public works employment seems to 
be a public policy tool in which public money is spent less efficiently. For ex-
ample, re-allocating money from the programme to provide unemployment 
benefits for a longer period of time would mean a more just allocation of the 
funding, probably also needing less administrative capacities. However, it is 
certainly clear that public works employment is ‘effective’ in several other re-
gards: in reproducing and increasing socio-spatial inequalities and effectively 
supporting subsequent governments’ class politics.
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2.8 WINTER PUBLIC WORKS
Irén Busch
In this section we present the most important data pertaining to participants 
in the winter public works training programmes.
In 2013, the average number of participants in the new public works pro-
grammes introduced in 2011 increased to 127 thousand persons, which is one 
and a half times higher than two years previously. The average number of par-
ticipants was not equally distributed in each month, but displayed significant 
seasonal variation. This was partly due to annual budget regulations defining 
financial support,1 and partly the result of the fact that most public works are 
performed outdoors, which significantly constrains job opportunities in the 
winter. The aim of introducing winter public works was to mitigate this sea-
sonality. The temporary winter public works programme, which was launched 
in November 2013, included employment in jobs that were also possible to 
carry out in the winter, and some training programmes. During the training 
programmes, just as in other public works-related training, participants re-
ceived a public works wage. The declared aim of these training programmes 
was to provide an opportunity for public workers to increase their chances 
of employment on the primary labour market.
Up to now, two winter training programmes have been realised: the first one 
between November 2013 and April 2014, the second one between December 
2014 and March 2015. In the second programme, there was an opportunity 
for those who successfully completed basic competency or remedial training 
for primary education to participate in the training once again.
The most important data pertaining to the number of participants in the 
winter public works training programmes are presented in Table 2.8.1.
Table 2.8.1: Number of participants in the training programmes  
related to winter public works
Winter public works  
in 2013–2014a
Winter public works  
in 2014–2015
Total number 99,571 27,999
Number of dropouts from the training 5,052 1,101
Dropout rate (per cent) 5.1 3.9
Number of Roma involved in the training 22,107 6,908
Share of Roma involved in the training (per cent) 22.2 39.3
a � � ������ �� �a������a��� �� ��� �a�a �a������� �������� �� ��� ������a��� ������
�a���� ������ �� ��� H���a��a� Na����a� E��������� S��v��� (PES) ��ff�� ��������, 
�� 0.5 ��� ���� ���� ��� �a�a ��������� �� SROP 2.1.6.
S�����: �a��� �� ��� ������ �� 16�� Ma��� 2015 ������ �� ��� P��j��� I��������a���� 
D��a������ �� ��� D����� S�a�� S�����a��a� R���������� ��� B�����a�� Ma�a���
���� a� ��� M������� ��� Na����a� E������.
1 �� ����������� �� ���������� 
�� ��� ��x� ��a� �a� �������.
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In the first training programme related to winter public works in 2013–2014, 
almost 100 thousand people took part, and in the second, 28 thousand peo-
ple, that is, the number of participants in winter training programmes sig-
nificantly declined. Participants of Roma origin made up 22 per cent of the 
first programme and almost 40 per cent in the second programme. The drop-
out rate in these programmes was relatively small, and this rate has decreased 
from 5 per cent in the first programme to 4 per cent in the second programme. 
The distribution of participants of winter training programmes are presented 
in Table 2.8.2–2.8.4. In the first winter training, 15 per cent of the partici-
pants were below 25 years of age, in the second cycle this rate was 22 per cent 
(Table 2.8.2). Compared to the age composition of the total pool, the share 
of young participants in the first training programme was somewhat below 
the share of young participants among all public workers, while in the second 
cycle, young people were slightly over-represented.
Table 2.8.2: Age distribution of participants in winter training public works 
programmes and among all public workers by age (percentages)
Age group
Distribution of participants in the winter 
public works training programmesa Distribution of all public workers
2013–2014 2014–2015 2013 2014
Under 25 years 14.8 21.8 17.0 16.3
26–50 years 59.6 58.3 59.0 60.6
Over 50 25.6 19.9 24.6 23.2
Together 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a �� ������ �� �a������a��� �� ��� ������a��� ������a���� ������ �� NFSZ ��ff�� �� 
0.5 ��� ���� ���� ��� �a��a��� �a������ �a�a �� SROP 2.1.6.
S�����: Ba��� �� ��� ������a��� ������a���� ������ �� ��� PES.
In terms of education (Table 2.8.3) 62 and 64 per cent of the winter training 
participants had completed at least primary education in 2013 and 2014 re-
spectively, which implies that the participation rate of those with lower edu-
cation in the training was higher than their rate among all public workers. As 
regards residence, 66 and 77 per cent of participants in winter training lived 
in disadvantaged settlements, their share being slightly lower than among all 
public workers (Table 2.8.4).
In terms of course type, there has been a significant change inbetween the 
two training periods (Table 2.8.5). While almost half of the participants in 
the first training period took part in a basic skill development or elementary 
training this course type almost disappeared by the second training period. 
Subsequently, the share of registered courses (i.e. courses that are listed in 
the ‘OKJ’, the National Qualifications Register) has increased. While in the 
winter of 2013/2014, 22 per cent of successfully completed training modules 
were recognised OKJ training ones, in the winter of 2014/2015 this rate in-
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creased to 62 per cent. The increase in the share of OKJ training modules was 
also related to the fact that participants successfully completing the basic skill 
development training in the previous year could participate again, but this 
time in vocational training.
Table 2.8.3: Educational distribution of participants in winter training public works 
programmes and among all public workers (percentages)
Education
Participants in the winter public 
works training programmes All public workers
2013–2014 2014–2015 2013 2014
Less than primary education 10.2 8.5 7.7 7.2
Primary education 52.2 55.7 45.6 45.6
Lower secondary vocational school 22.8 22.5 28.2 30.7
Upper secondary vocational school 7.7 7.4 9.5 8.6
Secondary school 5.5 5.3 7.0 6.0
Higher education 1.5 0.7 2.1 2.8
Together 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
S�����: Ba��� �� ��� ������a��� ������a���� ������ �� ��� PES.
Table 2.8.4: Per cent distribution of participants in winter training public works 
programmes and among all public workers by their disadvantaged settlements
Distribution of participants in the winter 
public works training programmes Distribution of all public workers
2013–2014 2014–2015 2013 2014
Does not live in a disad-
vantaged settlement 30.7 23.1 22.8 17.8
Lives in a disadvantaged 
settlement 69.3 76.9 77.2 82.2
Together 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
S�����: Ba��� �� �a�a ���� ��� ������a��� ������a���� ������ �� ��� PES.
Table 2.8.5: Distribution of participants in winter training public works programmes 
by course type (percentages)
Winter public works in 
2013–2014
Winter public works in 
2014–2015
Basic competency, primary 47.8 0.3
Semi-skilled 30.2 35.3
Authority* 0.5 1.8
OKJ (National Qualifications Register) 21.5 62.7
Together 100.0 100.0
* P��v���� �� a� a�������� �� ��a��� �� ������� a ���a��� �������, �.�. ��� ���� ����a����.
S�����: Ba��� �� �a�a ���� ��� ������a��� ������a���� ������ �� ��� PES.
Evaluations on the change of employment opportunities following the winter 
public works and training are not available. As was shown earlier, the com-
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position of participants in winter training programmes and that of all public 
workers differ. Based on the available data, it cannot be established whether 
the lower re-employment rate of former training participants is due to their 
different composition or to their participation in the training programmes.
Of those who exited public works in 2014, 10–11 per cent were employed 
in the open labour market 180 days after the programme, in November 2014. 
Among those who participated in the training, this rate is below 10 per cent: 
among other winter public workers the rate is slightly higher at 11–12 per cent.
A low employment rate (around 5 per cent) was recorded for those train-
ees who participated in basic competency or other types of primary training 
in order to establish their further participation in training or subsidised em-
ployment.
More than two thirds of those with secondary education received vocation-
al OKJ training. The employment rates of trainees who had had secondary 
education and participated in lower secondary education and semi-skilled 
training was between 14 to 21 per cent, which reached, and even surpassed 
the rates of all public workers and of those who completed secondary educa-
tion but did not participate in training.
In those counties (Vas, Veszprém, Budapest) where the economic and em-
ployment situation is more favourable, the employment indicators (12–18 per 
cent) of public workers participating in the training also reached and exceeded 
the rates that characterised non-participants. In counties with a better eco-
nomic situation (Budapest, Győr-Sopron-Moson, Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom, 
Csongrád, Vas, Veszprém), the employment rates of participants in “skilled 
and semi-skilled training” exceeded the employment rate of the total pool of 
public works participants.
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2.9 LABOUR MARKET SITUATION FOLLOWING EXIT  
FROM PUBLIC WORKS
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely & György Molnár
This sub-chapter examines the individual and environmental factors related 
to exit from public works, relying on administrative data. The composition 
and characteristics of exiting participants have a major impact on exit pros-
pects. We look into which factors are related to exit to the open labour mar-
ket and which ones hinder it. Exogenous events and factors are not included 
in the analyses; therefore it will not establish causal links. The correlations 
presented may serve as a basis for further research.
The sub-chapter applies the same analytical framework as sub-chapter 2.3, 
the two major episode types of the public employment system: non public 
works and public works episodes. At the end of non public works episodes 
participants make a decision (albeit often with limited room for manoeuvre) 
on the direction in which to proceed. They may remain registered unemployed 
or search for jobs without registration but it is also possible that they find 
employment on the open labour market. Immediate entry to public works 
is excluded by the definitions used herein and neither does it happen in ac-
tual practice.1 The result of this decision is measured, based on the monitor-
ing system of the National Labour Office (NLO), on day 180 after exiting.
The public works section of the episode-based micro-database used in sub-
chapters 2.3 and 2.6 is also used here. 517,730 public works episodes of the 
years 2011 and 2012 are analysed, which is less than the total 931,817 epi-
sodes started during 2011–2013. The reason for the constraint is that it is not 
only the monitoring variable of the NLO which is applied: it is corrected and 
information from the database is added to it (see Annex 2.9 for the method 
and the results). Since examining day 180 after exit was only possible by lim-
iting the period to 2011–2012 in order not to misleadingly distort the sam-
ple,2 this period was used throughout the study.
In addition to the employment on the open labour market and in public 
works included in the monitoring data of the NLO, registered job seeker as 
well as “unregistered and not in (declared) employment outside the system” 
statuses are also considered and the original monitoring data are adjusted. 
The four statuses – 1) in employment on the open labour market, 2) in pub-
lic works, 3) registered unemployed, 4) unregistered, not in work – defined 
together as “day 180 after exit status” or briefly “day 180 status”, already cov-
er all major events relevant to movement in the public employment system.
The most important indicator of the various statuses is the exit rate. It is 
calculated by considering the size (number of participants) of a cohort at a 
1 As presented in Subchapter 2.3, 
some overlapping and directly 
contiguous public works epi-
sodes have been merged. Only 
a small part of clients receive 
such an offer.
2 The constraint also takes 
into account other, technical 
considerations. Public works 
episodes longer than 365 days 
are excluded as well as those 
who died in the meantime and 
those who had spent more than 
2200 days (about six years) in 
the public employment system 
at the beginning of the period. 
Two per cent of the 529,744 epi-
sodes constrained by the time 
limit, i.e. 11,403 episodes are 
excluded in this way.
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particular time, then counting how many of them belong to a certain “day 
180” status and finally dividing the latter by the former.
As for the total public works participant population of 2011 and 2012, near-
ly half of these have “registered unemployed” as a day 180 status (see Table 
2.9.1). Slightly more than one-tenth of them work on the open labour market 
in a declared job. One-third of them are in public works again and one-twen-
tieth of them are not in declared employment but are not registered unem-
ployed either. On the whole, 80 per cent of participants appear in the public 
employment system within six months after leaving public works.
Table 2.9.1: Distribution of statuses on day 180 after leaving public works
Status on day 180 Number of cases Percentage
Works on the open labour market 68,921 13.3
Public works participant 176,837 34.2
Registered unemployed 237,097 45.8
Unregistered; does not work 34,875 6.7
Total 517,730 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the reduced Employment and Public Works 
Database (EPWD).
In the case of rapid calculations, the most suitable way of grouping exiting 
participants is to treat participants starting a public works episode approxi-
mately at the same time together.
It is because day 180 measuring involves lots of compromises that it may be best tackled in 
this way. In the case of unlimited data collection, it is not a specific day after leaving pub-
lic works but after entering which should be designated for the examination of statuses, 
or rather a day after entering a related episode of the public employment system. In that 
way (and by statistically controlling other factors), the comparison of the results would be 
more realistic. Since it was not feasible in this study, the best choice is (without using mul-
tivariate methods) to compare participants starting out at the same time.
Day 180 statuses are broken down according to the month of start in Fig-
ure 2.9.1. During the two years examined the likelihood of entering the open 
labour market diverged very little from the average of 13.3 per cent. The bet-
ter employment prospects of those starting public works at the beginning of 
the year deteriorates in the case of participants starting later (in accordance 
with the seasonal characteristics of entrants). The likelihood of entering pub-
lic works increased strongly in winter and spring, mirrored by a decrease in 
registering as unemployed.
As presented in sub-chapter 2.6, the time spent in the public employment 
system is strongly related to entry to public works and the same holds for ex-
iting it. Figure 2.9.2 shows the occurrence of day 180 statuses as a function 
of four types.
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Figure 2.9.1: Status of public works participants on day 180 after exiting,  
broken down by the months of entering public works
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the reduced EPWD.
Figure 2.9.2: The raw rates of day 180 statuses after exiting public works as a function 
 of the length of various episodes, non-parametric estimation, 2011–2012
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The rate of employment on the open labour market decreases with a longer his-
tory, whichever indicator is used. That is, the longer the time spent either in 
the public employment system or in public works, the lower the rate of em-
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ployment on the open labour market. The likelihood of public works partici-
pation increases with time spent in both the public employment system and 
public works. In the case of the long-term unemployed, it is mainly re-entry to 
registered unemployment that increases with a longer history, but it decreases 
with time spent in public works. The status unregistered, not in work is rare 
in itself and decreases with time spent in both the public employment sys-
tem and public works.
Just as in the case of entry to public works, we now examine which charac-
teristics of individuals and the work undertaken are related to the likelihood 
of day 180 statuses. In the interest of clarity, findings for 2011 and 2012 are 
merged in Table 2.9.2.
Table 2.9.2: The raw rates of day 180 statuses
Factor
Share in  
population
Works in open 
labour market
In public  
works
Registered  
unemployed
Unregistered, 
does not work
Total public works episodes 100.0 13.3 34.2 45.8 6.7
Demographic characteristics
Female 40.5 14.7 29.2 50.7 5.4
Male 59.5 12.4 37.5 42.4 7.7
Age
Below 25 19.9 16.8 29.0 45.8 8.4
Aged 25–44 52.0 13.6 33.6 46.3 6.5
Over 44 28.1 10.3 38.8 44.9 6.1
Schooling
Max. eight years of schooling 57.6 8.9 33.6 51.0 6.4
Vocational school 30.4 14.9 37.4 40.7 7.0
Min. secondary school leaving 
examination (Matura) 12.0 25.6 30.4 36.6 7.4
Fresh graduate 9.1 16.0 27.9 47.3 8.9
Not fresh graduate 90.9 13.0 34.8 45.7 6.5
History of participants in the preceding non public works episode
Max. 3 months 25.3 16.9 46.6 27.8 8.7
4–9 months 25.1 14.4 36.4 41.8 7.4
Over 12 months 42.4 10.8 26.2 57.9 5.2
Received unemployment benefit 28.0 16.9 39.2 37.8 6.1
Received employment substitute 
allowance 79.7 11.9 31.5 50.8 5.8
Participated in training 1.2 19.8 35.2 38.2 6.8
Participated in other programmes 1.0 17.8 42.1 34.1 6.0
Characteristics of public works episodes
Number of work hours
4 hours 34.5 11.8 19.3 64.3 4.6
6 hours 19.5 15.3 27.6 50.4 6.7
8 hours 46.1 13.7 48.1 29.9 8.3
Undertook undemanding work 51.4 8.7 34.7 50.2 6.3
Undertook demanding work 48.6 18.1 33.6 41.1 7.2
–▶
in focus
152
Factor
Share in  
population
Works in open 
labour market
In public  
works
Registered  
unemployed
Unregistered, 
does not work
Sub-programme
Short 34.8 11.7 19.3 64.3 4.7
Long 45.6 14.8 38.3 39.5 7.4
Countrywide 18.4 12.4 51.7 27.7 8.2
Other 1.4 15.7 36.2 31.6 16.4
Employer
Municipality 71.5 13.2 31.4 49.3 6.1
Other 28.5 13.6 41.1 36.9 8.4
Participated in training 2.8 8.0 81.5 6.2 4.3
Year of starting episode
2011 50.1 13.1 28.3 53.4 5.2
2012 49.9 13.6 40.1 38.1 8.3
Exit
Contract expired 19.4 10.6 37.2 47.1 5.1
Other 12.4 25.9 16.0 43.9 14.2
Unknown 68.2 11.8 36.6 45.8 5.8
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the reduced EPWD.
The likelihood of entering the open labour market is stronger, while the likelihood of en-
tering public works is lower in the case of women, younger participants, those with a 
higher level of schooling and fresh graduates. It is skilled workers (with a vocational 
school qualification) that re-enter public works in the highest proportion. In registered 
unemployment there are higher rates of women and the unqualified. The fresh graduate 
status has little, while age has no, correlation with entry to registered unemployment. 
In the unregistered, not in work status there are relatively more men, young people and 
those with at least an upper-secondary qualification (Matura).
There is a higher than average chance of entering the open labour market for those 
who spent a short time in registration, received unemployment benefits and are among 
the few who participated in an active labour market programme other than public 
works in the preceding non public works episode. The likelihood of entering public 
works is surprisingly similar: it only decreases with more than 12 months spent in reg-
istered unemployment. It is those in registered unemployment for over 12 months and 
who received employment substitute that return to registered unemployment in higher 
than average proportions. Participants spending a very short time – maximum of three 
months – in registered unemployment have the highest chances of getting into the un-
registered and not in work group.
As for the characteristics of public works, it is mainly the number of work hours, the 
complexity of work undertaken, participation in training and the circumstances of 
exit that have an impact on the likelihood of entering the open labour market. Partici-
pants of six-hour public works are in the highest proportion in the open labour market; 
however, nearly half of people working eight hours a day in public works re-enter pub-
lic works. While 64 per cent of participants working four hours a day in public works 
–▶
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become registered unemployed, this is the case for only 30 per cent of those 
working eight hours a day. The correlation is the opposite for those unregis-
tered and not in work.
A similar proportion of participants undertaking simple, undemanding and 
more complex, demanding work enter public works. A higher proportion of 
the latter exit to the open labour market, while the former tend to return to 
registered unemployment. As for entering the open labour market, there is a 
smaller share of participants from short-term and countrywide programmes 
and a larger share of participants from long-term programmes. As for entry 
to public works, the situation is just the opposite. It is especially worth noting 
that three quarters of the few public work participants that also participated 
in training re-enter public works.3 There is no significant difference according 
to the start of programmes. However, participants terminating their public 
works contract by mutual agreement before its expiry are extremely likely to 
find employment on the open labour market.
The raw effects presented earlier do not take into consideration the possi-
ble correlation between individual factors. For example there are more par-
ticipants with an upper-secondary qualification among women than among 
men (17 per cent and 8 per cent respectively) and twice as many among those 
under 25 (20 per cent) as among the ones over 44. As seen earlier, women 
and young people have higher than average chances of finding employment 
on the open labour market soon after leaving public works and be there at 
the time of monitoring. Nevertheless, because of the above correlation it is 
possible that the good employment prospects are only applicable to the qual-
ified participants and women and young people only perform well because 
of the composition effect.
In order to exclude this effect, a multivariate discrete choice model may be 
used and correlate the four different statuses of day 180 with the above char-
acteristics. As the possibilities examined include all possible outcomes, but 
there being no information available on them concerning choices, a multino-
mial logit model was used for the sake of simplicity in order to calculate aver-
age marginal effects comparable to raw differences in likelihood.
Comparison of Table 2.9.3 and Table 2.9.2 reveals that the effects of many 
factors examined previously are similar to the earlier findings. These include 
individual characteristics such as gender, age and educational attainment 
(the latter is in interaction with the “Fresh graduate” status in the estima-
tion). There is a strikingly strong likelihood of finding the younger partici-
pants, the more qualified ones and women in employment on the open la-
bour market on day 180. It is remarkable that the raw advantage of fresh 
graduates becomes a disadvantage here – the apparent impact is due to age 
and better schooling.
3 In the two years of the research, 
the extensive training campaign 
characteristic of the winters of 
2013–2114 and 2014–2015 had 
not yet started (see Subchapter 
2.8).
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Table 2.9.3.: Average marginal effects gained from multinomial logit estimation.  
Outcome variable: day 180 status
Works in open  
labour market
In public  
works
Registered  
unemployed
Unregistered,  
does not work
Demographic characteristics
Male –0.0200*** 0.0511*** –0.0432*** 0.0121***
Age: 25–44 –0.00939*** 0.0281*** –0.0163*** –0.00242**
Age: 44– –0.0340*** 0.0495*** –0.0106*** –0.00492***
Schooling: vocational 0.0300*** 0.0148*** –0.0416*** –0.00315***
Schooling: min. upper-secondary qualification 0.0836*** –0.0114*** –0.0709*** –0.00126
Fresh graduate –0.0116*** –0.0163*** 0.0234*** 0.00447***
History of participants in the preceding registration
Registered for 4–11 months 0.0648*** –0.0784*** –0.0167 0.0304***
Registered for 12+ months –0.198*** 0.144*** 0.178*** –0.125***
Number of days spent in the public employment system –3.03e–05*** –2.47e–05*** 5.90e–05*** –4.09e–06***
Number of days spent in public works 0.000188*** 0.000569*** –0.000795*** 0.0000377***
Participated in training 0.0462*** –0.00306 –0.0493*** 0.00614*
Participated in other programmes 0.0183*** 0.0848*** –0.0976*** –0.00553
Number of unsuccessful placements 0.00374*** –0.0191*** 0.0106*** 0.00480***
Received unemployment benefits 0.0372*** 0.0442*** –0.0721*** –0.00936***
Received employment substitute allowance –0.0139*** –0.0317*** 0.0571*** –0.0114***
Characteristics of public works episodes
Undertook undemanding work –0.0360*** 0.0148*** 0.0211*** 6.28e–05
Work hours: 6 0.00231 –0.00658*** –0.0117*** 0.0159***
Work hours: 8 –0.0113*** 0.0473*** –0.0587*** 0.0227***
Length of episode, week –0.00193*** 0.00334*** 0.000983*** –0.00239***
Employer: municipality 0.00456*** 0.0177*** –0.0226*** 0.000324
Attended training in public works 0.0258*** 0.198*** –0.230*** 0.00589**
Exit: other 0.0812*** –0.104*** –0.0110*** 0.0340***
Exit: unknown 0.00994*** –0.00811*** –0.00603*** 0.00420***
Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors.
The multinomial logit coefficients were calculated using the complete sample, while 
average marginal effects were calculated using a 5-per-cent sample due to being 
highly resource-intensive.
The month of measurement and the number of participants exiting at the same time 
are included as control variables in the regression but are not presented in the table. 
Variables describing the client group of the registering employment centres at the 
time of the measurement in terms of educational attainment, long-term unemploy-
ment, and rate of cash benefits are also included.
Significant at a level of ***1 per cent, **5 per cent, *10 per cent.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the reduced EPWD.
As for the history of participants, the 4–11-month registration period has a 
positive correlation with the probability of finding employment in the open 
labour market and a negative correlation with entering public works – as op-
posed to longer and shorter registration periods. Logically, this implies that 
the only way of significantly increasing the probability of finding employment 
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in the open labour market and at the same time not increasing the probabil-
ity of entering public works is not to increase the time spent in public works 
and to fix the time spent in the public employment system (as well as all other 
factors). If the time spent in public works does not change, longer episodes 
spent in the public employment system have a positive correlation with the 
probability of returning to registered unemployment, while the length of 
public works episodes has a negative correlation with entry to registered un-
employment and a positive correlation with the other outcomes. Attending 
training has a positive correlation with leaving the public employment sys-
tem and especially with employment on the open labour market, while par-
ticipation in other programmes positively correlates with the probability of 
entering public works. It is the first time we are able to see that unsuccessful4 
job placements have a positive correlation with employment on the open la-
bour market and negative correlation with public works. The length of the 
public works episode negatively correlates with the likelihood of finding em-
ployment in the open labour market and positively correlates with the likeli-
hood of public works. When controlled for other factors, the effect of train-
ing received in public works is not selective: it only reduces the probability of 
registered unemployment but increases the probability of all other statuses. 
The rate of participants exiting before the expiry of their contract, for “other” 
reasons, in employment in the open labour market is significantly above the 
average and only a very small part of them re-enter public works. The month 
of measurement and the number of participants exiting at the same time are 
included in the regression but are not presented in the table. The former indi-
cates a clear employment advantage in summer and a peak of entry to public 
works at the end of winter and in spring, partly at the expense of registered 
unemployment.
After leaving public works, participants have to make a decision on either 
trying their luck on the open labour market or returning to one of the branch-
es of the public employment system, including public works.
*
Having observed the significant and slightly increasing rate of entry to pub-
lic works, this sub-chapter has examined which individual and program-level 
factors correlate with the various statuses seen half a year after exiting.
The first observation has been that experience in the system is multiply re-
lated to the direction of exit. The likelihood of entry to public works correlates 
differently with times spent in the public employment system and in public 
works. In the case of participants who have been registered unemployed or 
within the employment system for years, the probability of entering public 
works decreases with the length of both experiences. However, similar expe-
rience gained between 2011 and 2013 clearly increases the probability of en-
4 Successful job placements also 
include public works participa-
tion, which has a positive effect 
on public works by definition, 
therefore they are excluded here.
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try to public works and slightly reduces the probability of entry to the open 
labour market. Therefore it seems that public works retains fresh entrants but 
does not retain the long-term registered unemployed. At the same time, an ac-
tive relationship with other (not public works related) sections of the public 
employment system (related to training and cash benefits) seem beneficial 
to entering the open labour market, while a passive relationship (which only 
increases the time spent in the system) only results in re-entering registered 
unemployment.
The second observation is that certain individual factors have a strong posi-
tive impact on re-entering public works. These include the lack of a higher-lev-
el qualification and age. The latter cannot be “improved” but schooling can 
be. However, this has a remarkable effect. In the current regime, some of the 
participants with vocational qualifications have better prospects not only in 
the open labour market but also in public works – the reasons for this are 
unclear. Although training programmes not necessarily raising educational 
attainment clearly encourage exit from registered unemployment, training 
provided during public works episodes is more closely related to entry to pub-
lic works than to entry to the open labour market – the same holds true for 
other programmes except for apparently more efficient training unrelated to 
public works.
The third observation is that the conditions of public works have a consider-
able impact on the day 180 status. Participating in public works for long hours 
and for a long time obviously have a negative impact on the probability of entry 
to the open labour market and a positive impact on the probability of return to 
public works. Although work undertaken at municipalities correlates positively 
with both employment on the open labour market and with public works, its 
relationship with the latter is an order of magnitude stronger. On the whole, 
if someone enters public works, the weaker the attachment to it, the higher 
the chances of exit are. However trivial this observation seems, it is of signifi-
cance because of the contradiction between the aim of public works and the 
way of its implementation.
As mentioned before, the findings herein are descriptive. They do not reveal 
cause and effect relationships and do not make suggestions on which currently 
implemented Hungarian active labour market programme would be able to 
more efficiently perform the social welfare, activating and developing tasks 
of public works. However, it is possible to conclude that, granting financial 
benefits to the unemployed, allowing them to search for jobs for nine months 
and providing training for them in the meanwhile as well as limiting the dai-
ly hours of work in and the length of public works have positive correlations 
with finding employment in the open labour market. And that is the stated 
aim of public works. Exploring the exact mechanism of the correlations may 
be a topic of future research.
cseres-GerGely & Molnár: labour Market situation...
157
Annex 2.9
In order to adjust and expand the day 180 status, the daily database described 
above has been used. It contains the status (within the public employment sys-
tem) of all persons, who have at one time participated in a branch of the system. 
It enables identifying if someone was in public works or registered unemploy-
ment on a given day. Aligning this information with the end of the public works 
episode, it may be verified whether it corresponds to the result of the monitor-
ing. There is complete correspondence in 2012, which proves that the monitor-
ing procedure is reliable. For the whole of 2011, the day 180 statuses “works in 
the open labour market” and “in public works” were determined on the basis 
of the new information. The starting point was the latter, since it is completely 
reliable: if someone is in public works in the database, it supersedes the data 
contained in the monitoring system. Persons found in employment according 
to the monitoring and indicated as not in public works according to our data 
are classified as “works in the open labour market”. Works mistakenly regis-
tered as employment in the open labour market are corrected as public works.
According to the rule and as seen in Table A2.9.1, only 2011 figures are ad-
justed: public works figures to a greater extent, while open labour market fig-
ures to a lesser extent. This is due to the nature of registration and adjustment. 
The differences in figures before 1 September 2011 are explained by the lack 
of public works status registered at the National Tax and Customs Admin-
istration – it was not registered as a separate piece of information whether or 
not someone was in public works. The reason for the errors occurring until 
the end of 2011 is unclear; however, sources of errors and uncertainties dis-
appeared after 2012.
However, it does not hold true for work on the open labour market; its ad-
justment raises further questions. Apparently the increase in the number of 
public works participants is bigger than the decrease in the number of persons 
on the labour market. It is only possible if in the case of some public works par-
ticipants the Tax and Customs Administration did not even register the fact 
that they were working. It draws attention to the fact that while public works 
figures may be completely adjusted (accepting the data of the National Labour 
Office and now the Central Office for Administrative and Electronic Public 
Services as reference data), it is not possible in the case of open labour market 
figures. As a result, the number of persons working on the open labour mar-
ket is probably underestimated by the monitoring system (and our analysis).
The impact of adjustment on relative indicators (exit rates) in the time se-
ries of the starting months of episodes is shown in Figure A2.9.1. It is con-
spicuous, that the trend and seasonal changes of earlier (erroneous) day 180 
statuses of 2011 become realistic, similarly to 2012 (the adjusted data series 
are shown by a dashed line).
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Table A2.9.1: Exit from public works and finding employment  
in the open labour market or in public works within 180 days after exiting  
– original and adjusted headcounts (persons)
Year/starting 
month
Number  
of exiting 
participants
On day 180 after exit
Works
In public works In open labour market
original adjusted original adjusted
2011
I 14,928 4,624 1,175 5,490 3,449 2,257
II 21,011 6,097 1,219 5,621 4,878 3,422
III 26,130 6,914 1,109 5,345 5,805 4,068
IV 32,555 8,800 2,389 7,657 6,411 4,601
V 32,914 7,821 2,360 7,687 5,461 4,060
VI 24,413 5,834 1,868 4,947 3,966 3,076
VII 20,890 5,527 2,334 5,393 3,193 2,287
VIII 23,224 7,237 3,680 7,819 3,557 2,477
IX 23,242 8,022 3,924 8,137 4,098 2,753
X 20,604 7,429 3,893 7,593 3,536 2,306
XI 10,705 3,294 1,745 3,391 1,549 1,019
XII 15,197 6,008 3,499 5,841 2,509 1,997
2012
I 1,969 960 629 629 331 331
II 66,924 40,113 30,585 30,585 9,528 9,528
III 50,394 30,032 23,290 23,290 6,742 6,742
IV 21,916 10,075 7,090 7,090 2,985 2,985
V 16,013 6,666 4,653 4,653 2,013 2,013
VI 13,876 5,676 3,777 3,777 1,899 1,899
VII 19,862 9,544 6,965 6,965 2,579 2,579
VIII 14,840 6,933 5,141 5,141 1,792 1,792
IX 17,501 9,009 6,640 6,640 2,369 2,369
X 15,998 8,257 6,305 6,305 1,952 1,952
XI 11,529 6,310 4,942 4,942 1,368 1,368
XII 13,109 7,859 6,021 6,021 1,838 1,838
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the complete EPWD.
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Figure A2.9.1: The difference between the adjusted and non-adjusted day 180 
public works and open labour market statuses
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the complete EPWD.
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2.10 WHERE DO PUBLIC WORKERS WORK?
János Köllő
One of the frequently mentioned objectives of public works is to reintegrate 
the unemployed into the labour market. As to what constructions serve this 
objective best, depends on whether the unemployed are capable of finding a 
job and able to integrate without external assistance. If labor demand is high 
and the unemployed – once they try – easily find their place in genuine work 
organizations, then the system should be constructed in such a way as to 
promote entry into market jobs, e.g. by public works remuneration set below 
the minimum wage, by enforcing active job-seeking and periodically testing 
readiness for work. If, on the contrary, no jobs are available and integration 
is hopeless, then public works should be offered as a program of poverty relief, 
with government-created jobs, offering respectable breadwinning.
However, these are extreme cases, disregarding the heterogeneity of unem-
ployed people and of labour markets. Even if limited in numbers, market jobs 
are available also for public workers in most regions of the country.1 Moreo-
ver, it is certainly true that there is an élite among public works participants 
whom the employers could profitably employ once they gained direct infor-
mation about them. While a carrot-and-stick approach to public works and 
poverty relief need not require that public works participants work in genu-
ine business organizations, together with co-workers employed on a market 
basis, a policy promoting transition from public to market work can hardly 
be successful without such a requirement.
According to the data analyzed below the vast majority of Hungarian pub-
lic workers – especially the unskilled – work in separated public works units. 
This tendency is stronger in depressed labour markets, suggesting that the 
considerations mentioned above are put in practice by local governments and 
labor offices. At the same time the level of segregation depends not only on 
the state of the labour market, but strongly affected by the regional propor-
tion of Roma people.
Data and estimation
Starting with 2011, the Wage Survey of the National Labour Office (abbre-
viated in Hungarian as NMH) differentiates public works participants from 
other employees. In the survey, the units of observation are the geographi-
cally distinct branches of firms, so the percentage share of public workers can 
be defined per site. The Wage Survey is a linked employer-employee data set 
providing information on the persons working in the firm. In this chapter 
we use year 2013 data on the public sector, where individual data is available 
for all employees working at the given site.2 We observe 116,559 persons, 89% 
1 � � ���1�� ������ ������� ���
am�n�d �n S�����t��n �.� �n�
t���d ma���t j��� ���833 t�m�� 
��t���n �003 and �011.
� Th�� �� t��� t� �n�t�t�t��n� 
�h��� a����nt� a�� adm�n���
t���d �y th� T��a���y.
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of the 131,104 public works participants reported by the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (KSH, 2013, p. 32). The deviation is due to slight differences 
between the sampling methods and the target groups covered.
Firstly we observe the percentage share of public workers per site, and re-
peat the analysis for unskilled employees (those with primary education or 
less). Secondly, we estimate – by limiting our calculations to unskilled work-
ers – how the percentage of public workers at the site correlates with the rate 
of local unemployment.
The correlation between local unemployment and the share of public work-
ers at the site is trivial if further factors are disregarded. If there are many 
unemployed people, then there are many potential public workers, and the 
expected share of public workers is high, especially if unemployment is high 
because few institutions in the settlement are suitable to employ public work-
ers. Thus, besides the rate of local unemployment we will also control the 
equation for the percentage of public workers within the local population. 
The question is if we can still find a correlation between the rate of local un-
employment and the percentage of public workers within a site.
Furthermore, we assume that the share of public workers within a branch 
depends on the size of the branch (a high percentage is less likely in an institu-
tion employing many people) and the size of the settlement (in a small village 
it is difficult or impossible to mix public workers with ‘genuine’ employees).
Finally, we have sufficient empirical knowledge to expect correlation be-
tween the extent of segregation and the percentage of Roma people in the 
population.
The data on the size of branches and the share of public workers is derived 
from the Wage Survey conducted in May 2013.
We measure unskilled unemployment by the percentage of unemployed and 
inactive people, aged 15–59, with a primary education background, within the 
respective population, taking into account that the majority of people with 
such an education, if non-employed, is not actively searching for a job.3 The 
indicator defined in this way will be referred to as “unemployment”, for the 
sake of brevity. Data of such detail is available only from the census, which 
reflects the situation in October 2011. The resulting bias is insignificant be-
cause big changes in the relative situation of settlements were unlikely to oc-
cur between October 2011 and May 2013. The same applies to the size of set-
tlements, which is also taken from the 2011 census.
The occurrence of public works per settlement was measured using the reg-
ister of the National Labour Office. The variable in the equation is the num-
ber of public works episodes started in 2013 per one thousand inhabitants.
The percentage of the Roma is also taken from the 2011 census. In this 
case we can rely only on district-level (NUTS-4) data because the Central 
Statistical Office prohibited the releasing of settlement-level indicators in 
3 In th� th��d q�a�t�� �f �013 
�n�y ��% �f th� �n������d �����
�at��n n��th�� �n �m���ym�nt 
n�� �n �d��at��n ���� ��a��h�
�ng f�� a j�� a�t�v��y� and th�� 
��n��d���d �n�m���y�d �n th� 
La���� F���� S��v�y (A�th��’� 
�a����at��n).
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the form of a database. The changes over time must have been similarly in-
significant.
With whom do public workers work?
Histogram a) of Figure 2.10.1 shows the share of public works participants 
within public sector establishments. In the majority of cases the shares were 
above 80%, with an average of 79.8% and a median of 88.2%. Less than one 
quarter of the public workers were employed at a site where their share fell 
short of 75%. In 40% of the cases the percentage of public workers employed 
at the site exceeded 90%.
Figure 2.10.1: The share of public workers within public sector establishments,  
May 2013 (density function, per cent)
a) All public workers. Number of observations: 116,569 public workers at 4,532 sites
b) Public workers with primary education attainment or less.  
Number of observations: 86,995 unskilled public workers at 3,459 sites
S�����: Wag� S��v�y� May �013� ������ �n�t�t�t��n�� data �n ��t�� �m���y�ng 
at ��a�t �n� ������ ������.
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Data related to unskilled workers show an even more extreme picture: the av-
erage share of public workers working within the branch amounted to 93% 
with a median of 98%. In 36% of cases all unskilled employees observed at 
the site were public works participants.
The within-branch share of public workers and local unemployment
The regression results are shown in Table 2.10.1. The degree of segregation 
of unskilled public workers is, as expected, stronger in small settlements and 
small sites and in municipalities where there are many unskilled public work-
ers. Local unemployment and the number of Roma has a strong influence even 
after controlling for these factors.
Table 2.10.1: The within-branch share of public workers and local unemployment  
–regression results
Dependent variable: The share of unskilled public workers within unskilled employees (logarithm)a
Coefficient t-value
The share of unemployed and inactive people, aged 15–59, with 
primary school attainment in the settlement (logarithm)b 0,2469 6.23
Public works episodes started by unskilled workers per thousand 
unskilled inhabitants in the settlement (logarithm)c 0,0035 2.50
Size of the site (persons)a –0,0012 4.89
Square of the size of the site /1000 0,0004 2.18
Population of the settlement (thousand persons)b –0,0366 9.26
Square of the population of the settlement 0.0006 8.45
The share of Roma (district-level, logarithm)b 0,0716 5.68
Constant 0.0979 3.60
R2 0.1717
Number of sites 3,378
Sam���: P����� ���t�� �������t�� �m���y�ng �n������d ������ �������
a Wag� S��v�y �013� ������ ���t��.
� C�n���� �011
� Nat��na� La���� Offi�� ������ ����� ��g��t��� �013. In m�n����a��t��� �h��� n� ����
��d� �ta�t�d (��1 �a���)� �� �m��t�d a va��� �f �n(0.�/1000)
The coefficient of local unemployment is a rounded 0.25, meaning that a 10% 
difference in unemployment shifts the share of public workers by 2.5%. The 
standard deviation of the unemployment rate is 12% around an average of 
57%, which anticipates a difference of 3%. The predicted share of unskilled 
public workers employed in branches operating in the first (works) decile of 
municipalities is 87% while it is 64% in the tenth (best) decile. This is an 
economically significant difference: for the median site (21 persons) 3 and 8 
“genuine” employees for 18 and 13 public workers, respectively.
A 10% increase of the share of Roma within the population implies a 0.7% 
higher share of public workers within the site. A one standard deviation dif-
ference in the percentage of Roma makes an effect of 0.8%.4 However, this 
� F�� d������t�v� �tat��t��� �f 
��t�mat��n �am��� ��� Table 
A2.10.1 �n A���nd�� �.10.
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effect is weak and statistically not significant where unemployment is high 
and public workers – either Roma or not – are in any event difficult to em-
ploy in market jobs (Table 2.10.2).
Table 2.10.2: The effect of the district-level share of Roma on the within-branch 
share of public workers at different levels of unemployment – regression results
Quintiles of work-sites  
by local unemployment levels Coefficient t-value Number of sites
First and second quintiles (low unemployment) 0.061*** 3.35 1,317
Third quintile (medium unemployment) 0.128*** 4.02 682
Fourth and fifth quintiles (high unemployment) 0.036* 1.88 1,379
D���nd�nt va��a���: L�ga��thm �f th� �ha�� �f ������ ������� at th� �������t�. E��
��anat��y va��a����: ��ga��thm �f th� d��t���t���v�� �ha�� �f th� R�ma� and th� ��n�
t��� va��a���� �n Ta��� �.10.1.
S�gn�fi�ant at th� ��v�� �f ***1%� **�%� *10%.
S����� �f data: ��� n�t� t� Ta��� �.10.1
The degree of segregation is significantly higher where low unemployment is 
coupled with a high percentage of Roma. The effect is strongest where un-
employment is at a medium level, exactly the locations where it would be 
the most advisable that public workers get into direct contact with potential 
employers and co-workers, and this is particularly true in the case of a dis-
criminated minority.
Conclusions
Less than one quarter of public workers are employed at a site where their 
percentage share remains below 75%. As much as 36% of unskilled public 
works participants work in an institution where their share is 100%. Their 
share amounts to a mean of 93% and a median of 98%. The vast majority 
of these people have no opportunity to meet colleagues employed with a 
work contract.
Segregation works against reintegration since it offers no opportunity to 
employers to gain first-hand information regarding the readiness to work and 
performance of the public works participants. This outcome is unavoidable 
in regions where finding a market job is hopeless. The question in these areas 
is rather how a remuneration below the minimum wage can be justified and 
why arbitrary calls to do public works are allowed. Efforts in these munici-
palities should clearly be targeted at poverty relief which presupposes a low 
but decent remuneration and access to temporary (illegal) work, household 
production, subsistence farming and gathering.
Data shows that in the more fortunate regions of the country segregation 
– as expected – is lower than the average, though also strong, which could 
hardly be changed without a revision of the whole concept of public works. 
Remuneration below the minimum wage seems dysfunctional in this case, 
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too, because in a work organization different payments for the same job can-
not be sustained for longer periods of “probation”.
Our estimations suggest that segregation is stronger in regions more densely 
populated by Roma people and shows that it is also true for identical levels 
of unemployment and identical numbers of public workers in the settlement. 
In a prosperous environment it hampers reintegration, while in a depressed 
environment it makes breadwinning more difficult for a minority whose pri-
mary interest would indeed be to cross the gateway “from the world of ben-
efits to the world of work”.
Appendix 2.10
Table A2.10.1: Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample
Variable Mean S.D.
The within-branch share of unskilled public workers (all unskilled 
workers=100) 81.6 25.4
The share of unskilled unemployed and inactive people in the 
settlement’s unskilled population (aged 15–59, per cent) 58.2 12.3
Public works episodes started by unskilled public workers per 
thousand unskilled inhabitants in the settlement (head count) 293.3 979.9
Size of the site (number of workers) 58.3 147.9
Population of the settlement (thousand persons) 3.11 9.21
Percentage Roma (district-level, per cent) 16.7 11.5
N�t�: �� �a����at��n �f ��ga��thm� �� �a��d �n ������t��n� �n�t�ad �f va���� ���
������d �n ��� ��nt.
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SERVICES1
1. Labour market policy services
A) Services of the National Employment Service
Since September 2014 the National Employment Service has been assigned 
new tasks in relation to public works programmes. Labour centre branch of-
fices have thus been involved in organizing and implementing related train-
ing courses, and also in public works-related job brokerage.
The institutional set-up of the public employment body was significantly 
changed in 2015, in two phases. However, these changes have had no di-
rect impact on labour market services, so these were left unchanged and still 
available in the period in question in the labour offices – or as of April 2015, 
in the operational units – integrated in the employment and labour market 
bodies of the district-level offices of the government offices of the capital and 
the counties. For a detailed presentation of the changes to the institutional 
set-up, see Section 16 entitled “The institutional set-up of the central govern-
ance, finances and evaluation of employment policy”.
B) Further activities of the National Employment Service
Since September 2014 the scope of additional activities performed by labour 
centres and their branch offices related to public works programmes has also 
been extended. Beyond the performance checks of work done and the finan-
cial implementation tasks of public works contracts, the labour centres have 
ever since:
•	 undertaken the professional management and coordination of branch of-
fice activities in relation to public works programmes and the professional 
training of their staff;
•	 participated in the process of planning financial allocations on public works 
programmes from the National Employment Fund, made decisions on how 
to use decentralized funds, signed official contracts on subsidies belonging 
to their scope of authority, and facilitated the checks concerning the use 
of funds;
•	 organised training in relation to public works programmes and coordinated 
the related activities of branch offices.
Branch offices have performed checks on the implementation of official con-
tracts and the justification and validity of requests for public works subsidies.
Labour centres and their branch offices thus perform their tasks related to 
public works programmes in cooperation with local governments and fur-
ther organizations.
New tasks in relation to 
public works programmes
1 This section was elaborated 
on the basis of the database of 
the Eurostat Labour Market 
Policy (LMP) and the Directo-
rate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, DG ECFIN 
called LABREF. Interventions 
are analyzed by following the 
numbering of the list thereof 
(see Busch–Cseres-Gergely–Neu-
mann, 2013, p. 275).
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A further change in September 2014 was that the operational tasks of the 
Employment and Public Works Database were transferred from the National 
Employment Office to the Central Office for Administrative and Electronic 
Public Services.
The changes made to the institutional set-up of public employment also had 
a significant impact on the further activities of the National Employment 
Service The closure of the National Labour Office on 1 January 2015 led to 
a reallocation of former tasks which were not related to employment policy 
(for details see Section 16).
Major regulations: Government Decree 323/2011. (XII. 28.) on the roles and 
responsibilities of the National Labour Office and the bodies directed and 
professionally supervised by it; Ministerial Decree 44/2012. (XII. 22.) issued 
by the Minister for the Economy on the roles and responsibilities of the la-
bour centre branch offices of the district-level (in Budapest: city district-lev-
el) branches of the Budapest and County Government Offices; Ministerial 
Decree 30/2000. (IX. 15.) issued by the Minister for the Economy on labour 
market services and related subsidies.
New regulations: Government Decree 221/2014 (IX. 4.) amending Govern-
ment Decrees in relation to the structural reorganization of the Government; 
Government Decree 320/2014. (XII. 13.) on the designation of the public 
employment body and the labour and labour safety authority, and the official 
and further tasks of these authorities.
On-line source: http://munka.hu
ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES (ALMPs)
2. Training
As of 15 March 2014 persons receiving a child-care allowance have also been 
entitled – beyond those receiving child-care support after their child reached 
the age of one (as opposed to the former limit of one and a half years) – to 
take part in training courses subsidized by the public employment service, 
provided that they have no income from a paid job.
Governmental policy put much more emphasis on dual training and its de-
velopment both at the level of secondary and higher education.
In March 2014 the pilot project no. TÁMOP-2.2.7.B entitled Model pro-
gramme for piloting the transfer of vocational content in a dual system, with a 
budget of over HUF 1 billion (cca EUR 3.2 million) was launched with the 
participation of the National Labour Office and the Budapest Chamber of 
Commerce and Crafts.
Reallocation of former 
tasks not related to  
employment policy
Dual training at the  
level of secondary and 
higher education
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The objective of the programme is to develop dual vocational training based 
on the experience gained from the programme. New competence descriptions 
will be elaborated for 18 professions, of which 16 professions will be piloted 
in a way that participants in the vocational training course will finish their 
last training year in the form of adult training.
As of 5 September 2014 the Dual Training Council has been operational as 
a counselling body promoting the development of higher education. Its main 
task is to promote the dual form of training by elaborating the general and 
training-specific qualification and evaluation requirements for the curricula 
of both bachelor and master degrees, and also the qualification and evaluation 
requirements for organizations and professionals involved in practical training.
In the course of the changes made to the institutional set-up of the pub-
lic employment service the National Vocational and Adult Training Office 
was established as an institution belonging to the Ministry for the National 
Economy to perform tasks related to vocational and adult training (for de-
tails see Section 16).
A decree was issued to regulate in detail training subsidies based on the in-
dividual decision of the minister supervising vocational and adult training, 
more specifically subsidies (incl. their rate, conditions, accounting, checks) 
promoting job creation and subsidies for establishing training workshops and 
for improving the conditions of practical training implemented in training 
workshops. The source of these subsidies is the training sub-fund of the Na-
tional Employment Fund.
For training subsidies the co-financing rate is a maximum of 50%, which 
can be increased by a further 10% on condition that the training participant 
is a person with a changed working capacity or a disadvantaged person, or 
the subsidy is disbursed to a middle-sized company. For small companies the 
co-financing rate can be increased by a further 20%. The rate of the subsidy 
per person is the HUF equivalent amount of EUR 3 thousand, and the sub-
sidy must not exceed the HUF equivalent amount:
•	 of EUR 500 thousand for companies having 50–250 employees,
•	 of EUR 1 million for companies having 251–500 employees,
•	 of EUR 1.5 million for companies having 501–750 employees,
•	 of EUR 2 million for companies having more than 750 employees.
The employer is entitled to the subsidy on condition that at least 50 jobs are 
created and at least 70% of training participants remain in full-time employ-
ment for one and a half years following the end of the training.
The co-financing rate for the cost of establishing or developing training 
workshops is 73%. The rate of the subsidy per pupil is the HUF equivalent 
amount of EUR 8 thousand, and the total amount of subsidy must not ex-
ceed EUR 2 million. The condition for the subsidy is that at least 50 more 
pupils employed as apprentices get a placement beyond the total number of 
Regulation of training 
subsidies promoting job 
creation and of estab-
lishing and developing 
training workshops
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practical training participants calculated as an average of the number of par-
ticipants in the two years prior to the submission of the request for a subsidy. 
This condition must be met by the end of the second school year and sustained 
continually for at least five school years.
The rate of training subsidy requested by employers for employing job-seek-
ers in job openings has changed. As of 31 March 2015 the rate of employers’ 
own contribution to total costs must be at least 50% as opposed to the former 
40%. The rules governing the increase of the co-financing rate are identical 
with the rules for subsidies promoting job creation.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 (Section 14) on promoting employment 
and unemployment benefits; Act CLV of 2011 on contributions to vocation-
al education and promoting the development of training; Act CLXXXVII 
of 2011 on vocational education; Act LXXVII of 2013 on adult training; 
Government Decree 280/2011. (XII. 20.) on the amounts of practical train-
ing normative support and the calculation of amounts subject to reductions 
which can be accounted for as the cost of practical training incurred as voca-
tional education contribution; Government Decree 150/2012. (VII. 6.) on 
the National Register of Qualifications and the procedure of its amendment; 
Government Decree 314/2013. (VIII. 28.) on the vocational training agree-
ment; Government Decree 393/2013. (XI. 12.) on the detailed regulations 
stipulating the licensing procedure and requirements to be met, the registra-
tion and the system of checks concerning adult training institutions; Minis-
terial Decree 27/2012. (VII. 27.) issued by the Minister for the Economy on 
the professional and exam requirements for qualifications within the respon-
sibility of the Minister for the Economy; Ministerial Decree 21/2013. (VI. 
18.) issued by the Minister for the Economy for companies implementing 
practical training on accounting for the cost of training the company’s own 
employees as vocational education contribution; Ministerial Decree 6/1996. 
(VII. 16.) issued by the Minister of Labour on financial support promoting 
employment and on tackling employment crisis situations from the Labour 
Market Fund; Ministerial Decree 3/2011. (II. 11.) issued by the Minister of 
Public Administration and Justice on the management and tasks of the re-
gional training centres in charge of adult training and coordinating action 
tackling regional disparities.
New regulations: Act XVI of 2014 on collective forms of investment and 
their operators, and amending specific acts on finances; Government De-
cree 220/2014. (VIII. 29.) amending specific Government Decrees related 
to higher education; Government Decision 1418/2014. (VII. 23.) on the 
approval and the inclusion in the action plan of the central project no. TÁ-
MOP-2.2.7.B-3-13/1-2014-0001. (entitled Model programme for piloting the 
transfer of vocational content in a dual system); Ministerial Decree 3/2015. 
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(II. 13.) issued by the Minister for the Economy regulating training subsidies 
and subsidies for establishing and developing training workshops, financed 
from the training sub-fund of the National Employment Fund based on the 
individual decision of the minister supervising vocational and adult training; 
Ministerial Decree 8/2015. (III. 30.) issued by the Minister for the Economy 
amending Ministerial Decree 6/1996. (VII. 16.) issued by the Minister of La-
bour on financial support promoting employment and on tackling employ-
ment crisis situations from the Labour Market Fund, and amending Minis-
terial Decree 30/2000. (IX. 15.) issued by the Minister for the Economy on 
labour market services and related subsidies;
3. Job rotation and job sharing
No change has occurred in the regulation of this active labour market pol-
icy tool.
Major regulations: Act CXXIII of 2004 on promoting the employment of 
career starters, unemployed persons over the age of 50 and those seeking em-
ployment after parental leave or taking care of a family member, and employ-
ment with an internship (Section 8/B).
4. Employment incentives
Among the changes introduced as part of the Job Protection Act in the field 
of employment incentives, as of January 2015 further changes were made 
– beyond those minor changes effected after January 2014 – to the most sig-
nificant tool in favour of certain target groups: persons receiving or having 
received child-care allowances, child-care benefits or child-care support. Part-
time employment is no longer taken into consideration when calculating the 
amount of social contribution tax credit for employees belonging to these 
target groups. Thus the tax credit can be effected up to the amount of HUF 
100 thousand (approx. EUR 323)2, and not in proportion to the duration of 
part-time employment.
As of July 2014 the system of development tax credits was changed on the 
basis of the categorization of regions defined by the European Commission 
for the period 2014–20. Changes were primarily made with a view to equal 
opportunity considerations. For effecting tax credits the following condi-
tions apply:
•	 starting investment by a small and middle-sized enterprise;
•	 starting investment by a large enterprise in the regions of North Hungary, 
North Great Plain, South Great Plain, South Transdanubia, Central Trans-
danubia or Western Transdanubia;
•	 starting investment by a large enterprise aimed at a new economic activity 
in eligible settlements in the region of Central Hungary.
2 An exchange rate of 1 EUR 
= 310 HUF is used throughout 
the chapter.
Changes in the system of 
development tax credits
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The co-financing rate (that is the percentage of subsidy in proportion to 
the total of eligible costs) for large enterprises is 50% in the regions of North 
Hungary, North Great Plain, South Great Plain and South Transdanubia, 
35% in Central Transdanubia, 25% in Western Transdanubia, and either 20% 
or 35% in the eligible settlements in the region of Central Hungary. These 
rates reflect a 5% reduction in the central and western Transdanubian coun-
ties. Moreover, the change had a negative impact on large enterprises that 
had planned investment in non-eligible settlements in the region of Central 
Hungary – in Budapest and County Pest.
On top of the rates presented above a further 20% of co-financing is avail-
able for small companies and a further 10% for middle-sized companies. Pro-
vided that the planned starting investment is located in a non-eligible settle-
ment in the region of Central Hungary the co-financing rate is set at 20% for 
small companies and at 10% for middle-sized companies.
A cap is set for big investments, inasmuch as the co-financing rate is set at 
50% of the original rate for amounts ranging from EUR 50 to 100 million, 
and at 34% for amounts exceeding EUR 100 million.
A further change in favour of small and middle-sized enterprises is that the 
expected output values reflecting the conditions set for tax credits were halved.
In the four tax years following the first request for a subsidy the average 
number of staff should be increased by 10 instead of 20 employees for small 
enterprises and by 25 instead of 50 employees for middle-sized enterprises. 
Alternatively, the annual total personnel cost should be increased to the equiv-
alent of 25 instead of 50 times the minimum wage for small enterprises, and 
to 50 instead of 100 times the minimum wage for middle-sized enterprises 
in comparison to the level prior to the launch of the investment.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 on promoting employment and unemploy-
ment benefits; Act CXXIII of 2004 on promoting the employment of career 
starters, unemployed people over the age of 50 and those seeking employment 
after parental leave or taking care of a family member, and employment with 
an internship; Government Decree 69/2012. (IV. 6.) amending the Govern-
ment Decree on the subsidies available for preserving the net value of sala-
ries and on the amount of pay-rise expected in 2012 to preserve the net value 
of salaries and the amounts of fringe benefits to be considered; Government 
Decree 27/2013. (II. 12.) on the establishment and operation of free enter-
prise zones and the rules stipulating tax credits; Ministerial Decree 6/1996. 
(VII. 16.) issued by the Minister of Labour on financial support promoting 
employment and on tackling employment crisis situations from the Labour 
Market Fund (Sections 11 and 18).
New regulations: Act XXV of 2014 amending specific acts on taxation and re-
lated acts; Act LXXIV of 2014 amending specific acts on taxation and related 
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acts, and amending Act CXXII. of 2010 on the National Tax and Customs 
Office; Government Decree 165/2014 (VII. 17.) on development tax credits.
5. Sheltered employment and vocational rehabilitation
As of 21 November 2014 accredited sheltered employers offering permanent 
or transit employment are required to employ disabled people (in Hungarian 
terminology: people with a changed working capacity) to the level of 30% in-
stead of 50% of their staff. Beyond that employers are entitled to receive the 
full amount of subsidy if the working time of their employees in rehabilitation 
employment reaches a minimum of 4 instead of 5 hours on average per day.
A new decree was issued to reinforce the tasks and responsibilities of the 
National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs as a body financed from 
the central budget and operating as a central office under the supervision of 
the minister responsible for social policy and pensions.
Major regulations: Act CXCI of 2011 on the allowances of people with a 
changed working capacity and the amendment of specific acts; Government 
Decree 327/2011. (XII. 29.) on the procedural rules related to the allowanc-
es of people with a changed working capacity; Government Decree 95/2012. 
(V. 15.) on the National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs and on 
the roles and responsibilities of the bodies under its professional supervision; 
Government Decree 327/2012. (XI. 16.) on the accreditation of employers 
of people with a changed working capacity and on the central budget subsi-
dies for the employment of people with a changed working capacity; Min-
isterial Decree 38/2012. (XI. 16.) of the Ministry of Human Resources on 
the rules governing the fees to be paid for the accreditation procedure by the 
employer of people with a changed working capacity; Ministerial Decree 
7/2012. (II. 14.) of the Ministry of National Resources on the detailed rules 
related to comprehensive qualification; Ministerial Decree 8/2012. (II. 21.) 
of the Ministry of National Resources on vocational rehabilitation experts.
New regulations: Government Decree 221/2014. (IX. 4.) amending Gov-
ernment Decrees in relation to the structural reorganization of the Govern-
ment; Government Decree 285/2014. (XI. 20.) amending Government De-
cree 327/2012. (XI. 16.) on the accreditation of employers of people with a 
changed working capacity and on the central budget subsidies for the em-
ployment of people with a changed working capacity; Government Decree 
74/2015 (III. 30.) on the National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs
6. Direct job creation
Public works programmes are still the number one tool for direct job creation. 
In this context a decision was made to cater for public works programmes 
from May to December 2014 for 200 thousand people, on a monthly average.
Two hundred thousand 
public works employees 
per month on average
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The tasks of the minister responsible for public works programmes were rein-
forced in a decree by adding the analysis and evaluation of these programmes 
to the existing tasks of planning and management.
In comparison to those ones of 2013 the objectives of public works pro-
grammes were extended to include public works producing added value 
through jobs that are characteristic of the local labour market and public 
works leading to the establishment of a social cooperative.
In 2015 these objectives were further extended to provide for the widest 
possible accessibility to tools promoting the open labour market (re)integra-
tion of people involved in public works programmes, especially the disadvan-
taged target groups. New objectives include the promotion of development 
schemes based on local facilities such as small private gardens, improvement of 
the living conditions and social integration of the Roma population, smooth-
ing territorial and seasonal labour market imbalances, and the creation of 
opportunities for the local country population to prevent their moving away 
from the area.
As of December 2014 the number of months that one could spend as a par-
ticipant in a short- or longer term, or national-level public works programme 
was no longer defined for the calendar year, but for each programme, sepa-
rately. The duration of participation in longer term, or national-level public 
works programmes is again 12 months, which can be extended by a further 
6 months following expiry. In longer term, or national-level public works 
programmes persons receiving rehabilitation subsidies are eligible to partici-
pate by working 4–8 instead of 6–8 hours per day. The organizational and 
material costs of longer term, or national-level public works programmes 
are also eligible.
The co-financing rate of the investment and material costs of model pro-
grammes and the further public works programmes built on them was dif-
ferentiated depending on the number of public works employees.
As of 1 January 2015 job-seekers refusing a job offer that was placed in line 
with the related rules are excluded from public works programmes for three 
months. Moreover, people employed in public works programmes are also 
obliged to accept job offers placed by the public employment service while 
still working in the public works programme.
As of 25 March 2015 the Ministry of the Interior launched a website on pub-
lic works programmes at http://www.kozfoglalkoztatas.kormany.hu. The aim 
of the website is to widely publicise the system of public works programmes, 
training and services, current and planned public works programmes, news, 
events and research findings.
Major regulations: Act CVI of 2011 on public works and amending acts re-
lated to public works and other acts; Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code; Gov-
Changes to the duration 
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lic works programmes
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ernment Decree 375/2010. (XII. 31.) on the subsidies related to public works 
programmes; Government Decree 170/2011. (VIII. 24.) on setting the wage 
for public works and the guaranteed minimum wage for public works; Gov-
ernment Decision 1142/2013. (III. 21.) to transfer certain pieces of land by 
the National Fund of Land for free use to the local governments to implement 
public works programmes; Government Decision 1624/2013. (IX. 5.) to pre-
pare for the implementation of training related to public works programmes.
New regulations: Government Decree 221/2014. (IX. 4.) amending Gov-
ernment Decrees in relation to the structural reorganization of the Govern-
ment; Government Decree 296/2014. (XI. 28.) amending Government De-
cree 375/2010. (XII. 31.) on the subsidies related to public works programmes 
and Government Decree 393/2013. (XI. 12.) on the detailed regulations 
stipulating the licensing procedure and requirements to be met, the registra-
tion and the system of checks concerning adult training institutions; Gov-
ernment Decision 1199/2014. (IV. 1.) on the 2014 objectives of public works 
programmes; Government Decision 1277/2014. (IV. 30.) on the issues related 
to public works programmes in the period May to December 2014; Govern-
ment Decision 1082/2015. (III. 3.) on the 2015 objectives of public works 
programmes and amending Government Decision 1044/2013. (II. 5.) in re-
lation to decisions concerning public works programmes.
On-line source: http://www.kozfoglalkoztatas.kormany.hu
7. Start-up incentives
In October 2014 the call for proposals entitled “Promoting entrepreneurship 
for young people” was published in the framework of the Economic Develop-
ment and Innovation Operational Programme. The objective of the call was 
to help young people planning new individual or micro enterprises to launch 
their own enterprise. The programme has two pillars. On the one hand, or-
ganizations specializing in the promotion and development of enterprises of-
fer related services to young people and help with the elaboration of business 
plans. On the other hand the programme provides for funds in the form of 
grants so that young entrepreneurs with an accepted and viable business plan 
can accomplish their business plans.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 on promoting employment and unemploy-
ment benefits (Section 17); Ministerial Decree 6/1996. (VII. 16.) issued by the 
Minister of Labour on financial support promoting employment and on tack-
ling employment crisis situations from the Labour Market Fund (Section 10).
On-line source: http://palyazat.gov.hu/doc/4386
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SUBSIDIES
8. Subsidies and support for the unemployed (job-seekers)
Up to 28 February 2015 no changes have occurred concerning the passive em-
ployment policy tools. The types and amounts of subsidies available through-
out 2014 are shown in Table 1 of Cseres-Gergely–Varadovics (2014). In Janu-
ary and February 2015 only those subsidies increased which were calculated 
as a certain percentage of the minimum wage. The maximum amount of job-
seekers’ subsidy is HUF 105 thousand (EUR 338) per month or HUF 3.5 
thousand (EUR 11.3) per day. The amount of unemployment benefit prior 
to receiving the old age pension is HUF 42 thousand (EUR 135) per month 
or HUF 1.4 thousand (EUR 4.5) per day.
On 1 March 2015 significant changes entered into force in the social welfare 
system (for details see Section 11). The regular social benefit as known before 
was abolished. In its place an employment substitution subsidy can be disbursed 
to people who reach pensioner age within a period of 5 years and those entitled 
to such a subsidy on the basis of a local government decree. Similarly to those 
entitled to an employment substitution subsidy these people are also obliged 
to register as job-seekers and to cooperate with the public employment service.
Another form of subsidy – instead of the regular social benefit – is the sub-
sidy for health impairment and child supervision, which is disbursed to those 
suffering from health impairment or cannot provide for supervision for their 
child below 14 years of age.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 on promoting employment and unemploy-
ment benefits; Act III of 1993 on social administration and social benefits 
(Section 25).
New regulations: Act XCIX of 2014 on the central budget of Hungary for 
the year 2015.
9. Early retirement
Early retirement is still not an option since it was abolished as of 1 January 
2012. The only exception from this stipulation is women having spent at least 
40 years in a paid job – see Section 13.
COMPREHENSIVE INTERVENTIONS (COMPREHENSIVE 
PROGRAMMES)
In the programming period 2014–20 projects with an influence on employ-
ment policy and co-financed by the European Union will be launched in the 
framework of the Economic Development and Innovation Operational Pro-
gramme (abbreviated EDIOP, in Hungarian as GINOP). Priority 1 and 2 
The regular social benefit 
was terminated
The new comprehensive pro-
grammes in the EU’s 2014–
2020 programming period
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of the former operational programme (abbreviated SROP, in Hungarian as 
TÁMOP) will be followed up by Priority 1 (Promoting the competitiveness 
and employment potential of enterprises) and Priority 5 (Promoting employ-
ment and adaptability of enterprises) in GINOP.
Eligible activities that promote employment and the labour market inte-
gration of job-seekers and disadvantaged people are also found in the Terri-
torial and Settlement Development Operational Programme (abbreviated in 
Hungarian as TOP), the Human Resource Development Operational Pro-
gramme (abbreviated in Hungarian as EFOP) and the Competitive Central 
Hungary Operational Programme (abbreviated in Hungarian as VEKOP).
The most important objectives of GINOP are the following:
•	 creating the conditions for boosting the employment opportunities offered 
by small and medium-sized enterprises;
•	 strengthening the employment capacities of social enterprises;
•	 improving access to apprenticeship opportunities, increasing the entrepre-
neurial spirit among young people;
•	 access for a large number of unemployed or inactive people to labour market 
programmes implemented by non-governmental organizations;
•	 integration of job-seekers, especially the low-skilled, to the labour market;
•	 improving access to training opportunities aimed at developing the labour 
market competences of the working age population, especially the low-
skilled;
•	 improving the quality of education and training systems and their capacity 
to adapt to labour market needs.
According to the plans, the objectives mentioned above will be met primar-
ily by subsidies. Such subsidies may involve training subsidies, subsidies for 
the employment of disadvantaged workers or disabled workers, or subsidies 
compensating the additional costs of disabled people, and the various forms 
of grants offered to small and medium sized enterprises.
As of October 2014, before the approval of the operational programme by 
the European Commission, three calls for proposals contributing to the ob-
jectives mentioned above were launched:
•	 Enhancing f lexible employment in the ‘convergence’ regions: the pro-
gramme aims at increasing the employment of groups that need to recon-
cile work with private life. Such groups are, in the first place, parents with 
small children, those who want to combine work with studying, and those 
who care for elderly or impaired family members.
•	 Helping the entrepreneurship of young people: this programme supports 
young people who intend to become an entrepreneur or start an enterprise, 
on the one hand by developing the knowledge and skills necessary for this, 
and, on the other hand, by helping them prepare their business plan by pro-
viding expertise and financial support.
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•	Youth Guarantee Programme: in the framework of this programme the 
employment service provides personalized help for young people aged 15–
25 who are not in employment or education. The employment service has 
to offer within 6 months (in later times within 4 months) an opportuni-
ty to the unskilled to obtain a vocational qualification and to those with 
a qualification an opportunity to obtain work experience in the private 
sector. Hungary has made a specific commitment to introduce the Youth 
Guarantee Programme which is described in detail in the National Youth 
Strategy.3
Priority 1 of the Human Resources Development Operational Programme 
(EFOP) is active inclusion, which covers the objectives of the inclusion of 
marginalized communities and the incentives for the social economy and 
enterprises. In line with this, the projects to be financed under the priority 
axis called ‘Cooperating society’ will serve, among others, the improvement 
of the employability of people who face disadvantages in the labour market, 
the Roma and people with disabilities, as well as their integration into the 
labour market.
One of the objectives of this programme is to improve the employment op-
portunities and self-sustaining capacity in the social economy of people who 
are disadvantaged from a labour market perspective, primarily the Roma. To 
that end, financial support will be dedicated to social enterprises and social 
co-operatives that provide services aimed at improving the self-employment 
opportunities of disadvantaged people, especially the Roma.
The action plans linked to each of these operational programmes have not 
yet been drawn up, therefore there is no available information on the exact 
list and description of the planned interventions and the financial resources 
allocated to them.
In 2014 TÁMOP provided financial support to the following four pro-
grammes: ‘Supporting the entrepreneurship of young people’ (2.3.6), ‘Back 
to learning’ (2.1.6), ‘Development of the social economy’ (2.4.3.D), ‘Compre-
hensive and environmentally conscious programme of employers for territo-
rial development aimed at the enhanced employment of the disadvantaged 
and low-skilled labour force’.
The first programme is linked to the Youth Guarantee Programme and 
has already been described under section 7. The other programmes support 
the public work scheme in some form. Programme 2.1.6 supports the train-
ing of low-skilled adults in training adjusted to labour market needs, which 
is implemented practically through the training of those involved in public 
works programmes. Programmes 2.4.3.D and 2.4.3.F support social enter-
prises, primarily social co-operatives with the aim of creating pathways out 
of public works programmes and onto the open labour market. The budget 
available for these programmes amounts to HUF 6.12 billion.
3 Available as an annex to Parlia-
ment Decision 88/2009 (X. 29.).
Continuing SROP/ 
TÁMOP-programmes
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In 2015, an additional HUF 7.39 billion will be made available for the fol-
lowing two schemes: ‘Helping the rehabilitation and employment of people 
with disabilities’ and ‘Improving the employability of disadvantaged people 
(decentralised labour market programmes in the ‘convergence’ regions)’. Both 
of these will finance the regular comprehensive programmes for the priori-
tised target groups.
Major regulations: Government Decree 132/2009. (VI. 19.) on subsidies pro-
vided in the frameworks of measure 1.1.2 ‘Decentralised programmes for 
the employment of disadvantaged people’ (Priority 1 of Social Renewal Op-
erational Programme), and measure 1.1.1 ‘Helping the rehabilitation and 
employment of people with disabilities’ (Priority 1 of Social Renewal Op-
erational Programme); Government Decree 175/2010. (V. 13.) on subsidies 
provided in the frameworks of measure 1.1.4 “Improving the employment of 
disadvantaged people in the Central Hungary Region’ (Priority 1 of the So-
cial Renewal Operational Programme); Government Decision 1016/2013. (I. 
18.) on the action plan for Priority 1 of the Social Renewal Operational Pro-
gramme, and on the approval of specific calls for proposals.
New regulations: Government Decree 255/2014. (X. 10.) on the rules of state 
aid within the meaning of community law on competition concerning the fi-
nancial resources allocated to the 2014–2020 period; Government Decision 
1208/2014. (IV. 1.) on the amendment of the action plan for 2011–2013 of 
priority 2 of the Social Renewal Operational Programme; Government Deci-
sion 1254/2014. (IV. 18.) on the amendment of the action plan for 2011–2013 
of priority 2 of the Social Renewal Operational Programme; Government 
Decision 1172/2015. (III. 24.) on the adoption of the action plan for 2011–
2013 of the Social Renewal Operational Programme; Government Decision 
1210/2015. (IV. 10.) on the adoption of the annual development framework 
for 2015 of the Human Resources Operational Programme.
On-line source: http://palyazat.gov.hu
POLICY TOOLS WITH AN EFFECT ON THE LABOUR 
MARKET
10. System of taxes and social security contributions
No significant changes occurred in the system of relevant taxes and social se-
curity contributions in the period in question. The extension of the scope of 
eligibility concerning family tax credits may have a positive impact on the net 
income. Tax credits may be applied also by the spouse of the family member 
eligible for a family allowance.
Zsombor cseres-GerGeLy & kitti VaradoVics
188
Now beyond the income generated from a paid job also the income gener-
ated from other individual economic activities is added to the tax base used 
for calculating the amount of tax credit. However, in order to apply the tax 
credit in relation to remunerations in kind, two thresholds were introduced, 
both of which is lower than the former threshold of HUF 500 thousand (EUR 
1,613), and it may thus have a negative impact on the net salary.
The monthly amount of health service contribution is raised from HUF 
6,810 (EUR 21.9) to HUF 6.930 (EUR 22.3), so its amount per day is HUF 
231 (EUR 0.74) in 2015.
Major regulations: Act CXVII of 1995 on the personal income tax; Act 
LXXXI of 1996 on the corporate tax and the tax on dividends; Act LXXXI 
of 1997 on social security pensions; Act XCII of 2003 on the procedures of 
taxation; Act CXX of 2005 on the simplified contributions concerning public 
dues; Act CXXVII of 2007 on the value-added tax; Act LXXV of 2010 on 
simplified employment; Act CXLVII of 2012 on the tax for small taxpayers 
and the small enterprise tax; Act CLXXVIII of 2012 amending specific acts 
on taxation and related acts.
On-line source: http://www.nav.gov.hu/
11. Other transfers
On 1 March 2015 significant changes occurred in the system of social trans-
fers. As of this date decisions concerning state-regulated mandatory transfers 
are made uniformly at district level. Such transfers are old-age subsidies, ac-
tive age subsidies (employment substitution subsidy, subsidy for health im-
pairment and child supervision), care-taker subsidy, individual and normative 
public health subsidy, and entitlement to public health services.
The regular social benefit was replaced by the employment substitution sub-
sidy, and two new types of transfer, subsidy for health impairment and child 
supervision. The employment substitution subsidy can be disbursed to peo-
ple who reach pensioner age within a period of 5 years and those entitled to 
such subsidy on the basis of a local government decree. The new types of sub-
sidy can be disbursed to people who have health impairment or those unable 
to supervise their child below 14 years of age. The amount of subsidy is to be 
calculated similarly to the rules applied previously to calculate the amount 
of the regular social benefit, only the ceiling of the family income is changed. 
The amount of subsidy must not exceed 90% of the net amount of the public 
works wage, a maximum amount of HUF 46,662 (EUR 150.5) in 2015. Pro-
vided that a family member is also entitled to the employment substitution 
subsidy, the maximum amount of subsidy is HUF 23,862 (EUR 77).
Changes in the system  
of social transfers
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Beyond that, local governments shall decide on the types and eligibility 
criteria of further transfers. The uniform name of such transfers shall be set-
tlement-level transfers.
Child-care benefits
Up until 1 January 2015 child-care benefits were left unchanged, as presented 
in detail in Table 5 by Busch–Cseres-Gergely (2012).
As of 2015 the name of the pregnancy-puerperal benefit is changed to baby-
care benefit. The scope of entitlement has been extended to both the baby-care 
and the child-care benefit, and the method of calculation in calendar days in 
order to set the base of the amount of the benefit has also changed.
Major regulations: Act LXXX of 1997 on the eligibility rules concerning so-
cial security benefits and private pensions, and the financial cover of these 
services; Act LXXXIII of 1997 on the services of mandatory health insur-
ance; Act LXXXIV of 1998 on the support for families; Government Decree 
328/2011. (XII. 29.) on the fees payable for basic child-care welfare services 
and professional child protection services and the evidence acceptable when 
applying for such services;
New regulations: Act CXI of 2014 amending specific acts on health-care and 
health insurance and related acts; Act CCXXIV of 2013 amending specific 
acts related to the modifications of child-care benefits and to the extension 
of the range of exemption from paying the social contribution tax; Act XCIX 
of 2014 on the central budget of Hungary for the year 2015.
12. Contractual terms of employment, labour law
The Labour Code was only slightly changed. As of 1 January 2015 employees 
having three or more children may request – until their child is 5 years of age – 
a modification to their work contract by halving the general daily number of 
full-time working hours, and continue work part-time.
Major regulations: Act LXXV of 2010 on simplified employment; Act I of 
2012 on the Labour Code.
New regulations: Act XCIX of 2014 on the central budget of Hungary for 
the year 2015.
13. Old age and disability pensions – disability subsidies
For women having spent at least 40 years in a legal or contractual arrange-
ment that entitles them to a full amount of pension, regardless of their age, 
the time spent in the mandatory summer practical training of pupils learn-
Corrections as to the calcu-
lation of the 40-year period 
of entitlement for women
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ing in vocational training or vocational secondary education is considered eli-
gible when calculating the period justifying entitlement to a pension. It was 
decided that this period of entitlement includes the periods when the person 
received child-care benefit, child-care allowance, pregnancy-puerperal benefit 
or child-care support for a child below the age of three, or a care-taker sub-
sidy for a severely disabled person who is the person’s own or adopted child 
below the age of twelve.
Within the 40-year period of entitlement the period spent in a paid working 
arrangement must be at least 32 years. Exceptions are the persons receiving a 
care-taker subsidy for a severely disabled child, which sets the minimum pe-
riod of paid work at 30 years, and persons raising at least five children, which 
reduces the minimum period by one year, adding one further year for each 
following child, but the period of entitlement must not be reduced by more 
than 7 years.
On 31 December 2014 the opportunity in certain jobs to acquire entitle-
ment for a pension prior to the statutory pension age by accounting for a re-
duced period of entitlement was abolished.
A new decree was issued to reinforce the tasks and responsibilities of the 
Central Administration of National Pension Insurance as a body financed 
from the central budget and operating as a central office under the supervi-
sion of the minister responsible for social policy and pensions.
Disability pensions – disability subsidies
No change has occurred in the regulation of disability and rehabilitation 
transfers in the period observed.
Major regulations: Act LXXXI of 1997 on social security pensions; Act CXCI 
of 2011 on the allowances of people with a changed working capacity and the 
amendment of specific acts; Government Decree 327/2011 (XII. 29.) on the 
procedural rules related to the allowances of people with a changed working 
capacity; ; Government Decision 1150/2013 (III. 22.) on the implementation 
in the public health sector of Government Decision 1700/2012 (XII. 29.) on 
the pension policy principles to be applied in the public sector; Government 
Decision 1599/2013 (IX. 3.) on the implementation in education and voca-
tional education of Government Decision 1700/2012 (XII. 29.) on the pen-
sion policy principles to be applied in the public sector.
New regulations: Act XCIX of 2014 on the central budget of Hungary for 
the year 2015; Government Decree 90/2014 (III. 20.) amending Government 
Decree 168/1997 (X. 6.) on the implementation of Act LXXXI of 1997 on 
social security pensions and Government Decree 333/2011 (XII. 29.) on the 
rules governing entitlement to a pension prior to the statutory pension age, 
allowances based on a period of entitlement; ballet artists’ allowances and 
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miners’ transitional allowances, and amending specific related government 
decrees; Government Decree 73/2015. (III. 30.) on the Central Administra-
tion of National Pension Insurance.
14. Wage bargaining, wage regulation and interest 
representation
The system of minimum wages valid in 2014 is presented in Table 2 of Cseres-
Gergely–Varadovics (2014). The amounts applicable in 2015 are summed up 
in Table 1.
Table 1: Amounts of minimum wages on 1 January 2015 (HUF/day)
Minimum wage Guaranteed wage minimum
Regular 4,830 5,620
Employed in a public works programme 3,639 4,666
Workgroup leader employed in a public works programme 4,004 5,134
Simplified employment 4,106 4,777
Major regulations: Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social 
Council; Government Decree 170/2011. (VII. 24.) on setting the minimum 
wage and the guaranteed wage minimum to be applied in public works pro-
grammes; Government Decree 483/2013. (XII. 17.) on setting the manda-
tory minimum wage and the guaranteed wage minimum.
New regulations: Government Decree 347/2014 (XII. 29.) on setting the man-
datory minimum wage and the guaranteed wage minimum; Government De-
cree 376/2014 (XII. 31.) on the amendment of Government Decree 170/2011. 
(VII. 24.) on setting the mandatory minimum wage and the guaranteed wage 
minimum to be applied in public works programmes, and the amendment 
of Government Decree 63/2006 (III. 27.) on the rules governing the request 
and decision procedures and disbursement of cash and in-kind social transfers.
15. Measures related to migration and mobility
The 31 December 2013 deadline for making a decision on the de minimis 
support of domestic travel and the transportation of groups of people was 
prolonged up to 30 June 2014.
In order to issue a unified permit necessary for the employment of citizens 
from a third country, introduced as of January 2014, a set of employment cri-
teria were defined that the labour centre may use to turn down the procedure. 
Such criteria are the following:
•	 the citizen from a third country would take up such work for which a 
training course – funded from the National Employment Fund – is either 
in progress or will finish prior to the envisaged start date of employment;
The issue of a unified per-
mit may be rejected along 
a set of further criteria
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•	 the employer carried out mass redundancy in the year preceding the sub-
mission of the request;
•	 the kind of job for which the citizen from a third country would be hired 
is affected by a strike which is in progress with the employer;
the employer wishes to pay a basic salary and remuneration to the citizen 
from a third country whose amount is less than 80% of the national average 
basic salary.
As of 1 January 2015 the rules governing housing subsidies have slightly 
changed. Job-seekers become eligible if they are registered for one month as 
opposed to the former three months. If the job-seeker signs a work contract 
with their previous employer, the subsidy can be disbursed only if their new 
place of work is not the same as the former one. However, the former duration 
of the subsidy is decreased from 18 to 12 months. The former system where 
the amount of subsidy was linked to its duration was abolished. The amount 
was set at HUF 100 thousand (approx. EUR 323) for the twelve months. The 
amount of the subsidy is increased to HUF 150 thousand (approx. EUR 484) 
if requested by two close relatives for the same housing facility and both of 
them are entitled, and to HUF 200 thousand (approx. EUR 646) if requested 
by three or more persons. People having exhausted the subsidy become eligi-
ble to, and may request it again, within two instead of three years.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 on promoting employment and unemploy-
ment benefits; Government Decree 39/1998. (III. 4.) on support aimed at the 
reduction of burdens related to commuting to work, and on the support of 
labour force recruitment; Government Decree 355/2007. (XII. 23.) on the 
transitional rules related to the free movement of the labour force applied by 
the Republic of Hungary for persons having the right to free movement and 
residing in the country; Government Decree 355/2009. (XII. 30.) on the 
rules regulating the employment of citizens from third countries without a 
work permit in the territory of the Republic of Hungary; Government De-
cree 445/2013. (XI. 28.) on the issue of work permits for citizens from third 
countries on the basis of non-united request procedures, on the exemptions 
from the obligation for obtaining a work permit; on the tasks of the labour 
centre of the county (capital) government office on the issue of an opinion as 
an official authority in the united procedure, on reporting the employment 
of citizens from third countries who can be employed without a work permit 
in Hungary, and the reimbursement of remunerations.
New regulations: Government Decree 89/2014 (III. 20.) amending specific 
Government Decrees on employment; Government Decree 354/2014 (XII. 
29.) amending specific Government Decrees on employment.
Changes of rules in rela-
tion to the housing subsidy
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16. The institutions of management, financing  
and evaluation of employment policy
The transformation of the institutional set-up of employment policy was 
launched at the same time as the structural reorganization of the govern-
ment. The most important change, as stipulated in the regulation on the tasks 
and responsibilities of the government, is that the National Labour Office 
ceased to be – as of June 2014 – a central government body under the super-
vision of the minister for the economy.
On 1 January 2015 the National Labour Office was terminated without a 
successor. As of this date the National Employment Service – headed by the 
minister responsible for employment policy – is made up of the employment 
and labour market bodies of the government offices of the capital and the 
counties – that is the labour centres – and the district-level offices of the em-
ployment and labour market bodies of the government offices of the capital 
and the counties – that is the branch offices of labour centres.
Upon its termination the tasks and responsibilities of the National Labour 
Office were reallocated. Its tasks related to employment policy are managed 
by the minister responsible for employment policy. The rules of operation of 
the Ministry for the Economy detail the organizational structure and the 
tasks and responsibilities necessary to implement the objectives of employ-
ment policy. The activities of the state secretary responsible for the labour 
market and training is supervised by the minister for the economy. The two 
deputy state secretaries supervised by the state secretary are the deputy state 
secretary responsible for the labour market and the deputy state secretary re-
sponsible for vocational training and adult training.
The deputy state secretary responsible for the labour market is in charge of 
directing the work of the Unit of the Labour Market, Unit of Labour Mar-
ket Programmes, Unit of Labour Market Regulation, Unit of Labour In-
spection, Unit of Employment Inspection, and the Unit of Job Brokerage 
and Coordination.
The deputy state secretary responsible for vocational training and adult 
training is in charge of directing the work of the Unit of Training Develop-
ment and Institutional Supervision and the Unit of Vocational Training and 
Adult Training Regulation.
As of 15 December 2014 the tasks related to vocational and adult train-
ing are performed by the National Vocational and Adult Training Office, a 
new institution belonging to the Ministry for the National Economy. The 
Office is a body financed from the central budget and operates as a central 
office under the supervision of the minister responsible for vocational train-
ing and adult training.
The national Labour Of-
fice was terminated, its 
tasks were reallocated
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Among others, the Office took the role of the National Labour Office of 
designing, elaborating and maintaining the National Register of Qualifica-
tions, of the procedure of licensing adult training activities, of elaborating 
the system of requirements, and the task of registering and checking institu-
tions pursuing adult training activities. Accordingly, it is the responsibility 
of the Office to dispose of the funds available from the training sub-fund of 
the National Employment Fund.
The public administration tasks related to work safety and labour inspec-
tion belong to the minister responsible for employment policy, and these tasks 
are performed by the work safety and labour inspection body of the govern-
ment offices of the capital and the counties, i.e the work safety and labour 
inspection offices.
The areas of health at work and work hygiene are taken over by the Office 
of the Chief Medical Officer.
As of 2015 the Office for National Economic Planning was also terminat-
ed. Its remaining tasks are taken over by the ministry headed by the minister 
responsible for the strategic planning of regional development, presently the 
Ministry for the National Economy.
As of 1 April 2015 the institutional system was affected by further chang-
es as a consequence of the reform targeting a uniform organizational struc-
ture for government offices. Thus the public employment body is made up 
of the ministry headed by the responsible minister, the employment and la-
bour market bodies of the government offices of the capital and the counties, 
and the district-level offices of the employment and labour market bodies of 
the government offices of the capital and the counties. The main element of 
these changes is that the former employment and labour market bodies were 
turned into units, whose tasks and responsibilities belong now uniformly to 
the government office and its head, a designated government officer. Gov-
ernment offices are made up of district-level offices with a structure made up 
of units, and district-level offices are headed by district-level office managers.
The 2015 budget heading of the National Employment Fund in the central 
state budget is presented in Table 2. The direction of the budget of employ-
ment policy is still determined by two major areas: passive unemployment 
subsidies and public works programmes. As of 2012 the emphasis was shift-
ed from passive subsidies and – to a lesser extent – active labour market pro-
grammes to public works programmes.
Regarding the structure of expenditure from the National Employment 
Fund the former proportions of 20% for public works programmes and 40% 
for passive subsidies turned around by 2012. In 2014 the planned budget of 
HUF 183.1 billion (EUR 0.59 billion) allocated to public works programmes 
was further increased by an amount of HUF 47.3 billion (EUR 0.15 billion), 
which represents a 35% increase as compared to the actual amount disbursed 
Further changes for the sake 
of a unified organizational 
system of government offices
Increased amount of allo-
cation to public works pro-
grammes
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in the previous year, while this latter is considered the base for a 60% increase 
in allocations for 2015. This way the planned budget allocations to public 
works programmes and to unemployment benefits (job seekers’ assistance) 
take a share of 63% and 12% respectively, so these two will take 75% of the 
total expenditure of the Fund.
Major regulations: Act CXXX of 2009 on the 2010 central budget of Hunga-
ry; Act CLXIX of 2010 on the 2011 central budget of Hungary; Act CXXX-
III of 2011 on the implementation of the 2010 central budget of Hungary; 
Act CLXXXVIII of 2011 on the 2012 central budget of Hungary; Act CLV 
of 2012 on the implementation of Act CLXIX of 2010 on the implementa-
tion of the 2011 central budget of Hungary; Act CCIV of 2012 on the 2013 
central budget of Hungary; Act CXCIII of 2013 on the implementation of 
Act CLXXXVIII of 2011 on the implementation of the 2012 central budg-
et of Hungary; Act CCXXX of 2013 on the 2014 central budget of Hunga-
ry; Act LXXII of 2014 on the implementation of Act CCIV of 2012 on the 
implementation of the 2013 central budget of Hungary; Act C of 2014 on 
the 2015 central budget of Hungary; Government Decree 169/2011. (VIII. 
24.) on the Employment and Public Works Database; Government Decree 
248/2011. (XII. 1.) on the establishment of the Office for National Economic 
Planning; Government Decree 323/2011. (XII. 28.) on the roles and respon-
sibilities of the National Labour Office and the bodies directed and profes-
sionally supervised by it; 1426/2012. (X. 4.) on the approval of the special 
project no. TÁMOP 2.4.8-12/1 (entitled “Development of health and safety 
at work, development of labour inspection”) and its inclusion in the action 
plan; Government Decision 1507/2012. (XI. 16.) on the approval of the spe-
cial project no. TIOP-3.2.1-12/1-2012-0001 (entitled “Establishment of an 
integrated system by developing the infrastructure of the public employment 
service”) and its inclusion in the action plan; Ministerial Decree 18/2013. (VI. 
11.) of the Ministry for the Economy on the management and use of the Na-
tional Employment Fund.
New regulations: Government Decree 152/2014 (VI. 6.) on the roles and 
responsibilities of the members of the government; Government Decree 
221/2014 (IX. 4.) amending specific Government Decrees in relation to the 
structural reorganization of the Government; Government Decree 318/2014 
(XII. 13.) amending specific Government Decrees in relation to the termi-
nation of the National Labour Office and the establishment of the National 
Vocational and Adult Training Office; Government Decree 319/2014 (XII. 
13.) on the National Vocational and Adult Training Office; Government De-
cree 320/2014 (XII. 13.) designating the public employment body, the work 
safety and labour inspection office and on the official and other tasks of these 
bodies; Government Decree 326/2014. (XII. 15.) on the termination of the 
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Table 2: Income and expenditure related to employment policy in the central budget, 2011–2015 (in million HUF)
2011 2012
allocated disbursed allocated disbursed
Expenditure
1. Active measures
Employment and training subsidies 40,519.8 25,774.8 25,600.0 22,017.2
EU co-financing for employability (and adaptability) 4,820.7 3,970.7 6,967.0 6,967.0
Public works programmesa 64,000.0 59,799.8 132,182.5 131,910.7
Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP/TÁMOP), Measure 1.1. La-
bour market services and assistance 30,925.2 19,754.4 37,900.0 29,772.3
Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP/TÁMOP), Measure 1.2. Nor-
mative employment incentives 5,500.0 9,774.8 8,500.0 16,250.1
Reimbursement of contribution discount 5,800.0 5,147.7 6,000.0 4,784.1
Pre-financing of 2014–2020 labour market programmes
2. Vocational training and adult training subsidies 33,091.1 27,921.1 23,483.0 16,516.0
4. Expenditure on passive measures
Unemployment benefits (job seekers’ assistance) 134,800.0 124,543.2 57,000.0 64,067.2
Transfer to Pension Insurance Fund 681.3 1,221.5 1,700.0 907.0
5. Wage guarantee payments 7,000.0 5,363.0 6,000.0 6,606.6
6. Operating costs 100.0 86.7 300.0 100.0
9. Technical expenses of debt release incurred upon equity 303.6
13. Retention balance and risk management allocation 10,000.0 2,000.0
15. Employers’ supplemental support 5,222.9
16. Sectoral support to the increase in the minimum wage
17. Other expenditure
Total expenditure 337,238.1 283,661.3 307,632.3 305,121.1
Income
25. Income from the Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP/TÁMOP) 
measures 30,588.1 26,247.6 41,065.2 42,827.3
26. Other income
Territorial other income 800.0 734.2 830.0 559.0
Central other income 2,600.0 1,316.8 1,000.0 1,113.6
Vocational training and adult training other income 1,000.0 781.2 1,000.0 1,020.1
31. Vocational training contribution 49,000.0 49,415.5 52,700.0 80,352.5
33. Redemption of wage guarantee support 1,000.0 977.8 1,000.0 792.0
34. Technical income from debt release incurred upon equity 303.6
35. Share of the health insurance and labour market contribution payable to 
the Labour Market Fund 187,700.0 186,596.3 119,900.0 127,096.6
36. Central budget support 64,000.0 64,000.0 50,000.0 71,273.8
Share of the social contribution tax payable to the Labour Market Fund 73,630.0 67,284.5
Contribution related to the Job Protection Act
Total income 337,238.1 330,373 341,125.2 392,319.4
Pending itemsb 550.0 202.0 270.3
Changes in deposits 46,913.7 33,492.9 87,468.6
Total: 337,238.1 330,596.9 341,125.2 393,040.4
Deflating by 3% per year at 2011 prices 337,238.1 330,596.9 331,189.6 381,592.5
a Including the expenditure on public works programmes in 2011 and the expenditure 
on the Start Employment Programme beyond 2011.
b In 2011 also including income from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.
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2013c 2014 2015
allocated disbursed allocated allocated
Expenditure
1. Active measures
Employment and training subsidies 27,000.0 25,105.9 27,000.0 14,000.0
EU co-financing for employability (and adaptability) 16,279.6 16,279.6 17,130.0 11,064.6
Public works programmesa 179,897.8 171,053.4 231,105.3 270,000.0
Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP/TÁMOP), Measure 1.1. La-
bour market services and assistance 35,000.0 33,804.9 41,000.0 7,500.0
Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP/TÁMOP), Measure 1.2. Nor-
mative employment incentives 11,000.0 14,477.3 3,200.0
Reimbursement of contribution discount 6,000.0 3,277.5 5,000.0
Pre-financing of 2014–2020 labour market programmes 10,000.0 49,200.0
2. Vocational training and adult training subsidies 27,500.0 18,736.2 26,400.0 16,000.0
4. Expenditure on passive measures
Unemployment benefits (job seekers’ assistance) 59,000.0 51,819.9 56,000.0 50,000.0
Transfer to Pension Insurance Fund 361.9 961.3 313.9 400.0
5. Wage guarantee payments 6,000.0 5,487.8 6,000.0 6,150.0
6. Operating costs 300.0 1,472.8 1,600.0 3,050.0
9. Technical expenses of debt release incurred upon equity
13. Retention balance and risk management allocation 2,919.3
15. Employers’ supplemental support
16. Sectoral support to the increase in the minimum wage 10,000.0 7,000.0
17. Other expenditure 22.3
Total expenditure 381,258.6 349,498.9 424,749.2 427,364.6
Income
25. Income from the Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP/TÁMOP) 
measures 39,000.0 51,276.1 46,000.0 43,000.0
26. Other income
Territorial other income 850.0 602.3 750.0 1,000.0
Central other income 1,000.0 1,376.8 1,000.0 1,000.0
Vocational training and adult training other income 800.0 692.6 650.0 800.0
31. Vocational training contribution 54,814.6 60,398.7 57,071.1 63,134.0
33. Redemption of wage guarantee support 1,000.0 1,046.1 1,000.0 1,000.0
34. Technical income from debt release incurred upon equity
35. Share of the health insurance and labour market contribution payable to 
the Labour Market Fund 120,133.3 125,614.6 125,041.5 141,772.9
36. Central budget support 20,000.0 20,000.0 8,449.0
Share of the social contribution tax payable to the Labour Market Fund
Contribution related to the Job Protection Act 91,542.7 91,542.7 95,936.7 100,541.7
Total income 329,140.6 352,549.9 327,449.3 360,697.6
Pending itemsb –964.6
Changes in deposits –52,118.0 –2,086.4 –97,300.0
Total: 381,258.6 351,560.1 424,749.2 427,364.6
Deflating by 3% per year at 2011 prices 359,372.8 331,379.1 388,705.7 379,707.9
c Including interim amendments of the budget.
Source: Act on the central state budget (plan) and the implementation of the central state budget 
of the related year, 153,779.8 in 2013 amended by the stipulations of Government Decisions 
1507/2013. (VIII. 1.) and 1783/2013. (XI. 4.) (HUF 26,118 million extra funds allocated to pub-
lic works programmes); 183,805.3 in 2014 amended by the stipulation of Government Decision 
1361/2014 (VI. 30.) (HUF 47,300 million extra funds allocated to public works programmes).
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Office for National Economic Planning; Government Decree 66/2015. (III. 
30.) on the government offices of the capital and the counties and the district-
level (capital district) offices; Government Decree 66/2015. (III. 30.) on the 
exceptional scope of authority of district-level (capital district) government 
offices acting as the public employment body; Government Decree 70/2015. 
(III. 30.) amending specific Government Decrees in relation to the structur-
al reorganization of the regional organizational system of public administra-
tion; Government Decision 1361/2014 (VI. 30.) on specific issues related to 
public works programmes; Ministerial Decree 1/2015. (I. 21.) issued by the 
Minister for the Economy on the Rules of Operation of the Ministry for the 
National Economy.
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Statistical tables on labour market trends that have been published in The Hungarian 
Labour Market Yearbook since 2000 can be downloaded in full from the website of the 
Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies: http://adatbank.krtk.mta.hu
1. Basic economic indicators
2. Population
3. Economic activity
4. Employment
5. Unemployment
6. Wages
7. Education
8. Labour demand indicators
9. Regional inequalities
10. Industrial relations
11. Welfare provisions
12. The tax burden on work
13. International comparison
14. Description of the main data sources
DATA SOURCES
CIRCA Communication & Information Resource Centre Administrator
KSH Table compiled from regular Central Statistical Office publications [Központi 
Statisztikai Hivatal]
KSH IMS CSO institution-based labour statistics [KSH intézményi munkaügyi  
statisztika]
KSH MEF CSO Labour Force Survey [KSH Munkaerő-felmérés]
KSH MEM CSO Labour Force Account [KSH Munkaerő-mérleg]
NAV National Tax and Customs Administration [Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal]
NEFMI Ministry of National Resources [Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium]
NEFMI EMMI STAT Ministry of National Resources, Educational Statistics [Nemzeti Erőforrás 
Minisztérium, Oktatásstatisztika]
NFA National Market Fund [Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Alap]
NFSZ National Employment Service [Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Szolgálat]
NFSZ BT National Employment Service Wage Survey [NFSZ Bértarifa-felvétel]
NFSZ IR NFSZ integrated tracking system [NFSZ Integrált (nyilvántartási) Rendszer]
NFSZ PROG National Employment Service Short-term Labour Market Projection Survey 
[NFSZ Rövid Távú Munkaerőpiaci Prognózis]
NFSZ REG National Employment Service Unemployment Register [NFSZ regisztere]
NGM Ministry of National Economy [Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium]
NMH National Labour Office [Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal]
NSZ Population Census [Népszámlálás]
NYUFIG Pension Administration [Nyugdíjfolyósító Igazgatóság]
ONYF Central Administration of National Pension Insurance [Országos  
Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság]
TB Social Security Records [Társadalombiztosítás]
EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS
( – ) Non-occurrence.
( .. ) Not available.
( n.a.) Not applicable.
( ... ) Data cannot be given due to data privacy restrictions.
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Table 1.1: Basic economic indicators
Year
GDPa
Industrial 
produc-
tionb
Exportc Importc Real  earningsd
Employ-
mentd
Consumer 
price  
indexd
Unemploy-
ment rate
1990 96.5 90.7 95.9 94.8 94.3 97.2 128.9 ..
1995 101.5 104.6 108.4 96.1 87.8 98.1 128.2 10.2
2000 104.2 118.1 121.7 120.8 101.5 101.0 109.8 6.4
2001 103.7 103.7 107.7 104.0 106.4 100.3 109.2 5.7
2002 104.5 103.2 105.9 105.1 113.6 100.1 105.3 5.8
2003 103.8 106.9 109.1 110.1 109.2 101.3 104.7 5.9
2004 104.8 107.8 118.4 115.2 98.9 99.4 106.8 6.1
2005 104.3 106.8 111.5 106.1 106.3 100.0 103.6 7.2
2006 104.0 109.9 118.0 114.4 103.6 100.7 103.9 7.5
2007 100.5 107.9 115.8 112.0 95.4 99.3 108.0 7.4
2008 100.9 100.0 104.2 104.3 100.8 98.6 106.1 7.8
2009 93.4 82.2 87.3 82.9 97.7 97.4 104.2 10.0
2010 100.8 110.6 116.9 115.1 101.8 99.6 104.9 11.2
2011 101.8 105.6 109.9 106.7 102.4 100.7 103.9 11.0
2012 98.5 98.2 100.7 99.9 96.6 101.8 105.7 11.0
2013 101.5 101.1 104.2 105.0 103.1 101.7 101.7 10.2
2014 103.5 107.6 107.1 108.8 103.2 105.3 99.8 7.7
a Data adjusted for seasonality and variations in the number of workdays. After 1996 there was 
a change in the methodology for accounting the undivided service fee of financial interme-
diation. Previous year = 100.
b 1990–2000: those with more than 5 employees, 2001–: without water and waste manage-
ment, including businesses with fewer than 5 employees. Previous year = 100.
c Volume index. Previous year = 100.
d Previous year = 100.
Source: GDP: 1990–2013: STADAT (2014. 10. 08. version), 2014: preliminary data, STADAT 
(2015.02.13. version); Industrial production index: 2001–: STADAT (2015. 02. 13. version); 
Export and import: 2001–: STADAT (2015. 03. 05. version); Real earnings: 1995–: STADAT 
(2015.02.20. version); Employment: 1990: KSH MEM; 1995–: KSH MEF. Consumer price 
index: 1990–: STADAT (2015.01.14. version). Unemployment rate: 1990–: STADAT 
(2015.03.05. version). Other data: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent01_01
Figure 1.1: Annual changes of basic economic indicators
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena01_01
–15
–12
–9
–6
–3
0
3
6
9
12
15
Real earnings
Employment
GDP
2014201220102008200620042002200019981996199419921990
Pe
r c
en
t
statistical data
202
Figure 1.2: Annual GDP time series (2000 = 100%)
Source: Eurostat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena01_02
Figure 1.3: Employment rate of population aged 15–64
Source: Eurostat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena01_03
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Table 2.1: Populationa
Year
In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual  changes
Population age 
15–64,  
in thousands
Demographic dependency rate
Total  
populationb Old age
c
1980 10,709 103.6 n.a. 6,918.9 0.54 0.21
1990 10,375 100.4 –0.2 6,870.4 0.51 0.20
2000 10,221 98.5 –0.3 6 961.3 0.47 0.21
2005 10,098 97.3 –0.2 6,940.3 0.45 0.23
2006 10,077 97.1 –0.2 6,931.8 0.45 0.23
2007 10,066 97.0 –0.1 6,932.4 0.45 0.23
2008 10,045 96.8 –0.2 6,912.7 0.45 0.24
2009 10,031 96.7 –0.1 6,898.1 0.45 0.24
2010 10,014 96.5 –0.1 6,874.0 0.46 0.24
2011 9,986 96.3 –0.2 6,857.4 0.46 0.24
2012 9,932 95.7 .. 6,815.7 0.46 0.25
2013 9,909 95.5 –0.2 6,776.3 0.46 0.25
2014 9,877 95.2 –0.3 6,719.7 0.47 0.26
a January 1st. The data for 1980 and 1990 are based on the censuses of those years. Those for 
2000–2011 are estimates based on the 2001 census and demographic data (reference date 
2001.02.01.). Those for 2012–2014 are estimates based on the 2011 census (reference day 
2011.10.01.) and demographic data.
b (population age 0–14 + 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
c (population age 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent02_01
Table 2.2: Population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 2,341.2 1,464.4 4,399.8 1,054.7 1,449.4 10,709.5
1990 2,130.5 1,445.5 4,231.4 1,193.5 1,373.9 10,374.8
2000 1,729.2 1,526.5 4,291.4 1,143.4 1,531.1 10,221.6
2005 1,579.7 1,322.0 4,409.1 1,209.2 1,577.6 10,097.6
2006 1,553.5 1,302.0 4,399.8 1,230.0 1,590.7 10,076.6
2007 1,529.7 1,285.9 4,393.9 1,251.5 1,605.1 10,066.1
2008 1,508.8 1,273.3 4,377.1 1,262.3 1,623.9 10,045.4
2009 1,492.6 1,259.9 4,346.1 1,292.0 1,640.3 10,030.9
2010 1,476.9 1,253.4 4,293.7 1,326.9 1,663.5 10,014.4
2011 1,457.2 1,231.7 4,257.7 1,367.8 1,671.3 9,985.7
2012 1,440.3 1,214.1 4,164.6 1,437.0 1,675.9 9,931.9
2013 1,430.9 1,196.4 4,144.8 1,435.0 1,701.7 9,908.8
2014 1,425.8 1,172.8 4,123.8 1,423.2 1,731.8 9,877.4
a January 1st. The data for 1980 and 1990 are based on the censuses of those years. Those for 
2000–2011 are estimates based on the 2001 census and demographic data (reference date 
2001.02.01.). Those for 2012–2014 are estimates based on the 2011 census (reference day 
2011.10.01.) and demographic data.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent02_02
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Figure 2.1: Age structure of the Hungarian population, 1980, 2014
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena02_01
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Table 2.3: Male population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–59 60–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 1,205.4 749.9 2,475.6 170.5 587.3 5,188.7
1990 1,090.4 740.3 2,366.9 259.9 527.5 4,984.9
2000 885.0 780.9 2,403.8 224.8 570.8 4,865.2
2005 809.5 674.6 2,480.0 252.2 576.8 4,793.1
2006 796.7 664.0 2,493.7 249.3 580.9 4,784.6
2007 784.5 655.4 2,503.7 249.4 586.1 4,779.1
2008 773.9 649.2 2,501.3 252.5 592.8 4,769.6
2009 765.8 642.7 2,497.0 258.4 599.2 4,763.1
2010 757.7 640.4 2,488.8 261.7 608.3 4,756.9
2011 747.6 629.7 2,480.4 274.7 611.5 4,743.9
2012 739.5 623.1 2,449.9 294.1 617.9 4,724.6
2013 734.7 614.4 2,439.4 297.0 630.5 4,716.0
2014 732.2 602.1 2,419.1 305.3 644.7 4,703.4
a January 1st. The data for 1980 and 1990 are based on the censuses of those years. Those for 
2000–2011 are estimates based on the 2001 census and demographic data (reference date 
2001.02.01.). Those for 2012–2014 are estimates based on the 2011 census (reference day 
2011.10.01.) and demographic data.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent02_03
Table 2.4: Female population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 1,135.8 714.5 2,232.8 365.3 1,072.4 5,520.8
1990 1,040.1 705.2 2,144.4 327.6 1,172.5 5,389.9
2000 844.3 745.6 2,170.5 334.8 1,261.3 5,356.5
2005 770.2 647.4 2,221.9 341.7 1,323.1 5,304.3
2006 756.8 638.6 2,213.0 356.6 1,327.0 5,292.0
2007 745.1 630.6 2,206.8 369.6 1,335.0 5,287.1
2008 734.9 624.1 2,194.5 373.2 1,349.1 5,275.8
2009 726.8 617.2 2,176.0 381.8 1,366.1 5,267.9
2010 719.2 613.1 2,145.5 396.8 1,382.8 5,257.4
2011 709.6 601.9 2,124.0 404.4 1,401.9 5,241.8
2012 700.8 590.9 2,079.5 416.2 1,419.9 5,207.3
2013 696.2 582.0 2,066.5 411.2 1,436.9 5,192.8
2014 693.6 570.7 2052.7 395.5 1,461.5 5,174.0
a January 1st. The data for 1980 and 1990 are based on the censuses of those years. Those for 
2000–2011 are estimates based on the 2001 census and demographic data (reference date 
2001.02.01.). Those for 2012–2014 are estimates based on the 2011 census (reference day 
2011.10.01.) and demographic data.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent02_04
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Table 3.1: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, in thousandsa
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of males over 59  and females over 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 4,887.9 0.0 300.8 370.1 259.0 339.7 1,269.6 6,157.5 570.3 0.0 1,632.1 2,202.4
1990 4,534.3 62.4 284.3 548.9 249.7 297.5 1,380.4 5,977.1 345.7 0.0 1,944.9 2,290.6
1991 4,270.5 253.3 335.6 578.2 259.8 317.1 1,490.7 6,014.5 249.5 0.0 2,045.2 2,294.7
1992 3,898.4 434.9 392.7 620.0 262.1 435.9 1,710.7 6,044.0 184.3 9.8 2,101.7 2,295.8
1993 3,689.5 502.6 437.5 683.9 270.5 480.1 1,872.0 6,064.1 137.5 16.3 2,141.2 2,295.0
1994 3,633.1 437.4 476.5 708.2 280.9 540.7 2,006.3 6,076.8 118.4 11.9 2,163.8 2,294.1
1995 3,571.3 410.0 495.2 723.4 285.3 596.1 2,100.0 6,081.3 107.5 6.4 2,180.6 2,294.5
1996 3,546.1 394.0 512.7 740.0 289.2 599.4 2,141.2 6,081.3 102.1 6.1 2,184.6 2,292.8
1997 3,549.5 342.5 542.9 752.0 289.0 599.9 2,183.8 6,075.8 96.9 6.3 2,189.0 2,292.2
1998 3,608.5 305.5 588.8 697.0 295.5 565.7 2,147.0 6,061.0 89.3 7.5 2,197.6 2,294.4
1999 3,701.0 283.3 534.7 675.6 295.3 549.8 2,055.4 6,039.6 110.4 1.4 2,185.2 2,297.0
2000 3,745.9 261.4 517.9 721.7 281.4 571.4 2,092.4 6,099.7 130.3 2.3 2,268.0 2,400.6
2001 3,742.6 231.7 516.3 717.9 286.6 601.6 2,122.4 6,096.7 140.7 2.4 2,271.8 2,414.9
2002 3,719.6 235.7 507.1 738.3 286.8 593.0 2,125.2 6,080.5 164.1 3.2 2,263.9 2,431.2
2003 3,719.0 239.6 485.0 730.7 286.9 595.0 2,097.6 6,056.2 202.9 4.9 2,245.6 2,453.4
2004 3,663.1 247.2 480.5 739.8 282.4 622.4 2,125.1 6,035.4 237.3 5.7 2,236.1 2,479.1
2005 3,653.9 296.0 449.7 740.8 278.6 590.3 2,059.4 6,009.3 247.6 7.9 2,258.3 2,513.8
2006 3,680.1 309.9 416.1 811.4 261.1 524.3 2,012.9 6,002.9 248.3 8.4 2,270.2 2,526.9
2007 3,649.5 303.7 413.2 822.7 273.9 519.7 2,029.5 5,982.7 252.5 8.4 2,292.9 2,553.8
2008 3,596.3 315.5 394.7 814.3 282.2 549.0 2,040.2 5,952.0 252.0 10.9 2,323.6 2,586.5
2009 3,480.9 403.0 360.3 805.7 282.0 578.4 2,026.4 5,910.3 266.9 14.8 2,345.7 2,627.4
2010 3,435.8 450.1 336.6 805.4 275.9 558.1 1,976.0 5,861.9 298.5 19.3 2,353.3 2,671.1
2011 3,430.1 440.9 296.4 783.8 280.7 557.9 1,932.0 5,789.8 328.9 25.1 2,366.3 2,720.3
2012 3,498.6 447.0 260.1 769.6 263.2 484.3 1,777.2 5,722.8 328.6 26.1 2,407.2 2,761.9
2013 3,551.1 415.7 249.1 737.3 255.4 464.9 1,706.7 5,673.5 341.6 25.2 2,424.5 2,791.3
2014 3,720.7 317.5 223.4 701.2 237.8 411.4 1,573.8 5,612.0 380.0 25.8 2,419.0 2,824.8
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to the year 1999, weighting is based on the 1990 population census. From 2000 on-
wards the 2001 population census is used in its original form. After the 2011 Census the 
post-2000 population weights have been updated using the new census data.
Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiving pension or child 
support. The data on students for 1995–97 are estimates.
’Other inactive’ is a residual category calculated by deducting the sum of the figures in the 
indicated categories from the mid-year population, so it includes the institutional popula-
tion not observed by MEF. The population weights have been corrected using the 2011 Cen-
sus data.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the 
year 1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: 
KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent03_01
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Table 3.2: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, males, in thousandsa
Year
Population of males 15–59 Population of males 60 and over
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,750.5 0.0 173.8 196.3 0.0 99.1 469.2 3,219.7 265.3 0.0 491.8 757.1
1990 2,524.3 37.9 188.4 284.2 1.2 80.3 554.1 3,116.3 123.7 0.0 665.5 789.2
1991 2,351.6 150.3 218.7 296.5 1.5 115.0 631.7 3,133.6 90.4 0.0 700.7 791.1
1992 2,153.1 263.2 252.0 302.4 1.7 174.8 730.9 3,147.2 65.1 3.2 722.1 790.4
1993 2,029.1 311.5 263.2 346.9 2.0 203.3 815.4 3,156.0 47.9 4.5 735.7 788.1
1994 2,013.4 270.0 277.6 357.1 3.7 239.6 878.0 3,161.4 41.6 3.8 740.0 785.4
1995 2,012.5 259.3 282.2 367.4 4.9 237.8 892.3 3,164.1 37.1 2.1 742.6 781.8
1996 2,007.4 242.4 291.9 372.8 3.3 248.3 916.3 3,166.1 28.9 1.3 746.3 776.5
1997 2,018.0 212.2 306.0 377.6 1.5 251.6 936.7 3,166.9 25.5 1.9 743.5 770.9
1998 2,015.5 186.5 345.4 350.4 1.0 264.2 961.0 3,163.0 26.2 2.8 737.3 766.3
1999 2,068.4 170.3 312.7 338.8 4.2 261.5 917.2 3,155.9 34.7 0.4 727.2 762.3
2000 2,086.0 158.2 315.2 358.2 4.1 261.7 939.2 3,183.4 39.8 0.7 758.8 799.3
2001 2,087.6 141.6 311.0 353.4 4.3 283.2 951.9 3,181.1 41.1 0.9 763.0 805.0
2002 2,080.4 137.3 307.5 370.3 5.0 273.4 956.2 3,173.9 45.2 0.7 764.4 810.3
2003 2,073.5 137.6 293.6 367.9 4.3 288.1 953.9 3,165.0 53.0 0.9 762.5 816.4
2004 2,052.7 136.2 293.5 371.2 4.6 300.2 969.5 3,158.4 64.6 0.6 758.8 824.0
2005 2,050.7 158.2 278.8 375.4 5.8 288.8 948.8 3,157.7 65.4 0.9 763.9 830.2
2006 2,078.4 163.4 258.9 404.1 4.0 249.6 916.6 3,158.4 60.2 1.1 771.5 832.8
2007 2,067.4 162.5 261.8 410.2 4.1 248.8 924.9 3,154.8 61.9 1.0 777.5 840.4
2008 2,033.6 172.7 261.2 408.3 4.7 264.6 938.8 3,145.1 60.0 1.0 790.4 851.4
2009 1,961.9 230.3 240.1 409.0 4.4 288.7 942.2 3,134.4 63.1 1.6 798.9 863.6
2010 1,929.5 259.5 228.7 410.3 4.6 287.1 930.7 3,119.7 63.0 2.2 812.9 878.1
2011 1,950.9 248.7 203.7 397.9 3.6 286.8 892.0 3,091.6 70.1 2.9 826.2 899.2
2012 1,979.2 257.9 187.7 395.6 4.2 238.8 826.3 3,063.4 69.6 4.1 846.1 919.8
2013 2,022.2 234.4 169.8 375.6 3.8 231.7 780.9 3,037.5 81.5 4.8 852.4 938.7
2014 2,120.3 173.1 151.5 352.5 3.0 200.7 707.7 3,001.1 100.1 8.6 855.6 964.3
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to the year 1999, weighting is based on the 1990 population census. From 2000 on-
wards the 2001 population census is used in its original form. After the 2011 Census the 
post-2000 population weights have been updated using the new census data.
Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiving pension or child 
support. The data on students for 1995–97 are estimates.
’Other inactive’ is a residual category calculated by deducting the sum of the figures in the 
indicated categories from the mid-year population, so it includes the institutional popula-
tion not observed by MEF. The population weights have been corrected using the 2011 Cen-
sus data.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the 
year 1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: 
KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent03_02
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Table 3.3: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, females, in thousandsa
Year
Population of females 15–54 Population of females 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,137.4 0.0 127.0 173.8 259.0 240.6 800.4 2,937.8 305.0 0.0 1,140.3 1,445.3
1990 2,010.0 24.5 95.8 264.7 248.5 217.3 826.3 2,860.8 222.0 0.0 1,279.4 1,501.4
1991 1,918.9 103.1 116.9 281.8 258.3 201.9 858.9 2,880.9 159.1 0.0 1,344.5 1,503.6
1992 1,745.3 171.7 140.8 317.6 260.4 261.1 979.9 2,896.9 119.2 6.6 1,379.6 1,505.4
1993 1,660.4 191.1 174.3 337.0 268.5 276.8 1,056.6 2,908.1 89.6 11.8 1,405.5 1,506.9
1994 1,619.7 167.4 198.9 351.1 277.2 301.1 1,128.3 2,915.4 76.8 8.1 1,423.8 1,508.7
1995 1,558.8 150.7 213.0 356.0 280.4 358.3 1,207.7 2,917.2 70.4 4.3 1,438.0 1,512.7
1996 1,538.7 151.6 220.7 367.2 285.9 351.1 1,224.9 2,915.2 73.2 4.8 1,438.3 1,516.3
1997 1,531.5 130.3 236.9 374.4 287.5 348.3 1,247.1 2,908.9 71.4 4.4 1,445.3 1,521.1
1998 1,593.0 119.0 243.4 346.6 294.5 301.5 1,186.0 2,898.0 63.1 4.7 1,460.3 1,528.1
1999 1,632.6 113.0 222.0 336.8 291.1 288.3 1,138.2 2,883.8 75.8 1.0 1,458.0 1,534.8
2000 1,659.9 103.2 202.7 363.5 277.3 309.7 1,153.2 2,916.3 90.5 1.6 1,509.2 1,601.3
2001 1,655.0 90.1 205.3 364.5 282.3 318.3 1,170.4 2,915.5 99.6 1.5 1,508.8 1,609.9
2002 1,639.2 98.4 199.6 368.0 281.8 319.6 1,169.0 2,906.6 118.9 2.5 1,499.5 1,620.9
2003 1,645.6 102.0 191.4 362.8 282.6 306.9 1,143.7 2,891.2 149.9 4.0 1,483.2 1,637.1
2004 1,610.2 111.0 186.8 368.6 277.8 322.2 1,155.4 2,876.6 172.8 5.1 1,477.3 1,655.2
2005 1,603.2 137.8 170.9 365.4 272.8 301.5 1,110.6 2,851.6 182.2 7.0 1,494.4 1,683.6
2006 1,601.7 146.5 157.2 407.3 257.1 274.7 1,096.3 2,844.5 188.1 7.3 1,498.7 1,694.1
2007 1,582.1 141.2 151.4 412.5 269.8 270.9 1,104.6 2,827.9 190.6 7.4 1,515.4 1,713.4
2008 1,562.7 142.8 133.5 406.0 277.5 284.4 1,101.4 2,806.9 192.0 9.9 1,533.2 1,735.1
2009 1,519.0 172.7 120.2 396.7 277.6 289.7 1,084.2 2,775.9 203.8 13.2 1,546.8 1,763.8
2010 1,506.3 190.6 107.9 395.1 271.3 271.0 1,045.3 2,742.2 235.5 17.1 1,540.4 1,793.0
2011 1,479.2 192.2 92.7 385.9 277.1 271.1 1,040.0 2,698.2 258.8 22.2 1,540.1 1,821.1
2012 1,519.4 189.1 72.4 374.0 259.0 245.5 950.9 2,659.4 259.0 22.0 1,561.1 1,842.1
2013 1,528.9 181.3 79.3 361.7 251.6 233.2 925.8 2,636.0 260.1 20.4 1,572.1 1,852.6
2014 1,600.4 144.4 71.9 348.7 234.8 210.7 866.1 2,610.9 279.9 17.2 1,563.4 1,860.5
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to the year 1999, weighting is based on the 1990 population census. From 2000 on-
wards the 2001 population census is used in its original form. After the 2011 Census the 
post-2000 population weights have been updated using the new census data.
Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiving pension or child 
support. The data on students for 1995–97 are estimates.
’Other inactive’ is a residual category calculated by deducting the sum of the figures in the 
indicated categories from the mid-year population, so it includes the institutional popula-
tion not observed by MEF. The population weights have been corrected using the 2011 Cen-
sus data.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the 
year 1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: 
KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent03_03
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Table 3.4: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, per cent
Year
Population of males 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of males over 59  and female over 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 79.4 0.0 4.9 6.0 4.2 5.5 20.6 100.0 25.9 0.0 74.1 100.0
1990 75.9 1.0 4.8 9.2 4.2 5.0 23.1 100.0 15.1 0.0 84.9 100.0
1995 58.7 6.7 8.1 11.9 4.7 9.8 34.5 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
2000 61.4 4.3 8.5 11.8 4.6 9.4 34.3 100.0 5.4 0.1 94.5 100.0
2001 61.4 3.8 8.5 11.8 4.7 9.9 34.8 100.0 5.8 0.1 94.1 100.0
2002 61.2 3.9 8.3 12.1 4.7 9.8 35.0 100.0 6.7 0.1 93.1 100.0
2003 61.4 4.0 8.0 12.1 4.7 9.8 34.6 100.0 8.3 0.2 91.5 100.0
2004 60.7 4.1 8.0 12.3 4.7 10.3 35.2 100.0 9.6 0.2 90.2 100.0
2005 60.8 4.9 7.5 12.3 4.6 9.8 34.3 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.8 100.0
2006 61.3 5.2 6.9 13.5 4.3 8.7 33.5 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.8 100.0
2007 61.0 5.1 6.9 13.8 4.6 8.7 33.9 100.0 9.9 0.3 89.8 100.0
2008 60.4 5.3 6.6 13.7 4.7 9.2 34.3 100.0 9.7 0.4 89.8 100.0
2009 58.9 6.8 6.1 13.6 4.8 9.8 34.3 100.0 10.2 0.6 89.3 100.0
2010 58.6 7.7 5.7 13.7 4.7 9.5 33.7 100.0 11.2 0.7 88.1 100.0
2011 59.2 7.6 5.1 13.5 4.8 9.6 33.1 100.0 12.1 0.9 87.0 100.0
2012 61.1 7.8 4.5 13.4 4.6 8.5 31.1 100.0 11.9 0.9 87.2 100.0
2013 62.6 7.3 4.4 13.0 4.5 8.2 30.1 100.0 12.2 0.9 86.9 100.0
2014 66.3 5.7 4.0 12.5 4.2 7.3 28.0 100.0 13.5 0.9 85.6 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1990–90: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 TB 
and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013hua03_01
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 TB 
and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent03_04
Figure 3.1: Labour force participation of population for males 15–59 and females 15–54, total
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Table 3.5: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, males, per cent
Year
Population of males 15–59 Population of males 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 85.4 0.0 5.4 6.1 0.0 3.1 14.6 100.0 35.0 0.0 65.0 100.0
1990 81.0 1.2 6.0 9.1 0.0 2.6 17.8 100.0 15.7 0.0 84.3 100.0
1995 63.6 8.2 8.9 11.6 0.2 7.5 28.2 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
2000 65.5 5.0 9.9 11.3 0.1 8.2 29.5 100.0 5.0 0.1 94.9 100.0
2001 65.6 4.5 9.8 11.1 0.1 8.9 29.9 100.0 5.1 0.1 94.8 100.0
2002 65.5 4.3 9.7 11.7 0.2 8.6 30.1 100.0 5.6 0.1 94.3 100.0
2003 65.5 4.3 9.3 11.6 0.1 9.1 30.1 100.0 6.5 0.1 93.4 100.0
2004 65.0 4.3 9.3 11.8 0.1 9.5 30.7 100.0 7.8 0.1 92.1 100.0
2005 64.9 5.0 8.8 11.9 0.2 9.1 30.0 100.0 7.9 0.1 92.0 100.0
2006 65.8 5.2 8.2 12.8 0.1 7.9 29.0 100.0 7.2 0.1 92.6 100.0
2007 65.5 5.2 8.3 13.0 0.1 7.9 29.3 100.0 7.4 0.1 92.5 100.0
2008 64.7 5.5 8.3 13.0 0.1 8.4 29.8 100.0 7.0 0.1 92.8 100.0
2009 62.6 7.3 7.7 13.0 0.1 9.2 30.1 100.0 7.3 0.2 92.5 100.0
2010 61.8 8.3 7.3 13.2 0.1 9.2 29.8 100.0 7.2 0.3 92.6 100.0
2011 63.1 8.0 6.6 12.9 0.1 9.3 28.9 100.0 7.8 0.3 91.9 100.0
2012 64.6 8.4 6.1 12.9 0.1 7.8 27.0 100.0 7.6 0.4 92.0 100.0
2013 66.6 7.7 5.6 12.4 0.1 7.6 25.7 100.0 8.7 0.5 90.8 100.0
2014 70.7 5.8 5.0 11.7 0.1 6.7 23.6 100.0 10.4 0.9 88.7 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1990–90: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena03_02
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent03_05
Figure 3.2: Labour force participation of population for males 15–59
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Table 3.6: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, females, per cent
Year
Population of females 15–54 Population of females 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 72.8 0.0 4.3 5.9 8.8 8.2 27.2 100.0 21.1 0.0 78.9 100.0
1990 70.3 0.9 3.3 9.3 8.7 7.6 28.9 100.0 14.8 0.0 85.2 100.0
1995 53.4 5.2 7.3 12.2 9.6 12.3 41.4 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.1 100.0
2000 56.9 3.5 7.0 12.5 9.5 10.6 39.5 100.0 5.7 0.1 94.2 100.0
2001 56.8 3.1 7.0 12.5 9.7 10.9 40.1 100.0 6.2 0.1 93.7 100.0
2002 56.4 3.4 6.9 12.7 9.7 11.0 40.2 100.0 7.3 0.2 92.5 100.0
2003 56.9 3.5 6.6 12.5 9.8 10.6 39.6 100.0 9.2 0.2 90.6 100.0
2004 56.0 3.9 6.5 12.8 9.7 11.2 40.2 100.0 10.4 0.3 89.3 100.0
2005 56.2 4.8 6.0 12.8 9.6 10.6 38.9 100.0 10.8 0.4 88.8 100.0
2006 56.3 5.2 5.5 14.3 9.0 9.7 38.5 100.0 11.1 0.4 88.5 100.0
2007 55.9 5.0 5.4 14.6 9.5 9.6 39.1 100.0 11.1 0.4 88.4 100.0
2008 55.7 5.1 4.8 14.5 9.9 10.1 39.2 100.0 11.1 0.6 88.4 100.0
2009 54.7 6.2 4.3 14.3 10.0 10.4 39.1 100.0 11.6 0.7 87.7 100.0
2010 54.9 7.0 3.9 14.4 9.9 9.9 38.1 100.0 13.1 1.0 85.9 100.0
2011 54.8 7.1 3.4 14.3 10.3 10.0 38.1 100.0 14.2 1.2 84.6 100.0
2012 57.1 7.1 2.7 14.1 9.7 9.2 36.0 100.0 14.1 1.2 84.7 100.0
2013 58.0 6.9 3.0 13.7 9.5 8.8 35.1 100.0 14.0 1.1 84.9 100.0
2014 61.3 5.5 2.8 13.4 9.0 8.1 33.2 100.0 15.0 0.9 84.0 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent03_06
Figure 3.3: Labour force participation of population for females 15–54
Source: Pensioners: 1990–90: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena03_03
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Table 3.7: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), in thousands
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Together
In work 3,834.4 3,852.2 3,862.5 3,831.6 3,769.3 3,681.5 3,660.3 3,690.1 3,748.4 3,824.5 4,039.5
Unemployed 451.0 488.2 470.4 450.2 476.7 591.3 670.7 675.8 700.4 666.5 538.8
Students, pupils 783.8 792.0 846.3 861.1 863.7 854.8 854.6 842.2 811.2 772.5 733.5
Pensioner 800.3 755.6 622.9 592.2 635.6 627.6 599.3 582.0 630.3 613.6 557.5
Disabled 370.4 359.7 506.8 554.4 525.8 498.9 488.4 455.1 356.7 335.7 317.7
On child care leave 274.7 272.4 275.5 286.2 295.0 293.0 289.3 290.2 265.0 259.1 237.0
Dependent 133.3 134.6 115.2 111.9 104.0 101.9 95.3 104.3 93.1 96.9 85.3
Out of work for 
other reasons 178.4 160.0 107.7 101.8 101.7 104.9 78.2 78.9 89.1 78.0 78.4
Total 6,826.3 6,814.7 6,807.3 6,789.4 6,771.6 6,753.8 6,736.0 6,718.5 6,694.1 6,646.8 6,587.7
Males
In work 2,082.8 2,088.3 2,106.3 2,095.3 2,056.8 1,993.3 1,958.0 1,985.4 2,009.3 2,065.1 2,186.4
Unemployed 247.7 265.2 251.6 242.0 255.8 333.6 375.6 372.2 382.9 364.4 283.7
Students, pupils 391.1 398.5 418.3 428.4 431.7 430.6 432.7 427.2 416.1 393.4 366.9
Pensioner 322.5 304.5 234.9 217.4 243.4 246.2 245.6 243.7 254.9 236.7 209.7
Disabled 184.5 178.7 243.0 269.4 257.9 238.2 234.6 215.7 177.1 161.6 152.5
On child care leave 4.9 6.1 5.6 4.3 5.6 5.7 6.7 4.5 4.1 4.1 3.1
Dependent 6.0 7.0 5.4 6.3 6.8 6.8 9.6 10.0 7.0 9.8 8.3
Out of work for 
other reasons 89.6 80.1 55.1 51.8 51.6 49.8 36.1 35.8 40.8 37.1 36.0
Total 3,329.1 3,328.4 3,320.2 3,314.9 3,309.6 3,304.2 3,298.9 3,294.4 3,292.2 3,272.1 3,246.7
Females
In work 1,751.6 1,763.9 1,756.3 1,736.3 1,712.4 1,688.2 1,702.2 1,704.7 1,739.1 1,759.4 1,853.1
Unemployed 203.3 223.0 218.8 208.3 220.9 257.6 295.1 303.6 317.5 302.1 255.0
Students, pupils 392.7 393.5 428.0 432.7 432.0 424.2 421.9 415.0 395.1 379.0 366.6
Pensioner 477.8 451.1 388.0 374.8 392.2 381.4 353.7 338.2 375.4 376.9 347.8
Disabled 185.9 181.0 263.9 285.0 267.9 260.7 253.8 239.5 179.6 174.1 165.2
On child care leave 269.8 266.3 269.9 281.9 289.4 287.3 282.6 285.7 260.9 255.0 233.8
Dependent 127.3 127.6 109.7 105.6 97.2 95.1 85.7 94.3 86.1 87.2 77.0
Out of work for 
other reasons 88.8 79.9 52.6 50.0 50.1 55.1 42.1 43.1 48.3 40.9 42.4
Total 3,497.2 3,486.3 3,487.1 3,474.5 3,462.1 3,449.6 3,437.1 3,424.1 3,401.9 3,374.7 3,341.1
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent03_07
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Table 3.8: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), per cent
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Together
In work 56.2 56.5 56.7 56.4 55.7 54.5 54.3 54.9 56.0 57.5 61.3
Unemployed 6.6 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.0 8.8 10.0 10.1 10.5 10.0 8.2
Students, pupils 11.5 11.6 12.4 12.7 12.8 12.7 12.7 12.5 12.1 11.6 11.1
Pensioner 11.7 11.1 9.2 8.7 9.4 9.3 8.9 8.7 9.4 9.2 8.5
Disabled 5.4 5.3 7.4 8.2 7.8 7.4 7.3 6.8 5.3 5.1 4.8
On child care leave 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.6
Dependent 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.3
Out of work for 
other reasons 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Males
In work 62.6 62.7 63.4 63.2 62.1 60.3 59.4 60.3 61.0 63.1 67.3
Unemployed 7.4 8.0 7.6 7.3 7.7 10.1 11.4 11.3 11.6 11.1 8.7
Students, pupils 11.7 12.0 12.6 12.9 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.0 12.6 12.0 11.3
Pensioner 9.7 9.1 7.1 6.6 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.7 7.2 6.5
Disabled 5.5 5.4 7.3 8.1 7.8 7.2 7.1 6.5 5.4 4.9 4.7
On child care leave 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dependent 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Out of work for 
other reasons 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Females
In work 50.1 50.6 50.4 50.0 49.5 48.9 49.5 49.8 51.1 52.1 55.5
Unemployed 5.8 6.4 6.3 6.0 6.4 7.5 8.6 8.9 9.3 9.0 7.6
Students, pupils 11.2 11.3 12.3 12.5 12.5 12.3 12.3 12.1 11.6 11.2 11.0
Pensioner 13.7 12.9 11.1 10.8 11.3 11.1 10.3 9.9 11.0 11.2 10.4
Disabled 5.3 5.2 7.6 8.2 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.0 5.3 5.2 4.9
On child care leave 7.7 7.6 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.3 7.7 7.6 7.0
Dependent 3.6 3.7 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.3
Out of work for 
other reasons 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent03_08
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Table 4.1: Employment
Year In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual changes Employment ratioa
1980 5,458.2 133.7 .. 65.3
1990 4,880.0 119.5 .. 59.0
1991 4,520.0 110.7 –7.4 54.4
1992 4,082.7 100.0 –9.7 49.0
1993 3,827.0 93.7 –6.2 45.8
1994 3,751.5 91.9 –2.0 44.8
1995 3,678.8 90.1 –1.9 43.9
1996 3,648.2 89.4 –0.9 43.6
1997 3,646.4 89.3 0.0 43.6
1998 3,697.8 90.6 1.4 44.3
1999 3,811.4 93.4 3.2 45.7
2000 3,849.1 94.3 1.0 46.2
2001 3,883.3 95.1 0.3 45.6
2002 3,883.7 95.1 0.0 45.6
2003 3,921.9 96.1 1.2 46.2
2004 3,900.4 95.5 –0.5 45.8
2005 3,901.5 95.6 0.0 45.7
2006 3,928.4 96.2 0.7 46.0
2007 3,902.0 95.6 –0.7 45.7
2008 3,848.3 94.3 –1.4 45.0
2009 3,747.8 91.8 –2.6 43.9
2010 3,732.4 91.4 –0.4 43.7
2011 3,759.0 92.1 0.7 44.2
2012 3,827.2 93.7 1.8 45.1
2013 3,892.8 95.3 1.7 46.0
2014 4,100.9 100.4 5.3 48.6
a Per cent of the population over 14 years of age.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_01
Figure 4.1: Employed
Source: 1990–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena04_01
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Table 4.2: Employment by gender
Year
Males Females Share of females 
(%)In thousands 1992 = 100 In thousands 1992 = 100
1980 3,015.8 136.0 2,442.4 131.0 44.7
1990 2,648.0 119.4 2,232.0 119.7 45.7
1991 2,442.0 110.1 2,078.0 111.5 46.0
1992 2,218.2 100.0 1,864.5 100.0 45.7
1993 2,077.0 93.6 1,750.0 93.9 45.7
1994 2,055.0 92.6 1,696.5 91.0 45.2
1995 2,049.6 92.4 1,629.2 87.4 44.3
1996 2,036.3 91.8 1,611.9 86.5 44.2
1997 2,043.5 92.1 1,602.9 86.0 44.0
1998 2,041.7 92.0 1,656.1 88.8 44.8
1999 2,103.1 94.8 1,708.4 91.6 44.8
2000 2,122.4 95.7 1,726.7 92.6 44.9
2001 2,128.7 96.0 1,754.6 94.1 45.2
2002 2,125.6 95.8 1,758.1 94.3 45.3
2003 2,126.5 95.6 1,795.4 96.2 45.8
2004 2,117.3 95.5 1,783.1 95.6 45.7
2005 2,116.1 95.4 1,785.4 95.8 45.8
2006 2,138.6 96.4 1,789.8 96.0 45.6
2007 2,129.3 96.0 1,772.7 95.1 45.4
2008 2,093.6 94.4 1,754.7 94.1 45.6
2009 2,025.1 91.3 1,722.8 92.4 46.0
2010 1,992.5 89.8 1,739.8 93.3 46.6
2011 2,021.0 91.1 1,738.0 93.2 46.2
2012 2,048.8 92.4 1,778.4 95.4 46.5
2013 2,103.7 94.8 1,789.0 96.0 46.0
2014 2,220.5 100.1 1,880.4 100.9 45.9
Source: 1990–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_02
Figure 4.2: Employment by gender
Source: 1990–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena04_02
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Table 4.3: Composition of the employed by age groups, males, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1990 5.0 10.8 64.1 8.6 6.8 4.7 100.0
2000 1.5 12.4 67.3 10.6 6.4 1.8 100.0
2001 1.2 10.4 68.6 11.1 6.7 2.0 100.0
2002 0.9 9.4 69.4 11.3 6.9 2.1 100.0
2003 0.7 8.6 69.1 11.8 7.3 2.5 100.0
2004 0.7 7.4 69.5 12.0 7.3 3.0 100.0
2005 0.6 6.8 68.9 12.7 7.9 3.1 100.0
2006 0.6 6.7 71.1 10.3 8.5 2.8 100.0
2007 0.5 6.7 71.3 10.2 8.4 2.9 100.0
2008 0.5 6.4 71.2 10.6 8.5 2.8 100.0
2009 0.4 5.7 70.6 10.9 9.3 3.1 100.0
2010 0.3 5.8 70.5 10.8 9.8 2.8 100.0
2011 0.3 5.5 69.8 10.9 10.0 3.5 100.0
2012 0.3 5.5 69.4 10.7 10.7 3.4 100.0
2013 0.4 6.1 68.6 10.3 10.7 3.9 100.0
2014 0.5 6.4 68.2 9.9 10.5 4.5 100.0
Source: 1990: Census based estimates. 2000–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_03
Table 4.4: Composition of the employed by age groups, females, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55+
Total
years old
1990 5.2 8.6 66.2 10.0 10.0 100.0
2000 1.4 11.1 69.6 12.7 5.2 100.0
2001 1.1 9.6 70.5 13.1 5.7 100.0
2002 0.8 9.2 69.4 13.8 6.8 100.0
2003 0.5 8.2 68.8 14.0 8.5 100.0
2004 0.5 7.1 68.2 14.6 9.7 100.0
2005 0.4 6.3 67.7 15.4 10.2 100.0
2006 0.4 6.0 70.1 12.9 10.6 100.0
2007 0.3 5.8 70.0 13.1 10.8 100.0
2008 0.3 5.6 69.8 13.4 10.9 100.0
2009 0.2 5.4 69.1 13.5 11.8 100.0
2010 0.3 5.3 67.4 13.6 13.4 100.0
2011 0.2 5.1 66.4 13.4 14.9 100.0
2012 0.2 5.2 66.6 13.4 14.6 100.0
2013 0.3 5.1 67.1 13.1 14.4 100.0
2014 0.4 5.6 66.4 12.7 14.9 100.0
Source: 1990: Census based estimates. 2000–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_04
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Table 4.5: Composition of the employed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1990 37.6 30.5 20.1 11.8 100.0
2000 16.1 41.6 26.7 15.6 100.0
2001 15.6 42.8 26.0 15.6 100.0
2002 14.6 43.2 26.4 15.8 100.0
2003 14.0 41.3 27.7 17.0 100.0
2004 13.0 40.4 28.0 18.6 100.0
2005 13.0 40.8 27.7 18.5 100.0
2006 12.3 41.0 28.2 18.5 100.0
2007 11.7 40.7 28.8 18.8 100.0
2008 11.7 39.4 29.1 19.8 100.0
2009 10.9 38.7 30.1 20.3 100.0
2010 10.6 38.3 30.6 20.5 100.0
2011 10.7 37.2 30.2 21.9 100.0
2012 10.6 36.8 30.1 22.5 100.0
2013 10.2 37.1 30.1 22.6 100.0
2014 11.1 35.8 30.6 22.5 100.0
Note: Since 2000, slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest educa-
tion level.
Source: 1990: Census based estimates. 2000–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_05
Table 4.6: Composition of the employed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1990 43.4 13.4 31.4 11.8 100.0
2000 19.1 20.9 40.8 19.2 100.0
2001 19.1 21.3 40.3 19.3 100.0
2002 18.5 21.5 40.2 19.8 100.0
2003 16.4 21.5 40.9 21.2 100.0
2004 15.9 20.5 40.2 23.4 100.0
2005 15.4 20.2 40.0 24.4 100.0
2006 14.2 20.7 40.0 25.1 100.0
2007 13.5 21.2 40.0 25.3 100.0
2008 13.3 20.3 39.2 27.2 100.0
2009 12.5 19.8 39.3 28.4 100.0
2010 12.3 20.3 38.8 28.6 100.0
2011 11.7 20.1 38.0 30.2 100.0
2012 11.0 19.5 38.4 31.1 100.0
2013 10.9 19.6 38.1 31.4 100.0
2014 11.4 19.4 37.8 31.5 100.0
Note: Since 2000, slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest educa-
tion level.
Source: 1990: Census based estimates. 2000–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_06
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Table 4.7: Employed by employment status, in thousands
Year
Employees Member  of cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1998 3,088.5 55.8 132.5 397.9 3,674.7
1999 3,201.3 42.5 111.8 435.9 3,791.5
2000 3,255.5 37.1 129.4 407.1 3,829.1
2001 3,313.6 31.4 118.9 404.4 3,868.3
2002 3,337.2 22.5 109.9 401.0 3,870.6
2003 3,399.2 8.6 114.7 399.4 3,921.9
2004 3,347.8 8.1 136.6 407.8 3,900.3
2005 3,367.3 5.8 146.7 381.7 3,901.5
2006 3,428.9 4.8 128.0 366.7 3,928.4
2007 3,415.5 4.7 123.9 357.9 3,902.0
2008 3,378.4 2.6 120.9 346.4 3,848.3
2009 3,274.9 2.5 131.7 338.7 3,747.8
2010 3,272.7 2.9 137.6 319.3 3,732.5
2011 3,302.5 2.0 133.3 321.2 3,759.0
2012 3,378.1 2.3 144.3 302.5 3,827.2
2013 3,453.9 3.3 156.6 279.0 3,892.8
2014 3,652.0 3.6 157.3 288.0 4,100.9
Note: Conscripts are excluded.
Source: 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_07
Table 4.8: Composition of the employed persons by employment status, per cent
Year
Employees Member  of cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1998 84.0 1.5 3.6 10.8 100.0
1999 84.4 1.1 2.9 11.5 100.0
2000 85.0 1.0 3.4 10.6 100.0
2001 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.5 100.0
2002 86.2 0.6 2.8 10.4 100.0
2003 86.7 0.2 2.8 10.3 100.0
2004 85.8 0.2 3.5 10.5 100.0
2005 86.3 0.1 3.8 9.8 100.0
2006 87.3 0.1 3.2 9.4 100.0
2007 87.6 0.1 3.1 9.2 100.0
2008 87.7 0.1 3.2 9.0 100.0
2009 87.5 0.1 3.6 8.8 100.0
2010 87.7 0.1 3.7 8.5 100.0
2011 87.9 0.0 3.5 8.5 100.0
2012 88.3 0.1 3.8 7.9 100.0
2013 88.9 0.1 4.0 7.0 100.0
2014 93.8 0.1 4.0 6.8 100.0
Note: Conscripts are excluded.
Source: 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_08
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Table 4.9: Composition of employed persons by sectora, by gender, per cent
2011 2012 2013 2014
Males Females Together Males Females Together Males Females Together Males Females Together
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5.7 2.0 3.9 5.6 1.9 3.8 5.1 1.9 3.5 5.0 1.7 3.5
Mining and quarrying 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3
Manufacturing 27.0 18.8 23.0 26.4 17.9 22.3 26.7 18.0 22.6 28.1 18.0 23.3
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 1.6 0.6 1.1 1.5 0.5 1.1 1.3 0.5 0.9 1.4 0.6 1.0
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities
2.2 0.8 1.5 2.7 0.9 1.8 2.6 0.8 1.7 2.2 0.7 1.5
Construction 11.0 0.9 6.2 10.0 1.0 5.7 10.1 0.9 5.7 10.0 1.0 5.7
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
11.4 15.8 13.5 10.7 15.9 13.2 10.3 15.6 12.8 10.2 15.5 12.7
Transportation and storage 9.5 4.1 6.9 9.8 3.8 6.9 9.7 3.8 6.9 9.1 3.8 6.6
Accommodation and food 
service activities 2.9 5.2 4.0 3.1 5.2 4.1 3.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 5.2 4.1
Information and communica-
tion 2.9 1.5 2.2 3.4 1.6 2.5 3.2 1.9 2.6 3.0 1.8 2.4
Financial and insurance activi-
ties 1.5 3.3 2.4 1.5 3.3 2.4 1.8 3.3 2.5 1.6 3.0 2.3
Real estate activities 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 2.0 3.2 2.6 1.9 3.4 2.6 2.2 3.7 2.9 2.0 3.5 2.7
Administrative and support 
service activities 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.8 2.9 3.4 4.3 2.8 3.6 4.1 3.0 3.6
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security
8.9 9.7 9.3 9.2 9.8 9.5 10.1 11.1 10.6 10.5 11.6 11.0
Education 4.2 15.0 9.4 4.1 14.7 9.2 3.8 14.2 8.8 3.8 14.1 8.7
Human health and social work 
activities 2.8 11.8 7.1 2.6 12.5 7.3 2.6 12.2 7.2 2.5 11.9 7.0
Arts, entertainment and recrea-
tion 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.5
Other services 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.2 2.3 1.7 1.2 2.3 1.8 1.2 2.4 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a By TEÁOR’08.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_09
Table 4.10: Employed in their present job for 0–6 months, per cent
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Hungary 8.5 6.8 7.2 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.0 6.8 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.9 7.3 8.4 9.1 8.9
Source: MEF, IV. quarterly waves.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_10
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Table 4.11: Distribution of employees in the competitive sectora by firm size, per cent
Year
Less than 20 20–49 50–249 250–999 1000 and more
employees
2002 21.6 14.0 21.5 20.1 22.9
2003 23.0 15.3 20.5 19.3 21.8
2004 23.6 14.8 21.3 18.3 22.0
2005 27.0 15.0 20.5 17.5 20.0
2006 15.7 10.7 25.7 24.3 23.6
2007 25.2 14.2 20.0 18.4 22.2
2008 26.0 15.7 20.7 18.9 18.6
2009 23.4 15.7 19.7 18.4 22.8
2010 23.5 15.7 18.6 18.0 24.2
2011 24.9 15.6 18.5 17.7 23.4
2012 24.2 14.7 18.3 18.6 24.1
2013 23.2 14.5 18.1 19.0 25.2
2014 23.8 15.0 18.4 19.2 23.5
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_11
Table 4.12: Employees of the competitive sectora by the share of foreign ownership, per cent
Share of 
foreign  
ownership
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
100% 17.7 16.5 17.7 18.6 19.0 19.4 20.4 17.5 19.2 20.2 21.1 21.8 22.9
Majority 9.2 8.8 7.8 8.5 7.5 7.4 6.4 6.3 5.4 5.7 6.5 7.8 5.1
Minority 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.1 2.2 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.5 2.9 2.2
0% 69.5 70.8 70.7 69.8 71.3 70.3 71.0 74.6 73.5 72.4 70.9 67.5 69.9
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_12
Figure 4.3: Employees of the corporate sector by firm size and by the share of foreign ownership
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena04_03
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Table 4.13: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, males, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1998 11.4 59.9 78.8 66.0 38.3 10.0 3.2 54.4
1999 10.6 60.3 80.5 69.0 44.0 10.4 3.8 56.2
2000 8.4 58.9 80.9 69.6 49.6 11.8 3.8 56.8
2001 7.9 56.7 81.6 68.2 51.3 13.1 3.1 57.1
2002 5.6 53.1 81.9 68.6 52.8 14.4 3.4 57.1
2003 4.8 51.8 82.2 69.7 55.2 16.8 3.8 57.6
2004 4.5 46.5 82.7 69.7 54.0 20.1 4.3 57.5
2005 4.0 43.6 82.5 70.1 56.6 20.9 4.2 57.4
2006 4.1 44.0 83.1 70.7 58.5 18.9 4.2 58.0
2007 3.7 44.0 83.4 71.0 57.3 18.0 4.7 57.8
2008 3.5 42.0 82.9 71.6 54.5 16.5 4.8 56.9
2009 2.4 36.7 80.5 70.5 56.1 16.7 5.0 55.1
2010 2.2 36.7 79.6 69.0 56.3 16.5 4.7 54.2
2011 2.4 36.1 81.0 71.2 56.9 17.4 4.4 55.0
2012 2.2 35.9 81.5 73.1 61.2 17.0 5.2 55.7
2013 2.8 40.8 82.6 74.2 64.9 21.1 4.9 57.4
2014 3.8 45.6 86.6 76.9 70.6 26.9 4.4 60.8
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_13
Table 4.14: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, females, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1998 10.7 47.5 66.3 52.3 13.6 5.0 1.2 41.0
1999 8.7 48.1 67.3 59.4 16.2 5.5 1.6 42.3
2000 8.0 45.9 67.8 62.5 20.0 5.1 1.8 43.0
2001 6.3 44.2 68.0 62.1 23.2 5.5 1.3 43.1
2002 4.3 44.2 67.0 64.0 28.3 6.0 1.5 43.3
2003 3.1 41.9 67.8 65.8 35.1 7.3 2.0 44.3
2004 2.7 37.4 67.2 66.0 39.8 9.0 1.9 44.1
2005 2.6 34.7 67.4 66.6 41.7 9.6 1.5 44.2
2006 2.5 33.6 67.8 67.5 42.4 8.5 1.6 44.4
2007 2.0 32.4 67.8 68.1 40.0 9.4 2.2 44.1
2008 1.8 31.3 67.8 68.7 38.7 9.8 2.3 43.8
2009 1.5 30.0 66.7 68.3 40.7 9.7 2.2 43.1
2010 1.9 30.3 66.6 69.4 46.6 9.5 2.4 43.6
2011 1.5 30.0 66.2 68.8 49.9 11.0 2.6 43.7
2012 1.4 31.3 68.3 72.7 49.7 11.2 2.6 44.9
2013 1.7 30.5 69.3 74.0 51.4 11.1 2.4 45.4
2014 3.0 35.2 72.3 77.9 56.8 13.4 2.3 48.0
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_14
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Table 4.15: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
males, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College, 
 university Total
1998 35.0 75.3 67.0 84.9 60.4
1999 33.6 76.8 68.3 86.8 62.4
2000 33.6 77.4 67.9 87.1 63.1
2001 33.0 77.6 67.3 87.4 62.9
2002 32.0 77.6 67.1 85.8 62.9
2003 32.4 76.5 67.8 86.4 63.4
2004 31.0 75.7 67.3 87.1 63.1
2005 31.6 74.7 66.9 86.9 63.1
2006 31.4 75.6 67.7 86.0 63.9
2007 31.0 74.4 67.3 85.6 63.7
2008 31.1 72.4 66.1 84.3 62.7
2009 28.8 69.5 64.6 82.8 60.7
2010 28.1 67.7 64.2 81.8 59.9
2011 29.0 68.0 64.5 83.7 60.7
2012 30.0 68.7 64.6 84.4 61.6
2013 30.8 70.9 67.1 85.3 63.7
2014 36.3 74.8 71.2 87.1 67.8
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_15
Figure 4.4: Activity rate by age groups, males aged 15–64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena04_04
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Table 4.16: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
females, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1998 26.6 60.5 58.1 76.9 47.3
1999 26.1 61.4 59.0 77.5 49.0
2000 26.0 61.0 59.3 77.8 49.7
2001 26.1 60.8 59.2 77.8 49.8
2002 26.0 60.4 58.6 77.9 49.8
2003 25.3 59.7 59.5 78.3 50.9
2004 25.0 58.8 58.1 78.1 50.7
2005 25.1 57.6 57.9 78.9 51.0
2006 24.3 57.8 57.5 78.0 51.1
2007 23.6 57.2 57.2 75.5 50.7
2008 23.7 55.2 56.1 75.3 50.3
2009 22.7 54.0 54.6 74.2 49.6
2010 23.3 56.2 54.0 74.3 50.2
2011 22.5 56.1 53.9 74.6 50.3
2012 22.6 56.8 56.3 74.3 51.9
2013 23.7 57.1 56.6 74.2 52.6
2014 27.3 60.4 59.1 76.1 55.9
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent04_16
Figure 4.5: Activity rate by age groups, females aged 15–64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena04_05
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Table 5.1: Unemployment rate by gender and share of long term unemployed, per cent
Year
Unemployment rate Share of long term 
unemployedaMales Females Total
1992 10.7 8.7 9.8 ..
1993 13.2 10.4 11.9 ..
1994 11.8 9.4 10.7 43.2
1995 11.3 8.7 10.2 50.6
1996 10.7 8.8 9.9 54.4
1997 9.5 7.8 8.7 51.3
1998 8.5 7.0 7.8 48.8
1999 7.5 6.3 7.0 49.5
2000 7.0 5.6 6.4 49.1
2001 6.3 5.0 5.7 46.7
2002 6.1 5.4 5.8 44.9
2003 6.1 5.6 5.9 43.9
2004 6.1 6.1 6.1 45.0
2005 7.0 7.5 7.2 46.2
2006 7.1 7.9 7.5 46.9
2007 7.1 7.7 7.4 48.1
2008 7.7 8.0 7.8 48.1
2009 10.3 9.7 10.0 42.9
2010 11.6 10.7 11.2 50.6
2011 11.1 11.0 11.0 49.4
2012 11.3 10.6 11.0 47.0
2013 10.2 10.1 10.2 50.4
2014 7.6 7.9 7.7 49.5
a Long term unemployed are those who have been without work for 12 months or more, ex-
cluding those who start a new job within 90 days.
Note: Conscripted soldiers are included in the denominator.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_01
Figure 5.1: Unemployment rates by gender
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena05_01
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Table 5.2: Unemployment rate by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1999 14.3 8.2 5.0 1.5 7.5
2000 13.4 7.7 4.8 1.6 7.0
2001 13.6 6.4 4.3 1.2 6.3
2002 14.1 6.2 4.0 1.4 6.1
2003 13.6 6.6 3.9 1.6 6.1
2004 14.3 6.4 4.1 1.7 6.1
2005 15.6 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.0
2006 17.3 7.0 5.1 2.6 7.1
2007 18.7 6.8 5.1 2.4 7.1
2008 20.2 7.7 5.2 2.3 7.7
2009 24.6 10.7 7.6 3.6 10.3
2010 27.2 12.2 8.3 4.9 11.6
2011 25.5 12.1 8.3 4.1 11.1
2012 25.3 12.0 9.6 4.2 11.3
2013 24.5 10.8 8.4 3.4 10.2
2014 18.4 7.8 6.2 2.8 7.6
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_02
Table 5.3: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1999 34.5 45.3 17.4 2.8 100.0
2000 32.9 45.8 17.9 3.4 100.0
2001 36.5 43.2 17.5 2.8 100.0
2002 36.7 43.3 16.7 3.3 100.0
2003 34.0 44.7 17.2 4.1 100.0
2004 33.9 42.6 18.6 4.9 100.0
2005 32.1 43.1 19.0 5.8 100.0
2006 33.4 40.3 19.9 6.4 100.0
2007 35.1 38.6 20.4 5.9 100.0
2008 35.9 39.4 19.2 5.5 100.0
2009 31.2 40.5 21.7 6.6 100.0
2010 30.3 40.5 21.1 8.1 100.0
2011 29.4 41.1 21.9 7.6 100.0
2012 28.1 39.3 24.9 7.6 100.0
2013 29.2 39.3 24.4 7.1 100.0
2014 30.6 37.0 24.5 7.9 100.0
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_03
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Table 5.4: Unemployment rate by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school or 
less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College, 
 university Total
1999 10.5 8.0 5.2 1.3 6.3
2000 9.1 7.4 4.9 1.5 5.6
2001 8.4 6.4 4.0 1.6 5.0
2002 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.4 5.4
2003 10.5 7.2 4.4 1.9 5.6
2004 10.3 8.0 5.3 2.9 6.1
2005 13.0 9.8 6.7 3.1 7.5
2006 16.2 10.4 6.5 2.7 7.9
2007 16.3 9.7 6.2 3.2 7.7
2008 17.4 9.6 6.8 3.1 8.0
2009 21.6 12.6 7.8 4.1 9.7
2010 22.8 12.6 9.6 4.3 10.7
2011 24.5 12.9 9.9 4.4 11.0
2012 24.4 12.7 9.4 4.7 10.6
2013 22.7 12.8 9.0 4.3 10.1
2014 18.7 9.3 7.1 3.4 7.9
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_04
Table 5.5: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school or 
less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1999 36.2 26.2 33.8 3.8 100.0
2000 31.8 28.2 35.0 5.0 100.0
2001 33.7 28.0 32.2 6.1 100.0
2002 33.2 26.0 32.2 8.5 100.0
2003 32.7 28.3 32.0 7.0 100.0
2004 27.8 27.4 34.2 10.6 100.0
2005 28.2 27.1 35.2 9.5 100.0
2006 31.8 27.9 32.3 8.0 100.0
2007 31.3 27.2 31.6 9.9 100.0
2008 32.3 24.7 33.0 10.0 100.0
2009 31.8 26.4 30.6 11.2 100.0
2010 30.5 24.4 34.3 10.7 100.0
2011 30.8 24.1 33.9 11.2 100.0
2012 29.8 23.8 33.5 12.9 100.0
2013 28.5 25.6 33.4 12.5 100.0
2014 30.5 23.1 33.4 13.0 100.0
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_05
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Figure 5.2: Intensity of quarterly flows between labour market status, population between 15–64 years
 Employment Unemployment Inactivity
Employment
Unemployment
Inactivity
Note: The calculations were carried out for the age group between 15–64 based on KSH la-
bour force survey microdata. The probability of transition is given by the number of people 
who transitioned from one status to the other in the quarter, divided by the initial size of the 
group in the previous quarter, which were then corrected to preserve the consistency of stock 
flows. The red curves show the trend smoothed using a 4th degree polynomial.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena05_02
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Table 5.6: The number of unemployeda by duration of job search, in thousands
Year
Length of job search, weeks [month]
Total1–4 
[<1]
5–14 
[1–3]
15–26 
[4–6]
27–51 
[7–11]
52 
[12]
53–78 
[13–18]
79–104 
[19–24]
105– 
[>24]
1992 43.9 90.9 96.4 110.7 10.6 41.7 38.4 n.a. 432.6
1993 36.2 74.8 87.9 120.5 14.7 75.1 83.7 n.a. 492.9
1994 30.5 56.5 65.0 91.9 8.4 63.0 73.8 40.4 429.5
1995 23.0 51.0 56.5 69.4 20.2 57.2 34.3 93.2 404.8
1996 19.9 46.4 49.3 61.5 18.2 56.1 37.1 100.2 388.7
1997 16.1 43.7 45.9 54.4 15.7 44.5 31.1 77.3 328.7
1998 12.9 44.2 44.5 45.7 16.0 39.0 27.6 63.5 293.4
1999 15.4 44.1 38.8 46.0 13.2 38.1 26.8 62.3 284.7
2000 16.7 38.5 35.1 42.8 12.7 36.9 23.6 55.4 261.3
2001 14.9 37.0 33.2 38.6 11.5 31.6 20.9 44.2 231.9
2002 15.5 39.4 34.8 40.7 11.6 32.7 19.8 42.5 237.0
2003 15.9 42.1 38.9 42.0 14.5 27.6 17.6 43.0 241.6
2004 13.0 42.0 39.9 41.8 13.5 33.4 19.6 47.2 250.4
2005 14.8 48.9 44.1 51.3 14.1 41.0 27.4 54.3 295.9
2006 13.2 51.1 48.5 52.0 17.9 41.1 26.6 59.7 310.0
2007 13.9 49.5 44.2 50.5 12.8 42.8 26.2 65.1 304.9
2008 13.5 50.3 47.9 53.4 13.5 39.1 26.3 74.0 317.9
2009 18.7 71.4 66.6 77.5 18.4 51.3 27.1 79.0 410.0
2010 16.9 65.4 62.5 83.5 23.2 74.7 42.6 93.7 462.5
2011 28.9 70.7 62.8 70.0 18.0 64.7 40.1 103.7 458.9
2012 39.2 64.0 63.1 80.5 22.2 59.5 36.6 100.9 466
2013 48.2 49.4 53.7 62.1 25.3 49.8 45.0 97.1 430.7
2014 36.5 41.5 44.9 46.3 19.0 35.1 29.2 82.7 335.3
a Not including those unemployed who will find a new job within 30 days; since 2003: within 
90 days.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_06
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment rate by age groups, males aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena05_03
Figure 5.4: Unemployment rate by age groups, females aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena05_04
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Table 5.7: Registered unemployeda and LFS unemployment
Year
Registered unemployed LFS unemployed, total LFS unemployed, age 15–24
In thousands rate in % In thousands rate in % In thousands rate in %
1990 47.7 – .. .. .. ..
1995 507.7 10.6 416.5 10.2 114.3 18.6
1996 500.6 11.0 400.1 9.9 106.3 17.9
1997 470.1 10.5 348.8 8.7 95.8 15.9
1998 423.1 9.5 313.0 7.8 87.6 13.4
1999 409.5 9.7 284.7 7.0 78.6 12.4
2000 390.5 9.3 262.5 6.4 70.7 12.1
2001 364.1 8.5 232.9 5.7 55.7 10.8
2002 344.7 8.0 238.8 5.8 56.5 12.3
2003 357.2 8.3 244.5 5.9 54.9 13.4
2004 375.9 8.7 252.9 6.1 55.9 15.5
2005 409.9 9.4 303.9 7.2 66.9 19.4
2006 393.5 9.0 318.2 7.5 64.1 19.1
2007 426.9 9.7 312.1 7.4 57.4 18.0
2008 442.3 10.0 326.3 7.8 60.0 19.5
2009 561.8 12.8 417.8 10.0 78.8 26.4
2010 582.7 13.3 469.4 11.2 78.3 26.4
2011 582.9 13.2 466.0 11.0 74.5 26.0
2012 559.1 12.6 473.2 11.0 84.6 28.2
2013 527.6 11.9 441.0 10.2 83.5 26.6
2014 422.4 9.7 343.3 7.7 67.6 20.4
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
Note: the denominator of registered unemployment/jobseekers’ rate in the economically ac-
tive population on 1st January the previous year.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: NFSZ; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_07
Figure 5.5: Registered and LFS unemployment rates
Note: Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: NFSZ; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena05_05
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Table 5.8: Composition of the registered unemployeda by educational attainment, yearly averages, per cent
Educational  
attainment 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
8 grades of primary 
school or less 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.4 42.7 42.3 41.9 42.0 42.4 43.3 40.1 39.3 40.3 40.3 40.5 41.0
Vocational school 35.7 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.9 32.3 32.4 32.1 31.5 30.9 32.5 31.4 29.8 29.2 29.0 28.3
Vocational secondary 
school 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.1 14.4 15.0 14.9 15.1 15.3 15.3
Grammar school 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.5 9.1 9.5 9.7 9.8 10.1
College 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.4
University 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Em-
ployment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_08
Table 5.9: The distribution of registered unemployed school-leaversa by educational attainment,  
yearly averages, per cent
Educational  
attainment 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
8 grades of primary 
school or less 25.3 26.8 31.1 33.7 34.7 35.2 36.1 38.2 40.1 41.3 37.7 35.2 35.6 34.9 35.5 39.4
Vocational school 30.9 27.8 23.7 20.6 20.4 20.2 20.5 19.7 18.1 17.3 18.9 18.9 18.5 19.8 20.1 18.3
Vocational secondary 
school 25.0 25.4 25.3 25.5 23.2 22.1 21.5 20.3 20.7 21.2 23.1 23.9 23.6 23.7 23.1 21.7
Grammar school 13.6 13.7 12.6 11.6 10.8 10.7 10.8 11.7 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.3 15.0 14.9 14.9 15.0
College 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.2 7.7 8.1 7.8 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.5 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.4 2.8
University 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.8 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered school-leaver jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_09
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Table 5.10: Registered unemployed by economic activity as observed in the LFS, per cent
Year Employed LFS-unemployed Inactive Total Year Employed LFS-unemployed Inactive Total
1999 6.7 55.8 37.5 100.0 2007 3.7 62.2 34.1 100.0
2000 4.7 54.3 41.0 100.0 2008 3.9 62.8 33.2 100.0
2001 6.5 45.2 48.3 100.0 2009 3.7 67.1 29.2 100.0
2002 4.4 47.4 48.2 100.0 2010 3.2 70.4 26.4 100.0
2003 9.4 44.1 46.5 100.0 2011 3.5 66.7 29.8 100.0
2004 3.0 53.5 43.5 100.0 2012 3.4 64.9 31.7 100.0
2005 2.3 59.7 38.0 100.0 2013 4.9 61.6 33.4 100.0
2006 3.0 60.9 36.1 100.0 2014 6.2 60.5 33.2 100.0
Note: The data pertain to those who consider themselves registered jobseekers in the KSH 
MEF. From 1999 those who reported that their last contact with the employment centre was 
more than two months ago were filtered from among those who reported themselves as reg-
istered unemployed.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_10
Table 5.11: Monthly entrants to the unemployment registera, monthly averages, in thousands
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
First time 
entrants 12.8 11.2 11.2 10.4 10.0 10.5 10.8 8.6 8.0 7.1 8.3 7.2 6.6 7.5 7.3 6.3
Previously 
registered 44.4 42.9 45.8 45.6 44.8 47.3 50.0 42.2 43.4 46.9 60.7 58.1 64.3 62.0 58.2 63.1
Together 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0 65.3 70.9 69.5 65.5 69.4
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the 
Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_11
Figure 5.6: Entrants to the unemployment register, monthly averages, in thousands
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena05_06
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Table 5.12: Selected time series of registered unemployment, monthly averages, in thousands and per cent
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Registered unemploymenta 409.5 390.5 364.1 344.7 357.2 375.9 409.9 393.5
Of which: School-leavers 29.9 26.0 26.8 28.5 31.3 33.8 40.9 38.7
Non school-leavers 379.6 364.4 337.4 316.2 325.9 342.2 369.1 354.7
Male 221.4 209.7 196.4 184.6 188.0 193.3 210.4 200.9
Female 188.1 180.8 167.7 160.1 169.2 182.6 199.5 192.5
25 years old and younger 85.4 79.1 75.6 71.1 71.6 71.4 78.9 75.8
Manual workers 336.8 321.2 302.0 286.3 296.2 308.5 336.2 321.9
Non manual workers 72.7 69.3 62.1 58.4 61.0 67.4 73.7 71.6
Unemployment benefit recipientsb 140.7 131.7 119.2 114.9 120.0 124.0 134.4 151.5
Unemployment assistance recipientsc 148.6 143.5 131.2 113.4 116.2 120.4 133.4 121.8
Unemployment rated 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0
Shares within registered unemployed, %
School-leavers 7.3 6.7 7.3 8.3 8.8 9.0 10.0 9.8
Male 54.1 53.7 53.9 53.5 52.6 51.4 51.3 51.1
25 years old and younger 20.9 20.3 20.8 20.6 20.0 19.0 19.2 16.5
Manual workers 82.3 82.2 82.9 83.1 82.9 82.1 82.0 81.8
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8
Of which: school-leavers 9.3 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.6 8.2 7.0
Outflow from the Register 57.2 56.8 59.4 55.8 53.5 54.4 59.8 51.4
Of which: school-leavers 9.4 8.2 7.7 7.5 7.6 7.1 7.9 7.1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Registered unemploymenta 426.9 442.3 561.8 582.7 582.9 559.1 527.6 422.4
Of which: School-leavers 40.4 41.4 49.3 52.6 52.9 61.5 66.0 54.6
Non school-leavers 386.5 400.9 512.5 530.1 529.9 497.6 461.6 367.8
Male 219.9 228.3 297.9 305.0 297.1 275.8 267.7 214.2
Female 207.0 214.0 263.9 277.7 285.8 283.3 259.9 208.2
25 years old and younger 80.3 75.9 104.3 102.8 102.3 101.1 97.8 78.2
Manual workers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Non manual workers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Unemployment benefit recipientsb 134.6 136.5e 202.1 187.7 159.9 71.1 61.2 56.4
Unemployment assistance recipientsc 133.0 147.5 156.0 167.8 182.1 200.3 184.4 132.4
Unemployment rated 9.7 10.0 12.8 13.3 13.2 12.6 11.9 9.5
Shares within registered unemployed, %
School-leavers 9.5 9.4 8.8 9.0 9.1 11.0 12.5 12.9
Male 51.5 51.6 53.0 52.3 51.0 49.3 50.8 50.7
25 years old and younger 18.8 17.2 18.6 17.6 17.5 18.1 18.5 18.5
Manual workers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 51.4 54.0 69.0 65.3 70.9 69.5 65.5 69.4
Of which: school-leavers 6.2 6.3 7.5 7.9 8.2 10.0 10.8 11.2
Outflow from the Register 48.4 51.3 58.4 66.4 74.2 68.1 78.4 71.3
Of which: school-leavers 6.0 6.2 6.7 7.5 8.1 8.6 11.8 11.3
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. (The data concern the closing date of 
each month.) From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition 
of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
statistical data
234
b Since 1st of November, 2005: jobseeker benefit recepients. From September 1st, 2011, the 
system of jobseeking support changed.
c Only recipients who are in the NFSZ register. Those receiving the discontinued income sup-
port supplement were included in the number of those receiving income support supplement 
up to the year 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular social assistance from 2005 
to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, 
the on call support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from Jan-
uary 1, 2011, then from September 1, 2011, the name was changed to employment substitu-
tion support.
d Relative index: registered unemployment rate in the economically active population. From 
1st of November, 2005, registered jobseekers’ rate in the economically active population.
e The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes pos-
sible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those enter-
ing or leaving the different types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are, 
– work for short time periods, receipt of child support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in 
training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first 
accounting of the jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
2008 data, comparable to 2009: 141.5 thousand people.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_12
Table 5.13: The number of registered unemployeda who became employed on subsidised  
and non-subsidised employmentb
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent
Subsidised em-
ployment 170,464 40.0 198,974 38.5 282,673 48.5 261,631 50.0 359,962 60.2 351,550 63.2
Non-subsidised 
employment 255,356 60.0 317,622 61.5 299,716 51.5 261,581 50.0 237,795 39.8 204,887 36.8
Total 425,820 100.0 516,596 100.0 582,389 100.0 523,212 100.0 597,757 100.0 556,437 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Em-
ployment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Annual totals, the number of jobseekers over the year who were placed in work. It reflects the 
placements at the time of their exit from the registry.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_13
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Table 5.14: Benefit recepients and participation in active labour market programmes
Év
Unemploy-
ment  
benefita
Regular 
social  
assistance b
UA for 
school-
leavers
Do not  
receive 
provision
Public  
workc Retraining
c Wage  
subsidyc
Other pro-
grammesc Total
1990 In thousands 42.5 – – 18.6 .. .. .. .. 61.0
Per cent 69.6 n.a. n.a. 30.4 .. .. .. .. 100.0
2000 In thousands 117.0 139.7 0.0 106.5 26.7 25.3 27.5 73.5 516.2
Per cent 22.7 27.1 0.0 20.6 5.2 4.9 5.3 14.2 100.0
2001 In thousands 111.8 113.2 0.0 105.2 29.0 30.0 25.8 37.2 452.2
Per cent 24.7 25.0 0.0 23.3 6.4 6.6 5.7 8.2 100.0
2002 In thousands 104.8 107.6 – 115.3 21.6 23.5 21.2 32.8 426.8
Per cent 24.6 25.2 – 27.0 5.1 5.5 5.0 7.7 100.0
2003 In thousands 105.1 109.5 – 125.0 21.2 22.5 20.1 36.6 440.0
Per cent 23.9 24.9 – 28.4 4.8 5.1 4.6 8.3 100.0
2004 In thousands 117.4 118.4 – 132.3 16.8 12.6 16.8 28.5 442.8
Per cent 26.5 26.7 – 29.9 3.8 2.8 3.8 6.4 100.0
2005 In thousands 125.6 127.8 – 140.2 21.5 14.7 20.8 31.0 481.6
Per cent 26.1 26.5 – 29.1 4.5 3.1 4.3 6.4 100.0
2006 In thousands 117.7 112.9 – 146.4 16.6 12.3 14.6 13.8 434.3
Per cent 27.1 26.0 – 33.7 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.2 100.0
2007 In thousands 128.0 133.1 – 151.8 19.3 14.6 23.4 6.8 477.0
Per cent 27.6 28.7 – 32.7 2.7 2.3 3.7 2.3 100.0
2008 In thousands 120.7d 145.7 – 158.2 21.2 21.2 25.0 14.1 506.1
Per cent 23.8 28.8 – 31.3 4.2 4.2 4.9 2.8 100.0
2009 In thousands 202.8 151.9 – 215.0 135.3 13.6 17.8 54.1 790.5
Per cent 25.7 19.2 – 27.2 17.1 1.7 2.3 6.8 100.0
2010 In thousands 159.6 163.5 – 222.4 164.5 17.8 26.7 40.3 794.8
Per cent 20.1 20.6 – 28.0 20.7 2.2 3.4 5.1 100.0
2011 In thousands 122.8 168.2 – 239.8 91.6 13.6 20.4 39.9 696.3
Per cent 17.6 24.2 – 34.4 13.2 2.0 2.9 5.7 100.0
2012 In thousands 56.3 185.6 – 281.1 92.4 15.4 30.0 2.2 663
Per cent 8.5 28.0 – 42.4 13.9 2.3 4.5 0.3 100.0
2013 In thousands 55.3 169.3 – 264.0 149.5 42.0e 31.7 3.8 715.5
Per cent 7.7 23.6 – 36.9 20.9 5.9 4.4 0.5 100.0
2014 In thousands 58.6 123.4 – 216.5 139.1 24.6 17.7 2.8 582.7
Per cent 10.0 21.3 – 37.3 24.0 4.2 3.1 0.5 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: jobseeker benefit recepients. From September 1, 2011, the sys-
tem of jobseeking support changed.
b Only recipients who are in the NFSZ register. Those receiving the discontinued income sup-
port supplement were included in the number of those receiving income support supplement 
up to the year 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular social assistance from 2005 
to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, 
the on call support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from Jan-
uary 1, 2011, then from September 1, 2011., the name was changed to employment substitu-
tion support.
c Up to the year 2008 the number financed from the MPA Decentralized Base, since 2009 the 
number financed from MPA, TAMOP.
Public-type employment: community service, public service, public work programmes.
Wage subsidy: wage subsidy, wage-cost subsidy, work experience acquisition assstance to ca-
reer-starters, support for employment of availability allowance recipients, part-time employ-
ment, wage support for those losing their job due to the crisis.
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Other support: job preservation support, support to would-be entrepreneurs, contribution to costs related to 
commuting to work, job creation support, jobseeker’s clubs.
d The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after a break or starting a break from the number of those entering or 
leaving the different types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time peri-
ods, receipt of child support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of 
the jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
2008 data, comparable to 2009: 134.1 thousand people.
e In 2013, 18.1 thousand trainees were simultaneously involved in public works programmes.
Note: The closing numbers from October of each year. For the percentage data, the sum of those registered and 
those taking part in labour market programmes ≈100.0.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_14
Table 5.15: The ratio of those who are employed among the former participants of ALMPsa, per cent
Active labour market 
programmes 2000
b 2001b 2002b 2003b 2004b 2005b 2006b 2007b 2008b 2009c 2010c 2011c 2012c 2013c 2014c
Suggested training 
programmesd 48.4 45.4 43.3 43.0 45.5 43.8 41.1 37.5 42.2 40.4 49.4 42.6 44.9 55.1 61.4
Accepted training 
programmese 52.0 49.3 45.8 46.0 45.6 51.4 50.9 47.6 48.0 41.9 48.8 41.6 56.7 65.9 58.8
Retraining of those who 
are employedf 94.9 94.2 92.7 93.3 92.1 90.4 .. 92.3 93.9 .. 59.9 75.0 65.7 72.7 61.4
Support for self-em-
ploymentg 89.4 89.2 90.7 89.6 90.7 89.6 86.4 87.6 83.6 73.1 76.4 71.5 72.6 74.1 76.3
Wage subsidy pro-
grammesh 62.3 59.7 62.9 62.0 64.6 62.6 62.3 63.4 65.0 72.4 90.9 69.6 70.3 73.0 56.0
Work experience pro-
grammesi 57.9 64.5 66.9 66.1 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.3 74.6 .. .. 72.0 69.9 68.5 –
Further employment 
programmej 73.8 71.6 78.4 78.2 71.5 70.9 65.0 77.5 – – – – – – –
a The data relate to people having completed their courses successfully.
b Three months after the end of programmes.
c Six months after the end of programmes.
d Suggested training: group training programmes for jobseekers organized by the NFSZ.
e Accepted training: participation in programmes initiated by the jobseekers and accepted by NFSZ for full or 
partial support.
f Training for employed persons: training for those whose jobs are at risk of termination, if new knowledge al-
lows them to adapt to the new needs of the employer.
g Support to help entrepeneurship: support of jobseekers in the amount of the monthly minimum wage or maxi-
mum HUF 3 million lump sum support (to be repaid or not), aimed at helping them become individual entre-
preneurs or self-employed.
h Wage support: aimed at helping the employment of disadvantaged persons, who would not be able to, or 
would have a harder time finding work without support. The data on wage subsidies and labour cost subsidies 
exclude the programs supporting job seeking school leavers and student work during summer vacation.
i Work experience-gaining support: the support of new entrants with no work experience for 6–9 months, the 
amount of the support is equal to 50–80% of the wage costs. The instrument was discontinued after December 
31, 2006.. In 2009 they reintroduced the work experience gaining support for skilled new entrants, for employ-
ers who ensure employment of at least 4 hours a day and for 365 days. The amount of the support is 50–100% 
of the wage cost. Monitoring for the first exiters is available from 2011. The program supporting the school to 
work transition of skilled school leavers was abolished in 2014.
j Further employment programmes: to support the continued employment of new entrants under the age of 25 
for 9 months. Discontinued from December 31, 2006.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_15
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Table 5.16: Distribution of registered unemployeda, unemployment benefit recipientsb and unemployment 
assistance recipientsc by educational attainment
Educational attainment 2006 2007 2008 2008e 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Registered unemployed
8 grades of primary school or less 41.5 42.8 43.8 – 40.0 39.2 39.9 40.1 40.1 42.4
Vocational school 32.3 31.5 30.7 – 33.1 31.4 29.8 29.1 28.9 27.6
Vocational secondary school 13.6 13.2 12.8 – 14.4 15.0 15.0 15.2 15.6 14.9
Grammar school 8.2 8.2 8.1 – 8.3 9.1 9.7 9.8 10.0 9.9
College 3.2 3.1 3.2 – 3.0 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.3
University 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
359.6 402.7 415.6 – 549.0 546.0 553.3 524.4 497.0 438.6
Unemployment benefit recipientsd
8 grades of primary school or less 25.4 25.4 24.4 26.3 25.7 24.1 23.4 20.2 21.8 27.8
Vocational school 39.5 37.4 37.0 39.2 39.4 36.2 34.5 34.5 34.8 33.3
Vocational secondary school 18.7 19.2 19.3 18.3 18.5 19.7 20.1 21.2 21.2 19.0
Grammar school 10.1 10.9 11.0 10.6 10.1 11.6 12.3 12.7 12.0 10.9
College 4.5 5.0 6.0 5.7 4.5 5.8 6.7 7.6 6.7 5.7
University 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.7 2.6 3.1 3.8 3.6 3.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
91.5 119.3 92.5 126.9 200.5 165.8 145.9 53.1 53.0 60.0
Unemployment assistance recipientsc
8 grades of primary school or less 60.1 60.3 60.3 – 59.4 56.4 56.1 53.4 52.4 53.5
Vocational school 27.7 27.1 26.5 – 26.6 27.4 26.1 26.4 26.6 26.1
Vocational secondary school 6.5 6.8 6.8 – 7.5 8.6 9.0 10.3 10.9 10.5
Grammar school 4.5 4.4 4.7 – 4.8 5.6 6.3 7.1 7.3 7.2
College 1.0 1.1 1.2 – 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.8
University 0.3 0.3 0.4 – 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
116.5 130.9 145.8 – 144.1 161.7 174.7 193.5 177.4 138.8
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the 
definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: those receiving jobseeking support. From the 1st of September 2011, the system of jobseek-
ing support changed.
c Only recipients who are in the NFSZ register. Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were included 
in the number of those receiving income support supplement up to the year 2004, and in the number of those receiving 
regular social assistance from 2005 to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support 
type, the on call support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from January 1, 2011, then from 
September 1, 2011, the name was changed to employment substitution support.
d After 1st of November, 2005: jobseeking support. Does not contain those receiving unemployment aid prior to pension in 
2004. From the 1st of September 2011 , the system of jobseeking support changed.
e The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the different 
types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are, – work for short time periods, receipt of child support 
(GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the jobseeking 
support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The right-hand column of 2008 contains the 2008 data in a form comparable to the 2009 data.
Note: Data from the closing date of June in each year.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_16
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Table 5.17: Outflow from the Register of Beneficiaries
Year
Total number  
of outflows
Of which:
Year
Total number  
of outflows
Of which:
became  
employed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
became  
employed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
1998 322,496 26.5 64.5 2007 251,889 33.4 46.9
1999 320,132 26.0 67.4 2008 232,151 40.0 48.7
2000 325,341 28.1 64.6 2008a 261,573 43.4 48.9
2001 308,780 27.2 65.1 2009 345,216 37.9 56.0
2002 303,288 27.6 66.7 2010 352,535 38.9 55.8
2003 297,640 26.7 65.2 2011 329,728 39.2 55.7
2004 308,027 27.4 64.6 2012 368,803 21.9 77.8
2005 329,738 27.2 63.0 2013 328,508 21.3 75.6
2006 234,273 33.2 53.7 2014 300,516 27.0 67.4
a The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes pos-
sible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those enter-
ing or leaving the different types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are, 
– work for short time periods, receipt of child support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in 
training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first 
accounting of the jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The row of 2008a contains the data from 2008 in the form comparable to the 2009 data.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_17
Table 5.18: The distribution of the total number of labour market training participantsa
Groups of training participants 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Participants in suggested training 52,045 52,198 53,447 46,802 45,261 33,002 29,252 36,212
Participants in accepted training 28,311 30,949 32,672 31,891 28,599 19,406 9,620 7,327
One Step Forward (OFS) programme – – – – – – – –
Non-employed participants together 80,356 83,147 86,211 78,693 73,859 52,407 38,872 43,539
Of which: school-leavers 25,260 22,131 20,592 19,466 18,320 12,158 9,313 1,365
Employed participants 4,408 5,026 5,308 4,142 9,036 7,487 4,853 3,602
Total 84,764 88,173 91,519 82,835 82,895 59,894 43,725 47,141
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013b 2014b
Participants in suggested training 32,747 48,561 41,373 50,853 32,172 43,438 22,574 10,900
Participants in accepted training 5,766 4,939 8,241 6,853 2,495 2,446 22,574 1,275
One Step Forward (OFS) programme 270 59,347 11,169 2,316 – – – –
Non-employed participants together 38,783 112,847 60,783 57,706 34,667 45,884 132,587 200,466
Of which: school-leavers 1,111 18,719 21,103 12,030 7,935 9,976 106,333 31,083
Employed participants 3,467 37,466 12,496 336 908 716 631 827
Total 42,250 150,313 73,279 60,358 35,575 46,600 133,218 201,293
a The data contain the number of those financed from the NFA decentralized employment 
base, as well as those involved in training as a part of the HEFOP 1.1 and the TÁMOP 1.1.2 
programmes.
b The data include public works participants simultaneously involved in training (88,004 pub-
lic works participants in 2013, 143,275 public works participants in 2014).
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_18
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Table 5.19: Employment ratio of participants ALMPs by gender, age groups and educational attainment  
for the programmes finished in 2014a, per cent
Non-employed participants Supported self-
employmentb
Wage subsidy  
programmesuggested training accepted training total
By gender
Males 63.2 60.3 61.7 72.0 57.2
Females 59.5 57.5 61.5 79.8 54.9
By age groups
–20 54.8 50.2 54.5 – 35.8
20–24 59.2 57.4 59.1 79.7 60.4
25–29 61.2 57.5 61.0 82.9 82.5
–29 together 59.5 56.6 59.3 54.9 47.7
30–34 62.0 58.3 61.8 78.0 83.6
35–39 62.5 60.5 62.4 79.7 81.6
40–44 63.4 60.5 63.2 72.0 82.2
45–49 62.2 59.6 62.0 73.1 83.5
50–54 62.1 62.0 62.1 67.8 92.4
55+ 61.1 56.6 60.8 80.3 86.6
By educational attainment
Less than primary school 55.9 56.0 56.0 – 51.0
Primary school 60.4 56.8 60.2 71.7 41.6
Vocational school for skilled workers 65.6 63.5 65.5 76.7 82.6
Vocational school 64.1 57.9 63.6 – 76.3
Vocational secondary school 62.5 64.1 62.6 77.8 68.0
Technicians secondary school 63.9 67.6 64.0 78.5 83.5
Grammar school 59.5 60.3 59.5 73.7 52.0
College 61.4 62.8 61.5 75.8 81.2
University 58.1 57.1 58.1 82.8 78.6
Total 61.4 58.8 61.2 76.3 55.9
a Includes all kinds of wage subsidies except financial support for student work during vacation.
a Survival rate.
Note: 6 months after the end of each programme.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_19
Table 5.20: Distribution of the average annual number of those with no employment status  
who participate in training categorised by the type of training, percentage
Types of training 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Approved qualifica-
tion 79.6 78.8 78.7 77.6 78.3 75.1 72.9 71.5 69.0 65.8 63.6 65.2 68.6 71.6 50.2 53.3
Non-approved quali-
fication 14.7 14.7 14.0 13.6 12.6 15.0 14.5 16.9 19.9 22.8 26.4 25.4 21.1 19.0 44.2 43.2
Foreign language 
learning 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.9 12.6 11.5 11.1 11.4 10.0 9.4 10.3 9.4 5.6 3.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_20
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Table 5.21: The distribution of those entering training programmes by age groups and educational level
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2013 2014
training
training 
for pub-
lic works 
partici-
pants
together training
training 
for pub-
lic works 
partici-
pants
together
Total number of 
entrants 26,459 25,353 42,710 37,467 39,780 18,464
a 33,540 28,089 78,052 106,141 24,137 68,518 92,655
By age groups, %
–20 8.7 7.0 8.1 4.9 3.8 4.0 3.2 5.6 2.8 3.6 6.3 4.1 4.7
20–24 23.0 24.7 26.9 25.1 23.9 27.2 23.4 33.8 12.7 18.3 30.0 15.3 19.1
25–44 52.0 51.3 48.3 51.5 52.4 46.5 46.7 43.8 47.3 46.4 43.7 47.8 46.7
45–49 7.8 8.0 7.0 8.5 8.8 8.3 10.0 7.1 12.9 11.3 7.6 11.5 10.5
50+ 8.4 9.2 9.7 10.0 11.0 14.0 16.6 9.7 24.3 20.4 12.4 21.4 19.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
By level of education, %
Less than primary 
school 1.2 1.6 2.1 7.5 3.0 0.7 2.7 1.0 9.7 7.4 1.2 8.1 6.3
Primary school 25.1 24.0 28.1 22.8 24.5 28.2 34.4 24.9 53.3 45.8 28.7 49.8 44.3
Vocational school 26.8 24.5 21.9 22.0 25.5 24.8 26.2 22.3 25.6 24.7 22.7 23.3 23.2
Vocational and 
technical second-
ary school
23.5 23.9 22.6 24.8 23.7 24.2 19.0 27.1 6.5 11.9 24.9 9.7 13.6
Grammar school 15.0 16.3 15.9 15.3 15.8 15.7 12.9 19.0 4.2 8.1 17.6 7.0 9.8
College, university 8.4 9.8 9.4 7.6 7.5 6.4 4.8 5.8 0.7 2.0 4.9 2.1 2.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a The drastic decrease in the number of training programmes offered was due to the centraliza-
tion of decision-making regarding the financing of training programmes, and the concurrent 
new requirement according to which only training programmes with a verifiable direct effect 
on employment were approved. Due to these, the number of preventative and general knowl-
edge training programmes among those supported decreased. The majority of training par-
ticipants were enrolled within the framework of EU programmes.
The significant growth in the number of trainees, during and following 2012, was predomi-
nantly explained by the inclusion into training of public works participants. The data for 
2013 and 2014 make a distinction between those and other trainees.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent05_21
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Table 6.1: Nominal and real earnings
Year
Gross earnings Net earnings Gross earnings index
Net earnings 
index
Consumer 
price index
Real earnings 
index
HUF previous year = 100
1990 13,446 10,108 128.6 121.6 128.9 94.3
1995 38,900 25,891 116.8 112.6 128.2 87.8
1996 46,837 30,544 120.4 117.4 123.6 95.0
1997 57,270 38,145 122.3 124.1 118.3 104.9
1998 67,764 45,162 118.3 118.4 114.3 103.6
1999 77,187 50,076 116.1 112.7 110.0 102.5
2000 87,750 55,785 113.5 111.4 109.8 101.5
2001 103,554 64,913 118.0 116.2 109.2 106.4
2002 122,481 77,622 118.3 119.6 105.3 113.6
2003 137,193 88,753 112.0 114.3 104.7 109.2
2004 145,523 93,715 106.1 105.6 106.8 98.9
2005 158,343 103,149 108.8 110.1 103.6 106.3
2006 171,351 110,951 108.2 107.6 103.9 103.6
2007 185,018 114,282 108.0 103.0 108.0 95.4
2008 198,741 121,969 107.4 107.0 106.1 100.8
2009 199,837 124,116 100.6 101.8 104.2 97.7
2010 202,525 132,604 101.3 106.8 104.9 101.8
2011 213,094 141,151 105.2 106.4 103.9 102.4
2012 223,060 144,085 104.7 102.1 105.7 96.6
2013 230,714 151,118 103.4 104.9 101.7 103.1
2014 237,736 155,717 103.0 103.0 99.8 103.2
Source: KSH IMS (earnings) and consumer price accounting. Gross earnings, gross earnings 
index: 2000–: STADAT (2015. 02. 20. version). Net earnings, net earnings index: 2008–: 
STADAT (2015.02.20.version). Consumer price index: 1990–: STADAT (2015. 02. 20. ver-
sion). Real earnings index: 1990–: STADAT (2015. 02.20. version).
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent06_01
Figure 6.1: Annual changes of gross and net real earnings
Source: KSH IMS (earnings) and consumer price accounting (STADAT, 2015. 02. 20. version).
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena06_01
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Table 6.2.a: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, HUF/person/month
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 97,219 103,190 112,388 122,231 133,570 137,101 143,861 153,301 164,136 171,921 180,110
Mining and quarrying 158,945 171,465 190,530 202,985 225,650 244,051 234,243 254,607 271,012 279,577 286,848
Manufacturing 136,354 145,997 158,597 172,277 183,081 190,331 200,692 213,281 230,877 241,170 252,860
Electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply 223,541 243,039 265,912 294,241 321,569 345,035 363,900 379,606 404,073 410,485 422,613
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities
129,486 140,699 151,912 164,572 178,049 181,818 193,604 207,614 223,206 224,654 225,132
Construction 100,124 106,608 117,626 136,301 146,475 152,204 153,130 156,682 163,649 177,790 185,380
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles
122,538 131,068 145,243 158,077 171,780 175,207 185,812 196,942 212,521 218,936 224,087
Transportation and stor-
age 137,526 149,068 162,091 173,776 186,376 196,350 200,129 210,146 217,794 223,410 230,253
Accommodation and food 
service activities 90,089 95,823 102,908 112,222 120,600 122,561 122,699 125,757 139,731 147,023 153,167
Information and communi-
cation 273,606 288,876 306,792 328,902 358,217 366,752 368,113 392,963 410,045 426,460 449,229
Financial and insurance 
activities 324,295 349,809 401,580 390,511 431,601 427,508 433,458 456,980 459,744 470,966 485,150
Real estate activities 126,388 134,409 145,550 159,225 169,845 177,747 182,903 184,829 219,287 212,391 215,129
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 182,970 200,830 212,963 244,998 281,150 292,974 297,489 303,292 330,860 320,422 344,955
Administrative and sup-
port service activities 113,276 119,555 128,486 139,127 147,125 149,131 145,576 149,675 163,300 169,223 183,801
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory 
social security
184,357 207,356 223,009 253,335 267,657 234,696 242,958 252,848 247,139 258,803 262,057
Education 159,803 181,444 191,211 193,250 204,600 194,958 195,930 192,984 197,344 216,927 245,936
Human health and social 
work activities 130,509 144,100 151,889 160,050 169,977 161,265 142,282 153,832 151,446 151,287 143,051
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 141,957 154,312 161,416 183,898 183,813 179,199 179,976 192,407 209,930 216,869 225,762
Other service activities 127,136 133,846 140,893 153,512 157,950 160,375 150,025 162,490 175,872 174,777 180,944
National economy, total 145,523 158,343 171,351 185,018 198,741 199,837 202,525 213,094 223,060 230,664 237,736
Of which:
– Business sector 138,926 148,555 162,531 177,415 192,044 200,304 206,863 217,932 233,829 242,191 252,710
– Budgetary institutions 161,559 182,185 193,949 206,225 219,044 201,632 195,980 203,516 200,027 207,191 209,707
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 
2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent06_02a
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Table 6.2.b: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, per cent
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 66.8 65.2 65.6 66.1 67.2 68.6 71.0 72.0 73.6 74.5 75.8
Mining and quarrying 109.2 108.3 111.2 109.7 113.5 122.1 115.5 119.5 120.9 121.2 120.7
Manufacturing 93.7 92.2 92.6 93.1 92.1 95.2 99.1 100.0 103.4 104.6 106.4
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 153.6 153.5 155.2 159.0 161.8 172.7 179.6 178.2 181.1 178.0 177.8
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities
89.0 88.9 88.7 88.9 89.6 91.0 95.6 97.4 100.0 97.4 94.7
Construction 68.8 67.3 68.6 73.7 73.7 76.2 75.5 73.5 73.4 77.1 78.0
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
84.2 82.8 84.8 85.4 86.4 87.7 91.7 92.4 95.3 94.9 94.3
Transportation and storage 94.5 94.1 94.6 93.9 93.8 98.3 98.9 98.6 97.8 96.9 96.9
Accommodation and food ser-
vice activities 61.9 60.5 60.1 60.7 60.7 61.3 60.6 59.0 62.7 63.7 64.4
Information and communication 188.0 182.4 179.0 177.8 180.2 183.5 181.7 184.4 183.9 184.9 189.0
Financial and insurance activi-
ties 222.8 220.9 234.4 211.1 217.2 213.9 214.0 214.5 206.2 204.2 204.1
Real estate activities 86.9 84.9 84.9 86.1 85.5 88.9 90.2 86.8 98.3 92.1 90.5
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 125.7 126.8 124.3 132.4 141.5 146.6 146.9 142.4 148.4 138.9 145.1
Administrative and support 
service activities 77.8 75.5 75.0 75.2 74.0 74.6 71.9 70.3 73.3 73.4 77.3
Public administration and de-
fence; compulsory social secu-
rity
126.7 131.0 130.1 136.9 134.7 117.4 120.2 118.7 110.8 112.2 110.2
Education 109.8 114.6 111.6 104.4 102.9 97.6 96.7 90.6 88.5 94.0 103.4
Human health and social work 
activities 89.7 91.0 88.6 86.5 85.5 80.7 70.3 72.2 67.9 65.6 60.2
Arts, entertainment and recrea-
tion 97.5 97.5 94.2 99.4 92.5 89.7 88.8 90.3 94.1 94.0 95.0
Other service activities 87.4 84.5 82.2 83.0 79.5 80.3 74.1 76.1 78.9 75.8 76.1
National economy, total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Of which:
– Business sector 95.5 93.8 94.9 95.9 96.6 100.2 102.1 102.3 104.8 105.0 106.3
– Budgetary institutions 111.0 115.1 113.2 111.5 110.2 100.9 96.8 95.5 89.7 89.8 88.2
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent06_02b
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Table 6.3: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Male 0.1480 0.1490 0.1500 0.1550 0.1790 0.1700 0.1500 0.1550 0.1570 0.1560 0.1330
Less than primary 
school –0.4110 –0.3900 –0.4800 –0.4010 –0.4390 –0.3970 –0.5750 –0.5110 –0.5350 –0.4850 –0.5230
Primary school –0.3550 –0.3670 –0.3730 –0.3800 –0.4170 –0.4010 –0.4540 –0.4280 –0.4220 –0.4160 –0.4140
Vocational school –0.2550 –0.2650 –0.2750 –0.2840 –0.2920 –0.2770 –0.3050 –0.2810 –0.2640 –0.2660 –0.2260
College, university 0.6190 0.5870 0.5900 0.5810 0.5620 0.5580 0.6190 0.6220 0.6160 0.5750 0.6000
Estimated labour 
market experience 0.0216 0.0237 0.0238 0.0252 0.0255 0.0248 0.0259 0.0267 0.0257 0.0238 0.0244
Square of estimated 
labour market experi-
ence
–0.0003 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004
Public sector 0.1120 0.1600 0.1130 0.0876 –0.0009 0.0257 –0.1260 –0.1440 –0.1670 –0.2790 –0.2590
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the refer-
ence group in log points (approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at 
the 0.01 level. The region parameters can be seen in Table 9.6.
Reference categories: female, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), not in the 
public sector, working in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent06_03
Figure 6.2: The percentage of low paid workers by gender, per cent
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena06_02
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Table 6.4: Percentage of low paid workersa by gender, age groups, level of education and industries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
By gender
Males 22.1 20.7 22.3 24.8 25.1 25.4 26.7 21.9 21.2 21.1 21.2 20.5 15.5 15.3 14.3
Females 26.8 25.0 22.5 21.6 22.8 22.9 21.9 21.3 20.8 21.7 21.2 20.8 18.2 18.4 13.0
By age groups
–24 37.0 35.5 37.6 39.9 43.9 44.2 46.3 40.1 34.6 38.9 38.2 36.6 26.4 31.7 28.6
25–54 22.8 21.9 21.8 22.3 23.6 24.0 24.2 21.4 20.6 21.0 20.9 20.4 16.3 16.4 13.0
55+ 19.8 18.1 16.2 15.3 16.5 16.5 16.4 15.8 15.5 17.6 18.1 17.6 17.0 15.0 13.1
By level of educa-
tion
8 grades of primary 
school or less 43.4 40.4 38.3 37.1 39.6 41.2 40.1 41.4 41.3 47.4 43.4 45.4 38.6 41.1 49.7
Vocational school 31.2 29.4 32.1 35.4 35.7 36.8 37.9 32.9 32.1 33.5 33.3 31.3 25.2 24.7 15.1
Secondary school 18.8 18.0 16.5 17.7 18.6 18.6 19.7 16.1 15.4 16.4 17.3 17.2 13.7 15.1 7.3
Higher education 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.7 2.0 2.0 1.0
By industriesb
Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing 38.0 34.3 37.9 37.3 37.1 37.5 41.6 37.9 36.6 36.7 34.6 31.8 21.8 26.2 25.3
Manufacturing 20.0 19.1 19.4 25.4 24.7 22.1 24.1 20.8 23.5 23.0 20.5 19.4 13.7 15.1 8.3
Construction 42.9 41.7 44.8 49.8 51.2 50.2 55.2 43.1 37.5 38.1 43.0 41.9 31.8 34.1 15.3
Trade, repairing 42.8 41.3 44.0 49.0 49.3 51.5 49.4 40.9 35.9 35.2 36.4 35.2 24.2 27.7 11.1
Transport, storage, 
communication 11.3 10.6 10.5 13.6 12.6 13.8 15.1 13.2 14.6 11.2 13.3 13.1 10.1 10.2 5.4
Financial interme-
diation 25.3 22.6 20.7 23.1 23.9 24.6 26.2 20.9 20.0 20.5 20.7 19.6 15.0 16.6 9.9
Public administra-
tion and defence, 
compulsory social 
security
13.7 13.8 9.3 6.6 8.2 6.0 6.3 7.4 6.7 8.7 8.8 9.8 13.4 10.7 30.9
Education 21.5 22.6 16.0 4.8 6.9 8.8 6.1 9.0 7.2 11.9 10.6 11.2 16.3 17.9 4.6
Health and social 
work 26.7 19.9 16.1 6.3 8.4 10.3 8.6 12.6 11.1 14.5 13.8 14.3 18.2 15.6 7.0
Total 24.4 22.8 22.4 23.2 24.0 24.2 24.3 21.6 21.0 21.4 21.2 20.7 16.8 16.8 13.7
a Percentage of those who earn less than 2/3 of the median earning amount.
b 2000–2008: by TEÁOR’03, 2009: by TEÁOR’08.
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent06_04
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Figure 6.3: The dispersion of gross monthly earnings
Figure 6.4: Age-income profiles by education level in 1998 and 2013, women and men
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena06_03
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena06_04
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Figure 6.5: The dispersion of the logarithm of gross real earnings (2013 = 100%)
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena06_05
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Table 7.1: School-leavers by level of education, full-time education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 119,809 49,232 43,167 14,859
1990 164,614 54,933 53,039 15,963
1995 122,333 57,057 70,265 20,024
1996 120,529 54,209 73,413 22,128
1997 116,708 46,868 75,564 24,411
1998 113,651 42,866 77,660 25,338
1999 114,302 38,822 73,965 27,049
2000 114,250a 35,500a 72,200a 29,843
2001 114,200a 33,500a 70,372 29,746
2002 113,923 26,941 69,612 30,785
2003 117,747 26,472 71,944 31,911
2004 113,179 26,620 76,669 31,633
2005 115,626 25,519 77,025 32,732
2006 114,240 24,427 76,895 29,871
2007 108,889 17,967 77,527 29,059
2008 106,426 19,289 68,453 28,957
2009 102,798 20,138 78,004 36,064
2010 103,643 20,693 77,930 38,456
2011 96,825 20,720 76,354 35,433
2012 92,254 29,299 73,802 36,262
2013 88,913 21,948 68,407 37,089
2014b 87,102 21,684 69,148 39,226
a Estimated data.
b Preliminary data.
Note: Primary school: completed the 8th grade. Other levels: received certificate. Excluding 
special schools, from the year 2000 excluding special education. College, university: from 
2007 including graduates in BA/BSc, MA/MSc and undivided (joint bachelor and master 
courses) training.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent07_01
Figure 7.1: Full time students as a percentage of the different age groups
Note: Data for 2014 are preliminary.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena07_01
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Table 7.2: Pupils/students entering the school system by level of education,  
full-time education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1990 125,665 87,932 83,939 22,662
2000 117,000a 33,900a 90,800a 54,100a
2001 112,144 34,210 92,322 56,709
2002 112,345 33,363 94,223 57,763
2003 114,020 33,394 92,817 59,699
2004 101,021 32,645 93,469 59,783
2005 97,810 33,114 96,181 61,898
2006 95,954 32,732 95,989 61,231
2007 98,766 31,897 92,957 55,789
2008 97,345 32,774 90,667 52,755
2009 97,083 34,177 87,731 61,948
2010 95,469 35,177 88,644 68,715
2011 96,455 35,420 83,025 70,954
2012 98,013 36,954 78,090 67,014
2013 105,075 34,927 83,198 96,775c
2014b 99,048 31,976 82,537 ..
a Estimated data.
b Preliminary data.
c Students with less than 60 credits. The figure cannot be compared with earlier data.
Note: Excluding special schools, from the year 2000 excluding special education. College, 
university: from the 2005/2006 school year including students in BA/BSc, MA/MSc and 
undivided (joint bachelor and master courses) training.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent07_02
Note: Data for 2014 are preliminary.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena07_02
Figure 7.2: Flows of the educational system by level
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Table 7.3: The number of full time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
2000/01 918,976a 120,330a 417,800a 176,046
2001/02 905,932 124,615 420,889 184,071
2002/03 893,261 123,069 426,384 193,155
2003/04 874,296 123,206 437,909 204,910
2004/05 854,930 123,008 438,496 212,292
2005/06 828,594 121,815 441,002 217,245
2006/07 800,635 119,520 443,166 224,616
2007/08 783,948 122,973 441,886 227,118
2008/09 765,822 123,640 439,957 224,894
2009/10 752,896 128,479 443,078 222,564
2010/11 736,977 129,076 438,892 218,057
2011/12 729,000 129,250 428,122 218,304
2012/13 725,068 117,356 413,531 214,320
2013/14 730,664 104,925 388,717 209,208
2014/15b 731,575 92,389 370,774 203,576
a Estimated data.
b Preliminary data.
Note: Excluding special education schools, from the 2000/2001 school year excluding special 
education. From the 2001/2002 school year, students in grades 5–8 who attend a 6 or 8 year 
secondary general school are included in the number of high school students. College, uni-
versity: from the 2005/2006 school year, includes students in BA/BSc, MA/MSc and undi-
vided (joint bachelor and master courses) training.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent07_03
Table 7.4: The number of part-time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
2000/01 2,940a 1,070a 91,700a 118,994
2001/02 2,793 2,453 95,231 129,167
2002/03 2,785 3,427 93,172 148,032
2003/04 3,190 3,216 93,322 162,037
2004/05 2,766 3,505 90,321 166,174
2005/06 2,543 4,049 89,950 163,387
2006/07 2,319 4,829 91,035 151,203
2007/08 2,245 5,874 83,008 132,273
2008/09 2,083 4,983 74,008 115,957
2009/10 2,035 6,594 70,124 105,511
2010/11 1,997 8,068 76,404 99,962
2011/12 2,264 10,383 74,204 98,081
2012/13 2,127 12,776 72,808 85,316
2013/14 2,587 12,140 70,588 73,088
2014/15b 2,548 9,946 66,522 67,904
a Estimated data.
b Preliminary data.
Note: College, university: from the 2005/2006 school year, including students in BA/BSC, 
MA/MSc and undivided (joint bachelor and master courses) training.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent07_04
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Table 7.5: Number of applicants for full-time high school courses
Year
Applying Admitted
Admitted as a 
percentage of 
applied
Applying Admitted
as a percentage of the secondary 
school graduates in the given year
1980 33,339 14,796 44.4 77.2 34.3
1989 44,138 15,420 34.9 84.0 29.3
1990 46,767 16,818 36.0 88.2 31.7
1991 48,911 20,338 41.6 90.2 37.5
1992 59,119 24,022 40.6 99.1 40.3
1993 71,741 28,217 39.3 104.6 41.1
1994 79,805 29,901 37.5 116.3 43.6
1995 86,548 35,081 40.5 123.2 49.9
1996 79,369 38,382 48.4 108.1 52.3
1997 81,924 40,355 49.3 108.4 53.4
1998 81,065 43,629 53.8 104.4 56.2
1999 82,815 44,538 53.8 112.0 60.2
2000 82,957 45,546 54.9 114.9 63.1
2001 84,380 49,874 59.1 119.8 70.8
2002 88,978 52,552 59.1 127.8 75.5
2003 87,110 52,703 60.5 121.1 73.3
2004 95,871 55,179 57.6 125.0 72.0
2005 91,583 52,863 57.7 118.9 68.6
2006 84,262 53,983 64.1 109.6 70.2
2007 74,849 50,941 68.1 96.5 65.7
2008 66,963 52,081 77.8 97.8 76.1
2009 90,878 61,262 67.4 116.5 78.5
2010 100,777 65,503 65.0 129.3 84.1
2011 101,835 66,810 65.6 133.4 87.5
2012 84,075 61,350 73.0 113.9 83.1
2013 75,392 56,927 75.5 110.2 83.2
2014 79,765 54,688 68.6 115.4 79.1
Note: Including students applying and admitted to BA/BSc, MA/MSc and undivided (joint 
bachelor and master courses) training. From 2008 students applying and admitted in repeat-
ed, spring and autumn admission procedures altogether.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent07_05
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Table 8.1: The number of vacanciesa reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Year
Number of vacancies  
at closing date
Number of registered unem-
ployedb at closing date
Vacancies per 100 registered 
unemployedb
1991 14,343 227,270 6.3
1992 21,793 556,965 3.9
1993 34,375 671,745 5.1
1994 35,569 568,366 6.3
1995 28,680 507,695 5.6
1996 38,297 500,622 7.6
1997 42,544 470,112 9.0
1998 46,624 423,121 11.0
1999 51,438 409,519 12.6
2000 50,000 390,492 12.8
2001 45,194 364,140 12.4
2002 44,603 344,715 12.9
2003 47,239 357,212 13.2
2004 48,223 375,950 12.8
2005 41,615 409,929 10.2
2006 41,677 393,465 10.6
2007 29,933 426,915 7.0
2008 25,386 442,333 5.7
2009 20,739 561,768 3.7
2010 22,241 582,664 3.8
2011 41,123 582,868 7.1
2012 35,850 559,102 6.4
2013 51,524 527,624 9.8
2014 69,316 422,445 16.4
a Monthly average stock figures.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent08_01
Figure 8.1: The number of vacancies reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena08_01
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Table 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staffa, per cent
Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase
1993
I. 34.7 23.6
2001
I. 25.3 40.0
II. 28.5 22.3 II. 28.6 32.6
1994
I. 24.5 29.1
2002
I. 25.6 39.2
II. 21.0 29.7 II. 27.9 35.4
1995
I. 30.1 32.9
2003
I. 23.6 38.5
II. 30.9 27.5 II. 32.1 34.3
1996
I. 32.9 33.3 2004 30.0 39.8
II. 29.4 30.4 2005 25.3 35.0
1997
I. 29.6 39.4 2006 26.6 36.2
II. 30.7 36.8 2007 20.4 27.0
1998
I. 23.4 42.7 2008 26.9 23.2
II. 28.9 37.1 2009 18.4 26.8
1999
I. 25.8 39.2 2010 15.4 26.0
II. 28.8 35.8 2011 17.2 25.5
2000
I. 24.4 41.0 2012 19.9 29.2
II. 27.2 36.5 2013 21.3 30.1
2014 19.3 27.7
a In the period of the next half year following the interview date, in the sample of NFSZ 
PROG, since 2004: 1 year later from the interview date.
Source: NFSZ PROG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent08_02
Figure 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff
Source: NFSZ PROG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena08_02
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Table 9.1: Regional inequalities: Employment ratea
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1993 58.4 55.2 60.5 52.9 49.3 48.4 53.4 54.5
1994 57.2 54.4 59.9 52.4 47.7 47.5 53.0 53.5
1995 57.1 53.1 58.5 48.8 46.3 46.4 53.0 52.5
1996 56.8 52.7 59.3 50.3 45.7 45.6 52.8 52.4
1997 56.8 53.6 59.8 50.0 45.7 45.2 53.6 52.5
1998 57.7 56.0 61.6 51.5 46.2 46.4 54.2 53.7
1999 59.7 58.5 63.1 52.8 48.1 48.8 55.3 55.6
2000 60.5 59.2 63.4 53.5 49.4 49.0 56.0 56.3
2001 60.6 59.3 63.1 52.3 49.7 49.5 55.8 56.2
2002 60.9 60.0 63.7 51.6 50.3 49.3 54.2 56.2
2003 61.7 62.3 61.9 53.4 51.2 51.6 53.2 57.0
2004 62.9 60.3 61.4 52.3 50.6 50.4 53.6 56.8
2005 63.3 60.2 62.0 53.4 49.5 50.2 53.8 56.9
2006 63.1 61.3 62.5 53.2 50.7 51.1 54.0 57.4
2007 62.9 61.4 62.8 51.0 50.4 50.3 54.5 57.0
2008 62.7 59.9 61.6 50.8 49.4 49.5 54.0 56.4
2009 61.3 57.3 59.2 51.7 48.2 48.0 52.9 55.0
2010 60.0 57.0 58.6 52.4 48.3 49.0 54.1 54.9
2011 60.2 59.1 59.9 51.1 48.4 49.9 54.1 55.4
2012 61.7 59.2 61.0 51.9 49.1 51.8 55.5 56.7
2013 62.7 60.7 61.8 54.8 51.6 53.2 56.3 58.1
2014 66.0 64.3 65.8 58.6 55.7 57.3 59.7 61.8
a Age: 15–64.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent09_01
Figure 9.1: Regional inequalities: Labour force participation rates, gross monthly 
earnings and gross domestic product in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: Employment rate: KSH MEF; gross domestic product: KSH; earnings: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena09_01
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Table 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment ratea
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1995 7.4 11.0 6.9 12.1 16.0 13.8 9.3 10.3
1996 8.2 10.4 7.1 9.4 15.5 13.2 8.4 10.0
1997 7.0 8.1 6.0 9.9 14.0 12.0 7.3 8.8
1998 5.7 6.8 6.1 9.4 12.2 11.1 7.1 7.8
1999 5.2 6.1 4.4 8.3 11.6 10.2 5.8 7.0
2000 5.3 4.9 4.2 7.8 10.1 9.3 5.1 6.4
2001 4.3 4.3 4.1 7.7 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2002 3.9 5.0 4.0 7.9 8.8 7.8 6.2 5.8
2003 4.0 4.6 4.6 7.9 9.7 6.8 6.5 5.9
2004 4.5 5.6 4.6 7.3 9.7 7.2 6.3 6.1
2005 5.2 6.3 5.9 8.8 10.6 9.1 8.2 7.2
2006 5.1 6.0 5.8 9.2 10.9 10.9 8.0 7.5
2007 4.8 4.9 5.1 9.9 12.6 10.7 8.0 7.4
2008 4.5 5.8 5.0 10.3 13.3 12.1 8.7 7.8
2009 6.5 9.2 8.7 11.2 15.3 14.1 10.6 10.0
2010 8.9 10.0 9.3 12.4 16.2 14.4 10.4 11.2
2011 9.0 9.5 7.3 12.9 16.4 14.6 10.5 11.0
2012 9.5 9.9 7.5 12.1 16.1 13.9 10.3 11.0
2013 8.7 8.7 7.7 9.3 12.6 14.2 11.0 10.2
2014 6.2 5.6 4.6 7.8 10.4 11.8 9.0 7.7
a Age: 15–74.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent09_02
Figure 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment rates in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena09_02
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Table 9.3: Regional differences: The share of registered unemployeda  
relative to the economically active populationb, per cent
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
2000 3.8 7.5 5.6 11.8 17.2 16.0 10.4 9.3
2001 3.2 6.7 5.0 11.2 16.0 14.5 9.7 8.5
2002 2.8 6.6 4.9 11.0 15.6 13.3 9.2 8.0
2003 2.8 6.7 5.2 11.7 16.2 14.1 9.7 8.3
2004 3.2 6.9 5.8 12.2 15.7 14.1 10.4 8.7
2005 3.4 7.4 6.9 13.4 16.5 15.1 11.2 9.4
2006 3.1 7.0 6.3 13.0 15.9 15.0 10.7 9.0
2007 3.5 6.9 6.3 13.6 17.6 16.6 11.7 9.7
2008 3.6 7.1 6.3 14.3 17.8 17.5 11.9 10.0
2009 5.4 11.5 9.5 17.8 20.9 20.2 14.4 12.8
2010 6.6 11.8 9.3 17.1 21.5 20.9 15.2 13.3
2011 6.8 10.9 8.0 16.6 21.5 22.0 14.5 13.2
2012 6.6 9.9 7.4 16.4 21.2 21.0 13.6 12.6
2013 6.4 9.5 7.4 15.4 19.5 19.4 19.0 13.0
2014 5.2 7.1 5.4 13.6 17.4 16.7 10.5 9.8
a Since 1st of November, 2005: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 
the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of the previ-
ous year.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent09_03
Figure 9.3: Regional inequalities: The share of registered unemployed  
relative to the economically active population, per cent, in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena09_03
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Table 9.4: Annual average registered unemployment ratea by counties, per centb
County 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Budapest 0.1 5.7 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 4.6 5.9 6.2 6.1 5.8 4.5
Baranya 1.1 11.8 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.9 11.6 13.4 13.3 12.9 13.6 14.7 17.1 16.6 16.4 15.0 9.1
Bács-Kiskun 1.1 11.0 10.0 9.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.2 11.4 12.0 17.9 15.6 14.8 13.7 13.3 15.8
Békés 1.1 14.0 13.1 11.9 11.2 11.5 12.0 13.0 13.5 15.0 14.8 17.3 18.1 17.8 15.8 14.8 12.0
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 2.3 16.7 20.3 19.0 19.1 19.6 18.3 18.9 18.0 19.9 20.1 23.1 23.7 23.5 22.9 20.9 19.6
Csongrád 1.0 9.9 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.5 9.7 10.7 8.8 9.2 9.3 11.6 12.4 11.5 11.5 11.0 8.5
Fejér 1.0 10.6 7.2 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.5 11.5 12.4 12.1 10.8 10.1 7.6
Győr-Moson-Sopron 0.5 6.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.4 4.6 4.1 4.1 6.9 6.8 5.7 5.0 4.6 2.9
Hajdú-Bihar 0.9 14.2 14.7 13.6 12.8 13.1 12.9 14.0 13.9 15.6 16.5 19.1 20.3 20.7 19.9 18.6 16.1
Heves 1.6 12.5 12.0 10.6 9.8 10.0 10.6 11.3 11.1 12.2 12.7 15.8 16.1 16.1 15.7 15.0 11.9
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 1.6 14.6 13.4 11.5 10.2 10.7 11.2 12.0 11.4 11.8 12.2 15.5 16.4 18.1 16.8 15.4 13.4
Komárom-Esztergom 1.0 11.3 8.3 7.0 6.7 6.0 5.8 6.8 5.8 5.4 5.5 10.2 10.4 9.5 8.9 8.7 6.5
Nógrád 2.4 16.3 14.9 14.3 13.8 14.6 14.6 16.1 16.1 17.7 17.8 21.2 22.0 22.9 23.9 21.7 19.1
Pest 0.5 7.6 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.4 6.7 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.2 6.2
Somogy 1.4 11.2 11.9 11.6 11.5 12.2 13.4 14.5 14.6 16.2 16.9 19.4 18.9 18.3 18.2 17.1 16.1
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 2.6 19.3 19.5 17.8 16.7 17.7 17.5 18.6 18.8 21.0 22.4 24.7 24.8 26.0 25.0 23.0 19.5
Tolna 1.6 12.2 11.8 11.0 10.0 10.7 11.6 11.8 10.5 11.5 12.1 15.2 14.7 14.2 13.7 13.7 11.1
Vas 0.4 7.2 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1 9.8 9.6 7.7 6.7 6.9 5.1
Veszprém 0.9 10.0 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 8.0 7.7 8.0 8.2 12.6 12.3 10.8 9.6 9.4 6.9
Zala 0.8 9.2 7.2 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.4 9.3 9.0 9.3 9.4 13.0 12.9 11.7 11.6 12.3 9.6
Total 1.0 10.6 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8 13.3 13.2 12.6 11.9 9.8
a Since 1st of November, 2005: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
b The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of the 
previous year.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent09_04
Figure 9.4: Regional inequalities: Means of registered unemployment rates  
in the counties, 2014
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena09_04
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Table 9.5: Regional inequalities: Gross monthly earningsa
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western  
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern  
Hungary
Northern  
Great Plain
Southern  
Great Plain Total
1999 101,427 77,656 74,808 70,195 70,961 68,738 68,339 81,067
2000 114,637 87,078 83,668 74,412 77,714 73,858 73,591 90,338
2001 132,136 100,358 96,216 86,489 88,735 84,930 84,710 103,610
2002 149,119 110,602 106,809 98,662 102,263 98,033 97,432 117,672
2003 170,280 127,819 121,464 117,149 117,847 115,278 113,532 135,472
2004 184,039 137,168 131,943 122,868 128,435 124,075 121,661 147,111
2005 192,962 147,646 145,771 136,276 139,761 131,098 130,406 157,770
2006 212,001 157,824 156,499 144,189 152,521 142,142 143,231 171,794
2007 229,897 173,937 164,378 156,678 159,921 153,241 153,050 186,229
2008 245,931 185,979 174,273 160,624 169,313 160,332 164,430 198,087
2009 254,471 187,352 182,855 169,615 169,333 160,688 164,638 203,859
2010 258,653 194,794 183,454 171,769 173,696 162,455 169,441 207,456
2011 264,495 197,774 184,311 181,500 185,036 173,243 177,021 214,540
2012 279,073 215,434 202,189 208,895 196,566 191,222 187,187 230,073
2013 290,115 220,495 209,418 190,126 188,635 178,499 187,762 230,018
2014 296,089 228,974 219,727 200,359 204,472 194,654 196,667 240,675
a Gross monthly earnings (HUF/person), May.
Note: The data refer to full-time employees in the budgetary sector and firms employing at 
least 10 workers (1999), and at least 5 workers (2000–), respectively.
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent09_05
Table 9.6: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
Year
Central  
Hungary
Western  
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern  
Hungary
Northern  
Great Plain
Southern  
Great Plain
2000 0,0729 –0,0067 –0,1610 –0,1320 –0,1500 –0,1660
2001 0,0739 –0,0200 –0,1500 –0,1400 –0,1550 –0,1630
2002 0,0903 –0,0378 –0,1120 –0,0950 –0,1170 –0,1070
2003 0,0493 –0,0542 –0,1220 –0,1220 –0,1400 –0,1410
2004 0,0648 –0,0313 –0,1410 –0,0953 –0,1400 –0,1270
2005 0,0291 –0,0372 –0,1310 –0,1010 –0,1450 –0,1390
2006 0,0660 –0,0214 –0,1400 –0,0874 –0,1380 –0,1100
2007 0,0636 –0,0840 –0,1420 –0,1290 –0,1590 –0,1450
2008 0,0446 –0,0904 –0,1750 –0,1350 –0,1920 –0,1660
2009 0,0791 –0,0464 –0,1270 –0,1210 –0,1420 –0,1490
2010 0,0689 –0,0746 –0,1390 –0,1270 –0,1720 –0,1500
2011 0,1060 –0,0301 –0,0806 –0,0058 –0,0886 –0,0947
2012 0,0673 –0,0439 –0,0784 –0,1020 –0,1320 –0,1250
2013 0,0411 –0,0543 –0,1180 –0,1190 –0,1630 –0,1350
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the refer-
ence group in log points (approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at 
the 0.01 level.
Reference category: women, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), not in the 
public sector, working in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent09_06
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Figure 9.5: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population  
aged 15–64, 1st quarter 2007, per cent
Note: The ratio of registered unemployed was calculated using the following method: number 
of registered unemployed divided by the permanent population of age 15–64. The number of 
registered unemployed is a quarterly average. The permanent population data is annual.
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena09_05
Figure 9.6: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population  
aged 15–64, 1st quarter 2014, per cent
Note: The ratio of registered unemployed was calculated using the following method: number 
of registered unemployed divided by the permanent population of age 15–64. The number of 
registered unemployed is a quarterly average. The permanent population data is from the 
year 2012 (since 2013 data is not yet available).
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena09_06
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Figure 9.7: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population  
aged 15–64, 3rd quarter 2007, per cent
Note: The ratio of registered unemployed was calculated using the following method: number 
of registered unemployed divided by the permanent population of age 15–64. The number of 
registered unemployed is a quarterly average. The permanent population data is annual.
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena09_07
Figure 9.8: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population  
aged 15–64, 3rd quarter 2014, per cent
Note: The ratio of registered unemployed was calculated using the following method: number 
of registered unemployed divided by the permanent population of age 15–64. The number of 
registered unemployed is a quarterly average. The permanent population data is from the 
year 2012 (since 2013 data is not yet available).
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ena09_08
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Table 9.7: Regional inequalities: Gross domestic product
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western  
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern  
Hungary
Northern  
Great Plain
Southern  
Great Plain Total
Thousand HUF/person/month
2000 2,009 1,246 1,455 972 837 855 966 1,302
2001 2,370 1,395 1,545 1,106 989 1,022 1,112 1,505
2002 2,794 1,499 1,754 1,237 1,088 1,124 1,207 1,710
2003 2,993 1,725 2,013 1,345 1,212 1,254 1,304 1,876
2004 3,309 1,952 2,142 1,454 1,353 1,357 1,449 2,069
2005 3,586 2,092 2,205 1,532 1,465 1,419 1,527 2,214
2006 3,925 2,178 2,418 1,605 1,539 1,514 1,603 2,386
2007 4,196 2,344 2,482 1,702 1,615 1,580 1,660 2,531
2008 4,441 2,430 2,617 1,824 1,670 1,679 1,799 2,685
2009 4,379 2,186 2,458 1,793 1,590 1,690 1,725 2,612
2010 4,450 2,349 2,698 1,821 1,624 1,709 1,746 2,695
2011 4,541 2,495 2,868 1,897 1,694 1,821 1,881 2,811
2012 4,681 2,543 2,917 1,951 1,720 1,841 1,951 2,878
Per cent
2000 154.3 95.7 111.8 74.7 64.3 65.7 74.2 100.0
2001 157.5 92.7 102.7 73.5 65.7 67.9 73.9 100.0
2002 163.4 87.7 102.6 72.4 63.6 65.7 70.6 100.0
2003 159.5 91.9 107.3 71.7 64.6 66.8 69.5 100.0
2004 159.9 94.4 103.5 70.3 65.4 65.6 70.0 100.0
2005 162.0 94.5 99.6 69.2 66.2 64.1 69.0 100.0
2006 164.5 91.3 101.3 67.3 64.5 63.4 67.2 100.0
2007 165.8 92.6 98.1 67.2 63.8 62.4 65.6 100.0
2008 165.4 90.5 97.5 67.9 62.2 62.5 67.0 100.0
2009 167.7 83.7 94.1 68.6 60.9 64.7 66.0 100.0
2010 165.1 87.2 100.1 67.6 60.3 63.4 64.8 100.0
2011 161.5 88.7 102.0 67.5 60.2 64.8 66.9 100.0
2012 162.6 88.4 101.4 67.8 59.8 64.0 67.8 100.0
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent09_07
Table 9.8: Commuting
Year
Working in the place of residence Commuter
in thousands per cent in thousands per cent
1980 3,848.5 76.0 1,217.2 24.0
1990 3,380.2 74.7 1,144.7 25.3
2001 2,588.2 70.1 1,102.1 29.9
2005 2,625.1 68.2 1,221.3 31.8
2011 2,462.8a 62.5 1,479.8 37.2
a Includes those working abroad but classified by the respondents of LFS as household members.
Source: NSZ, microcensus.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent09_08
statistical data
262
Table 10.1: Strikes
Year Number of strikes
Number of persons  
involved Hours lost, in thousands
1995a 7 172,048 1,708
2000 5 26,978 1,192
2001 6 21,128 61
2002 4 4,573 9
2003 7 10,831 19
2004 8 6,276 116
2005 11 1,425 7
2006 16 24,665 52
2007 13 64,612 186
2008 8 8,633 ..
2009 9 3,134 8.6
2010 7 3,263 133.1
2011 1 … …
2012 3 1,885 4.6
2013 1 .. ..
2014 0 0 0
a Teachers strikes number partly estimated.
Source: KSH strike statistics.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_01
Table 10.2: National agreements on wage increase recommendationsa
Year
OÉT – from 2013 VKF – Recommendations Actual indexes
Minimum Average Maximum Budgetary sector Competitve sector
2000 108.5 .. 111.0 112.3 114.2
2001 .. .. .. 122.9 116.3
2002 108.0 .. 110.5 129.2 113.3
2003 .. 4.5 % real wage growth .. 117.5 108.9
2004 .. 107.0–108.0 .. 100.4 109.3
2005 .. 106.0 .. 112.8 106.9
2006 .. 104.0–105.0 .. 106.4 109.3
2007 .. 105.5–108.0 .. 106.4 109.1
2008 .. 105.0–107.5 .. 106.2 108.4
2009 .. 103.0–105.0 .. 92.1 104.3
2010 .. real wage preservation .. 100.5b 102.6b
2011 .. 104.0–106.0 .. 103.8 105.3
2012 – no wage recommendations – 98.3 107.2
2013 .. real wage preservation .. 102.9b 103.4b
2014 .. 103.5 .. 105.9 b 104.3
a Average increase rates of gross earnings from recommendations by the National Interest Rec-
onciliation Council (OÉT) and the Permanent Consultation Forum of the Business Sector 
and the Government (VKF, from 2013 onwards). Previous year = 100.
b Mean real wage index.
Source: KSH, NGM.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_02
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Table 10.3: Single employer collective agreements in the business sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of 
agreements 1,277 1,272 1,295 1,025 1,033 1,032 1,027 962 966 959 942 951 951
Number of per-
sons covered 667,634 649,861 637,508 513,118 489,568 532,065 467,964 432,086 448,138 448,980 442,723 448,087 443,543
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_03
Table 10.4: Single institution collective agreements in the public sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of agree-
ments 2,019 2,026 2,020 1,750 1,435 1,711 1,710 1,737 1,751 1,744 1,735 1,736 1,734
Number of per-
sons covered 251,849 251,352 250,492 228,080 203,497 224,246 222,547 225,434 224,651 222,136 261,401 260,388 259,797
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_04
Table 10.5: Multi-employer collective agreements in the business sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of agree-
ments 66 71 79 71 75 74 78 80 82 81 81 83 83
Number of per-
sons covered 206,729 261,848 263,752 92,196 86,079 83,117 80,506 222,236 221,627 202,005 204,585 173,614 219,050
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_05
Table 10.6: Multi-institution collective agreements in the public sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of agree-
ments 9 9 10 5 4 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Number of persons 
covered 2,045 2,042 2,072 403 360 238 .. .. .. 320 0 0 0
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_06
Table 10.7: The number of firm wage agreementsa, the number of affected firms, and the number of employees covered
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of agree-
ments 531 545 515 298 302 214 202 785 905 888 863 874 876
Number of per-
sons covered 279,753 316,585 347,223 169,639 151,022 171,259 100,206 377,677 414,522 416,562 415,751 422,887 384,182
a Until 2008, the data relate to the number of ’wage agreements’ concerning the next year’s average wage 
increase, in the typical case. In and after 2009, the figures relate to resolutions within collective agree-
ments, which affect the remuneration of workers (including long-term agreements on wage supplements, 
bonuses, premia, non-wage benefits and rights and responsibilities connected with wage payments).
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_07
statistical data
264
Table 10.8: The number of multi-employer wage agreementsa, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of covered companies and employees
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of 
agreements 18 22 19 40 44 40 45 62 68 68 73 74 74
Number of com-
panies 172 243 145 145 162 147 150 2,350 2,460 2,199 2,219 1,096 2,886
Number of per-
sons covered 76,129 88,855 25,175 35,039 42,817 33,735 40,046 191,258 211,753 180,131 191,013 160,092 208,128
a Until 2008, the data relate to the number of ’wage agreements’ concerning the next year’s 
average wage increase, in the typical case. In and after 2009, the figures relate to resolutions 
within collective agreements, which affect the remuneration of workers (including long-term 
agreements on wage supplements, bonuses, premia, non-wage benefits and rights and re-
sponsibilities connected with wage payments).
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_08
Table 10.9: The share of employees covered by collective agreements, percenta
Industries
Multi-employer collective agreements  
in the business sectorb
Single employer collective agreements  
in the national economy
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Agriculture 27.28 27.80 21.93 23.08 21.12 12.82 12.47 9.81 11.71 9.87
Mining and quarrying 6.16 6.37 5.27 5.36 5.35 36.15 37.84 57.86 40.51 40.46
Manufacturing 11.95 11.40 12.78 11.95 11.94 24.35 23.36 25.94 25.95 25.86
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 72.05 69.28 70.27 69.67 73.69 63.69 60.04 59.16 53.09 53.19
Water supply; sewerage, waste management 
and remediation activities 24.59 25.15 24.32 23.87 27.10 59.58 55.95 46.97 46.61 46.57
Construction 99.40 98.93 98.27 99.88 98.00 6.73 6.74 5.47 5.84 6.65
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 3.36 3.41 6.71 6.83 6.88 11.07 11.22 7.74 7.82 7.71
Transportation and storage 15.07 15.27 15.69 14.82 37.38 57.57 56.26 58.68 56.65 54.40
Accommodation and food service activities 94.31 94.28 93.24 92.42 87.66 9.98 9.94 8.23 6.49 6.24
Information and communication 0.83 0.82 0.88 0.88 0.81 21.76 20.25 18.93 20.14 19.19
Financial and insurance activities 6.10 4.97 5.72 5.24 5.36 33.94 32.36 35.11 33.41 32.89
Real estate activities 38.06 39.78 16.37 15.73 17.36 30.95 29.30 25.69 24.61 26.14
Professional, scientific and technical  
activities 2.47 2.32 4.01 4.58 4.49 9.37 8.53 10.97 12.24 12.78
Administrative and support service activities 13.87 12.59 6.33 6.22 7.06 8.43 7.78 8.17 8.01 8.17
Public administration and defence; compul-
sory social security .. .. .. .. .. 51.22 6.89 14.48 14.52 15.55
Education .. .. 4.79 3.91 4.81 43.03 40.51 44.83 41.94 44.98
Human health and social work activities .. .. .. .. .. 50.35 35.88 38.24 34.48 36.38
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.31 1.28 0.14 0.16 0.14 22.81 19.79 23.57 24.01 22.99
Other service activities 0.93 0.84 0.62 0.63 1.46 9.70 6.78 7.07 8.76 6.88
National economy, total 20.43 19.86 19.94 19.34 21.51 27.18 23.52 25.05 24.24 24.59
a Percentage share of employees covered by collective agreements.
b In the observed period only a single multi-employer collective agreement was in effect in the 
public sector.
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System, Register of Collective Agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_09
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Table 10.10: Single employer collective agreements in the national economy
Industries
Number of collective agreements The number of employees covered by collective agreements
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Agriculture 65 64 65 66 66 9,765 9,310 7,628 8,709 7,680
Mining and quarrying 10 10 9 9 9 1,474 1,491 2,142 1,475 1,498
Manufacturing 339 344 344 354 355 142,402 144,844 157,710 157,659 157,178
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply
50 48 47 45 44 16,003 14,581 13,807 12,194 12,414
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management 
and remediation activi-
ties
70 69 67 68 68 24,236 23,737 19,175 19,010 19,010
Construction 49 48 45 45 46 7,917 7,800 6,153 6,190 7,488
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcy-
cles
126 126 119 118 119 38,031 37,973 25,686 25,573 25,565
Transportation and 
storage 59 60 57 59 59 102,452 102,164 104,150 98,748 96,550
Accommodation and 
food service activities 38 37 36 35 35 8,337 8,342 6,576 4,944 4,986
Information and com-
munication 15 15 14 15 15 14,256 14,256 13,540 13,727 13,727
Financial and insurance 
activities 26 27 27 26 26 22,729 20,997 22,300 20,892 20,892
Real estate activities 33 31 31 32 32 8,781 8,522 6,957 7,100 7,079
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 54 55 53 54 54 6,822 6,795 8,628 10,047 10,047
Administrative and 
support service activi-
ties
24 25 24 25 24 10,507 11,359 11,080 11,206 11,080
Public administration 
and defence; compul-
sory social security
103 105 102 105 104 16,433 17,015 37,643 38,313 40,431
Education 1,293 1,292 1,295 1291 1,292 106485 106,233 113,995 102,582 114,377
Human health and 
social work activities 241 239 236 226 228 77,719 88,141 100,879 92,631 95,961
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 92 94 92 91 91 7,242 7,109 7,786 7,637 7,592
Other service activities 19 18 18 19 18 1,422 1,482 1,515 1,514 1,474
National economy, total 2,706 2,707 2,681 2,683 2,685 623,013 632,151 667,350 640,151 655,029
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System, Register of Collective Agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_10
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Table 10.11: Multi-employer collective agreements in the business sectora
Industries
The number of firms covered by the multi-employerb collec-
tive agreements
The number of employees covered by multi-employer collec-
tive agreements
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Agriculture 601 601 600 27 41 20,724 20,416 16,833 17,098 17,002
Mining and quarrying 5 5 5 3 4 251 251 195 195 195
Manufacturing 604 601 179 155 174 69,871 68,953 75,700 70,908 72,623
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply
36 36 34 35 35 18,096 16,818 16,393 15,991 17,142
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities
23 23 23 22 28 9,769 9,769 9,229 9,229 9,283
Construction 489 491 486 484 510 116,745 113,936 110,173 105521 110,173
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcy-
cles
127 125 68 47 192 11,538 11,551 22,258 22,316 22,827
Transportation and stor-
age 197 155 157 155 1,209 26,780 26,780 26,867 24,972 63,934
Accommodation and 
food service activities 37 37 31 29 37 65,581 65,410 63,526 61,204 63,526
Information and com-
munication 10 10 12 12 12 543 543 597 597 597
Financial and insurance 
activities 12 12 13 7 9 4,082 3,215 3,626 3,269 3,269
Real estate activities 56 56 47 28 34 10,579 10,579 4,048 4,048 4,055
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 43 43 39 33 45 1,621 1,621 2,755 3,293 3,326
Administrative and sup-
port service activities 87 87 84 82 104 16,862 16,862 7,855 7888 10,013
Public administration 
and defence; compul-
sory social security
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 –
Education 17 17 17 20 24 .. .. 171 171 172
Human health and social 
work activities 1 1 1 0 2 .. .. .. .. –
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 1 1 1 1 4 127 127 13 13 13
Other service activities 8 8 7 2 2 133 121 88 83 204
National economy, total 2,354 2,309 1,804 1,142 2,467 373,302 366,952 360,327 346,796 398,354
a In the observed period only a single multi-employer collective agreement was in effect in the 
public sector.
b Multi-employer collective agreements are those concluded and/or extended by several em-
ployers or employer organizations.
Source: NGM, Employment Relations Information System, Register of Collective Agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent10_11
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Table 11.1: Family benefits
Year
Tax credit for familiesa Child benefitb Regular child protection allowancec
Wage related maternity 
benefitd
Flat rate maternity  
benefitsd
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount per 
family, HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
2004 6,941 969,512 11,971 1,290,200 5,236 670,000 54,322 83,678 24,174 210,509
2005 6,979 924,263 12,596 1,264,500 5,619 663,000 58,676 87,172 25,706 208,708
2006 9,392 122,883 21,637 1,269,000 – – 63,221 91,678 27,102 212,741
2007 .. .. 23,031 1,224,000 – – 68,763 93,973 28,496 207,608
2008 .. .. 24,521 1,246,600 – – 74,518 94,514 30,880 208,652
2009 .. .. 24,524 1,245,900 – – 78,725 95,050 30,328 214,416
2010 .. .. 24,442 1,224,000 – – 83,959 94,682 30,041 217,807
2011 .. .. 24,528 1,190,707 – – 84,929 87,717 .. 207,550
2012 .. .. 24,491 1,167,640 – – 91,050 81,839 .. 206,645
2013 .. .. 24,257 1,149,796 – – 96,661 81,234 .. 198,685
a Introduced in 1999. Beginning in 2006, this became a part of family benefits, only families with 3 or 
more children are entitled to tax credits to the amount of 4,000 HUF per child.
b Annual mean. From 1999 to November 8, 2002, the child care benefit includes the family allowance 
and schooling support. Beginning in 2002, the benefits paid in the 13th month are included as well.
c Annual average. Was in use from 1998 to 2005.
d Annual average.
Source: NAV, KSH Welfare Statistics.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_01
Table 11.2: Unemployment benefits and average earnings
Year
Insured unemployment benefit and 
other non-means tested benefitsa
Means tested unemployment  
assistanceb Net monthly earnings, HUF
c
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients Male Female Together
2004 37,107 109,654 15,864 144,853 98,101 87,710 93,233
2005 39,593 111,732 16,991 158,565 108,139 98,625 103,727
2006 43,344 109,095 23,771 160,426 .. .. 110,951
2007 46,208 96,463 25,705 194,779 .. .. 114,282
2008 49,454 97,047 27,347 213,436 .. .. 121,969
2009 51,831 152,197 23,117 167,287 .. .. 124,116
2010 50,073 125,651 27,574 174,539 .. .. 132,604
2011 52,107 110,803 25,139 209,918 .. .. 141,151
2012 63,428 62,380 21,943 236,609 .. .. 144,085
2013 68,730 48,019 22,781 211,760 .. .. 151,118
2014 .. .. .. .. .. .. 155,717
a Average of headcount at the end of the month. Includes the pre-pension allowance (2000).
b This scheme changed substantially in July 2006, therefore figures for 2006 are given for the period 
July-December 2006.
c The average net wage refers to the entire economy, competitive sector after 2001: firms with at least 4 
employees.
Source: KSH: Welfare systems 2007, Welfare Statistics, Yearbook of Demographics. KSH Social Statistics 
Yearbooks. KSH Stadat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_02
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Table 11.3.a: Number of those receiving pensiona, and the mean sum of the provisions they received  
in January of the given year
Year
Old age pension Disability pension under and above retirement age
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, 
HUF
Average amount 
after increase,  
HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, 
HUF
Average amount 
after increase,  
HUF
2002 1,664,062 43,368 47,561 789,544 37,369 40,972
2003 1,657,271 50,652 54,905 799,966 43,185 46,801
2004 1,637,847 57,326 60,962 806,491 48,180 51,220
2005 1,643,409 63,185 67,182 808,107 52,259 55,563
2006 1,658,387 69,145 72,160 806,147 56,485 58,935
2007 1,676,477 74,326 78,577 802,506 59,978 63,120
2008 1,716,315 81,975 87,481 794,797 65,036 69,160
2009 1,731,213 90,476 93,256 779,130 70,979 73,166
2010 1,719,001 94,080 98,804 750,260 73,687 77,500
2011 1,700,800 99,644 104,014 721,973 77,945 81,367
2012 1,959,202b 99,931 104,610 302,990c .. ..
a Pension: Excludes survivors pensions.
b From 2012 onwards, the disability pensions of persons older than the mandatory retirement 
age are granted as old-age pensions.
c Excludes persons older than the mandatory retirement age.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_03a
Table 11.3.b: Number of those receiving pensiona, and the mean sum of the provisions they received  
in January of the given year, from 2012
Type of benefit
2012 2013 2014
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount 
before in-
crease, HUF
Average 
amount 
after in-
crease, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount 
before in-
crease, HUF
Average 
amount 
after in-
crease, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount 
before in-
crease, HUF
Average 
amount 
after in-
crease, HUF
Old age pension 1,959,202 99,931 104,610 2,000,128 107,236 112,781 2,037,126 113,063 115,786
– Old age pension of per-
sons above the manda-
tory retirement ageb
1,884,583 102,332 107,138 1,900,661 109,841 115,521 1,925,103 112,700 115,416
– Pension for women enti-
tled to retire before the 
mandatory age after 
having accumulated at 
least 40 accrual years
62,955 102,402 106,731 90,166 109,803 115,474 105,172 114,035 116,753
– Old age pension of per-
sons younger than the 
mandatory retirement age
11,664 174,326 182,542 9,301 188,664 198,473 6,851 200,081 204,882
a Pension: Excludes survivors pensions. From 2012 onwards, no old-age pension is granted to 
persons younger than the mandatory retirement age. Exceptions are pensions for women 
having accumulated 40 or more accrual years.
b From 2012 onwards, the disability pensions of persons older than the mandatory retirement 
age are granted as old-age pensions.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_03b
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Table 11.4.a: Number of those receiving social annuities for people with damaged health,  
and the mean sum of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Temporary annuity Regular social annuity Health damage annuity  for miners Total
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
2002 11,523 26,043 200,980 17,645 3,348 59,558 215,851 18,744
2003 12,230 30,135 203,656 19,907 3,345 65,380 219,231 21,171
2004 11,949 33,798 207,300 21,370 2,950 69,777 222,199 22,681
2005 13,186 36,847 207,091 22,773 2,839 74,161 223,116 24,259
2006 14,945 40,578 195,954 23,911 2,786 77,497 213,685 25,776
2007 19,158 42,642 184,845 25,050 2,693 80,720 206,696 27,406
2008 21,538 46,537 170,838 27,176 2,601 85,805 194,977 30,096
2009 21,854 46,678 159,146 27,708 2,533 86,165 183,533 30,774
2010 20,327 47,060 148,704 27,645 2,448 86,252 171,479 30,783
2011 16,448 47,096 139,277 27,588 2,371 86,411 158,096 30,500
Disability pensions and temporary provisions for disability groups 1–2, granted prior to 2012, 
have been transformed to ’disability allotments’. The provisions for permanent social benefit 
recipients born before 1955 have also been transformed to ’disability allotments’. Disability 
pensions and permanent social benefits granted before 2012 to the members of disability 
group 3 have been transformed to ’rehabilitation allotment’. The conditions of these provi-
sions will be set in the framework of a complex revision of entitlement and eligibility.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_04a
Table 11.4.b: Number of those receiving social annuities for people with damaged health,  
and the mean sum of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year, from 2013
Support for disabled persons
2013 2014
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, 
HUF
Average amount 
after increase, 
HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, 
HUF
Average amount 
after increase, 
HUF
Disability and rehabilitation 
provision 444,014 62,780 66,035 418,617 64,811 66,364
– Disability provision for per-
sons older than the manda-
tory retirement age
41,162 63,260 66,542 52,186 71,362 73,077
– Disability provision for per-
sons younger than the man-
datory retirement
209,264 70,753 74,422 198,312 71,783 73,503
– Rehabilitation provision 178,112 51,718 54,398 161,761 53,262 54,538
– Rehabilitation benefit 13,265 80,101 84,256 4,153 84,886 86,919
– Annuity for miners with 
damaged health 2,211 86,455 90,915 2,205 92,174 94,369
Disability pensions and temporary provisions for disability groups 1–2, granted prior to 2012, 
have been transformed to ’disability allotments’. The provisions for permanent social benefit 
recipients born before 1955 have also been transformed to ’disability allotments’. Disability 
pensions and permanent social benefits granted before 2012 to the members of disability 
group 3 have been transformed to ’rehabilitation allotment’. The conditions of these provi-
sions will be set in the framework of a complex revision of entitlement and eligibility.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_04b
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Table 11.5: The median age for retirement and the number of pensioners
Pension
Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Females
Old age and similar pensions 57.7 45,115 57.5 46,093 57.8 62,015 57.3 39,290 59.9 15,243
Pension for women entitled to retire before the 
mandatory age after having accumulated at 
least 40 accrual years
– – – – – – – – – –
Disability and accident-related disability pension 49.1 19,250 49.3 18,488 49.8 15,837 50.5 8,565 51.1 9,065
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – – – 44.1 1,604 44.9 6,574
Total 55.1 64,365 55.2 64,581 56.2 77,852 55.7 49,459 54.1 30,882
Males
Old age and similar 59.9 30,560 59.9 33,134 59.7 50,878 59.8 25,749 59.7 37,116
Disability and accident-related disability pension 50.5 24,565 50.6 23,045 51.1 19,032 51.9 11,069 52.3 11,992
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – – – 44.5 1,556 44.8 6,278
Total 55.7 55,125 56.1 56,179 57.4 69,910 56.9 38,374 56.4 55,386
Together
Old age and similar pensions 58.6 75,675 58.5 79,227 58.7 112,893 58.3 65,039 59.7 52,359
Disability and accident-related disability pension 49.9 43,815 50.0 41,533 50.5 34,869 51.3 19,634 51.8 21,057
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – – – 44.3 3,160 44.9 12,852
Total 55.4 119,490 55.6 120,760 56.8 147,762 56.2 87,833 55.6 86,268
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014a
Females
Old age and similar pensions 60.7 13,617 58.5 84,922 59.1 53,581 59.5 40,616 59.3 35,565
Pension for women entitled to retire before the 
mandatory age after having accumulated at 
least 40 accrual years
– – 57.6 54,770 57.8 27,588 57.8 24,633 58.2 26,512
Disability and accident-related disability pension 50.8 10,478 50.7 8,667 – – – – – –
Rehabilitation annuity 47.6 6,789 47.2 4,386 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Total 54.4 30,884 57.3 97,975 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Males
Old age and similar pensions 60.2 37,219 60.3 43,240 62.0 21,996 62.2 21,639 62.2 14,751
Disability and accident-related disability pension 52.1 13,345 51.9 10,673 – – – – – –
Rehabilitation annuity 47.4 6,123 47.0 4,102 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Total 56.9 56,687 57.8 58,015 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Together
Old age and similar pensions 60.3 50,836 59.0 128,162 60.0 75,577 60.5 62,255 60.1 50,316
Disability and accident-related disability pension 51.5 23,823 51.3 19,340 – – – – – –
Rehabilitation annuity 47.5 12,912 47.1 8,488 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Total 56.0 87,571 57.5 155,990 .. .. .. .. .. ..
a Preliminary data.
Note: The source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the 
ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the data for the armed forces and the police. 
Data on MÁV is included from 2008.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_05
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Table 11.6: The number of those receiving a disability annuity and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Disability annuity
Year
Disability annuity
Number of re-
cipients
Average amount, 
HUF
Number of re-
cipients
Average amount, 
HUF
2001 25,490 18,220 2008 30,677 32,709
2002 26,350 20,931 2009 31,263 33,434
2003 27,058 23,884 2010 31,815 33,429
2004 27,923 25,388 2011 32,314 33,429
2005 28,738 27,257 2012 32,560 33,426
2006 29,443 28,720 2013 32,463 33,422
2007 30,039 30,219 2014 32,497 33,422
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_06
Table 11.7: Newly determined disability pension claims and detailed data  
on the number of newly determined old-age pension claims
Year
Disability and acci-
dent-related dis-
ability pensions
Old-age and old-age type pensionsa From the total: at the age limit From the total: under the age limit
Total Male Female Together Male Female Together Male Female Together
1998 42,975 12,908 17,841 30,749 385 882 1,267 11,461 15,244 26,705
1999 46,701 15,181 24,418 39,599 2,601 5,808 8,409 11,494 16,922 28,416
2000 55,558 18,071 29,526 47,597 613 813 1,426 16,089 26,859 42,948
2001 54,645 28,759 14,267 43,026 2,200 4,882 7,082 25,175 7,396 32,571
2002 52,211 30,209 25,719 55,928 2,593 646 3,239 26,346 23,503 49,849
2003 48,078 32,574 13,574 46,148 3,058 5,098 8,156 28,064 6,537 34,601
2004 44,196 35,940 36,684 72,624 3,842 989 4,831 30,234 33,817 64,051
2005 41,057 33,175 48,771 81,946 4,035 6,721 10,756 27,719 40,142 67,861
2006 36,904 34,207 47,531 81,738 4,013 732 4,745 29,025 45,675 74,700
2007 34,991 51,037 62,168 113,205 3,722 6,660 10,382 45,731 54,177 99,908
2008 19,832 25,912 39,423 65,335 3,154 288 3,442 22,180 38,761 60,941
2009 21,681 37,468 15,468 52,936 4,193 6,692 10,885 32,452 8,289 40,741
2010 24,094 37,394 13,719 51,113 6,350 7,213 13,563 29,990 5,801 35,791
2011 19,340 43,240 84,922 128,162 9,058 7,938 16,996 32,400 76,019 108,419
2012 – 21,996 53,581 75,577 11,054 9,471 20,525 8,317 42,624 50,941
2013 – 21,639 40,616 62,255 18,906 13,439 32,345 344 25,659 26,003
2014b – 14,751 35,565 50,316 11,963 7,672 19,635 749 26,616 27,365
a Before 2012 old-age type pensions include: old-age pensions given with a retirement age 
threshhold allowance (early retirement), artists’ pensions, pre-pension up until 1997, miners’ 
pensions. From 2012 onwards the data include the recipients of allowances substituting 
(abolished) early retirement pensions.
b Preliminary data.
Note: Pensions disbursed in the given year (determined according to the given year’s rules). 
The source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF 
(NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the data for the armed forces and the police.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_07
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Table 11.8: Retirement age threshhold
Birth year
Calendar year
20 
09
20 
10
20 
11
20 
12
20 
13
20 
14 
 I.
20 
14 
 II.
20 
15 
 I.
20 
15 
 II.
20 
16
20 
17 
 I.
20 
17 
 II.
20 
18 
 I.
20 
18 
 II.
20 
19
20 
20 
 I.
20 
20 
 II.
20 
21 
 I.
20 
21 
 II.
20 
22
20 
23
20 
24
1948 61 62 63 64 65 66 66 67 67 68 69 69 70 70 71 72 72 73 73 74 75 76
1949 60 61 62 63 64 65 65 66 66 67 68 68 69 69 70 71 71 72 72 73 74 75
1950 59 60 61 62 63 64 64 65 65 66 67 67 68 68 69 70 70 71 71 72 73 74
1951 58 59 60 61 62 63 63 64 64 65 66 66 67 67 68 69 69 70 70 71 72 73
1952 I. 57 58 59 60 61 62 62.5 63 63.5 64 65 65.5 66 66.5 67 68 68.5 69 69.5 70 71 72
1952 II. 57 58 59 60 61 61.5 62 62.5 63 64 64.5 65 65.5 66 67 67.5 68 68.5 69 70 71 72
1953 56 57 58 59 60 61 61 62 62 63 64 64 65 65 66 67 67 68 68 69 70 71
1954 I. 55 56 57 58 59 60 60 61 61.5 62 63 63.5 64 64.5 65 66 66.5 67 67.5 68 69 70
1954 II. 55 56 57 58 59 59.5 60 61 61 62 62.5 63 63.5 64 65 65.5 66 66.5 67 68 69 70
1955 54 55 56 57 58 59 59 60 60 61 61 62 63 63 64 65 65 66 66 67 68 69
1956 I. 53 54 55 56 57 58 58.5 59 59.5 60 61 61.5 62 62.5 63 64 64.5 65 65.5 66 67 68
1956 II. 53 54 55 56 57 58 58 59 59 60 60.5 61 61.5 62 63 63.5 64 64.5 65 66 67 68
1957 52 53 54 55 56 57 57 58 58 59 60 60 61 61 62 63 63 64 64 65 66 67
1958 51 52 53 54 55 56 56 57 57 58 59 59 60 60 61 62 62 63 63 64 65 66
1959 50 51 52 53 54 55 55 56 56 57 58 58 59 59 60 61 61 62 62 63 64 65
1960 49 50 51 52 53 54 54 55 55 56 57 57 58 58 59 60 60 61 61 62 63 64
Those persons are entitled to receive an old age pension who are at least of the age of the old 
age pension threshold indicated in the legislature – marked grey in the table – relevant to 
them (uniform for men and women), who have fulfilled the required number of years of ser-
vice, and who are not insured. In the case of old age pension, the minimum service time is 15 
years. The table displays the old age pension age threshold in the case of a “representative 
person”. The cells show the age, based on the calendar year, of a person born in the given year.
Women who have accumulated at least 40 accrual years are entitled to a full old age pension, 
regardless of their age. Following December 31, 2011 (legislature number CLXVII/2011) no 
pension can be granted prior to the old-age threshold. At the same time, the legislature con-
tinues to provide previously determined allowances under different legal titles (pre-retire-
ment age provision, service salary, allotments for miners and ballet dancers).
Prior to 2012, early retirement pensions included the following allowances : early and reduced-
amount early retirement pensions, pensions with age preference, miner’s pension, artist’s 
pension, pre-retirement age old age pension of Hungarian and EU MPs and mayors, pre-pen-
sion, service pension of professional members of the armed forces.
Source: 1997. legislature number LXXXI.; 2011. legislature number CLXVII., http://www.
ado.hu/rovatok/tb-nyugdij/nyudijkorhatar-elotti-ellatasok.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent11_08.
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Table 12.1: The mean, minimum, and maximum value of the  
personal income tax rate, per cent
Year
Mean tax burden, per cent
The personal income tax rate projected on the gross 
wage
minimum maximum
1988 .. 0 60
1989 .. 0 56
1990 .. 0 50
1991 .. 0 50
1992 .. 0 40
1993 .. 0 40
1994 .. 0 44
1995 .. 0 44
1996 .. 20 48
1997 .. 20 42
1998 .. 20 42
1999 .. 20 40
2000 .. 20 40
2001 .. 20 40
2002 .. 20 40
2003 .. 20 40
2004 .. 18 38
2005 18.89 18 38
2006 19.03 18 36
2007 18.63 18 36
2008 18.86 18 36
2009 18.10 18 36
2010a 16.34 21.59 40.64
2011a 13.78 20.32 20.32
2012b 14.90 16 20.32
2013 .. 16 16
2014 .. 16 16
2015 .. 16 16
a In 2010 the nominal tax rate was 17% for annual incomes lower than 5,000,000 HUF. For 
incomes higher than 5,000,001 HUF it was 850,000 HUF plus 32% of the amount exceeding 
5,000,000 HUF. In 2011, the nominal tax rate was 16%. The joint tax base is the amount of 
income appended with the tax base supplement (equal to 27%).
b In 2012 the nominal tax rate was 16%. The joint tax base is the amount of income appended 
with the tax base supplement.
The amount of the tax base supplement:
– does not need to be determined for the part of the income included in the joint tax base that 
does not surpass 2 million 424 thousand HUF,
– should be determined as 27 % of the part of the income included in the joint tax base that is 
over 2 million 424 thousand HUF.
Source: Mean tax burden: http://nav.gov.hu/nav/szolgaltatasok/adostatisztikak/szemelyi_jo-
vedelemado/szemelyijovedelemado_adostatiszika.html. Other data: http://nav.gov.hu/nav/
szolgaltatasok/adokulcsok_jarulekmertekek/adotablak.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent12_01
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Table 12.2: Changes in the magnitude of the tax wedge in the case of minimum wage  
and the temporary work booklet (AMK)
Year
Minimum wage
Total wage cost in 
the case of mini-
mum wage Minimum 
wage tax 
wedge, %
AMK public bur-
dena, HUF/day
Total wage costa, 
HUF/day AMK tax wedge, %
a
gross, 
HUF/
month
gross, 
HUF/day
net, 
HUF/
month
net, 
HUF/day
HUF/
month HUF/day general
regis-
tered 
unem-
ployed
general
regis-
tered 
unem-
ployed
general
regis-
tered 
unem-
ployed
1997 17,000 783 15,045 693 26,450 1,196 43.1 500 500 1,193 1,193 41.9 41.9
1998 19,500 899 17,258 795 30,297 1,369 43.0 500 500 1,295 1,295 38.6 38.6
1999 22,500 1,037 18,188 838 34,538 1,546 47.3 500 500 1,338 1,338 37.4 37.4
2000 25,500 1,175 20,213 931 38,963 1,746 48.1 800 800 1,731 1,731 46.2 46.2
2001 40,000 1,843 30,000 1,382 58,400 2,638 48.6 1,600 1,600 2,982 2,982 53.6 53.6
2002 50,000 2,304 36,750 1,694 71,250 3,226 48.4 1,000 500 2,694 2,194 37.1 22.8
2003 50,000 2,304 42,750 1,970 70,200 3,191 39.1 1,000 500 2,970 2,470 33.7 20.2
2004 53,000 2,442 45,845 2,113 74,205 3,376 38.2 1,000 500 3,113 2,613 32.1 19.1
2005 57,000 2,627 49,305 2,272 79,295 3,572 37.8 700 500 2,972 2,772 23.6 18.0
2006 62,500 2,880 54,063 2,491 85,388 3,910 36.7 700 700 3,191 3,191 21.9 21.9
2007 65,500 3,018 53,915 2,485 89,393 4,095 39.7 700 700 3,185 3,185 22.0 22.0
2008 69,000 3,180 56,190 2,589 94,065 4,310 40.3 900 900 3,489 3,489 25.8 25.8
2009 71,500 3,295 57,815 2,664 97,403b 4,464 40.6 900 900 3,564 3,564 25.3 25.3
2010 73,500 3,387 60,236 2,776 94,448 4,352 36.2 900 900 3,676 3,676 24.5 24.5
Minimum wage
Total wage cost in 
the case of mini-
mum wage
Minimum 
wage tax 
wedge, %
Simplified employ-
mentc, Ft/day
Total wage cost, 
HUF/day
Tax wedge, simpli-
fied employment, %
gross, 
HUF/
month
gross, 
HUF/day
net, 
HUF/
month
net, 
HUF/day
HUF/
month HUF/day
tempo-
rary work
seasonal 
agricul-
tural/
tourism 
work
tempo-
rary work
seasonal 
agricul-
tural/
tourism 
work
tempo-
rary work
seasonal 
agricul-
tural/
tourism 
work
2011 78,000 3,594 60,600 2,793 100,230 4,619 39.5 1,000 500 3,793 3,293 26.4 15.2
2012 93,000 4,280 60,915 2,803 119,505 5,500 49.0 1,000 500 3,803 3,303 26.3 15.1
2013 98,000 4,510 64,190 2,954 125,930 5,795 49.0 1,000 500 3,954 3,454 25.3 14.4
2014 101,500 4,670 66,483 3,059 130,428 6,001 49.0 1,000 500 3,600 3,100 24.6 14.0
2015 105,000 4,830 68,775 3,164 134,925 6,207 49.0 1,000 500 3,689 3,189 24.0 13.6
a Wage paid at the amount in accordance with the gross daily minimum wage column and in 
the case of work performed with a temporary work booklet. The basis for the comparison 
with the minimum wage is the assumption that employers pay temporary workers the small-
est possible amount.
b According to regulations pertaining to the first half of 2009.
c From April 1st, 2010. the temporary work booklets and the public contribution tickets were 
discontinued, these were replaced by simplified employment.
Note: The tax wedge is the quotient of the total public burden (tax and contribution) and the 
total wage cost, it is calculated as: tax wedge = (total wage cost – net wage)/total wage cost.
Source: Minimum wage: 1990–91: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_
qli041.html. Public contribution ticket: 1997. legislation number LXXIV. Simplified em-
ployment: 2010. legislation number LXXV. Data for 2014–2015: http://www.afsz.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=allaskeresoknek_ellatasok_osszegei_es_kozterhei, http://officina.hu/
gazdasag/93-minimalber-2015, http://nav.gov.hu. Based on calculations of Ágota Scharle.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent12_02
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Table 12.3: The monthly amount of the minimum wage, the guaranteed wage minimum, 
and the minimum pension, in thousands of current-year HUF
Date
Monthly amount 
of the minimum 
wage, HUF
As a percentage 
of mean gross 
earnings
As a ratio of APW, 
%
Guaranteed 
skilled workers 
minimum wage, 
HUF
Minimum pen-
sion, HUF
1990. II. 1. 4,800 .. 40.9 – 4,300
1991. IV.1. 7,000 .. .. – 5,200
1992. I. 1. 8,000 35.8 41.4 – 5,800
1993. II. 1. 9,000 33.1 39.7 – 6,400
1994. II. 1. 10,500 30.9 37.8 – 7,367
1995. III. 1. 12,200 31.4 37.0 – 8,400
1996. II. 1. 14,500 31.0 35.8 – 9,600
1997. I. 1. 17,000 29.7 35.1 – 11,500
1998. I. 1. 19,500 28.8 34.4 – 13,700
1999. I. 1. 22,500 29.1 34.6 – 15,350
2000. I. 1. 25,500 29.1 35.0 – 16,600
2001. I. 1. 40,000 38.6 48.3 – 18,310
2002. I. 1. 50,000 40.8 54.5 – 20,100
2003. I. 1. 50,000 36.4 51.5 – 21,800
2004. I. 1. 53,000 37.2 50.7 – 23,200
2005. I. 1. 57,000 33.6 49.2 – 24,700
2006. I. 1. 62,500 36.5 52.3 68,000 25,800
2007. I. 1. 65,500 35.4 49.3 75,400 27,130
2008. I. 1. 69,000 34.7 49.5 86,300 28,500
2009. I. 1. 71,500 35.8 50.0 87,500 28,500
2010. I. I. 73,500 36.3 48.6 89,500 28,500
2011. I. I. 78,000 36.6 49.8 94,000 28,500
2012. I. I. 93,000 41.7 54.3 108,000 28,500
2013. I. I. 98,000 42.5 55.1 114,000 28,500
2014. I. I. 101,500 42.7 .. 118,000 28,500
2015. I. I. 105,000 .. .. 122,000 28,500
Notes: Up to the year 1999, sectors employing unskilled labour usually received an extension 
of a few months for introducing the new minimum wage. 
The guaranteed wage minimum applies to skilled employees, the minimum wage and the 
skilled workers minimum wage are gross amounts. 
The minimum wage is exempt from the personal income tax from September 2002. This policy 
resulted in a 15.9% increase in the net minimum wage. 
APW: mean wage of workers in the processing industry, based on the NFSZ BT. In 1990, the 
data is the previous year’s data, indexed (since there was no NFSZ BT conducted in 1990).
Source: Minimum wage: 1990–91: http://www.mszosz.hu/files/1/64/345.pdf, 1992–: CSO. 
Guaranteed wage minimum: http://www.nav.gov.hu/nav/szolgaltatasok/adokulcsok_jarule-
kmertekek/minimalber_garantalt. Minimum pension: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xtab-
la/nyugdij/tablny11_03.html. APW: NFSZ BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent12_03
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Table 12.4: The tax burden on work as a ratio of tax revenue and earnings
Year
Tax burden on work 
as a ratio of  
tax revenuea, %
Implicit tax rateb
Tax wedge on 67% 
level of  
mean earnings
Tax wedge on the 
minimum wagec
1990 .. .. 38.2
1991 52.4 .. .. 40.4
1992 54.8 .. .. 40.9
1993 54.4 .. .. 42.3
1994 53.7 .. .. 41.2
1995 52.1 42.3 .. 44.2
1996 52.5 42.1 .. 41.8
1997 54.2 42.5 .. 43.1
1998 53.1 41.8 .. 43.0
1999 51.5 41.9 .. 47.3
2000 48.7 41.4 51.4 48.1
2001 49.8 40.9 50.9 48.6
2002 50.3 41.2 48.2 48.4
2003 48.8 39.3 44.6 39.1
2004 47.8 38.3 44.8 38.2
2005 48.9 38.4 43.1 37.8
2006 49.1 38.9 43.3 36.7
2007 49.7 41.0 46.1 39.7
2008 51.4 42.3 46.8 40.3
2009 48.2 40.2 46.2 40.6d
2010 47.3 38.4 43.8 36.2
2011 47.3 38.2 45.2 39.5
2012 46.4 39.8 47.9 49.0
2013 .. .. 49.0 49.0
2014 .. .. 49.0 49.0
2015 .. .. .. 49.0
a Tax burden on work and contributions as a ratio of tax revenue from all tax forms.
b The implicit tax rate is the quotient of the revenue from taxes and contributions pertaining to 
work and the income derived from work.
c The tax wedge is the quotient of the total public burden (tax and contribution) and the total 
wage cost, it is calculated as: tax wedge = (total wage cost – net wage)/total wage cost.
d The tax wedge of the minimum wage is the 2009 annual mean (the contributions decreased 
in June).
Source: 1991–1995: estimate of Ágota Scharle based on Ministry of Finance (PM) balance 
sheet data. 1996–2009: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/econom-
ic_analysis/tax_structures/index_en.htm. 2010: Eurostat online database. Implicit tax rate: 
Eurostat online database (gov_a_tax_itr). Tax wedge on the 67 percent level of the mean 
wage: OECD: Taxing wages 2010, Paris 2011, tax wedge at the level of the minimum wage: 
calculations of Ágota Scharle.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent12_04
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Table 13.1: Employment and unemployment rate of population  
aged 15–64 by gender in the EU, 2014
Country
Employment rate Unemployment rate
males females together males females together
Austria 75.2 66.9 71.1 5.9 5.4 5.6
Belgium 65.8 57.9 61.9 9.0 7.9 8.5
Bulgaria 63.9 58.2 61.0 12.3 10.4 11.4
Cyprus 66.0 58.6 62.1 17.1 15.1 16.1
Czech Republic 77.0 60.7 69.0 5.1 7.4 6.1
Denmark 75.8 69.8 72.8 6.4 6.8 6.6
United Kingdom 76.8 67.1 71.9 6.4 5.8 6.1
Estonia 73.0 66.3 69.6 7.9 6.8 7.4
Finland 69.5 68.0 68.7 9.3 8.0 8.7
France 67.6 60.9 64.2 10.1 9.6 9.9
Greece 58.0 41.1 49.4 23.7 30.2 26.5
Netherlands 78.6 69.1 73.9 7.0 6.6 6.8
Croatia 59.1 50.0 54.6 16.5 18.3 17.3
Ireland 66.9 56.7 61.7 12.9 9.4 11.3
Poland 68.2 55.2 61.7 8.5 9.6 9.0
Latvia 68.4 64.3 66.3 11.8 9.8 10.8
Lithuania 66.5 64.9 65.7 12.2 9.2 10.7
Luxembourg 72.6 60.5 66.6 5.9 5.8 5.9
Hungary 67.8 55.9 61.8 7.6 7.9 7.7
Malta 74.9 49.3 62.3 6.2 5.4 5.9
Germany 78.1 69.5 73.8 5.3 4.6 5.0
Italy 64.7 46.8 55.7 11.9 13.8 12.7
Portugal 65.8 59.6 62.6 13.7 14.5 14.1
Romania 68.7 53.3 61.0 7.3 6.1 6.8
Spain 60.7 51.2 56.0 23.6 25.4 24.5
Sweden 76.5 73.1 74.9 8.2 7.7 8.0
Slovakia 67.6 54.3 61.0 12.8 13.6 13.2
Slovenia 67.5 60.0 63.9 9.0 10.6 9.7
EU-28 70.1 59.6 64.9 10.1 10.2 10.2
Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent13_01
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Table 13.2: Employment composition of the countries in the EUa, 2014
Country
Self em-
ployedb Part time
Fixed term 
contract Agriculture Industry
Market 
services
Non market 
servicesc
Austria 11.2 27.7 9.1 4.7 25.8 41.5 28.0
Belgium 13.6 24.0 8.7 1.2 21.4 40.4 37.0
Bulgaria 11.8 2.6 5.3 7.0 30.1 40.3 22.5
Cyprus 15.9 14.0 18.9 4.3 16.4 47.8 31.4
Czech Republic 17.4 6.2 10.1 2.8 38.1 35.2 24.0
Denmark 8.7 25.5 8.5 2.5 19.2 39.3 38.7
United Kingdom 14.7 26.6 6.4 1.2 18.9 43.7 35.4
Estonia 8.9 9.6 3.2 3.9 30.1 39.2 26.7
Finland 13.5 15.4 15.5 4.2 21.8 39.2 34.3
France 11.0 18.9 15.8 2.8 20.5 39.0 36.7
Greece 31.2 9.4 11.6 13.5 15.0 43.8 27.7
Netherlands 16.1 50.5 21.6 2.1 14.9 42.5 32.7
Croatia 14.0 6.0 16.9 9.3 27.0 38.5 25.0
Ireland 16.3 23.4 9.3 5.4 18.3 45.1 31.1
Poland 18.2 7.6 28.4 11.4 30.5 34.4 23.4
Latvia 10.7 7.4 3.3 7.5 23.8 42.0 26.6
Lithuania 10.8 9.0 2.8 9.1 24.5 39.5 26.4
Luxembourg 8.2 18.9 8.2 1.4 10.8 43.8 41.9
Hungary 10.6 6.4 10.8 4.7 30.4 36.7 27.9
Malta 13.8 16.4 7.7 1.3 21.3 45.6 31.6
Germany 10.4 27.5 13.1 1.4 28.1 39.6 30.9
Italy 23.1 18.3 13.6 3.6 26.9 41.0 28.5
Portugal 18.0 12.1 21.4 7.5 24.2 38.2 30.1
Romania 20.5 10.0 1.5 28.3 28.9 27.7 15.1
Spain 17.0 15.9 24.0 4.2 19.5 45.8 30.5
Sweden 10.1 26.2 17.5 2.0 18.5 40.9 38.1
Slovakia 15.3 5.2 8.9 3.5 35.4 34.5 26.5
Slovenia 12.5 10.8 16.6 8.9 31.0 35.0 24.5
EU-28 15.0 20.3 14.0 4.6 24.1 40.0 30.7
a Per cent of employment, except for employees with fixed-term contracts: per cent of em-
ployees.
b Includes the members of cooperatives and business partnerships.
c One-digit industries O-U.
Source: Eurostat (Newcronos) Labour Force Survey.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2015ent13_02
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The data have two main sources in terms of which of-
fice gathered them: the regular institutional and pop-
ulation surveys of the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office (CSO, in Hungarian: Központi Statisztikai Hi-
vatal, KSH), and the register and surveys of the Na-
tional Employment Service (in Hungarian: Nemzeti 
Foglalkoztatási Szolgálat, NFSZ).
MAIN DATA SOURCES OF THE KSH
Labour Force Survey – KSH MEF
The KSH has been conducting a new statistical survey 
since January 1992 to obtain ongoing information on 
the labour force status of the Hungarian population. 
The MEF is a household survey which provides quar-
terly information on the non-institutional population 
aged 15–74. The aim of the survey is to observe employ-
ment and unemployment according to international 
statistical recommendations based on the concepts and 
definitions recommended by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), independently from existing na-
tional labour regulations or their changes.
In international practice, the labour force survey is 
a widely used statistical tool to provide simultaneous, 
comprehensive, and systematic monitoring of employ-
ment, unemployment, and underemployment. The sur-
vey techniques minimise the subjective bias in classi-
fication (since people surveyed are classified by strict 
criteria), and provide freedom to also consider national 
characteristics.
In the MEF, the surveyed population is divided into 
two main groups according to the economic activity 
performed by them during the reference week (up to 
the year 2003, this was always on the week contain-
ing the 12th of the month): economically active per-
sons (labour force), and economically inactive persons.
The group of economically active persons consists of 
those in the labour market either as employed or unem-
ployed persons during the reference week.
The definitions used in the survey follow ILO rec-
ommendations. According to these, those designated 
employed are persons who, during the reference week 
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worked one hour or more earning some form of income, 
or had a job from which they were only temporarily ab-
sent (on leave, illness, etc.).
Work providing income includes all activities that:
– result in monetary income, payment in kind, or
– that were carried out in the hopes of income realized 
in the future, or
– were performed without payment in a family business 
or on a farm (i.e. unpaid family workers).
From the survey’s point of view the activities below 
are not considered as work:
– work done without payment for another household 
or institution (voluntary work),
– building or renovating of an own house or flat, intern-
ships tied to education (not even if it is compensated),
– housework, including work in the garden. Work on 
a person’s own land is only considered to generate 
income if the results are sold in the market, not pro-
duced for self-consumption.
Persons on child-care leave are classified – based on 
the 1995 ILO recommendations for transitional coun-
tries determined in Prague – according to their activ-
ity during the survey week.
Since, according to the system of national account-
ing, defense activity contributes to the national prod-
uct, conscripts are generally considered as economi-
cally active persons, any exceptions are marked in the 
footnotes of the table. The data regarding the num-
ber of conscripts comes from administrative sourc-
es. (The retrospective time-series based on CSO data 
exclude conscripted soldiers. This adjustment affects 
the data until 2003, when military conscription was 
abolished.)
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15–74 who:
– were without work, i.e. neither had a job nor were at 
work (for one hour or more) in paid employment or 
self-employment during the reference week,
– had actively looked for work at any time in the four 
weeks up to the end of the reference week,
– were available for work within two weeks following 
the reference week if they found an appropriate job.
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Those who do not have a job, but are waiting to start 
a new job within 30 days (since 2003 within 90 days) 
make up a special group of the unemployed.
Active job search includes: contacting a public or 
private employment office to find a job, applying to an 
employer directly, inserting, reading, answering adver-
tisements, asking friends, relatives or other methods.
The labour force (i.e. economically active population) 
comprises employed and unemployed persons.
Persons are defined economically inactive (i.e. not 
in the labour force) if they were neither employed in 
regular, income-earning jobs, nor searching for a job, 
or, if they had searched, had not yet started work. Pas-
sive unemployed are included here – those who would 
like a job, but have given up any active search for work, 
because they do not believe that they have a chance of 
finding any.
The MEF is based on a multi-stage stratified sample 
design. The stages of sampling are defined as follows: 
primary sampling units (PSUs) are enumeration dis-
tricts (EDs) and secondary sampling units (SSUs) are 
dwellings in settlements with 15,000 or more inhabit-
ants, while PSUs are settlements, SSUs are EDs and ul-
timate sampling units are dwellings in all other cases. 
In the MEF sample design strata are defined in terms 
of geographic units, size categories of settlements and 
area types such as city centres, outskirts, etc.
The size of the sample means that the main indica-
tors of the labour market are representative in terms of 
regions (NUTS2) as well. The quarterly MEF sample 
includes a sample of three randomly selected dwell-
ings, and labour market information is collected from 
one household each month. From 1998, the quarterly 
sample contains about 33,000 households and 66,000 
persons. The sample has a simple rotation pattern: any 
household entering the sample at some time is expected 
to provide labour market information for six consecu-
tive quarters, then leave the sample permanently. The 
intersection of the samples of two consecutive periods 
tend to be less than the 5/6th that would be obtained 
at a 100 per cent response rate.
Since 2003, the weights used to make the sample 
representative are based on the 2001 census popula-
tion record base. At the same time, the 2001–2002 data 
was recalculated and replaced as well. The LFS-based 
time series published in this volume use the following 
weighting schemes: (i) in 1992–1997 the weights are 
based on the 1990 Census (ii) in 1998–2001 the weights 
based on the 1990 Census have been corrected using 
data of the 2001 Census (iii) in 2002–2005 the weights 
are based on the 2001 Census (iv) from 2006 onwards 
the weights based on the 2001 Census have been cor-
rected using the 2011 Census.
Institution-Based Labour Statistics – KSH IMS
The source of the earnings data is the monthly (annual) 
institutional labour statistical survey. The sample frame 
covers enterprises with at least 5 employees, and pub-
lic and social insurance and non-profit institutions ir-
respective of the staff numbers of employees.
The earnings data relate to the full-time employees 
on every occasion. The potential elements of the pre-
vailing monthly average earnings are: base wage, al-
lowances (including the miner’s loyalty bonus, and the 
Széchenyi and Professor’s scholarships), supplementary 
payments, bonuses, premiums, and wages and salaries 
for the 13th and further months.
Net average earnings are calculated by deducting from 
the institution’s gross average earnings the employer’s 
contributions, the personal income tax, according to the 
actual rates (i.e. taking into account the threshold con-
cerning the social security contributions and employee 
deductions). The personal income tax is calculated based 
on the actual withholding rate applied by the employ-
ers when disbursing monthly earnings in the given year.
The size and direction of the difference between the 
gross and the net (after-tax) income indexes depends 
on actual annual changes in the tax table (tax brack-
ets) and in the tax allowances. Thus the actual size of 
the differences are also influenced by the share of indi-
viduals at given firms that fall outside the bracket for 
employee allowances.
The indexes pertain to the comparable sample, tak-
ing changes in the definitions, and of the sample frame 
into account. The KSH traditionally publishes the main 
average index as the earnings growth measure. Thus 
the indicator of change in earnings reflects both the 
changes in the number of observations and the actual 
earnings changes simultaneously. The change of net real 
earnings is calculated from the ratio of net income in-
dex and the consumer price index in the same period.
Non-manual workers are persons with occupa-
tions classified by the standardized occupational code 
(FEOR) in major groups 1–4., manual workers are per-
sons with occupations classified in major groups 5–9.
KSH Strike statistics
The CSO data cover strikes with at least 10 participants 
and token strikes lasting for at least 2 hours.
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Labour Force Accounting Census – KSH MEM
Before the publication of the MEF, the annual MEM 
gave account of the total labour force in the time pe-
riod between the two censuses.
The MEM, as its name shows, is a balance-like ac-
count that compares the labour supply (human resourc-
es) to the labour demand at an ideal moment (1 Janu-
ary). Population is taken into account by economic 
activity, with a differentiation between statistical data 
of those of working age and the population outside of 
the working age. Source of data: Annual labour survey 
on employment since 1992 of enterprises and of all gov-
ernment institutions, labour force survey, census, na-
tional healthcare records, social security records, and 
company registry. Data on unemployment comes from 
the registration system of the NFSZ.
Other data sources
Census data were used for the estimation of the employ-
ment data in 1980 and 1990. The aggregate economic 
data are based on national account statistics, the con-
sumer’s and producer’s price statistics and industrial 
surveys. A detailed description of the data sources are 
to be found in the relevant publications of the KSH.
MAIN NFSZ DATA SOURCES
Unemployment (Jobseekers’) Register Database 
– NFSZ-REG
The other main source of unemployment data in Hun-
gary – and in most of the developed countries – is the 
huge database containing so called administrative re-
cords which are collected monthly and include the in-
dividual data of the registered unemployed/jobseekers.
The register actually includes all jobseekers, but from 
these, at a given point of time, only those are regarded 
as registered unemployed/jobseekers, who:
– had themselves registered with a local office of the 
NFSZ as unemployed/jobseekers (i. e. he/she has no 
job but wishes to work, for which they seek assistance 
from the labour market organisation).
– at the time of the examination (on the final day of any 
month), the person is not a pensioner or a full-time 
student, does not receive any rehabilitation provision 
or benefit, and is ready to co-operate with the local 
employment office in order to become employed (i. 
e. he/she accepts the suitable job or training offered 
to him/her, and keeps the appointments made with 
the local employment office’s placement officer/coun-
sellor/benefit administrator).
If a person included in the register is working under 
any subsidised employment programme on the clos-
ing day, or is a participant of a labour market training 
programme, her/his unemployed/jobseeker status is 
suspended.
If the client is not willing to co-operate with the lo-
cal office, he/she is removed from the register of the 
unemployed/ jobseekers.
The data – i. e. the administrative records of the reg-
ister – allow not only for the identification of date-re-
lated stock data, but also for monitoring flows, inflows 
as well as outflows, within a period.
The database contains the number of decrees pertain-
ing to the removal or suspension of jobseeking benefits, 
the number of those receiving monetary support based 
on accounting items, support transactions, the exact 
date of entry and exit and the reason for the exit (for 
example, job placement, the end of entitlement, dis-
qualification, entry into a subsidized employment pro-
gramme, etc.), as well as the financial data of jobseeking 
benefits (for example, average monthly amount, average 
support paid for the number of participants on the clos-
ing date, for exiters, and those who found placement).
The jobseeking benefit register can also monitor the 
average duration of the period of benefit allocation and 
the average monthly amount of the benefits allocated.
For the period between 1991 and 1996, the register 
also contains the stock and flow data of the recipients 
of new entrant’s unemployment benefit. Between 1997–
2005, the system also contained the recipients of pre-
retirement unemployment benefit.
Jobseeking allowance recipients: from September 1, 
2011 the conditions for determining and disbursing the 
jobseeking allowance changed. The two phases of the 
jobseeking allowance were discontinued and the peri-
od of entitlement decreased from 270 days to 90 days. 
Jobseekers needed to have at least 360 days of worktime 
counting towards entitlement in the 5 years prior to be-
coming a jobseeker (prior to September 1, 2011, this was 
365 days in the previous 4 years). Its amount is 60% of 
the allowance base, but maximum the amount of the 
smallest mandatory wage on the first day of the enti-
tlement (allowance base: the monthly average amount 
from the four calendar quarters preceding the submis-
sion of the application).
Jobseeking assistance recipients: from September 1, 
2011 the conditions for determining and disbursing the 
jobseeking assistance changed. The “a” and “b” type of 
benefit were discontinued, jobseekers can still request 
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the “c” type of benefit under the title of pre-retirement 
jobseeking benefit, but the period of entitlement (and 
depletion) of at least 140 days decreased to 90 days.
Regular social assistance recipients: those from 
among the regular registered jobseekers who are of 
active age and are in a disadvantaged labour market po-
sition, and who receive social assistance to complement 
or substitute their income. From January 1, 2009, those 
receiving regular social assistance were included in two 
categories: regular social assistance recipients, and re-
cipients of on call support. This support was replaced by 
a new type of assistance, the wage replacement support 
from January 1, 2011, then from September 1, 2011, the 
name was changed to employment substitution support. 
(Legislation III. of 1993 pertaining to social manage-
ment and social assistance).
Based on the records of labour demand needs re-
ported to the NFSZ, the stock and flow data of vacan-
cies are also processed and published for each month.
Furthermore, detailed monthly statistics of partici-
pation in the different active programmes, number of 
participants, and their inflows and outflows are also 
prepared based on the assistance disbursed.
The very detailed monthly statistics – in a breakdown 
by country, region, county, local employment office ser-
vice delivery area and community – build on the sec-
ondary processing of administrative records that are 
generated virtually as the rather important and useful 
“by-products” of the accomplishment of the NFSZ’s 
main functions (such as placement services, payment 
of benefits, active programme support, etc.).
The NFSZ (and its predecessors, i. e. NMH, OMK – 
National Labour Centre, OMMK and OMKMK) has 
published the key figures of these statistics on a month-
ly basis since 1989. The denominators of the unemploy-
ment rates calculated for the registered unemployed/
jobseekers are the economically active population data 
published by the KSH MEM.
The figures of the number of registered unemployed/
jobseekers and the registered unemployment rate are 
obviously different from the figures based on the KSH 
MEF. It is mainly the different conceptual approach, 
definition, and the fundamentally different monitor-
ing/measuring methods that account for this variance.
Short-Term Labour Market Projection Surveys 
– NFSZ PROG
At the initiative and under the coordination of the 
NFSZ (and its legal predecessors), the NFSZ PROG 
has been conducted since 1991, twice a year, in March 
and September, by interviewing over 7,500 employers. 
Since 2004 the survey is conducted once a year, in the 
month of September.
The interviews focus on the companies’ projections 
of their material and financial processes, their devel-
opment and human resource plans, and they are also 
asked about their concrete lay-off or recruitment plans, 
as well as their expected need for any active labour mar-
ket programmes.
The surveys are processed from bottom up, from the 
service delivery areas, through counties, to the whole 
country, providing useful information at all levels for 
the planning activities of the NFSZ.
The survey provides an opportunity and possibility 
for the regions, the counties and Budapest to analyse 
in greater depth (also using information from other 
sources) the major trends in their respective labour mar-
kets, to make preparations for tackling problems that 
are likely to occur in the short term, and to effectively 
meet the ever-changing needs of their clients.
The forecast is only one of the outputs of the survey. 
Further very important “by-products” include regu-
lar and personal liaison with companies, the upgraded 
skills of the placement officers and other administra-
tive personnel, enhanced awareness of the local circum-
stances, and the adequate orientation of labour market 
training programmes in view of the needs identified 
by the surveys.
The prognosis surveys are occasionally supplemented 
by supplementary questions and sets of questions to ob-
tain some further useful information that can be used 
by researchers and the decision-makers of employment 
and education/ training policy.
From 2005, the surveys are conducted in cooperation 
with the Institute for Analyses of the Economy and En-
trepreneurship of the Hungarian Chamber of Industry 
and Commerce (in Hungarian: Magyar Kereskedel-
mi és Iparkamara Gazdaság- és Vállalkozáskutató In-
tézet, MKIK GVI), with one additional benefit being 
that with the help of the surveyors of the Institute, the 
sample size has increased to nearly 8,000.
Wage Survey Database – NFSZ BT
The NFSZ (and its legal predecessors) has conducted 
since 1992, once a year, a representative survey with a 
huge sample size to investigate individual wages and 
earnings, at the request of the Ministry of National 
Economy (and its legal predecessors).
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The reference month of data collection is the month 
of May in each year, but for the calculation of the 
monthly average of irregularly paid benefits (beyond 
the base wage/salary), 1/12th of the total amount of 
such benefits received during the previous year is used.
In the competitive sector, the data collection only 
covered initially companies of over 20 persons; it was 
incumbent on all companies to provide information, 
but the sample includes only employees born on cer-
tain dates in any month of any year.
Data collection has also covered companies of 10–19 
since 1995, and companies of 5–9 have been covered 
since 2000, where the companies actually involved in 
data collection are selected at random (ca. 20 per cent), 
and the selected ones have to provide information about 
all of their full-time employees.
Data on basic wages and earnings structure can only 
be retrieved from these surveys in Hungary, thus it is, 
in practice, these huge, annually generated databases 
that can serve as the basis of the wage reconciliation 
negotiations conducted by the social partners.
In the budgetary sector, all budgetary institutions 
provide information, regardless of their size, in such a 
way that the decisive majority of the local budgetary 
institutions – the ones that are included in the TAKEH 
central payroll accounting system – provide fully com-
prehensive information, and the remaining budgetary 
institutions provide information only about their em-
ployees who were born on certain days (regarded as 
the sample).
Data has only been collected on the professional 
members of the armed forces since 1999.
Prior to 1992, such data collection took place in eve-
ry third year, thus we are in possession of an enormous 
database for the years of 1983, 1986 and also 1989.
Of the employees included in the sample, the follow-
ing data are available:
– the sector the employer operates in, headcount, em-
ployer’s local unit, type of entity, ownership structure
– employee’s wage category, job occupation, gender, 
age, educational background.
Based on the huge databases which include the data 
by individual, the data is analysed every year in the 
following ways:
– Standard data analysis, as agreed upon by the social 
partners, used for wage reconciliation negotiations 
(which is received by every confederation participat-
ing in the negotiations).
– Model calculations to determine the expected impact 
of the rise of the minimum wage.
– Analyses to meet the needs of the Wage Policy De-
partment, Ministry of National Resources, for the 
analysis and presentation of wage ratios
– Analyses for the four volume statistical yearbook (to-
tal national economy, competitive sector, budgetary 
sector, and regional volumes).
The entire database is adopted every year by the KSH, 
which enables the Office to also provide data for certain 
international organisations, (e. g. ILO and OECD). The 
NGM earlier the NMH also regularly provides special 
analyses for the OECD.
The database containing the data by individual al-
lows for a) the analysis of data for groups of people de-
termined by any combination of pre-set criteria, b) the 
comparison of basic wages and earnings, with special 
regard to the composition of the different groups ana-
lysed, as well as c) the analysis of the dispersion of the 
basic wages and earnings.
Since 2002, the survey of individual wages and earn-
ings was substantially developed to fulfill all require-
ments of the EU, so from this time on it serves also for 
the purposes of the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), 
which is obligatory for each member state in every fourth 
year. One important element of the changes was the in-
clusion of part-time employees in the sample since 2002.
SES 2002 was the first, and recently the databases 
of SES 2006 and 2010 were also sent to the Eurostat in 
anonymized form in accordance with EU regulations.
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